Stern section of the Bismarck - question

[George Elder]

Randy:

Why not inculde the full sentense I used -- as you are so keen to do when you quote people correctly? But what are we to think of the following regarding US welding:

By early the next morning Rear Admiral Joseph J. Clark's Task Group 38.1, of which USS Pittsburgh was a member, was enveloped by the storm. Ships were rolling heavily in the high wind and waves and, despite changing course and reducing speed, most received damage. Just before 6AM on 5 June, the floatplane on Pittsburgh's port catapult was blown off. About a half-hour later the cruiser was hit by two very large waves and her bow broke away in front of her forward gun turret. Fortunately, as a precaution all watertight bulkheads had been closed and the crew sent to battle stations, so no lives were lost in the incident. Prompt work by damage control parties prevented any significant flooding and the ship was able to ride out the rest of the storm by keeping her stern into the wind.

After the typhoon had passed, Pittsburgh made her way to Guam, arriving on 10 June. The shortened cruiser was fitted there with a temporary "stub" bow, similar to those used on the torpedoed cruisers Minneapolis and New Orleans during the Guadalcanal Campaign. This work, made possible by the extensive repair facilities the Navy maintained near the combat zone, was completed in about two weeks. Pittsburgh was then able to steam safely across the Pacific to the West Coast, where a new bow was made and attached.

Meanwhile Pittsburgh's original bow was still afloat. Between 6 and 11 June the fleet tug Munsee (ATF-107), assisted late in the operation by her sister ship Patana (ATF-108), slowly towed the more than 100-foot long structure to Guam, where salvage work was undertaken.

The loss of Pittsburgh's bow, as well as less severe structural damage suffered by the heavy cruiser Baltimore and the light cruiser Duluth, dramatically demonstrated both the power of nature and the sometimes unreliable strength of contemporary welding. The latter problem, which resulted from both a not-completely-mature technology and the pressures of wartime production, was one that reared its ugly head from time to time on other war-built ships, both during and after the conflict.

Could the author be wrong?

George

[Randy Stone]

George:

Randy:

Why not inculde the full sentense I used -- as you are so keen to do when you quote people correctly? George

What sentence are you talking about ?

Randy

[Randy Stone]

...you appear to have confused yourself with your own arguments.

I pointed out that it was fair to consider the USN as ahead of the pack regarding the development of DP secondary armament -- an event, as we have seen, which began around late '28.

Your initial response, that "DP batteries didn't really become viable AA tools until the fuzing issue was addressed..." (1-03-05/4:37pm) appears to be a hasty retort designed to avoid conceding the obvious, for reasons which escape me. I challenged your assertion for some manner of justification even though your statement was irrelevant to the original observation. No justification was ever forthcoming.

Following this, you then shifted your position to the assertion, "...that early war AA was found wanting..." (1-04-05/3:43am). In effect, a non answer to an unasserted point. Of course, one can make a reasonable assertion that early war AA was found wanting but that was not your original statement, much less anywhere near what I had stated.

Next you sought a quick departure by commenting that you "...understand why..." I didn't "...want to address...the VT issue and the changes it made in AA effectiveness..." (1-04-05/2:07am) and further suggested that I "...read a few texts..." (1-05-05/4:06pm), once again writing as if fuzing was the topic of discussion.

Finally, you wrote that "The VT issue is much ado about nothing." (1-07-05/12:51am), which raises the immediate question as to why you made such a big issue about it in the first place !

However, that was then and this is now.

I agree with Bill that a DP armament system represents a distinct advantage over dual sets of SP weapons for the reasons he sets out as well as others, not least of which includes the logistics train, manning and training requirements.

With regard to the qualities regarding DP AA, you appear quite unaware of the capability of the AA shield deployed by the US Fleet during the prewar years. And while, as I agreed with you above, the USN would have preferred a more leakproof system, there is little doubt that farsighted development policies led to a first class system which -- even at the beginning of the Pacific War and throughout 1942 -- provided an envelope of protection over the fleet which was exceptionally stout by any reasonable standard.

Consequently, I have to reject your contention that until the advent of VT fuse, the DP AA gun (or its associated control systems) was not viable -- which is to say, it didn't function. Obviously, such a position could scarcely be further from the truth.

As a minor aside, I would point out that timed ammunition would have the advantage, at least during the day, of announcing itself to the enemy; intimidating attacking aircraft is no small part of an anti-aircraft defense

All that said, as Bill pointed out, although it is difficult to accurately model how much better a USN type AA armament would have suited Bismarck but combined with lighter AA the USN had also developed, such as the 1.1" quad, there would have been a great deal more metal through which attacking aircraft would have had to fly.

