Summation of Battle Phase Two
Posted: Wed Feb 09, 2005 2:10 am
Hi all,
This is the second part of my summation of the Battle of the Denmark Strait, and it deals with the actions involving primarily the engagement between Bismarck and Prince of Wales and the subsequent withdrawal of the opposing forces from the scene of battle. The evidence presented herein is based on primary source documents as well as the writings of internationally recognized naval historians and professionals who are noted for their expertise on the subject matter.
Let's first look at the narrative evidence. The most credible account of Phase II of the battle from the German side is provided in the Baron's book "Battleship Bismarck - A Survivor's Story." In that book, the Baron wrote: "When the Hood had gone, our heavy guns were ordered to shift to left target (Prince of Wales). Because our courses were converging, the range soon closed to 14,000 meters and the Prince of Wales was taking shells from both German ships."
The Baron went on to say: "The action did not last much longer. Clearly, it was telling on the Prince of Wales and she turned away to the southeast, laying down a smoke screen to cover her withdrawal. When the range increased to 22,000 meters, Lutjens gave the command to cease firing on the Prince of Wales." That was the extent of the Baron's comments regarding the latter phase of the battle.
It is obvious from the Baron's recollections that the Bismarck continued on the same course while firing at the retreating Prince of Wales after the British battleship turned away from the scene of action. The Baron also reported that "Apparently Lindemann wanted to pursue and destroy the hard-hit enemy, and Lutjens rejected the idea." If any turn at all had been contemplated at the time, it would have been to port to pursue the Prince of Wales.
The most authoritative account of the battle from the British side is that provided by Vice-Admiral B.B. Schofield in his book "Loss of the Bismarck." Admiral Schofield had access to Admiralty records on the action, and he was assisted in the preparation of his book by the staffs of the Admiralty, the Imperial War Museum, and the Royal United Service Institute. He also collaborated with the Baron in the preparation of the Baron's book "Battleship Bismarck."
Admiral Schofield wrote that after the Hood had blown up: "Captain Leach in the Prince of Wales had to swing his ship rapidly to starboard to avoid the wreck of the Hood. It was only a matter of a minute before a 15-inch shell struck the bridge structure, wrecking it and killing or wounding everyone on it except Captain Leach and his Chief Yeoman of Signals. During the next few minutes, the Prince of Wales received a further six hits, three from 15-inch and three from 8-inch shell."
Admiral Schofield went on to say: "The range was now down to 14,500 yards, and with the enemy's rate and accuracy of fire apparently unimpaired, at 0613 Captain Leach decided to break off the action and retire under cover of smoke. The Bismarck did not attempt to continue the action. Admiral Lutjens apparently decided to continue into the North Atlantic in the hope of throwing off his shadowers and then make for a port on the west coast of France, bearing in mind that only at St. Nazaire was there a dry dock large enough to take the Bismarck."
The Prinz Eugen War Diary (Logbook) entry for 24 May 1941 includes reports by the Prinz Eugen's skipper, Captain Helmut Brinkmann, First Gunnery Officer, Commander Paulus Jasper, and Second Gunnery Officer, Lt. Commander Paul Schmalenbach. For Phase II of the battle, Brinkmann reported merely: "0601. Both ships concentrate fire on King George V (actually Prince of Wales). This ship steers between us and the sinking Hood, and after swinging around Hood, makes smoke and breaks off the fight. 0620. Ceased fire."
Jasper reported on Phase II: "During the 8th salvo, the enemy (Prince of Wales) turned sharply toward us. (about 0601). I then observed a salvo from the main armament of the Bismarck, which had switched targets (from the Hood to the Prince of Wales), that covered the enemy ship. Immediately thereafter, the enemy turned hard in the opposite direction. The ship emitted black smoke and tried to obscure itself from view."
Jasper went on to say: "At the 28th salvo, the Prinz Eugen turned so far away that the target (Prince of Wales) was obscured by funnel smoke. During the battle, our own ship turned hard three times . Firing continued during these turns. Bismarck came directly into our line of fire during the third maneuver. I then received the order from the ship's command 'Do not shoot over Bismarck' and right after that 'Discontinue firing'."
According to the Prinz Eugen Battle Sketch, the three hard turns occurred between 0603 and 0606 with the last turn occurring at 0606. The broadside photograph of the Bismarck was probably taken at about 0605, but with both ships firing somewhat forward of their port beams, the Bismarck would not have been in the Prinz Eugen's line of fire until 0606. It would have taken the Bismarck another three minutes to clear the Prinz Eugen's line of fire, so the cruiser never had a chance to resume firing before the formal cease fire was declared at 0609 to end the battle.
Apparently as an afterthought Jasper added: "Firing was ceased at 0609." From Jasper's description of the battle, it is certain that the Bismarck came up on the port side of the Prinz Eugen when the cruiser continued to fire while turning and that she held her fire at about 0606. Jasper probably later added the comment "Firing was ceased at 0609" to correct the inaccurate time of 0620 cited in Captain Brinkmann's report, which had already been typed earlier.
In the Prinz Eugen War Diary, Schmalenbach described the hits that had been scored by the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen on the Prince of Wales after the German ships had switched targets from the Hood to the British battleship. Schmalenbach then stated that "I looked several times at the Bismarck, but had nothing to report." The implication of that last statement is quite profound since it in itself tells the true story.
Schmalenbach needed to turn his sights only a few degrees to the left to see the Bismarck coming up on the port side of the Prinz Eugen, and he saw that the Bismarck was firing regularly at the Prince of Wales. If the Bismarck had been on the opposite side of the Prinz Eugen, it would have been far more difficult for Schmalenbach to keep such close track of the flagship and the situation would not have been so normal as to have "nothing to report" under the circumstances.
In an article for "Warship Profile 6" published in April 1971, Paul Schmalenbach wrote: "After the Hood had been destroyed, the fire of the German ships was concentrated on the Prince of Wales, which received four hits from the Bismarck and three from the Prinz Eugen. The Prince of Wales broke off the engagement but maintained contact with the German ships, as did the Norfolk and Suffolk."
In his book "Prinz Eugen im ersten Gefecht," Lt. Commander Fritz Otto Busch, an observer aboard the Prinz Eugen during the operation, tells of the Bismarck firing at the Prince of Wales and then the British battleship "mindlessly turning away from the scene of battle under a cloud of black smoke just to escape as fast as possible the accurate fire of the Bismarck. The very severe battle lasted only for 24 minutes from 0545 until 0609 when the German ships ceased fire."
Ludovic Kennedy in his book "Pursuit" tells a story about Phase II of the battle that is similar to the Baron's account. Kennedy wrote that after the Hood had blown up: "Now the two German ships turned back, confident, assertive, weaving in and out of Prince of Wales shell splashes, dancing and side-stepping like boxers who suddenly sense victory in the blood. For after only another twelve minutes of battle, Prince of Wales had enough." Kennedy then described the hits received and damage sustained by the Prince of Wales thus far in the battle.
After rationalizing the course of action that the Prince of Wales had taken, Kennedy continues: "So after firing eighteen salvos, Prince of Wales made smoke and disengaged to the southeast. When the crews of the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were told that Prince of Wales had broken off action and turned away, there was much cheering and shouting, joy at victory and relief at survival."
The significance of the above descriptions of the battle from both sides is that there is not the slightest indication that the Bismarck ever deviated from her straight-line course of about 210 degrees throughout the entire engagement, nor did the Bismarck turn away from the Prince of Wales to avoid further damage and "live to fight another day," as some believe.
Now let us examine the graphical evidence of the case. Paul Schmalenbach prepared a diagram on the Battle of the Denmark Strait for "Warship Profile 6" on the Prinz Eugen published in 1971. In that diagram, he showed the Bismarck on the port side of the Prinz Eugen from 0601 to beyond 0609, when the Bismarck ceased fire on the Prince of Wales. While Schmalenbach later prepared other versions of the battle diagram, only this first version has stood the test of time.
