The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

[Herr Nilsson]

Well, that means Lütjens was a coward, too. He withdrew from the fight and did not chase PoW.

Edit: I forgot to mention his lack of "utmost exertion".

[dunmunro]

Captains were not permitted to throw away their commands either:

25. Every Person subject to this Act who shall either designedly or negligently or by any Default lose, strand, or hazard, or suffer to be lost, stranded, or hazarded, any Ship of Her Majesty or in Her Majesty's Service, shall be dismissed from Her Majesty's Service, with Disgrace, or suffer such other Punishment as is herein-after mentioned.

And the Fighting Instructions gave captains the initiative to act sensibly:

FIGHTING THE ENEMY
1. This can only be achieved by a strong offensive spirit and by bold and correct tactical handling of the units engaged. Engagement with a greatly superior force does not constitute sound tactics unless there is some vital object to be achieved by so doing. Once in action, Flag Officers and Captains should concentrate on pressing the enemy and not be influenced by the possible damage their ships may receive.

INITIATIVE
2. The varying and unforeseen circumstances which always arise in action demand the display of initiative by all concerned. Captains, whenever they find themselves without specific directions during an action or are faced with unforeseen circumstances which render previous orders inapplicable, must act as their judgement dictates to further their Admiral's wishes. Care should be taken when framing instructions, that these are not of too rigid a nature.

MUTUAL SUPPORT
3. In the past the unfailing support given by one British ship to another in battle has contributed largely to success in action. To-day the same mutual support must be given and expected between all classes of ships. The fact that it is often the duty of heavy ships to give support to small ships should not be forgotten.

LOSS OF SHIPS
4. War at sea cannot be waged successfully without risking the loss of ships. Before any specific operations can be undertaken, consideration must be given to the losses that may be expected. Should the object to be achieved justify a reasonable loss of ships, the fact that such losses may occur should be no deterrent to the carrying out of the operation.

MAINTENANCE OF TOUCH WITH THE ENEMY
5. It is the duty of any ship or aircraft which gains touch with the enemy to retain it. Ships should not normally, however, expose themselves to such disablement as would render them incapable of reporting the enemy's movements. In the event of losing touch or being driven off, endeavour should be made to regain touch as soon as possible.

6. Very good reasons should exist before touch with an enemy is relinquished. If an order from a Senior Officer is received, compliance with which will result in losing touch with the enemy, the possibility of the authority concerned not being in full possession of the facts must be considered.

After Holland's death W-W was in command and he was bound by Tovey's wish to bring about a superior concentration of forces, which could only be achieved according to his role in shadowing and reporting Bismarck's position:
http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... ectIV.html

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

I am not aware of any discipline action or inquiry or request for better explanations being asked to Adm Lutjens ?

Do You have any evidence about it ? I do not ?

I am aware of something being asked by VizeAdm Schmundt to Kpt Brinkmann, and on this purpose I have explained it on a dedicated thread on this forum :

http://www.kbismarck.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8285

I have nor received any " hooligan/deniers " counter attack about it by Kriegsmarine supporters as you can verify yourself.

Now the question here are :

1) Why on a similar event involving 2 Royal Navy Officers directly requested by The Royal Navy First Sea Lord Adm Pound to the C in C Home Fleet Adm Tovey there is so much reluctance to accept the simple fact that it did happen, since it is proven and properly documented now. Why ?

2) Why there is the same reluctance to accept the fact that the same 2 Officers few months later have been rewarded with medals. Why ?

3) Why everybody does not like to admit and accept that the above rewarding process was enabled solely by the intentional written lies on the dispatches delivered by Adm Tovey and accepted in writings by the Admiralty ( Sir Barnes letter ). Why ?

The above 3 questions only have a single answer and we do know the answer in full details now.

So, why some persons here in are not willing to simply accept it since everything is so well demonstrated ? Why ?

Bye Antonio

[Herr Nilsson]

@Antonio

The point is that we "deniers" are reproached with not having worn an officer's uniform

...the "deniers" (nobody among them ever wearing an officer uniform ) ...

(forgetting

Note : Be careful about others curriculum, experience and skills, ... because they can have both the ones you listed above and until you know them personally really well enough, ... you cannot realize at what level they have it too.

.)

Anyway, I suppose Lütjens was wearing an officer's uniform. So why he did not use his utmost Exertion to bring his ship into Action, why he withdrew improperly in Time of Action from the Fight and why he forbore to pursue the Chase of any Enemy?

[Alberto Virtuani]

Herr Nilsson wrote: "I suppose Lütjens was wearing an officer's uniform"

Hi Marc,
which were the explicit orders for Lutjens ? Are you aware of similar orders given by the Admiralty to Leach and/or Wake-Walker for the Bismarck Operation ?