Randy

[Randy Stone]

Could the author be wrong?

George

What author are you referring to ?

Randy

[George Elder]

What was it that you said about arguing with the facts? Ho, ho, ho... you can argue what "not viable" is until the cows come home, but rather than it being "non functional", as you seert, I suggest you consider less than effective or ineffective -- as in the Iowa's external splinter belt not being a viable means of protecting the waterplane from damage from even light guns. You see, your carping falls apart completely when we abandon the black/white assumptions you tend to use. Then you have to waste words explaining what "is" is, and all the rest -- which is a waste of everyone's time.
What you should have noticed is that MR. K seems to indicate it was quite common for cruiser sterns to suffer cracks and structural failures following torpedo hits aft, and to lose their bows following hits forward -- although I don't think to many German cruisers were found to fall in that catagory with regard to bow hits. Thus, it seems what was claimed to be endemic in the German navy may have been endemic to all navies with regard to cruisers -- QED.
Now, with regard to the structural integrety and welding issues, I not that you simply do want to addess the statement above regarding bow damage: Please see this link:

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-u ... ca72-l.htm

This is the USN Historical Center, and the passage reads:

"The loss of Pittsburgh's bow, as well as less severe structural damage suffered by the heavy cruiser Baltimore and the light cruiser Duluth, dramatically demonstrated both the power of nature and the sometimes unreliable strength of contemporary welding. The latter problem, which resulted from both a not-completely-mature technology and the pressures of wartime production, was one that reared its ugly head from time to time on other war-built ships, both during and after the conflict."

So, do you agree with this bit from the USN Hsitorical Center? If so, then it seems to me that poor welding was also endemic -- and thus why should the German's be chastizes for a proplem that was universal during WWII? Gosh, I think we have another QED in the making.

George, smiling broadly

[phil gollin]

As a matter of interest AND IRRESPECTIVE OF "RACE CREED OR COLOUR" is there any particular reason that bows are (OR AREN'T) particularly vulnerable ?

I can think of factors that might affect their strength, are any of these valid or not particularly valid ?

1: "Thinness/fineness" - i.e. whilst the hull section is stilldeep, the shape of the bow reduces the overall structural strength of the structure.

2: Any sort of cantilever effect, the bow being the end of the hull might mean that any explosion stresses it more than a hit on the hull proper

3: Any discontinuity effect that there might be due to either the first thick, or armoured, bulkhead ahead of the magazines/shell rooms. (By discontinuity I don't just mean a structura discontinuityl, but also the stiffness difference in front of and behind the bulkhead)

4: Likewise any discontinuity associated with the start of the side armour or magazine splinter protection (and again "stiffness" differences)

5: what effect would the intended strength of the bow (i.e. bashing its way longitudanally through the waves) have relative to its sideways strength.

Any views ?


(edited re. "stiffness"

[Randy Stone]

...out of embarassment, George ?

Now I am not too certain what connection there is between the Iowa's splinter belt and the efficacy of DP AA batteries but maybe you've discovered something here.

As for the term viable -- which my dictionary defines as not functional -- this is a term which you used and which I quoted at your own request.

If you now want to run away from your own words that is your choice. I am still mystified as to the position you assumed but perhaps you will get around to justifying it at some point.

My own view is that the categorical stances you assume from time to time are somewhat dubious, particularly when they are not supported by any evidence of record.

Randy

[Randy Stone]

...I would like to make a few comments at some point.

I think Phil, you have raised some fundamental and good questions. All are quite appropriate and have been addressed at length in, among other things, some of the documentation which Bill brought up just a bit earlier.

But now, pleasure awaits...

Randy

[Javier L.]

Wow!!!! I didn't know Pittsburgh lost her bow because of a storm! Well I think I read something about a storm but never saw photos of its consequences. Either the storm was a "gigantic-tsunami" or there was something wrong with her structural design because the damage seen in the photo is the kind of damage one would expect after a torpedo hit at least. Just compare this photo with that of Belgrano.

Photo Pittsburgh without bow.



Photo Belgrano without bow.


As I said before bows and sterns are particularly vulnerable to torpedoes but I didn't know they could be lost because of a strom!!! I agree with you George E. in this point (although sometimes I get lost with your "sermons"!).

Now, Just imagine the amount of critics that would fall on German warship construction design if any of the German cruisers in Norway had lost her bow in a heavy storm in the frozen waters of the Arctic!

Anyway, can someone guess what is the speed of Pittsburgh sailing under this circumstances?