The Baron adopted the original Schmalenbach diagram for use in the latest editions of his book "Battleship Bismarck - A Survivor's Story," an English version published in 1990 and a German version published in 1999. German historians, Ulrich Elfrath and Bodo Herzog, also showed the Bismarck to the port side of the Prinz Eugen from 0600 to beyond 0609 in their highly detailed battle diagram for the book "Battleship Bismarck - A Documentary in Words and Pictures."
It is now well established that the Bismarck was on the port side of the Prinz Eugen during Phase I, and specifically, she was several hundred yards off the port quarter of the Prinz Eugen at 0601.0 when Phase II began. The Bismarck was also on the port side of the Prinz Eugen after the battle, as shown in the many photographs taken of her as the Prinz Eugen passed on the starboard side of the Bismarck to again take the lead of the German squadron.
If the Bismarck had ever been on the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen during the engagement, she would have had to make two crossovers with a loop in between. Schmalenbach knew that the Bismarck was on the port side of the Prinz Eugen during Phase II of the battle because he often looked at the Bismarck as she was gradually coming up on the port side of the cruiser, so he relegated the two crossovers and the intervening loop to Phase I of the battle.
Schmalenbach cited the time for the crossovers as being between 0555 and 0600 when he did not have direct sight of the Bismarck since the flagship was still astern of the Prinz Eugen. If the crossovers had occurred in Phase II, the first crossover from port to starboard would have had to be made after 0601 when the Bismarck was still several yards off the starboard quarter of the Prinz Eugen, and the second crossover from starboard back to port would have had to be made before the Prinz Eugen rejoined the Bismarck after the battle.
Other German naval historians, Gerhard Koop and Klaus-Peter Schmolke, provided a battle diagram in their book "Battleships of the Bismarck Class," which shows the Bismarck on the port side of the Prinz Eugen throughout the entire engagement. The two books by Fritz Otto Busch, "Prinz Eugen im ersten Gefecht" and "Das Geheimnis der Bismarck," have only artistic scenes of the battle that do not separate the two German ships and therefore cannot be used
for comparison purposes.
The Prinz Eugen's Battle Sketch shows that the cruiser maintained a steady course of 220 degrees throughout the engagement until 0603, when she began to turn to starboard, purportedly to avoid torpedoes fired by the British force. This reason given for this maneuver is highly questionable since the British did not fire any torpedoes, and the sound of torpedoes, being higher pitched than ship's screws, should have been readily distinguishable from other noises.
The torpedo avoidance procedures supposedly employed by the Prinz Eugen were not in accordance with the normal practice of turning toward the enemy (in this case to port) to comb the tracks of the incoming torpedoes. In fact, the turn to starboard followed shortly thereafter by a reciprocal turn to port would have continued to expose the full length of the Prinz Eugen to any incoming torpedoes.
There is a more rational explanation of the maneuvers of the Prinz Eugen after 0602. With the Bismarck coming up on the port side of the Prinz Eugen and still being under fire by the Prince of Wales, some of Prince of Wales salvos were short and others were over. The Prinz Eugen simply wanted to put more lateral distance between herself and the Bismarck to avoid from accidentally being hit by "overs" fired by the Prince of Wales at the Bismarck
This was a wise decision since at least two "overs" landed between the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen as shown by their splashes in Photos NH697728 and Bundesarchiv 68/15/12. Those photographs were probably taken at about 0606-0607 since the shells had to have been fired from the rear turret of the Prince of Wales while under local control after 0604, but before the rear turret jammed during her final turn to 160 degrees while withdrawing from the scene at 0608.
Now let's look at the photographic evidence. Photograph NH69730 was taken at 0601.0, making it the first photograph of Phase II. As described in the Phase I account, NH69730 shows the Bismarck when she was directly off the port quarter of the Prinz Eugen at 0601.0 after coming up on the port side of the cruiser. In NH69730, the turrets of the Bismarck have been calculated to be aimed 12-15 degrees forward of her port beam.
The broadside view of the Bismarck, showing the German battleship directly off the port beam of the Prinz Eugen while passing the cruiser, clearly follows Photo NH69730 in the sequence of battle photographs. The direction of fire in this photograph, about 15 degrees forward of the port beam, is consistent with that shown in NH69730. This photograph is positive proof that the Bismarck was on the port side of the Bismarck during the latter phase of the battle.
We now come to the issue of the six still photographs showing the Bismarck on the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen. Twenty years ago, when I was trying to put together a slide program on the Bismarck, I was faced with a dilemma. I had four slides showing the Bismarck sailing from left to right and six slides showing the Bismarck sailing from right to left. I could arrange each set of slides chronologically by eye, but I could not merge the two sets together to form a contiguous series of views of the Bismarck during the battle.
That seemed to be impossible since the battle lasted only 13 minutes, and with 10 photographs having been taken of the Bismarck during the battle, that averaged out to nearly one picture per minute. They just had to fit. I tried arranging the slides every which way, but to no avail - they just didn't fit together in any sort of a logical sequence. Paul Schmalenbach had written a number of books and articles on the battle, but he never showed the photographs in any chronological sequence, so I had nothing to go on.
Then on a hunch, I decided to turn the last six slides backward so that the Bismarck would be sailing in the same direction, from left to right, as in the first four slides. Voila! The last six slides now matched perfectly with the first four slides and formed a contiguous series of views showing the Bismarck sailing in a straight line from far astern of the Prinz Eugen, coming up on the port side of the cruiser, passing the Prinz Eugen, and gradually advancing ahead of the flagship.
This sequence of the photographs in their proper orientation can be seen on:
http://www.bismarck-class.dk/bismarck/d ... areth.html
When the slides were projected in that sequence, they were obviously a perfect fit since they showed the smooth progression of the Bismarck on the port side of the Prinz Eugen. The probability of that happening with any random set of slides is nearly zero, so they must have been reflecting the truth of the matter. It now became apparent that the six photographs had to have been printed in reverse, and every new discovery has further reinforced that point of view.
When I showed the two sets of photographs, one oriented as originally published and the other with the last six photographs reversed, to the Editorial Staff at the U.S. Naval Institute Press, they readily recognized the validity of my conclusion and suggested that I prepare an article for their magazine "Naval History" to explain my analysis. This became unnecessary with their subsequent decision to publish my book "The Bismarck Chase."
In seeking further validation of my concept of the battle, I sent a copy of my manuscript to Ludovic Kennedy, author of the Bismarck book "Pursuit." He commented: "I am sure that you are right in concluding from a look of the prints they were printed the wrong way round. There is no other explanation." Sir Ludovic Kennedy subsequently wrote: "No doubt you have been in contact with Jurgen Rohwer the German naval historian of the Second World War."
I recognized the name of Jurgen Rohwer as the source of the battle diagram in the Baron's first book on the Bismarck in English. Jurgen Rohwer was also mentioned by Vice-Admiral B.B. Schofield in his book "Loss of the Bismarck" as the source of the diagrams of the Bismarck's movements used in the Admiral's own book. After I obtained his address, I sent Jurgen Rohwer a copy of my manuscript and related material for his review.
Jurgen Rohwer was credited with the battle diagram in the original version of the Baron's book "Battleship Bismarck - A Survivor's Story," published in 1980. In that diagram, he showed the Bismarck crossing over from port to starboard at about 0603 and crossing back over from starboard to port at about 0607. This diagram was apparently based on the fact that six of the battle photographs showed the Bismarck on the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen.
Prof. Dr. Jurgen Rohwer is regarded as the most knowledgeable expert on the Bismarck operation still alive. When I pointed out to him the possibility of the six photographs having been printed in reverse, he checked out my concept of the battle with the Bismarck Archives held in the Library of Contemporary History in Stuttgart It was not until six months later that he finally responded to my letter and told me that my arguments regarding the battle were well founded and that he thought that I was right about the photographs having been reversed.