Regarding the aspect of "wearing a uniform", this is reproached to the ones who say that "an officer honor is a luxury for peacetime" or other nonsense like this, because this demonstrate only how they are totally unable to understand military things, possibly they can play statistic simulations and wargames ONLY....




I'm anyway very happy to see that someone is finally accepting the "Articles of War" as the disciplinary rules reference in 1941 (and not the pretended "King's Regulations", proposed by an insulting hooligan just to refuse to admit he was simply wrong since 2013)

Dunmunro wrote: "Captains were not permitted to throw away their commands either:

25. Every Person subject to this Act who shall either designedly or negligently or by any Default lose, strand, or hazard, or suffer to be lost, stranded, or hazarded, any Ship of Her Majesty or in Her Majesty's Service, shall be dismissed from Her Majesty's Service, with Disgrace, or suffer such other Punishment as is herein-after mentioned."

I think the quotation is wrong, as article is n.29 (NDA 1866) and not 25. http://www.pdavis.nl/NDA1866.htm

This offense is under the section "miscellaneous offenses", not under "misconduct in the presence of the enemy" and this offense is MUCH less serious than the "misconduct" ones, as evident from the punishment severity...
I was taught that it is better to risk a failure trying to do something against the enemy than to risk the blame for having done nothing, because usually the superiors are much more indulgent in the first case.
However, I agree that this is something the judges would have taken into account, had a serious inquiry and a subsequent Court Martial been held, instead of the decision to go for a "sugar-coating" of the otherwise militarily poor part of the story.



Bye, Alberto

[Herr Nilsson]

Herr Nilsson wrote: "I suppose Lütjens was wearing an officer's uniform"

Hi Marc,
which were the explicit orders for Lutjens ? Are you aware of similar orders given by the Admiralty to Leach and/or Wake-Walker ?

Do you know Leach's and Wake-Walker's orders? Do you? Do you?

I'm anyway very happy to see that someone is finally accepting the "Articles of War" as the disciplinary rules reference in 1941 (and not the pretended "King's Regulations", proposed by an insulting hooligan)

So once again you misinterpret the meaning of my words intentionally.

[pgollin]

.

Oh dear - first you tried to claim that "The Articles of War" were what matter - but you were shown that you were wrong.

Now, you claim that the HDA is the be all and end all, but you have been shown that the HDA is only part of the story - you need the relevant "King's Regulations", but because you can't find them you try to claim that they are unimportant.

You just keep demonstrating you ignorance and any competent editor will find you out.

(By the way, you seem proud of having served for only 18 months, in a navy (or was that army) where you didn't learn even the basics of maritime navigation - why should anyone be impressed with that ? )

.


.

[northcape]

The point is that we "deniers" are reproached with not having worn an officer's uniform

...the "deniers" (nobody among them ever wearing an officer uniform ) ...

Well, some people are just happy with an uniform or any other tag as a replacement for knowledge or critical thinking. If you have come that far, you truly have hit rock-bottom.

[northcape]

Hello everybody,

We have seen how the disciplinary rules ("Articles of War") in force in 1941 were the ones from NDA 1866 (http://www.pdavis.nl/NDA1866.htm) and they were still almost the same even in 1957 (http://www.pdavis.nl/NDA1957.htm), as logical.
The relevant "Articles" for Leach (underlined in red) and Wake-Walker (underlined in green) are IMO n.2 and 3, from the section "misconduct in the presence of the enemy":


Articles_2_3.jpg



Bye, Alberto

I really cannot believe that somebody thinks these ancient rules had any relevance for any of the the people involved in fighting the ocean war in 1939-1945. In what kind of fantasy world do you have to live to think that somebody even bothered about this in these circumstances? Only if you have plenty of time and idleness, then you would bother about this. But this only applies to two obviously very bored persons in 2018, but defintely not to real soldiers with real duties in 1941.

And I see they already sorted out the specific verdicts for WW and Leach - hillarious! I suggest to get a time machine, travel back to 1941, and make it clear once for all for all the stupid wrong-doers and cover-up-agents. They for sure will greet you with delight, and spend their time with you to get convinced.

[dunmunro]

I really cannot believe that somebody thinks these ancient rules had any relevance for any of the the people involved in fighting the ocean war in 1939-1945. In what kind of fantasy world do you have to live to think that somebody even bothered about this in these circumstances? Only if you have plenty of time and idleness, then you would bother about this. But this only applies to two obviously very bored persons in 2018, but defintely not to real soldiers with real duties in 1941.

And I see they already sorted out the specific verdicts for WW and Leach - hillarious! I suggest to get a time machine, travel back to 1941, and make it clear once for all for all the stupid wrong-doers and cover-up-agents. They for sure will greet you with delight, and spend their time with you to get convinced.

