The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "Just because you tell me a thing...............doesn't necessarily mean you are right"
Hi Sean,
that's why I have another good reason for not giving you any info anymore....therefore you are still here parroting Kennedy..... :lol:


Regarding the "shores of France" signal, repeated in clear, consistent words and with several interesting details in Tovey's letters (many more than the ones in the "redacted" parts you simply cut/past in your interventions; be at least careful when you do so, not to include again and again wrong info... :negative: ) for 11 years, IMO there are 2 options:
  • 1) the signal was sent in the evening of May 26, possibly deciphered by KGV only (it looks like you admit there can be a cipher code for the C.in.C. HF only.... :think: ), and later espunged from the very few subsequently redacted lists of signals available, as Pound told Tovey he was already doing in May 1941; or

    2) Tovey received the "Bay of Biscay" signal, correctly understood (not being dumb) what this was meaning (even W-W was able to understand precisely what the "intentions" signal on May 24 meant for him....); then, in 1950, he was simply misled by Churchill book and connected together this signal with the 1137/27 one
.
I personally think option 1) is more probable, but option 2) would basically change nothing.... Roskill could not find the "shores of France" signal and he did not confirm it as such, but he said he was unable to see the original message log of KGV and, mostly, he had not in his hands the text of the "Bay of Biscay" signal......
Kennedy, your favorite author, was initially sure that the May 26 signal was actually sent, but then, this time, he followed Roskill "caveat" about it and even misused it in his book, to lowly insinuate Tovey's memory failures (provoking Roskill "reaction" that you have seen several times here). :lol:


Bye, Alberto
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,
Regarding the "shores of France" signal, repeated in clear, consistent words and with several interesting details in Tovey's letters
However, despite repeating and being asked more than once to confirm this consistent wording, Tovey apparently neglects to say it was not actually this wording at all, but a Direct Order hidden as a cryptic clue in a weather forecast. That would be quite memorable- the stupidest signal ever sent, being camouflaged as a weather forecast. But he never mentioned the Bay of Biscay weather forecast. So we can discount option 2 as being fantasy.
the signal was sent in the evening of May 26, possibly deciphered by KGV only
Roskill surely realised as soon as Tovey described the "Shores of France" it was dynamite for his cause, denigrating Pound and Churchill's bullying power over him. It was vital to lay his hands on it. So he spent either the next ten or maybe twenty years looking for it, before admitting defeat and deliberately misrepresenting the 11:37B signal as being it, in Churchill and the Admirals in 1977. Although citation 36 references the 11:37 on the 27th correctly, his wording before the quote "When it seemed" is designed to suggest it happened shortly after the 18:00 notification of Tovey's plan to break off, not 18 hours later when it was actually transmitted.

Despite his vast experience of RN records, his huge number of contacts established from the War at Sea, undoubtedly including Brind and Paffard, Tovey's confidants aboard KG V, to whom he apparently divulged the secret of the CMDS threat, Roskill never found this signal. He devotes pages in the foreword to C and the A to demonstrating his ability as the supreme chronicler of the RN in WWII, and yet this piece of evidence, or even confirmation of its existence by those who stood beside Tovey as he reportedly laughed when he read it, eluded him. In citation 36 he references Kennedy. Of course Kennedy too had come to the conclusion that Tovey's memory of "Shores of France" was fantasy and made an accommodation in describing the message. Drafted but never sent on the 26th. Substantially altered and sent as recorded on the 27th.

So we can discount option 1 as being as laughable as option 2. :lol:

Leaving option 3. Tovey misremembered things, just as Pafford told Kennedy, and both Roskill and Kennedy had worked out for themselves.

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: " But he never mentioned the Bay of Biscay weather forecast"
Hi Sean,
as I clearly said, Roskill did not have the "Bay of Biscay" signal, therefore he could not ask Tovey whether he was referring to it (implicitly mentioning the shores of France), having been misled by Churchill book in 1950.
Option 2) is still there.... :negative:

you wrote: "...misrepresenting the 11:37B signal... "
you insist to write about this signal NOT having the full text of the Tovey's letters to Roskill. Roskill could NOT discount Tovey detailed account of the situation at the time he received the order to pursue Bismarck "up to the shores of France"..... :negative:
When you will have it, you will see why Roskill, even admitting the signal could not be found, was not in a position to ignore Tovey version, not having found the original message log of KGV. This is for option 1).