Dr. Rohwer could have brushed me off as a totally unknown American without any credentials as a historian or writer who would presume to know more about the Battle of the Denmark Strait than the British and German naval experts involved. He could have regarded my unsolicited manuscript as a completely worthless document, devoid of any meaningful information concerning the battle. He could have, but he did not, probably because he instinctively knew that there was something basically wrong with the previous accounts of the battle.
Dr. Rohwer not only agreed with my findings, but he also felt that they were so important that they should be published. Putting his own professional reputation on the line, he endorsed the publication of "The Bismarck Chase" and arranged to have my manuscript reviewed by his publisher, Robert Gardiner of Chatham Publishing in London. Chatham agreed to publish the book, and the U.S. Naval Institute accepted the book for publication and distribution in the United States.
When I presented my views on the photographs to the German Office of Military History Research in Potsdam, they agreed with my interpretation that the six photographs in question showed the Bismarck firing to starboard. They stated: "You are definitely right concerning the fact that these photographs have been printed in reverse and so, as shown in several publications and documents, give a false impression of the battle between the British forces and Bismarck/Prinz Eugen."
Over the last three years, my point of view, especially in regard to the six reversed photographs, has been challenged by various sources on this and other web sites. I realized that it would be almost impossible to convince others on the validity of my analysis strictly on the basis of a visual comparison of the six starboard photographs, especially if they did not have ready access to all of the photographic evidence. The six photographs in question are basically silhouette views of the Bismarck with little detail to determine with any degree of certainty the orientation of the Bismarck.
I therefore acquired glossy prints from the U.S. Naval Historical Center of three photographs that seemed to have the best potential for resolving the issue.
Photographs NH69727 and NH69728 were disappointing since after scanning them at a high magnification, I still could not make out sufficient detail to positively establish the orientation of the Bismarck in those views. Some, however, claim that they could make out the turret faces on the forward turrets of the Bismarck in NH69727 and the gun barrels on the forward turrets of the Bismarck in NH69728.
I can only assume that those who saw the reported features on the forward turrets of the Bismarck in those two photographs were mislead by the pattern of dots inherent in published halftone photographs. No one has yet refuted my observations on the basis of glossy prints or other high resolution images, so it appears that the persons who believe that they saw those features may have had overactive imaginations.
While glossy prints of NH69727 and NH69728 did not prove to be of value, NH69726 was another matter. Similar to NH69730, this photograph also shows the Bismarck silhouetted by the flash of her guns. Also like NH69730, this photograph clearly shows the flash of the Bismarck's guns to be on the far side of the ship with the near side completely in the shadow of the flash, but in this case, the far side was the starboard side of the Bismarck. This is clear-cut proof that NH69726 had been printed in reverse.
NH69726 not only proves that the photograph had been printed in reverse, it also clearly shows the orientation of the Bismarck as sailing away from the Prinz Eugen. By comparing an enlargement of the ship with the photograph of the port quarter view of the Bismarck published in "Battleship Bismarck" by Ulrich Elfrath and Bodo Herzog, you can readily see the similarity of light patterns caused by reflection of light sources off the starboard side of the ship in both cases.
To be more specific, two sides of the tower mast of the Bismarck are shown in NH69726, the side to the left being in the shadow and the side on the right being illuminated by the flash. This phenomenon could occur only in a port quarter view which would show the rear of the tower mast illuminated on the right side only. If the Bismarck had been sailing toward the Prinz Eugen, both sides would be in the shadow of the flash, the front face to the left and the port side to the right.
All of the other patterns of reflected light from the flash of the Bismarck's guns are also consistent with only a port quarter view of the ship, not a port bow view. Those other patterns of light include the edge of the splinter shield for the upper AA position on the forward part of the tower mast, the dome-covered forward port side AA director adjacent to the port side of the tower mast, and the two identical patterns representing the center and rear 150mm (5.9-inch) gun turrets and barbettes just above the deck on the port side of the ship.
No one has yet been able to prove that the Bismarck was sailing toward the Prinz Eugen by describing the structural features that would have caused the same patterns of light to be reflected from the flash of the Bismarck's guns regardless of their orientation.
We now come to the film evidence. While Lagemann was taking the six still photographs during the last few minutes of the battle, another photographer was taking the motion picture film of the battle. It is quite obvious that the six starboard still pictures and the battle film were all taken during the same general time frame, most probably in the four-minute period from 0606 to 0609, and they are directly related to each other.
The starboard still photographs and the battle film all show the Bismarck in the same general orientation off the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen with only a slight variation in inclination among the different views of the Bismarck as the flagship moved ahead. When looking at the film being projected, one get the distinct impression that the Bismarck is several hundred yards off the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen and is sailing slightly ahead of her cruiser consort.
A comparison of the still photographs with the battle film shows a direct correlation between the two sources. Each of the still photographs is nearly identical to one of the frames from the battle film in at least four instances where such a comparison can be made. It is possible that additional frames of the battle film can be made available for further analysis, but even what we have now proved to be very enlightening.
When looking at the sequences where the flash from the Bismarck firing her guns becomes evident, one can notice that the brightness of the flash literally "burns" (overexposes) the film at first, but then it gradually subsides and seems to disappear on the far (starboard) side of the ship. It is there that the huge smoke cloud seems to form and progressively develop and grow.
The forward views of the Bismarck firing broadsides at the British ships show the huge cloud of black smoke that forms when the hot gasses producing the flash cool down and form a cloud of smoke from the products of combustion. The size of this cloud of smoke is almost 100 yards high and 200 yards outward from the muzzle of the guns, and it extends along the surface of the water for almost its entire length.
When one looks again at the side views of the Bismarck, one can imagine that huge cloud of smoke extending forward toward the Prinz Eugen and what it would obscure, especially along the waterline. Since the smoke cloud is coming toward the camera, its size would appear to be even greater than as seen in the frontal views, and it should therefore obscure much of the ship, including the waterline area.
In viewing the still photographs and the frames of the battle film, one sees no huge cloud of smoke coming toward the camera. In fact, the waterline seems to be completely free of any smoke in all of those scenes. The size of the smoke cloud is, however, consistent with the guns being fired to starboard, away from the camera, which would reduce the apparent size of the smoke cloud and leave the waterline area free of any smoke.
One must therefore conclude that this is further proof that the Bismarck was firing to starboard in all of the six still pictures in question as well as in all of the frames of the battle film. Since we know that the British ships were always to port of the German squadron, the still photographs and battle film showing the Bismarck on the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen had to have been printed in reverse. This fact seems to have been lost by those holding opposing views of the battle.
Obviously, the German's did not recognize the fact that the six starboard views of the Bismarck had been printed in reverse. It must have been frustrating for Paul Schmalenbach not to be able to prepare consistent diagrams of the battle and not be able to arrange the photographs in their proper chronological sequence in the several publications that he wrote or contributed to due to the conflicting evidence.
There are also many indications of confusion among persons in authority as well as other authors and historians as a result of the conflicting evidence of the battle. One example is Vice-Admiral Schmundt's criticism of Captain Brinkmann's failure to place the lightly armored Prinz Eugen on the lee side of the Bismarck during the battle. How could Brinkmann have taken such action if Admiral Lutjens had actually taken the initiative and turned to starboard before the Prinz Eugen, placing the cruiser in the direct line of fire from the Prince of Wales.
Some still believe that the six starboard photographs and the battle film were printed in their correct orientation. They therefore had to devise some scenario that would encompass the six photographs and battle film showing the Bismarck on the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen. This meant that the Bismarck, initially on the port side of the Prinz Eugen, had to cross over to the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen and later cross back over to the port side again.
