Bismarck and her contemporaries

[RF]

Lutjen was the perfekt man for this job. He really knew how to think outside the box.

I would identify four mistakes by Lutjens:

1) Failure to refuel from the tanker Weissenburg in the Arctic prior to the Denmark Strait run. This reduced Bismarck's fuel capacity.

2) Failure to pursue POW when that ship disengaged from the DS battle.
I don't necessarily think POW would have been sunk (although I believe Karl Heidenreich certainly thinks so) but the opportunity should have been followed up.

3) The long radio message after Bismarck had slipped Suffolk.

4) The fatalistic ''pep talk'' to Bismarck's crew which left crewmembers convinced the ship was doomed.

[lwd]

...
2) Failure to pursue POW when that ship disengaged from the DS battle.
I don't necessarily think POW would have been sunk (although I believe Karl Heidenreich certainly thinks so) but the opportunity should have been followed up.....

I have a hard time faulting him for this one. Consider the following:
1) At that point it was thought that Bismark was still capable of acomplishing her initial objective, ie a productive raiding cruise. Any additional damage or even fuel and amunition consumption could put this at risk.
2) Could Bismark realisticlly expect to sink POW. I don't think so. Damage her severely perhaps but sink no. In the mean time Bismark would be expending time, fuel and ammo and risking further damage herself.

Now one could argue that sinking Hood and throughly trashing POW would have been success enough. That's not an unreasonable postion but neither is obeying orders and continueing with the intial mission.

How long would the refueling have taken and what were the risks? I'd have to know those before I would make a decision in that regard.

[Karl Heidenreich]

I agree with RF in his points about Lutjens. I will also point out that his decision to travel via Belt was also questionable.

But at DS is where he proved himself not the ideal commander:

1. He "froze". You can see that Bismarck and PE not even manouver when the enemy was sighted (as something from FATE was that their course in relation to the British Squadron was favourable). He didn´t even order to fire back against an enemy that was firing upon him already.

2. The order to disengage and give PoW the minutes it needed in order to put itself back again in combat order. If after the false torpedo warning Lutjens would have followed Lindemann´s sugestion both, fast PE with gunnery and torpedoes and Bismarck with a quite precise aiming (both of them with a moral ascendency in that particular battlefield), and PoW would have gone to the bottom 7 months before it did anyway. At that point PoW was like a boxer after some pounding, completely disoriented.

And that particular mistake from Lutjens cost him a lot because PoW did put itself back and was part of the shadowing force.

Another point, here. Many forum posters believe that Lutjens actions were justificable in order to carry out his mission. That sounds nice in paper. But when you are exiting DS and suddennly a nominal superior force of a BB+BC + 2 CA came out from nowhere and is shooting everything at you, call it whatever you want pal, but your mission is already a memory and a combat for survivial is the only thing that MUST be in your mind.
Of course, this didn´t apply if we grant the German force such a superiority that even in those circumstances you don´t worry about the enemy squadron (because you know you will win anyway). But the common wisdom here is clear that at no moment of the war the axis displayed such a superiority and the allies had a weekend walk all the war, no sweat. So, Lutjens mission was not a priority during DS but the survival of his ships, so he would have cared a lot more in dealing with his enemies.
His carelesness of not destroying his hunters cost him, at the end, his mission (because he never acomplish it), his flagship and the lives of 2,200 crewmen. A little more agression in his posture would have suit him best... let´s say, a little more Nelson, Tojo or Nimitz in him...

Best regards.

[dunmunro]

I agree with RF in his points about Lutjens. I will also point out that his decision to travel via Belt was also questionable.

But at DS is where he proved himself not the ideal commander:

1. He "froze".

2. The order to disengage and give PoW the minutes it needed in order to put itself back again in combat order... At that point PoW was like a boxer after some pounding, completely disoriented.


Another point, here. Many forum posters believe that Lutjens actions were justificable in order to carry out his mission.

1) How do you know that he "froze"? His decision to not open fire may have been based upon the fact that Bismarck could not develop a firing solution due to the prevailing visibility. According to PE's war log, her range estimate on Hood, at the time Holland opened fire, was 29km, which was a wildly inaccurate estimate. We have a story that he quarreled with Lindeman, but given that they may have been in separate locations on Bismarck - Lindeman in the CT and Lutjens on the Admirals bridge, this seems unlikely. There are other plausible explanations, as well, for example Lutjens may have also been concerned that he was confronting USN units, and may have wanted to be absolutely certain who he was dealing with.

2) Bismarck had suffered serious damage during the battle, despite many statements to the contrary, and probably had 2000 to 4000 tons of flood water on board, and was suffering from progressive flooding into her machinery spaces. Bismarck was not in a position to try and pursue an enemy of unknown fighting strength, but whose apparent speed was not less than his own. Lutjens was also constrained by the presence of PE, whose high fuel consumption meant that a return to Norway, might not be possible, especially as Group West knew that another RN fast battle group was probably south of Iceland, probably in an ideal position to cut Lutjens off before he could reach Norwegian based aircover.