Of course these rules have no relevance to WW2 naval battles and if applied universally, to the same standard as A/A would would apply to Leach and W-W, then the history books would record dozens of RMI, KM and IJN admirals and captains as having been tried and convicted on similar grounds.

As the Fighting Instructions make clear COs were fight intelligently, on a cost-benefit basis, in order to inflict the maximum damage on the enemy at least cost to the RN. 2ndly, COs had to balance the strategic and geopolitical costs of their actions as well and Leach, for example, was well aware of the importance of preserving PoW, due to the RN's overall strategic and geopolitical position. 3rdly, the Fighting Instructions themselves were written when the RN had a great preponderance of strength over any single opponent, but by May 1941 the RN was facing a greatly altered balance of forces than that envisaged by the authors of the Fighting Instructions.

[Algonquin-R17]

Sir Frederic Wake-Walker
The Third Sea Lord. January 1944, Admiralty. Vice Admiral Sir W Frederic Wake-walker, Kcb, Cbe, Third Sea Lord and Controller. A23581.jpg
Wake-Walker when Third Sea Lord - January 1944
Birth name William Frederic Wake-Walker
Born 24 March 1888
Died 24 September 1945 (aged 57)
London, England
Allegiance United Kingdom
Service/branch Royal Navy
Years of service 1903–1945
Rank Admiral
Battles/wars Operation Dynamo
Battle of the Denmark Strait
Last battle of the battleship Bismarck


and,


John Catterall Leach
Captain J C Leach.jpg
Captain John Leach on the deck of HMS Prince of Wales in 1941
Born 1 September 1894
Died 10 December 1941 (aged 47)
HMS Prince of Wales, South China Sea, near Kuantan, Malaysia
Allegiance United Kingdom
Service/branch Royal Navy
Years of service 1907–1941
Rank Captain
Commands held HMS Prince of Wales (1941)
HMS Cumberland (1936–38)
Battles/wars
First World War
Second World War

Denmark Strait
Sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse †
Awards Distinguished Service Order
Member of the Royal Victorian Order
Relations Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach (son)

Take note of the years in service.

Sir Fredrick Wake Walker 42 years, Captain J C Leach 34 years, and let us not forget that both men DIED IN HARNESS.

I cannot appreciate the courage and resolve of these British Officers who held the lives of so many young men in their hands under such conditions and facing such formidable German foes in conditions of war not peace. Let's not hear anymore about how 18 months of peace time service in the Italian Navy affords anyone a better perspective or capability to judge the sentencing these Officers as cowards than those who have not served.

Pure, incontrovertible facts are necessary for such a statement. So far you have nothing, otherwise there would be no dispute.

Bob

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,

as anyone can see from the above posts, full of personal attacks ( ), the "deniers" and the "hooligans" have no way to counter the demonstrated FACTS:

1) The "Misconduct" Articles of War contained in the 1866 NDA (http://www.pdavis.nl/NDA1866.htm) were still in force in 1941 and almost unchanged even after 1957 (King's Regs are irrelevant in this discussion).
2) Instead of holding an Inquiry and/or a Court Martial, the poor part of the story was sugar-coated with intentionally false declarations (e.g. Tovey's despatches point 17 and 19 or Pinchin's Plot).
3) Tovey letters (1941 and 1961) describe very well the mood at the end of May 1941 (following Churchill and Pound statements) and explain the consequent reports "preparation" to sell a different, better story (process ended as per ADM 205/10).
4) No alternative battlemap has been presented here to counter Antonio's reconstruction, that nails all the timid officers to their responsibilities during the battle.





@Herr Nilsson:
2 quick answers to your points: 1) we all know the orders for Lutjens not to engage battleships in order to accomplish a different mission, we don't have here the British orders (that were usually much less"cautionary" than German ones....) but they were aimed to prevent Bismarck from her mission. Therefore your observation re.Lutjens is not pertinent.

2) "Someone" was Mr.Dunmunro who correctly mentioned the NDA article 29, not you, I hope for you that you never supported the thesis of the poorly educated guy who tried (without providing any evidence) to say that the King's Regs were the reference for the "misconduct in the presence of the enemy" disciplinary rules....


Bye, Alberto

[HMSVF]

Afternoon all.

1) The "Misconduct" Articles of War contained in the 1866 NDA (http://www.pdavis.nl/NDA1866.htm) were still in force in 1941 and almost unchanged even after 1957 (King's Regs are irrelevant in this discussion).