With the recollection of the Bismarck coming up on the port side of the Prinz Eugen and the order not to shoot over the Bismarck, Schmalenbach had to relegate the period between the two crossovers to the initial phase of the battle between 0555 and 0600. During that period, he did not have the Bismarck in his direct view, so he included the maneuver in that time frame in his 1971 diagram for Warship Profile 6 on the Prinz Eugen.
A year later, however, Schmalenbach presented a different diagram for Warship Profile 18 on the Bismarck showing the Bismarck turn off to starboard at 0545 and back to port again at about 0610. In 1978, Schmalenbach presented a third version of the battle diagram for his book "Kreuzer Prinz Eugen Unter 3 Flaggen." In that diagram, the Bismarck is shown turning to starboard at 0603 and back to port again at 0608. This further illustrates the confusion generated by the six photographs printed in reverse.
I believe that we can all dismiss the idea that the two crossovers occurred between 0555 and 0600 because of the evidence provided by the Prince of Wales Salvo Plot and the Prinz Eugen Battle Sketch, as well as the photographic evidence. I also believe that there is general agreement that the Bismarck was off the port quarter of the Prinz Eugen at 0601 as shown in Photo NH69730. That means that, if she turned at all, the Bismarck would have had to turn to starboard at 0602 to cross over the Prinz Eugen's track at 0603.
There is precious little evidence of the Bismarck ever making such a turn. True, Admiralty Report ADM116/4352 states: "It now seems probable that the enemy turned away at the same time as Prince of Wales, and about two enemy salvos were seen short during this period. Also, The Prince of Wales Salvo Plot shows a small curve to starboard at the end of the Bismarck's projected track during the battle, but that is hardly solid evidence that the Bismarck ever made such a turn to starboard. Admiral Schofield and Ludovic Kennedy certainly did not consider such a turn to be a viable possibility.
It is also true that there was a brief comment by Prinz Eugen war artist, Lt. Julius C. Schmitz in the book "Prinz Eugen im ersten Gefecht" that the Bismarck was "in a slight starboard staggered position in relation to Prinz Eugen." Since Schmitz painted a water color from the reversed photograph NH69728, which was later published in the German military magazine "Signal," it is possible that he was also influenced by that orientation in his later recollections. No mention is made of the Bismarck being on the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen by Captain Brinkmann, Jasper, Schmalenbach, or the author of the book, Fritz Otto Busch.
To be sure, the captions of certain photographs that had been printed in reverse in some publications state that they show the Bismarck on the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen or turning to the starboard side of the cruiser. Those captions by the authors or editors of those publication merely reflect what is seen in the photographs and do not in themselves constitute proof that the Bismarck had actually been on the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen when the photographs were taken.
Despite the massive evidence to the contrary, some still believe that the Bismarck did actually turn to starboard away from the Prince of Wales at about the same time that the Prince of Wales withdrew from the scene of battle. The basis for this turn is totally fallacious for the reasons cited below.
The German ships had the Prince of Wales at a distinct disadvantage at the time since the British battleship had to fight two modern enemy ships by herself, one a powerful new battleship with eight 15-inch guns and the other a new heavy cruiser which could fire her eight 8-inch guns at the rate of 4-5 rounds per minute. In contrast, the Prince of Wales had at the most only seven or eight operational 14-inch guns with gun crews that were not fully trained..
There was absolutely no need for the Bismarck to turn away from the scene of battle. The Bismarck and Prinz Eugen had been pounding the Prince of Wales without receiving any hits in return. The Bismarck had scored four hits on the Prince of Wales in only two minutes from 0600.5 to 0602.5. Admiral Lutjens would certainly have not turned away from the Prince of Wales under those circumstances, especially when the Prince of Wales herself was withdrawing from the scene of battle.
There was no refuge to the west, only the coast of Greenland with her foreboding icecap only a few miles away. If additional heavy Royal Navy units happened upon the scene, the Bismarck would have been hopelessly trapped. A turn to starboard at that time would have been absolutely senseless. The only recourse open to the German squadron was to get past the Prince of Wales and head south into the North Atlantic. There they could rendezvous with a German tanker and refuel before commencing raiding operations.
We know from her Battle Sketch that the Prinz Eugen did turn to starboard at 0603.0. If the Bismarck had already turned in that direction and was crossing the wake of the Prinz Eugen at that time, the Bismarck would have been on a collision course with the cruiser, which by then was only a few hundred yards away. The Prinz Eugen would certainly not have had made such a hazardous maneuver, even under the threat of enemy torpedoes approaching.
A precipitous turn to starboard would have left the Prinz Eugen exposed in the direct fire from the heavy 14-inch guns of the Prince of Wales, which was still a formidable foe. Leaving the Prinz Eugen on the exposed side of the Bismarck was contrary to German standard naval operating procedures that prescribed that lighter units, such as cruisers, be positioned on the lee (protected) side of battleships. Admiral Lutjens was not a coward, and he never would have left the Prinz Eugen in that predicament nor blatantly disobeyed naval directives.
The Baron made no mention of such a turn in his description of the battle, nor did any other Bismarck survivor. Neither did Brinkmann, Schmalenbach, Busch, nor for that matter, any other Prinz Eugen crew member, make any mention of such a turn by the Bismarck during the battle. You would think that, if the Bismarck had actually made such a significant turn away from the Prince of Wales during the height of the battle, there would have been some mention made of it.
There are no photographs showing the Bismarck in the process of any turns or crossing the wake of the Prinz Eugen, either at the beginning or the end of the period when the Bismarck was purportedly on the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen. Nor are there any photographs showing the Bismarck passing to the rear of the Prinz Eugen. Surely Lagemann would have caught these dramatic scenes on film if they had actually occurred.
All of the six photographs with the Bismarck off the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen show the Bismarck already at least 500-600 yards away from the cruiser. How did the Bismarck get in that position without having been caught on film? It must have taken the Bismarck at least 5-6 minutes to reach that distance, and Lagemann was snapping pictures at the average rate of about one per minute throughout the entire battle sequence. So why no photographs?
The purported second crossover at 0608 also has some problems. Some believe that the Bismarck was directly off port beam at 0609, as shown in the broadside view of the Bismarck. Backing off 100 yards travel from 0608 to 0609, that would put the bow of the Bismarck overlapping the stern of the Prinz Eugen at 0608, which is of course ridiculous. Also, the short time indicated for the return of the Bismarck to the port side of the Prinz Eugen is not plausible.
One important aspect of the battle to remember is that the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were always traveling in the same general southwesterly direction toward their objective, even considering the few short turns by the Prinz Eugen. The relative gain by the Bismarck over the Prinz Eugen therefore remains at 100 yards per minute, except that the small turns made by the Prinz Eugen allowed the Bismarck to gain an additional 200-300 yards over the Prinz Eugen.
In an attempt to quantify to process of arranging all of the battle photographs of the Bismarck in their proper chronological sequence, I devised a time-distance analysis technique that precludes the random placement of the photographs in any improper order. No one has yet been able to arrange the photographs in any logical sequence that meets the time constraints of the battle without correcting the orientation of the six reversed photographs.
One final bit of evidence, which seems to have been disregarded by many, is the Prinz Eugen Speed Chart. That graph shows the Prinz Eugen traveling at a steady speed of 27.0 knots (900 yards per minute) throughout the engagement. At 0610.0, immediately after the cease fire, the Prinz Eugen increased her speed to 32.5 knots (1100 yards per minute) for 10 minutes until 0620.0, when she dropped her speed to 30.5 knots (1030 yards per minute).
This clearly indicates that by 0610.0 the Bismarck had gained 600 yards on the Prinz Eugen and that the cruiser needed the extra speed to catch up with the flagship and again take the lead of the German squadron. With a speed differential of 2.5 knots (80 yards per minute) over the Bismarck, which was still traveling at 30.0 knots, the Prinz Eugen closed the 600-yard gap between the two ships in 8 minutes and then moved ahead of the flagship before settling back to a speed of 30.5 knots at 0620.0.