Option 3) is interesting, being however in contrast with a clear statement of Roskill, the official historian of the Royal Navy, about Tovey reliability and spirt. As I suggested you, please go on looking for evidences and then publish your own work to discredit Roskill as an historian...... good luck!


Bye, Alberto
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

You are, presumably, aware of Roskill's credentials as the author of War at Sea, and of Churchill and the Admirals and his unprecedented access to Admiralty records long before their official release date and yet you say:
as I clearly said, Roskill did not have the "Bay of Biscay" signal, therefore he could not ask Tovey whether he was referring to it
He did not "have". You "clearly said" he "did not have". This message appears in full in Wellings' book. Even an American has it.

What you mean is Roskill did not assign to it the ludicrous assumption that it was the direct order that Tovey kept misquoting as the "Shores of France".

With your unrivalled access (currently) to the Roskill material you will know whether Tovey ever mentioned the message the Admiralty and an eavesdropping Somerville actually record, the 11:37B. Receiving pretty much the same stupid message twice, the second time after the Bismarck was sunk, would surely be worthy of some comment? :D

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: " This message appears in full in Wellings' book. Even an American has it. "
Hi Sean,
have you seen the date of publication of Wellings book ? And the date of Roskill publications (and death) ? :kaput:


Roskill complained he was unable to see the original signal log of KGV....His unrivaled access to info failed to find the only original document that would have allowed to close the question (his words).

We have the text of the "Bay of Biscay" message (and not only this one, btw..... :shock: ) only thanks to Wellings, who kept his diary, with all limitations of an "unofficial" diary. Roskill would have surely understood that such a signal sent to Tovey only by the ACNS-H would have possibly explained the "shores of France" reference (as option 2), even if I personally still think that the May 26 message was sent to Tovey exactly with his referred words after his "uncautious" signal about the lack of fuel and his intention to give up the chase at midnight, with Churchill present in the War Room......that is option 1)


Bye, Alberto
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,
We have the text of the "Bay of Biscay" message (and not only this one, btw..... ) only thanks to Wellings
Yes after a bruising and economically devastating but successful war against Fascism, the UK did not have the resources to archive every bit of "Bumf" sent to the Royal Navy during the War. Especially obsolete weather forecasts.

The Bay of Biscay forecast is of no significance whatsoever, and so was not retained, although many less extraneous signals are still recorded in the listing Duncan provided. So Roskill indeed could not find a weather forecast, but then he wasn't looking for it, what he was looking for was the "Shores of France" message repeated so many times in Tovey's letters.

Once again you leave reality in the determination to promote your suppositions.
Roskill would have surely understood that such a signal sent to Tovey only by the ACNS-H would have possibly explained the "shores of France" reference
You have exagerrated for effect. In Wellings' signal list he lists only the first addressee, in many cases there may be ten or twenty ships and individuals copied. You cannot say this message was sent ONLY to Tovey. In fact, obviously, for Wellings to know its contents proves it was not sent ONLY to Tovey. "Even Wellings had it"

So you are left with imagining why a stupid signal would be sent only to Tovey in a secret code one day, and an almost equally stupid message would be sent the following day in a more generally accessible code. And why nobody that Grenfell, Schofield, Roskill or Kennedy interviewed remembers the former with the distinctive wording, "Shores of France". Apart from Tovey that is. 10-20 years later. Who never refers, apparently, to the 11:37B message which was actually sent.

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hi Sean,
I'm happy you were finally able to realize that Roskill could NOT have found the text of the "Bay of Biscay" signal..... :lol:

you wrote: "what he was looking for was the "Shores of France" message repeated so many times in Tovey's letters."
Since the Royal Navy was at sea at the age of sail, the Bay of Biscay means the shores of France !
Of course, had Roskill seen the weather forecast sent ONLY to Tovey as first addressee (see below) by ACNS-H instead of by the Meteorological Duty Officer, at 0213/17, as an exceptional issue compared to the usual 7 am and 7 pm, he would have asked Tovey whether he meant this signal.... :think:


you wrote: "In Wellings' signal list he lists only the first addressee"
Yes and no. The addresses are sometimes inconsistent between Wellings and the Admiralty file from Dunmunro, but this is not the case (in both sources the weather forecast is addressed to the C.in C. HF only).
However, you are wrong, in Wellings book, there are several signals with 2 or more addressees (see below some examples). The fact that everybody could read and decode the "Bay of Biscay" means nothing, as the ONLY addressee was Tovey, so, even if not coded for him only, the signal was for him only, as a quite clear reference to the "Shores of France", later associated to the towing signal due to Churchill book (option 2), or as a kind reminder of what had already be ordered, coded for him ONLY (being a direct order given in a very tough way), with the "Shores of France" towing signal, as Churchill and Tovey both wrote (option 1)..... :negative:


Bye, Alberto


Wellings_signal_2.jpg
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

I can't imagine how much time you wasted reading page after page of Welling's book to find maybe the only two out of hundreds of messages with dual addressees. We know that many of these messages had ten or twenty addresses. IF ACNS H chipped in with extra info for Tovey, who was about to undertake a major battle against Bismarck on the western margin of sea area Bay of Biscay, so what? You are certainly dedicated to peddling this stuff about hidden messages.
Since the Royal Navy was at sea at the age of sail, the Bay of Biscay means the shores of France !
Does the North Sea mean the shores of England, Denmark, Nederlands or Belgium?

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "I can't imagine how much time you wasted reading page after page of Welling's book to find maybe the only two out of hundreds of messages with dual addressees."
Hi Sean,
possibly it would have been a awful waste of time for you, unable to read documents and even books now....the time taken was just to copy and post them in order to counter another FALSE statement of you. The two signals I have posted are at pag.218 and 222 respectively. Just between them, there are other 5 signals sent to more then one addressee.....(have you noticed how much time took to me to find these 5 additional ones ?) :lol:
If you want many more, just ask and .... be my guest !

you wrote: "We know that many of these messages had ten or twenty addresses"
MISLEADING ! You only know, nobody has seen yet the list of the original addressees of these very messages we are speaking about !
Stop inventing things and speculating, the only (more or less reliable) lists we are speaking about are the Admiralty one (posted by Dunmunro) and Wellings one in his book....In both cases this signal has only ONE main addresse: Adm Tovey ! :stop:




RE. ACNS-H sending himself (I guess ACNS-H role was not meteorological duty officer....) a signal addressing it to Tovey only (please demonstrate the contrary or shut up...) and transmitting it totally out of the usual forecast transmission timings, when another previous weather forecast message had already been issued, covering a reasonable area of 200 sm, still valid up to 7:00 am on May 27, it is VERY CLEAR what "Bay of Biscay" (400 to 500 sm distant) meant for Tovey. :stubborn:


Bye, Alberto
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Herr Nilsson »

From the sources presented here only admiralty knew the different originators of her own various signals. For all others it was just "Admiralty". So there was no difference between ACNS-H and the Meteorological Duty Officer for the recipients.
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Marc

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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

Once again, on reading back, Antonio has given some of your withheld information away.
only after having unsuccesfully done those 2 researches Stephen Roskill told Sir L. Kennedy, ... which was still convinced of the existence of the 26th of May " shores of France " message, ... that probably that message was not existing otherwise he was thinking that he should have found a copy of it somewhere, ... and only at that point they started thinking about a possible different solution for the " KGV towing home " enigma.

I am still a step backward from the " final solution " S. Roskill and Sir L. Kennedy proposed for this enigma.

Having both Churchill and Tovey clear inputs about it, ... I personally still think we need to try to realize more about it.
This was Antonio on the 10th Feb My underlinings.

This indicates Roskill after several letters and all those charming conversations with Tovey "suspected" the "Shores of France" message never existed. These two men interviewed a huge number of potential witnesses including at the Admiralty and aboard the KG V and at the end concluded the
message was not existing
.

So now we come to the "Final Solution" adopted. Well actually two completely different ones.

Which was in Kennedy's case to say a message, which may have included IMHO the signature phrase "Shores of France", was drafted , but never sent on the 26th. That a not dissimilar message, starting "We cannot visualise...." was composed and sent on the 27th at 11:37B.

In Roskill's case he is less straightforward and as I have described before artfully fudges things to quote the 11:37B wording but presents it as if it follows immediately after Tovey's announcement on the 26th he will give up the chase at midnight, whereas it actually happens 18 hours later after Bismarck is sunk.

Hello Antonio,

Are you still a
step backward
from accepting what these two authors accepted? Namely that the "Shores of France" whoever it was addressed to and encoded in whatever matter, never was transmitted?

We could come to a rapprochment. Yes there was a draft, and when Tovey complained on the phone about the stupid 11:37B he was told it could have been much worse and Pound related to him the details of the unsent draft he had successfully stopped being transmitted, despite Churchill thinking it had been. Tovey was so outraged by this even stupider message it drove the real message out of his memory and all he could remember 10 years later was "Shores of France" which he kept on repeating ad nauseam. This is what celebrated investigative journalist Kennedy describes and provides corroberative evidence for via Paffard.

