Could Vichy have saved Bismarck?

[José M. Rico]

This topic has been moved here from the old forum. Feel free to continue the discussion.
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26 Aug 2004 15:37:41 - Patrick McWilliams

I came across this very interesting record in the "Führer's Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1941" (London, Admiralty, 1947), pp 137-38.

On 3 Dec. 1941, Admiral Schultze of the Kriegsmarine in Paris met with Admiral J-F Darlan, second in command of the Vichy government, to discuss a possible "naval hotline" between the two. Soon after, Schultze sent the following memorandum to Raeder.

"Based on his [Darlan's] co-operation with the British Admiralty, he had a very well-informed intelligence service and was in a position and willing to supply the German Naval War Staff with valuable information on British ships' movements and intentions. So, for example, in the case of the Bismarck he had had knowledge of the positions and intentions of the British forces at the time when it would have been possible for Bismarck to avoid destruction by escaping to the north-east".

Darlan is often thought of as a collaborator. He was certainly an opportunist, as he later joined the Allies, but in 1941 he was sucking up to the Germans, believing that they would win the war, and met Hitler (on 11 May 1941). His activities led to his assassination at Christmas 1942.

It is clear that Darlan was no friend of the British, due in part to the actions of the Royal Navy against the French fleet in June 1940. However, the important questions to be asked are:

(i) was his claim to have been aware of British ship dispositions against the Bismarck merely posturing to ingratiate himself with his German friends (of the time)?

(ii) if there is substance to these claims, what part of the pursuit was he referring to? Bismarck was under continuous, or near continuous, watch from 10.00 on 26 May, so would a turn to the north-east have brought her out of the range of Ark Royal's aircraft? I don't think so, and wouldn't it actually have closed the gap to KGV and Rodney?

The text, translated from German, mentions "avoiding destruction" (rather than, for example, "avoiding air attack"): to my mind this suggests a time near the end of the pursuit, when strong British forces had concentrated near Bismarck. However, I might be reading too much into this.

Much of this is speculation of course, but perhaps it introduces another angle to the Bismarck story.

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26 Aug 2004 17:46:58 - Tiornu

Darlan was a crafty fellow. His assassination and his position on the fence has made it very difficult to figure what exactly was going on in his mind, though there's little doubt he had a ceaseless drive to do what was best for his navy and his nation.
The French navy often supplied intelligence on British ship movements in the Mediterranean after getting backstabbed by the British. Whether or not Darlan had specific information in this case, I cannot say.

[Robert J. Winklareth]

Hi Jose,

A very interesting topic. I doubt very seriously that the British would have shared any information on British warship deployments with Vichy Franch, or even with the French Navy before the fall of France unless of course it was absolutely necessary. There was no need to, and you always wanted to avoid that information from being compromised.

Even if the Bismarck had information on British naval movements against her, there was very little she could have done about it. With her fuel situation being critical, it was necessary for the Bismarck to continue to head for St. Nazaire as best she could.

Once the Bismarck had been located by the RAF Catalina flying boat, she could no longer avoid detection. The lucky torpedo hit during the subsequent Swordfish attack from the Ark Royal kept the Bismarck from reaching her goal and finally sealed her fate.

It is hard to imagine what else Vichy France could have done to assist the Bismarck. The German's themselves were in charge of the northern and western coastal areas of France, and fleet units at Toulon were in no position to intervene even if they were so inclined, and they certainly were not.

I would be interested in any further comments by others.

Bob.

[ostriker]

The fact that French could have give a hand to German during the Operation Rheinübung was never proved, it is only a supposition . Some people also told that the French Battleship Richelieu coud leave Dakar to support Bismarck during his escape to brest. Curiously, these people forget that Richelieu had 3 guns ruined and one propeller shaft sealed.

[nwhdarkwolf]

Didn't the British know the plans of Bismarck? I'm struggling to place the exact year that Bletchly Park cracked Enigma.

[RF]

Didn't the British know the plans of Bismarck? I'm struggling to place the exact year that Bletchly Park cracked Enigma.

The first effective Enigma decodes were for Operation Juno. The information from the decodes was not acted upon, however the sinking of Glorious which in part resulted from that inaction, plus the fact that Marschall only missed Devonshire by about 80 miles while Devonshire had the King of Norway on board, changed the British atitude, so that the decodes were acted upon.

[wadinga]

RF,
Sorry but I think you will find there were no useful decodes for Juno in 1940. Harry Hinsley of Bletchley Park makes it clear that it was radio traffic analysis only which indicated a foray by S & G was imminent, and this techniques' value was recognised when it was proved correct.

Useful naval Enigma decodes mainly started in 1941.

All the Best
wadinga

[RF]

Yes, you are right Wadinga. It was the capture of enigma rotors from German weather ships that enabled the actual decodes.
But as you say the experience from Operation Juno pointed the way.