Lagemann waited until the Prinz Eugen was abreast of the Bismarck before resuming his photography of the flagship with a series of views showing the Bismarck as the cruiser passed the flagship to move up to the lead of the German squadron again. The Bismarck was still on the port side of the Prinz Eugen where she had been continuously since the beginning of the battle.
Some have tried to place the broadside view of the Bismarck at the point where the Bismarck fired her last salvo at the Prince of Wales at 0609.0. If the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen had been side-by-side at that time, there would have been no need for the Prinz Eugen to increase her speed to 32.5 knots and maintain that speed for ten full minutes as shown in the Prinz Eugen Speed Chart.
Based on all of the above evidence, I have concluded that the Prinz Eugen fired 6 salvos at the Hood from 0555.0 to 0557.0 and then fired an additional 22 salvos at the Prince of Wales from 0558.0 until 0605.0 when she had to hold her fire to avoid shooting over the Bismarck.
After the Hood blew up at 0600.0, the Bismarck also switched targets to the Prince of Wales, immediately taking the British battleship under fire at about 0600.5. For the next two minutes, both sides exchanged fire at a furious pace, but it was now the Prince of Wales which was outnumbered in firepower.
The Prince of Wales took four heavy 15-inch gun hits from the Bismarck in those two minutes as well as an additional three 8-inch gun hits from the Prinz Eugen since the cruiser opened fire. One hit by the Bismarck at 0602.0 wiped out the compass platform and killed everyone at that station except Captain Leach and a rating. This apparently caused a temporary loss of command and control of the ship as well as central fire control over her main guns.
While the other hits were significant, they did not seriously affect the fighting capability of the Prince of Wales, but under the circumstances, the Prince of Wales turned away from the action. According to the Prince of Wales Salvo Plot, the Prince of Wales sailed a meandering course to the southwest for several minutes. Three salvos were fired by the after turret of the Prince of Wales under local control, probably at about 0606-0607, after which the ship retreated from the scene to the south on a course of 160 degrees under a smoke screen,
The Bismarck maintained the course of 210 degrees as she took on the Prince of Wales after the Hood had blown up. Even as the Prince of Wales turned away, the Bismarck still maintained her position on the port side of the Prinz Eugen. At about 0605.0, the Bismarck passed the Prinz Eugen off the port beam of the cruiser, and at 0609.0, the Bismarck ceased fire on the retreating Prince of Wales. The Bismarck made no crossovers and no turns whatsoever.
After the Bismarck ceased fire at 0609.0, Admiral Lutjens ordered Prinz Eugen to move up and again take the lead of the German squadron. The Prinz Eugen's Speed Chart shows that the cruiser increased her speed from 27.0 knots to 32.5 knots at 0610.0 and maintained that speed for ten minutes until 0620.0 when she dropped her speed down to 30.5 knots after catching up to the Bismarck and again taking the lead of the German squadron.
The German squadron then headed south to break out into the North Atlantic with the Prinz Eugen at the lead to end Phase Two of the Battle. Some hours later, the Prinz Eugen was detached to begin commerce raiding on her own, and the Bismarck subsequently eluded the Royal Navy to begin her voyage to St. Nazaire in France for necessary repairs. The Bismarck was later located, crippled in an aerial torpedo attack, and sunk three days later.
Hope that this clarifies the situation.
Bob
This is the second part of my summation of the Battle of the Denmark Strait, and it deals with the actions involving primarily the engagement between Bismarck and Prince of Wales and the subsequent withdrawal of the opposing forces from the scene of battle. The evidence presented herein is based on primary source documents as well as the writings of internationally recognized naval historians and professionals who are noted for their expertise on the subject matter.
Let's first look at the narrative evidence. The most credible account of Phase II of the battle from the German side is provided in the Baron's book "Battleship Bismarck - A Survivor's Story." In that book, the Baron wrote: "When the Hood had gone, our heavy guns were ordered to shift to left target (Prince of Wales). Because our courses were converging, the range soon closed to 14,000 meters and the Prince of Wales was taking shells from both German ships."
The Baron went on to say: "The action did not last much longer. Clearly, it was telling on the Prince of Wales and she turned away to the southeast, laying down a smoke screen to cover her withdrawal. When the range increased to 22,000 meters, Lutjens gave the command to cease firing on the Prince of Wales." That was the extent of the Baron's comments regarding the latter phase of the battle.
It is obvious from the Baron's recollections that the Bismarck continued on the same course while firing at the retreating Prince of Wales after the British battleship turned away from the scene of action. The Baron also reported that "Apparently Lindemann wanted to pursue and destroy the hard-hit enemy, and Lutjens rejected the idea." If any turn at all had been contemplated at the time, it would have been to port to pursue the Prince of Wales.
The most authoritative account of the battle from the British side is that provided by Vice-Admiral B.B. Schofield in his book "Loss of the Bismarck." Admiral Schofield had access to Admiralty records on the action, and he was assisted in the preparation of his book by the staffs of the Admiralty, the Imperial War Museum, and the Royal United Service Institute. He also collaborated with the Baron in the preparation of the Baron's book "Battleship Bismarck."
Admiral Schofield wrote that after the Hood had blown up: "Captain Leach in the Prince of Wales had to swing his ship rapidly to starboard to avoid the wreck of the Hood. It was only a matter of a minute before a 15-inch shell struck the bridge structure, wrecking it and killing or wounding everyone on it except Captain Leach and his Chief Yeoman of Signals. During the next few minutes, the Prince of Wales received a further six hits, three from 15-inch and three from 8-inch shell."
Admiral Schofield went on to say: "The range was now down to 14,500 yards, and with the enemy's rate and accuracy of fire apparently unimpaired, at 0613 Captain Leach decided to break off the action and retire under cover of smoke. The Bismarck did not attempt to continue the action. Admiral Lutjens apparently decided to continue into the North Atlantic in the hope of throwing off his shadowers and then make for a port on the west coast of France, bearing in mind that only at St. Nazaire was there a dry dock large enough to take the Bismarck."
The Prinz Eugen War Diary (Logbook) entry for 24 May 1941 includes reports by the Prinz Eugen's skipper, Captain Helmut Brinkmann, First Gunnery Officer, Commander Paulus Jasper, and Second Gunnery Officer, Lt. Commander Paul Schmalenbach. For Phase II of the battle, Brinkmann reported merely: "0601. Both ships concentrate fire on King George V (actually Prince of Wales). This ship steers between us and the sinking Hood, and after swinging around Hood, makes smoke and breaks off the fight. 0620. Ceased fire."
Jasper reported on Phase II: "During the 8th salvo, the enemy (Prince of Wales) turned sharply toward us. (about 0601). I then observed a salvo from the main armament of the Bismarck, which had switched targets (from the Hood to the Prince of Wales), that covered the enemy ship. Immediately thereafter, the enemy turned hard in the opposite direction. The ship emitted black smoke and tried to obscure itself from view."
Jasper went on to say: "At the 28th salvo, the Prinz Eugen turned so far away that the target (Prince of Wales) was obscured by funnel smoke. During the battle, our own ship turned hard three times . Firing continued during these turns. Bismarck came directly into our line of fire during the third maneuver. I then received the order from the ship's command 'Do not shoot over Bismarck' and right after that 'Discontinue firing'."
According to the Prinz Eugen Battle Sketch, the three hard turns occurred between 0603 and 0606 with the last turn occurring at 0606. The broadside photograph of the Bismarck was probably taken at about 0605, but with both ships firing somewhat forward of their port beams, the Bismarck would not have been in the Prinz Eugen's line of fire until 0606. It would have taken the Bismarck another three minutes to clear the Prinz Eugen's line of fire, so the cruiser never had a chance to resume firing before the formal cease fire was declared at 0609 to end the battle.