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "Are you still a step backward from accepting what these two authors accepted? Namely that the "Shores of France" whoever it was addressed to and encoded in whatever matter, never was transmitted? "
Hi Sean,
at least you moved one step forward, implicitly admitting you were totally wrong with the single addressee in Wellings book signals.... however,
"are you still a step backward from accepting" that none of two authors could have in his hands the text of the "Bay of Biscay" signal ?

Roskill was inclined to think that the "shores of France" signal was not sent on May 26, BUT he wrote that the matter could have been closed ONLY by looking into the original signal log of KGV, that he could not see.


"We could come to a rapprochment. ...This is what celebrated investigative journalist Kennedy describes and provides corroberative evidence for via Paffard...."
Don't even try to re-propose this after having seen yourself how many errors Kennedy did (e.g. while simply reading and referring to the letters that Roskill kindly provided him.....) :negative:
Re. Paffard, Roskill provided a very clear statement, demolishing his insinuations. I will not post it again here, but please refresh your memory.



The two most probable options are still:
1) the "shores of France" towing signal was actually sent sometimes in the evening of May 26, as Churchill and Tovey wrote in clear, being coded for Tovey only, and later espunged from the records (as Pound himself said to Tovey that he was already doing, during the phone call). The "Bay of Biscay" at 0213/27 was a "kind reminder" of what was expected by the Admiralty from him. The 1137/27 signal was in this case not even "noticed" by Tovey, who was already in a "strong" position, having sunk Bismarck.

2) the "Bay of Biscay" weather forecast, addressed to Tovey ONLY from the Admiralty at 0231/27, transmitted totally out of the usual forecast transmission timings, when another previous weather forecast message had already been made available (covering a more reasonable area of 200 sm), still valid up to 7:00 am on May 27, meant for Tovey (correctly): "you have to go up to the shores of France" to pursue Bismarck. We know now that this message was sent by ACNS-H, confirming Tovey "intuition" about what the message meant for him. Then, he was misled by Churchill account and associated this with the 1137/27 towing signal, received after the sinking of Bismarck and making explicit the expectations of the Admiralty.


I would add that your proposed option (as well as option 2 for this aspect, this is why option 1 is my favorite) does not seem very likely, not only for the reasons I already said, but because Tovey (in the letter from 1954) is very detailed about the situation in which he was when he received the "shores of France" towing message, timing it clearly to the evening of May 26, BEFORE Bismarck got crippled, as logical reaction of a "dreadfully difficult master" like Churchill to his 1821/26 message, about his intention to give up the chase at midnight.


Bye, Alberto
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by wadinga »

Hello Alberto,

Since you have plenty of time on your hands maybe you count the number of multiple addressee messages versus single addressee?

Then consider that both Duncan's list and the Wellings book only list significant addressees because when there are ten or twenty they only list the top ones.

Do you accept that Roskill's notes (which you will not detail) say he concluded the "Shores of France" message did not exist?

All the best

wadinga
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote: "Since you have plenty of time on your hands maybe you count the number of multiple addressee messages versus single addressee? "
Quite few but they are there and, since you have already wasted my time until now with your incorrect statements, please do it yourself ! :negative:

you wrote: "Do you accept that Roskill's notes (which you will not detail) say he concluded the "Shores of France" message did not exist? "
No, I don't.
I have written: "Roskill was inclined to think that the "shores of France" signal was not sent on May 26, BUT he wrote that the matter could have been closed ONLY by looking into the original signal log of KGV, that he could not see."
Bye, Alberto
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Re: The KGV and Adm fuel signals on May 26 and 27.

Post by Herr Nilsson »

2115/1/4/41 CinC Home Fleet from Admiralty 1930/1;
'Situation at Brest necessitates our maximum effort being disposed in best manner to engage the two German battle cruisers should they leave harbour. HOOD, NIGERIA and FIJI leave Bay of Biscay area on 4/4/41 to refuel in United Kingdom. REPULSE and FURIOUS leave Gibraltar on about 4/4/41 for United Kingdom. Submarines on Bay of Biscay patrol will require to be withdrawn on 5/4/41. It is requested you will sail KING GEORGE V with such cruisers as you think fit in company to the area in which HOOD has recently been operating'
:wink:
Regards

Marc

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