Lutjens was also aware that the German Army was attempting an air and seaborne invasion of Crete. Bismarck had to draw the RN away from Crete to prevent the defeat of that invasion, and the slaughter of tens of thousands of German troops. He also had to detach PE, and give her a chance to refuel away from shadowing RN cruisers. Lutjens also knew that positioning Bismarck in France would greatly complicate RN strategic planning. Lutjens did prevent the RN from sending additional heavy units to reinforce Crete, and he did allow PE to refuel. He almost made it to France, and the last ditch attempt by Ark Royal to slow him down, seemed a most unlikely outcome.

[lwd]

...
2. The order to disengage and give PoW the minutes it needed in order to put itself back again in combat order. If after the false torpedo warning Lutjens would have followed Lindemann´s sugestion both, fast PE with gunnery and torpedoes and Bismarck with a quite precise aiming (both of them with a moral ascendency in that particular battlefield), and PoW would have gone to the bottom 7 months before it did anyway. At that point PoW was like a boxer after some pounding, completely disoriented....

Your version of what was possible seams at odds with most of what I've heard.
1) The POW withdrew making smoke. That means that she is going to be a very difficult target.
2) POW is as fast or faster than Bismark at the point she withdraws.
3) Eugen may be able to catch up to her but by the time she gets into torpedo range she is likely to be taking fire from POW main battery and it woun't take more than a couple 14" rounds to render her raid over.
4) Bismark has to head away from the open sea to follow POW. Furthermore she has bow damage that not only restricts her speed it threatens to get worse if she tries to maintain a high speed chase.
5) Bismark can't afford much more damage if she wants to make it home.
6) Sinking an opposing BB with gunfire is non trivial especially in the abscence of critical weaknesses. Even if POW doesn't return fire it's far from clear Bismark can sink her. It is possible. However the most likley result of her continueing the battle is that both ships take a beating and much of her main battery ammo is used up. With two opposing cruisers capable of either shadowing or torpedo attacks this is not a good positon to be in.

If anyone can be acused of lack of nerve in this it's the Admiralty that ordered POW to break off after she reengaged.

[Bgile]

I agree with dunmunro and lwd except for dunmunro's statement that Bismarck might not have had a good firing solution early on. Schneider was requesting permission to open fire, and he wouldn't have done that if he didn't think he could hit the target.

[dunmunro]

I agree with dunmunro and lwd except for dunmunro's statement that Bismarck might not have had a good firing solution early on. Schneider was requesting permission to open fire, and he wouldn't have done that if he didn't think he could hit the target.

I am only surmising, but a stereo RF, in poor visibility, will often give wildly inaccurate ranges. Schneider may have been getting a range estimate, but the forward RF, may have been getting estimates that varied widely from the Baron's after RF and these conflicting range estimates may have convinced Lutjens that he would simply be wasting ammo by firing at that point. When Bismarck did open fire, the range and rate estimates were not particularly accurate.

[Bgile]

Since all of Bismarck's alternate rangefinders were much closer to the water, I would expect that their results would be discounted at the opening range of the DS engagement. In any case, Lutjens would probably not be aware of details like that. In fact, Lindeman probably wouldn't either. It would be information managed by the gunnery department. Why would the gunnery officer want to open fire if his people were telling him they didn't have much confidence in their solution?

I was under the impression that Bismarck's opening ladder (3 half salvoes at 400m variation) bracketed hood, and they were very close in deflection. Of course British observers might have treated it as three salvoes, one over and two short (not sure where the middle one was, but there were no straddles). They would have been about 10 seconds apart, but all in the air at the same time.

[dunmunro]

Since all of Bismarck's alternate rangefinders were much closer to the water, I would expect that their results would be discounted at the opening range of the DS engagement. In any case, Lutjens would probably not be aware of details like that. In fact, Lindeman probably wouldn't either. It would be information managed by the gunnery department. Why would the gunnery officer want to open fire if his people were telling him they didn't have much confidence in their solution?

I was under the impression that Bismarck's opening ladder (3 half salvoes at 400m variation) bracketed hood, and they were very close in deflection. Of course British observers might have treated it as three salvoes, one over and two short (not sure where the middle one was, but there were no straddles). They would have been about 10 seconds apart, but all in the air at the same time.

I don't know, as Lutjens may have requested to be kept informed of the range and/or the quality of the firing solution. He was an experienced combat officer and may have judged that the visibility was too poor for accurate fire from his own observations, plus he may have judged that Hood was targetting PE, but would spot Bismarck when his MA opened fire. Bismarck was also vulnerable to plunging fire and it may have suited Lutjens to close to a safer range before drawing fire from both RN BBs. Bismarck's flat trajectory MA was most effective at medium ranges while a long range plunging fire scenario would favour the RN. We know that PoW had great difficulty in obtaining accurate ranges due to the visibility, and it is likely that the same was happening on Bismarck. In the 2nd action, PoW was able to generate a firing solution and a straddle at ranges exceeding 30,000yds, and Bismarck was unable to effectively reply.

Here's a good summary of the action:
http://www.hmshood.com/history/denmarks ... trait2.htm
be sure and crosscheck the times with the "detailed salvo analysis".