Apparently as an afterthought Jasper added: "Firing was ceased at 0609." From Jasper's description of the battle, it is certain that the Bismarck came up on the port side of the Prinz Eugen when the cruiser continued to fire while turning and that she held her fire at about 0606. Jasper probably later added the comment "Firing was ceased at 0609" to correct the inaccurate time of 0620 cited in Captain Brinkmann's report, which had already been typed earlier.
In the Prinz Eugen War Diary, Schmalenbach described the hits that had been scored by the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen on the Prince of Wales after the German ships had switched targets from the Hood to the British battleship. Schmalenbach then stated that "I looked several times at the Bismarck, but had nothing to report." The implication of that last statement is quite profound since it in itself tells the true story.
Schmalenbach needed to turn his sights only a few degrees to the left to see the Bismarck coming up on the port side of the Prinz Eugen, and he saw that the Bismarck was firing regularly at the Prince of Wales. If the Bismarck had been on the opposite side of the Prinz Eugen, it would have been far more difficult for Schmalenbach to keep such close track of the flagship and the situation would not have been so normal as to have "nothing to report" under the circumstances.
In an article for "Warship Profile 6" published in April 1971, Paul Schmalenbach wrote: "After the Hood had been destroyed, the fire of the German ships was concentrated on the Prince of Wales, which received four hits from the Bismarck and three from the Prinz Eugen. The Prince of Wales broke off the engagement but maintained contact with the German ships, as did the Norfolk and Suffolk."
In his book "Prinz Eugen im ersten Gefecht," Lt. Commander Fritz Otto Busch, an observer aboard the Prinz Eugen during the operation, tells of the Bismarck firing at the Prince of Wales and then the British battleship "mindlessly turning away from the scene of battle under a cloud of black smoke just to escape as fast as possible the accurate fire of the Bismarck. The very severe battle lasted only for 24 minutes from 0545 until 0609 when the German ships ceased fire."
Ludovic Kennedy in his book "Pursuit" tells a story about Phase II of the battle that is similar to the Baron's account. Kennedy wrote that after the Hood had blown up: "Now the two German ships turned back, confident, assertive, weaving in and out of Prince of Wales shell splashes, dancing and side-stepping like boxers who suddenly sense victory in the blood. For after only another twelve minutes of battle, Prince of Wales had enough." Kennedy then described the hits received and damage sustained by the Prince of Wales thus far in the battle.
After rationalizing the course of action that the Prince of Wales had taken, Kennedy continues: "So after firing eighteen salvos, Prince of Wales made smoke and disengaged to the southeast. When the crews of the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were told that Prince of Wales had broken off action and turned away, there was much cheering and shouting, joy at victory and relief at survival."
The significance of the above descriptions of the battle from both sides is that there is not the slightest indication that the Bismarck ever deviated from her straight-line course of about 210 degrees throughout the entire engagement, nor did the Bismarck turn away from the Prince of Wales to avoid further damage and "live to fight another day," as some believe.
Now let us examine the graphical evidence of the case. Paul Schmalenbach prepared a diagram on the Battle of the Denmark Strait for "Warship Profile 6" on the Prinz Eugen published in 1971. In that diagram, he showed the Bismarck on the port side of the Prinz Eugen from 0601 to beyond 0609, when the Bismarck ceased fire on the Prince of Wales. While Schmalenbach later prepared other versions of the battle diagram, only this first version has stood the test of time.
The Baron adopted the original Schmalenbach diagram for use in the latest editions of his book "Battleship Bismarck - A Survivor's Story," an English version published in 1990 and a German version published in 1999. German historians, Ulrich Elfrath and Bodo Herzog, also showed the Bismarck to the port side of the Prinz Eugen from 0600 to beyond 0609 in their highly detailed battle diagram for the book "Battleship Bismarck - A Documentary in Words and Pictures."
It is now well established that the Bismarck was on the port side of the Prinz Eugen during Phase I, and specifically, she was several hundred yards off the port quarter of the Prinz Eugen at 0601.0 when Phase II began. The Bismarck was also on the port side of the Prinz Eugen after the battle, as shown in the many photographs taken of her as the Prinz Eugen passed on the starboard side of the Bismarck to again take the lead of the German squadron.
If the Bismarck had ever been on the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen during the engagement, she would have had to make two crossovers with a loop in between. Schmalenbach knew that the Bismarck was on the port side of the Prinz Eugen during Phase II of the battle because he often looked at the Bismarck as she was gradually coming up on the port side of the cruiser, so he relegated the two crossovers and the intervening loop to Phase I of the battle.
Schmalenbach cited the time for the crossovers as being between 0555 and 0600 when he did not have direct sight of the Bismarck since the flagship was still astern of the Prinz Eugen. If the crossovers had occurred in Phase II, the first crossover from port to starboard would have had to be made after 0601 when the Bismarck was still several yards off the starboard quarter of the Prinz Eugen, and the second crossover from starboard back to port would have had to be made before the Prinz Eugen rejoined the Bismarck after the battle.
Other German naval historians, Gerhard Koop and Klaus-Peter Schmolke, provided a battle diagram in their book "Battleships of the Bismarck Class," which shows the Bismarck on the port side of the Prinz Eugen throughout the entire engagement. The two books by Fritz Otto Busch, "Prinz Eugen im ersten Gefecht" and "Das Geheimnis der Bismarck," have only artistic scenes of the battle that do not separate the two German ships and therefore cannot be used
for comparison purposes.
The Prinz Eugen's Battle Sketch shows that the cruiser maintained a steady course of 220 degrees throughout the engagement until 0603, when she began to turn to starboard, purportedly to avoid torpedoes fired by the British force. This reason given for this maneuver is highly questionable since the British did not fire any torpedoes, and the sound of torpedoes, being higher pitched than ship's screws, should have been readily distinguishable from other noises.
The torpedo avoidance procedures supposedly employed by the Prinz Eugen were not in accordance with the normal practice of turning toward the enemy (in this case to port) to comb the tracks of the incoming torpedoes. In fact, the turn to starboard followed shortly thereafter by a reciprocal turn to port would have continued to expose the full length of the Prinz Eugen to any incoming torpedoes.
There is a more rational explanation of the maneuvers of the Prinz Eugen after 0602. With the Bismarck coming up on the port side of the Prinz Eugen and still being under fire by the Prince of Wales, some of Prince of Wales salvos were short and others were over. The Prinz Eugen simply wanted to put more lateral distance between herself and the Bismarck to avoid from accidentally being hit by "overs" fired by the Prince of Wales at the Bismarck
This was a wise decision since at least two "overs" landed between the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen as shown by their splashes in Photos NH697728 and Bundesarchiv 68/15/12. Those photographs were probably taken at about 0606-0607 since the shells had to have been fired from the rear turret of the Prince of Wales while under local control after 0604, but before the rear turret jammed during her final turn to 160 degrees while withdrawing from the scene at 0608.
Now let's look at the photographic evidence. Photograph NH69730 was taken at 0601.0, making it the first photograph of Phase II. As described in the Phase I account, NH69730 shows the Bismarck when she was directly off the port quarter of the Prinz Eugen at 0601.0 after coming up on the port side of the cruiser. In NH69730, the turrets of the Bismarck have been calculated to be aimed 12-15 degrees forward of her port beam.
The broadside view of the Bismarck, showing the German battleship directly off the port beam of the Prinz Eugen while passing the cruiser, clearly follows Photo NH69730 in the sequence of battle photographs. The direction of fire in this photograph, about 15 degrees forward of the port beam, is consistent with that shown in NH69730. This photograph is positive proof that the Bismarck was on the port side of the Bismarck during the latter phase of the battle.
We now come to the issue of the six still photographs showing the Bismarck on the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen. Twenty years ago, when I was trying to put together a slide program on the Bismarck, I was faced with a dilemma. I had four slides showing the Bismarck sailing from left to right and six slides showing the Bismarck sailing from right to left. I could arrange each set of slides chronologically by eye, but I could not merge the two sets together to form a contiguous series of views of the Bismarck during the battle.