It appears that there were several versions between 1913 and 1957. The good news is that I found a link. The bad news is that they are not exactly numerous and the nearest copy seems to be at The National Maritime Museum in Greenwich...

http://www.worldcat.org/title/kings-reg ... sView=true

2) Instead of holding an Inquiry and/or a Court Martial, the poor part of the story was sugar-coated with intentionally false declarations (e.g. Tovey's despatches point 17 and 19 or Pinchin's Plot).

This is interpretation.

3) Tovey letters (1941 and 1961) describe very well the mood at the end of May 1941 (following Churchill and Pound statements) and explain the consequent reports "preparation" to sell a different, better story (process ended as per ADM 205/10).

Again this interpretation and certainly the Tovey letters of 1961 should be treated with a degree suspicion as the were 20 years after the event.

4) No alternative battlemap has been presented here to counter Antonio's reconstruction, that nails all the timid officers to their responsibilities during the battle.

But what would be the point? We have had a world renowned expert (and cartologist to boot) say that for various reasons an accurate map cannot be produced.It would like asking us to produce our own perpetual motion machine. You may have made one, but it doesnt/cannot work. So asking the rest of us to make our own is a bit pointless.


Best wishes


HMSVF

[wadinga]

Hello All,

Alberto has done very well to discover that the archaic wording was nostalgically passed on to the new 1957 "Nuclear Age" version of the NDA, and therefore may have been on the statute books in 1941, but that it beside the point. I have already supplied that part where they discussed other nostalgic wording:

We are particularly sad to repeal Section 44, which contains these time-honoured words: … punished according to the laws and customs in such cases used at sea.

Giving a great deal of latitude to those imposing punishment, with this Article of the NDA approved by Parliament providing authorisation and protection for those applying unspecified punishments for unspecified offences.

As we have seen, from another, earlier, Parliamentary discussion, flogging was still officially endorsed by statute into the 20th Century, but it was precluded by Admiralty Order. They simply overruled certain aspects of the NDA.

It would appear that, from the listing of Court Martials in WW II, nobody was ever subject to these charges of 2, 3 and 4 in World War II.

2) Instead of holding an Inquiry and/or a Court Martial, the poor part of the story was sugar-coated with intentionally false declarations (e.g. Tovey's despatches point 17 and 19 or Pinchin's Plot).
This is interpretation.

No I'm afraid it is intuition. The interpretation is generated subsequently to align precisely with the pre-existing intuition. Facts are changed, facts are left out.


The same is true of the battle-map and timeline. Precious few bearings are shuffled about in location and time to provide the required picture. Those which don't are supressed. Anonymous splashes are identified definitively as particular salvoes precise to the second, solely to fit the required answer. Alternative explanations are dismissed with insults and derogatory remarks about "education" or demands for alternatives, of which there could be hundreds.

But what would be the point?

The objective is to out-Cernuschi Cernuschi in fabricating and gaining acceptance for a story denigrating the Royal Navy in general and certain unfortunate officers in particular. There are many who secretly harbour grudges against the Allied cause and a feeling that "winners" tell only their version of the truth. For these avid potential consumers these fabrications are "tailor-made" because they share the intuitions of the fabricators.

All the best

wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nillson,

thanks for having underlined that here in this forum we have a lot ( apparently ) of persons writing about military arguments that never wear an uniform and pretend to explain to the ones having done it, ... even being Officers, ... what are the usual way to do things into a military environment.

This alone defines quite well the level of this discussion, ... between some ignorant ( I mean they ignore ) and better qualified persons of course.

Anyway, the Adm Lutjens orders were clear and we know them, ... unfortunately we do not have the same luck about the Royal Navy ones ( ) that like many other documents about this battle ( an evident Royal Navy defeat ) simply disappeared, ... guess why ?

However, once again I have to remind you and all the other " deniers " that it was not our invention the May 28th, 1941 letter from Adm Pound to Adm Tovey asking him to call a Board of Inquiry on the conduct while in action for RearAdm W.F. Wake-Walker and Capt J. C. Leach.

It was the Royal Navy First Sea Lord to ask the Commander in Chief of the Home Fleet to do it.

Put this concept clearly in your mind, ... it is a fact.

Did you got the point, ... apparently you did not, ... but it has been done, ... for real on May 1941, ... and it is an irrefutable fact.

Like it or not that was a start of a discipline action, ... and not a rewarding proposal.

Is it so difficult for you all to realize it and admit that it did happen ?

Apparently it is, ... and this defines with whom we are talking to, ... reference the above first statement, ... probably you know very little about the meaning of such a request at that level.

Neither it was an help for you Stephen Roskill, ... Corelli-Barnett ... or lately Graham Rhys-Jones, ... explaining to you what happened.

It is simply incredible that after all those evidence, ... there are still " deniers ", ... about this fact.

Anyway, the truth is out now, ... available for everybody.

Bye Antonio