It took Bismark about 6 salvos and 24 rounds to score her 1st hit on Hood, and it took PoW 6 salvos and 25 rounds to score the 1st hit on Bismarck, but at a somewhat longer range.

[tommy303]

Bismarck's first salvo was to test deflection; the barrels being cold and wet would not shoot to the same range as following salvos, so the first was to test deflection more than range. The same went for Prinz Eugen's first salvo. In both cases the fall of shot was on, or nearly so for deflection, but short in range for Bismarck by a small amount and slightly over for Prinz Eugen. In PE the first salvo was not spotted as it fell behind Hood and a second was fired, which scored the hit on the shelter deck. In Bismarck, Schneider ordered a three salvo Gabelgrupp, in which the long salvo was marked as over and the base salvo as straddling or close. He was able to cancel the third salvo before it was fired and ordered rapid salvos based on his observations. In both ships, the German fire control solutions acquired the target very rapidly, indicating that the range component was accurately measured. Lighting was somewhat more favorable to the Germans than to the British.

As for Luetjen's hesitation in opening fire, there are several possibilities.

1. Initially the ID of the enemy ships was in question and it was not for some minutes that Bismarck ID'd Hood as the leading ship.

2. Luetjens, mindful of the limited stocks of AP shell available, may have been waiting to see what the enemy intended. The two ships had been altering course in stages, making it more difficult for the German fire control teams, and he might have been expecting them to come broadside to open their after arcs at any moment. This would simplify the fire control problem and he might have been waiting to see if they would do so.

3. Once fire was opened by the enemy, without altering course to open the after arcs, Luetjens may have hesitated a little longer to allow the enemy to come within effective range of both of his ships. In Bismarck effective range--that is the range at which a straddling salvo might score a hit at least 50% of the time, was about 24,000 yards, while in the Prinz Eugen, the effective range would not be reached until range had dropped to around 20,000.

[dunmunro]

Bismarck's first salvo was to test deflection; the barrels being cold and wet would not shoot to the same range as following salvos, so the first was to test deflection more than range. The same went for Prinz Eugen's first salvo. In both cases the fall of shot was on, or nearly so for deflection, but short in range for Bismarck by a small amount and slightly over for Prinz Eugen. In PE the first salvo was not spotted as it fell behind Hood and a second was fired, which scored the hit on the shelter deck. In Bismarck, Schneider ordered a three salvo Gabelgrupp, in which the long salvo was marked as over and the base salvo as straddling or close. He was able to cancel the third salvo before it was fired and ordered rapid salvos based on his observations. In both ships, the German fire control solutions acquired the target very rapidly, indicating that the range component was accurately measured. Lighting was somewhat more favorable to the Germans than to the British.

PE was firing 8 gun salvos, but she did well to score with her 2nd salvo. However, her initial range estimates were wildly incorrect:

"On Prinz Eugen's command bridge the distance of the Hood and Prince of Wales was estimated long. Their estimate at 05:53 (24) was 31,728 yards (29,000 meters). In reality, the Hood and Prince of Wales were only at 22,000 meters."

On board Prinz Eugen, distances started being correctly measured by the First Artillery Officer Lieutenant Paulus Jasper who, based on rangefinder measurements, evaluated the target (Hood) to be at 22,975 yards (21,000 meters), prepared to open fire (28). He waited for permission to do so from the Bismarck. The estimate was accurate and in-line with the measurement of the Hood related to the Prinz Eugen, plus corrected the previous incorrect estimates made on the German cruiser's command bridge at 05:50 and at 05:53 (one can see that the distance between the 2 ships cannot be reduced by 8,000 meters within 1 minute by considering the ships relative position, course and speed ).

from:

http://www.hmshood.com/history/denmarks ... trait2.htm

[Bgile]

I like Antonio's description of the battle a lot, but I am of the opinion that he interpolated the salvo specifics based on how many shells were fired and how long the engagement lasted. The reason I say this is that I have seen the film of Bismarck firing 3 half salvoes in about 30 to 35 seconds, and iirc 5 half salvoes in 60 seconds. It looks as though each turret group is firing separately as fast as it can, and this doesn't coincide with his reconstruction, which has Bismark firing only two half salvoes at a time.

To fit the film in with the timeline of the battle and the total ammunition expenditure would require at least one pause in firing by Bismarck, and that must be what happened. I don't see how it could possibly be as regular as Antonio indicates, because it doesn't jell with the extremely rapid firing in the film.

[Bgile]

PE's bridge overestimated the range to Hood, but her gunnery department obviously didn't.

[dunmunro]

PE's bridge overestimated the range to Hood, but her gunnery department obviously didn't.

Any range estimate at that distance would have had to come from the gunnery dept, and the gunnery officer would have been passing ranges to the bridge. However, I find it to be quite a coincidence that Bismarck opened fire just when PE began to get good ranging data.

[Bgile]

Any range estimate at that distance would have had to come from the gunnery dept, and the gunnery officer would have been passing ranges to the bridge.

I don't think that's necessarily true at all.