That seemed to be impossible since the battle lasted only 13 minutes, and with 10 photographs having been taken of the Bismarck during the battle, that averaged out to nearly one picture per minute. They just had to fit. I tried arranging the slides every which way, but to no avail - they just didn't fit together in any sort of a logical sequence. Paul Schmalenbach had written a number of books and articles on the battle, but he never showed the photographs in any chronological sequence, so I had nothing to go on.
Then on a hunch, I decided to turn the last six slides backward so that the Bismarck would be sailing in the same direction, from left to right, as in the first four slides. Voila! The last six slides now matched perfectly with the first four slides and formed a contiguous series of views showing the Bismarck sailing in a straight line from far astern of the Prinz Eugen, coming up on the port side of the cruiser, passing the Prinz Eugen, and gradually advancing ahead of the flagship.
This sequence of the photographs in their proper orientation can be seen on:
http://www.bismarck-class.dk/bismarck/d ... areth.html
When the slides were projected in that sequence, they were obviously a perfect fit since they showed the smooth progression of the Bismarck on the port side of the Prinz Eugen. The probability of that happening with any random set of slides is nearly zero, so they must have been reflecting the truth of the matter. It now became apparent that the six photographs had to have been printed in reverse, and every new discovery has further reinforced that point of view.
When I showed the two sets of photographs, one oriented as originally published and the other with the last six photographs reversed, to the Editorial Staff at the U.S. Naval Institute Press, they readily recognized the validity of my conclusion and suggested that I prepare an article for their magazine "Naval History" to explain my analysis. This became unnecessary with their subsequent decision to publish my book "The Bismarck Chase."
In seeking further validation of my concept of the battle, I sent a copy of my manuscript to Ludovic Kennedy, author of the Bismarck book "Pursuit." He commented: "I am sure that you are right in concluding from a look of the prints they were printed the wrong way round. There is no other explanation." Sir Ludovic Kennedy subsequently wrote: "No doubt you have been in contact with Jurgen Rohwer the German naval historian of the Second World War."
I recognized the name of Jurgen Rohwer as the source of the battle diagram in the Baron's first book on the Bismarck in English. Jurgen Rohwer was also mentioned by Vice-Admiral B.B. Schofield in his book "Loss of the Bismarck" as the source of the diagrams of the Bismarck's movements used in the Admiral's own book. After I obtained his address, I sent Jurgen Rohwer a copy of my manuscript and related material for his review.
Jurgen Rohwer was credited with the battle diagram in the original version of the Baron's book "Battleship Bismarck - A Survivor's Story," published in 1980. In that diagram, he showed the Bismarck crossing over from port to starboard at about 0603 and crossing back over from starboard to port at about 0607. This diagram was apparently based on the fact that six of the battle photographs showed the Bismarck on the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen.
Prof. Dr. Jurgen Rohwer is regarded as the most knowledgeable expert on the Bismarck operation still alive. When I pointed out to him the possibility of the six photographs having been printed in reverse, he checked out my concept of the battle with the Bismarck Archives held in the Library of Contemporary History in Stuttgart It was not until six months later that he finally responded to my letter and told me that my arguments regarding the battle were well founded and that he thought that I was right about the photographs having been reversed.
Dr. Rohwer could have brushed me off as a totally unknown American without any credentials as a historian or writer who would presume to know more about the Battle of the Denmark Strait than the British and German naval experts involved. He could have regarded my unsolicited manuscript as a completely worthless document, devoid of any meaningful information concerning the battle. He could have, but he did not, probably because he instinctively knew that there was something basically wrong with the previous accounts of the battle.
Dr. Rohwer not only agreed with my findings, but he also felt that they were so important that they should be published. Putting his own professional reputation on the line, he endorsed the publication of "The Bismarck Chase" and arranged to have my manuscript reviewed by his publisher, Robert Gardiner of Chatham Publishing in London. Chatham agreed to publish the book, and the U.S. Naval Institute accepted the book for publication and distribution in the United States.
When I presented my views on the photographs to the German Office of Military History Research in Potsdam, they agreed with my interpretation that the six photographs in question showed the Bismarck firing to starboard. They stated: "You are definitely right concerning the fact that these photographs have been printed in reverse and so, as shown in several publications and documents, give a false impression of the battle between the British forces and Bismarck/Prinz Eugen."
Over the last three years, my point of view, especially in regard to the six reversed photographs, has been challenged by various sources on this and other web sites. I realized that it would be almost impossible to convince others on the validity of my analysis strictly on the basis of a visual comparison of the six starboard photographs, especially if they did not have ready access to all of the photographic evidence. The six photographs in question are basically silhouette views of the Bismarck with little detail to determine with any degree of certainty the orientation of the Bismarck.
I therefore acquired glossy prints from the U.S. Naval Historical Center of three photographs that seemed to have the best potential for resolving the issue.
Photographs NH69727 and NH69728 were disappointing since after scanning them at a high magnification, I still could not make out sufficient detail to positively establish the orientation of the Bismarck in those views. Some, however, claim that they could make out the turret faces on the forward turrets of the Bismarck in NH69727 and the gun barrels on the forward turrets of the Bismarck in NH69728.
I can only assume that those who saw the reported features on the forward turrets of the Bismarck in those two photographs were mislead by the pattern of dots inherent in published halftone photographs. No one has yet refuted my observations on the basis of glossy prints or other high resolution images, so it appears that the persons who believe that they saw those features may have had overactive imaginations.
While glossy prints of NH69727 and NH69728 did not prove to be of value, NH69726 was another matter. Similar to NH69730, this photograph also shows the Bismarck silhouetted by the flash of her guns. Also like NH69730, this photograph clearly shows the flash of the Bismarck's guns to be on the far side of the ship with the near side completely in the shadow of the flash, but in this case, the far side was the starboard side of the Bismarck. This is clear-cut proof that NH69726 had been printed in reverse.
NH69726 not only proves that the photograph had been printed in reverse, it also clearly shows the orientation of the Bismarck as sailing away from the Prinz Eugen. By comparing an enlargement of the ship with the photograph of the port quarter view of the Bismarck published in "Battleship Bismarck" by Ulrich Elfrath and Bodo Herzog, you can readily see the similarity of light patterns caused by reflection of light sources off the starboard side of the ship in both cases.
To be more specific, two sides of the tower mast of the Bismarck are shown in NH69726, the side to the left being in the shadow and the side on the right being illuminated by the flash. This phenomenon could occur only in a port quarter view which would show the rear of the tower mast illuminated on the right side only. If the Bismarck had been sailing toward the Prinz Eugen, both sides would be in the shadow of the flash, the front face to the left and the port side to the right.
All of the other patterns of reflected light from the flash of the Bismarck's guns are also consistent with only a port quarter view of the ship, not a port bow view. Those other patterns of light include the edge of the splinter shield for the upper AA position on the forward part of the tower mast, the dome-covered forward port side AA director adjacent to the port side of the tower mast, and the two identical patterns representing the center and rear 150mm (5.9-inch) gun turrets and barbettes just above the deck on the port side of the ship.
No one has yet been able to prove that the Bismarck was sailing toward the Prinz Eugen by describing the structural features that would have caused the same patterns of light to be reflected from the flash of the Bismarck's guns regardless of their orientation.
We now come to the film evidence. While Lagemann was taking the six still photographs during the last few minutes of the battle, another photographer was taking the motion picture film of the battle. It is quite obvious that the six starboard still pictures and the battle film were all taken during the same general time frame, most probably in the four-minute period from 0606 to 0609, and they are directly related to each other.