Javier

[Bill Jurens]

In very brief summary, the loss of Pittsburgh's bow was attributed to a discontinuity in structural characteristics -- as I recall the keel aft of the break point was rivetted and the keel forward of the break point was welded -- and also due to poor quality welding and perhaps lack of maintenance and/or inspection. (corrosion was a problem).

Overall, the design of the bow seems to have been fine; I'm unaware of any other ship of this class receiving any significant reinforcement due to this incident, so I would guess that the primary difficulty really revolved around weld quality and/or execution rather than poor design per se. A few other ships, notably aircraft carriers, suffered bow damage during this particular storm which -- because many or all of the ships involved had been through more violent storms before -- suggests that a contributory factor may have been some resonance with the oncoming seas. The aircraft carrier flight decks which collapsed were reinforced -- apparently taking 'green water' over the bows was (pehaps quite legitimately) unforseen or seen as a minor threat -- and seem to have performed well thereafter. One offshoot of this, though somewhat delayed, was the installation of the so-called 'hurricane bow' on most of the Essex class.

Welding was a relatively new technology in the 40s and it's entirely to be expected that some failures would occur due to a variety of reasons as experience was gained. Without necessarily pointing to any designs in particular, it should be noted that poor design -- especially egregiously poor design -- might be considered to fall in a somewhat different category than poor execution, or design work which only experience might prove to be inadequate.

Bill Jurens

[George Elder]

Hi Randy:

You wrote..."As for the term viable -- which my dictionary defines as not functional -- this is a term which you used and which I quoted at your own request. "

Am I reading this right? What an odd dictionary you have that defines viable as "not functional." It is a small wonder you keep needing to explain what you meant when you said what you may not have intended to be taken the way it was written. Ho, ho, ho. Ah, that's quite enough attention to you.

George, laughing a tad.

[George Elder]

Hi Bill:

Well, there were a number of other examples of US cruiser bows having weather related problems, as in the Duluth, etc., and here we find frames buckeling, etc.. So it seems to me that we have a rather widespread problem here -- and we're not even touching upon the Liberty ships, oilers etc.. In fact, Dave can show you a great example of where the problem persisted in the post-war era -- as in a cruiser bow bananna effect.
However, I agree with your essential point that welding was a problem for all nations during WWII, and that brings me back to the main point. Why should the Germans be castigated for a problem that was manifest in many ships from many countries? That is a fair question.
As for fundamental designs concerns, it is difficult to seperate fully design from execution in that a good designer must be aware of the practical problems associated with manufacturing a given item. In this respect, the US appears to have had many of the same problems as the British, Germans, etc..
Lastly, it is very difficult to argue that a bow that fails due to the stress of weather for X, Y or Z reasons, is sound when exposed to battle damage.

George

[Randy Stone]

Hi Bill:

Welding was a relatively new technology in the 40s and it's entirely to be expected that some failures would occur due to a variety of reasons as experience was gained. Without necessarily pointing to any designs in particular, it should be noted that poor design -- especially egregiously poor design -- might be considered to fall in a somewhat different category than poor execution, or design work which only experience might prove to be inadequate.

Bill Jurens

You have, in my opinion, highlighted one of the major reasons why this issue is so misunderstood. I would agree that poor design is quite a different mode of failure than poor workmanship or designing without precise experience in the environment intended.

This is one of the reasons I see at work in terms of Bismarck's stern and perhaps within the entire series of major vessels within the Kriegsmarine as well.

As for the issue affecting Pittsburgh, I am not aware of any reworking or strengthening of the structure which was required, which indicates -- of course -- that workmanship and environment were far greater concerns than supposed defects in design.

Randy

[Randy Stone]

George:

What an odd dictionary you have that defines viable as "not functional."

...according to Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1976 Edition:

viable: adjective...definiton 3a: capable of working, functioning or developing adequately...

Since you asserted the USN DP AA as not viable you were asserting it as "not functional;" it is obvious that I failed to edit my post fully although one could easily have expected you to have been able to judge the proper meaning from context -- much as we were able to utilize context to 'correct' Tommy303's misstatement about 'eight mounts' per side when he discussed Bismarck's 10.5 cm armament.

Frankly George, if this is the best you can do in support of your assertions, then I can understand why you are having so much trouble understanding the various elements underlying the topics we are attempting to discuss here.

But I will continue to assist you as much as possible.

Randy

[Randy Stone]

George:

...Lastly, it is very difficult to argue that a bow that fails due to the stress of weather for X, Y or Z reasons, is sound when exposed to battle damage.

...that you are the only one making this very argument. Are there any supporting data for this position ?

Randy