The starboard still photographs and the battle film all show the Bismarck in the same general orientation off the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen with only a slight variation in inclination among the different views of the Bismarck as the flagship moved ahead. When looking at the film being projected, one get the distinct impression that the Bismarck is several hundred yards off the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen and is sailing slightly ahead of her cruiser consort.
A comparison of the still photographs with the battle film shows a direct correlation between the two sources. Each of the still photographs is nearly identical to one of the frames from the battle film in at least four instances where such a comparison can be made. It is possible that additional frames of the battle film can be made available for further analysis, but even what we have now proved to be very enlightening.
When looking at the sequences where the flash from the Bismarck firing her guns becomes evident, one can notice that the brightness of the flash literally "burns" (overexposes) the film at first, but then it gradually subsides and seems to disappear on the far (starboard) side of the ship. It is there that the huge smoke cloud seems to form and progressively develop and grow.
The forward views of the Bismarck firing broadsides at the British ships show the huge cloud of black smoke that forms when the hot gasses producing the flash cool down and form a cloud of smoke from the products of combustion. The size of this cloud of smoke is almost 100 yards high and 200 yards outward from the muzzle of the guns, and it extends along the surface of the water for almost its entire length.
When one looks again at the side views of the Bismarck, one can imagine that huge cloud of smoke extending forward toward the Prinz Eugen and what it would obscure, especially along the waterline. Since the smoke cloud is coming toward the camera, its size would appear to be even greater than as seen in the frontal views, and it should therefore obscure much of the ship, including the waterline area.
In viewing the still photographs and the frames of the battle film, one sees no huge cloud of smoke coming toward the camera. In fact, the waterline seems to be completely free of any smoke in all of those scenes. The size of the smoke cloud is, however, consistent with the guns being fired to starboard, away from the camera, which would reduce the apparent size of the smoke cloud and leave the waterline area free of any smoke.
One must therefore conclude that this is further proof that the Bismarck was firing to starboard in all of the six still pictures in question as well as in all of the frames of the battle film. Since we know that the British ships were always to port of the German squadron, the still photographs and battle film showing the Bismarck on the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen had to have been printed in reverse. This fact seems to have been lost by those holding opposing views of the battle.
Obviously, the German's did not recognize the fact that the six starboard views of the Bismarck had been printed in reverse. It must have been frustrating for Paul Schmalenbach not to be able to prepare consistent diagrams of the battle and not be able to arrange the photographs in their proper chronological sequence in the several publications that he wrote or contributed to due to the conflicting evidence.
There are also many indications of confusion among persons in authority as well as other authors and historians as a result of the conflicting evidence of the battle. One example is Vice-Admiral Schmundt's criticism of Captain Brinkmann's failure to place the lightly armored Prinz Eugen on the lee side of the Bismarck during the battle. How could Brinkmann have taken such action if Admiral Lutjens had actually taken the initiative and turned to starboard before the Prinz Eugen, placing the cruiser in the direct line of fire from the Prince of Wales.
Some still believe that the six starboard photographs and the battle film were printed in their correct orientation. They therefore had to devise some scenario that would encompass the six photographs and battle film showing the Bismarck on the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen. This meant that the Bismarck, initially on the port side of the Prinz Eugen, had to cross over to the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen and later cross back over to the port side again.
With the recollection of the Bismarck coming up on the port side of the Prinz Eugen and the order not to shoot over the Bismarck, Schmalenbach had to relegate the period between the two crossovers to the initial phase of the battle between 0555 and 0600. During that period, he did not have the Bismarck in his direct view, so he included the maneuver in that time frame in his 1971 diagram for Warship Profile 6 on the Prinz Eugen.
A year later, however, Schmalenbach presented a different diagram for Warship Profile 18 on the Bismarck showing the Bismarck turn off to starboard at 0545 and back to port again at about 0610. In 1978, Schmalenbach presented a third version of the battle diagram for his book "Kreuzer Prinz Eugen Unter 3 Flaggen." In that diagram, the Bismarck is shown turning to starboard at 0603 and back to port again at 0608. This further illustrates the confusion generated by the six photographs printed in reverse.
I believe that we can all dismiss the idea that the two crossovers occurred between 0555 and 0600 because of the evidence provided by the Prince of Wales Salvo Plot and the Prinz Eugen Battle Sketch, as well as the photographic evidence. I also believe that there is general agreement that the Bismarck was off the port quarter of the Prinz Eugen at 0601 as shown in Photo NH69730. That means that, if she turned at all, the Bismarck would have had to turn to starboard at 0602 to cross over the Prinz Eugen's track at 0603.
There is precious little evidence of the Bismarck ever making such a turn. True, Admiralty Report ADM116/4352 states: "It now seems probable that the enemy turned away at the same time as Prince of Wales, and about two enemy salvos were seen short during this period. Also, The Prince of Wales Salvo Plot shows a small curve to starboard at the end of the Bismarck's projected track during the battle, but that is hardly solid evidence that the Bismarck ever made such a turn to starboard. Admiral Schofield and Ludovic Kennedy certainly did not consider such a turn to be a viable possibility.
It is also true that there was a brief comment by Prinz Eugen war artist, Lt. Julius C. Schmitz in the book "Prinz Eugen im ersten Gefecht" that the Bismarck was "in a slight starboard staggered position in relation to Prinz Eugen." Since Schmitz painted a water color from the reversed photograph NH69728, which was later published in the German military magazine "Signal," it is possible that he was also influenced by that orientation in his later recollections. No mention is made of the Bismarck being on the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen by Captain Brinkmann, Jasper, Schmalenbach, or the author of the book, Fritz Otto Busch.
To be sure, the captions of certain photographs that had been printed in reverse in some publications state that they show the Bismarck on the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen or turning to the starboard side of the cruiser. Those captions by the authors or editors of those publication merely reflect what is seen in the photographs and do not in themselves constitute proof that the Bismarck had actually been on the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen when the photographs were taken.
Despite the massive evidence to the contrary, some still believe that the Bismarck did actually turn to starboard away from the Prince of Wales at about the same time that the Prince of Wales withdrew from the scene of battle. The basis for this turn is totally fallacious for the reasons cited below.
The German ships had the Prince of Wales at a distinct disadvantage at the time since the British battleship had to fight two modern enemy ships by herself, one a powerful new battleship with eight 15-inch guns and the other a new heavy cruiser which could fire her eight 8-inch guns at the rate of 4-5 rounds per minute. In contrast, the Prince of Wales had at the most only seven or eight operational 14-inch guns with gun crews that were not fully trained..
There was absolutely no need for the Bismarck to turn away from the scene of battle. The Bismarck and Prinz Eugen had been pounding the Prince of Wales without receiving any hits in return. The Bismarck had scored four hits on the Prince of Wales in only two minutes from 0600.5 to 0602.5. Admiral Lutjens would certainly have not turned away from the Prince of Wales under those circumstances, especially when the Prince of Wales herself was withdrawing from the scene of battle.
There was no refuge to the west, only the coast of Greenland with her foreboding icecap only a few miles away. If additional heavy Royal Navy units happened upon the scene, the Bismarck would have been hopelessly trapped. A turn to starboard at that time would have been absolutely senseless. The only recourse open to the German squadron was to get past the Prince of Wales and head south into the North Atlantic. There they could rendezvous with a German tanker and refuel before commencing raiding operations.
We know from her Battle Sketch that the Prinz Eugen did turn to starboard at 0603.0. If the Bismarck had already turned in that direction and was crossing the wake of the Prinz Eugen at that time, the Bismarck would have been on a collision course with the cruiser, which by then was only a few hundred yards away. The Prinz Eugen would certainly not have had made such a hazardous maneuver, even under the threat of enemy torpedoes approaching.
A precipitous turn to starboard would have left the Prinz Eugen exposed in the direct fire from the heavy 14-inch guns of the Prince of Wales, which was still a formidable foe. Leaving the Prinz Eugen on the exposed side of the Bismarck was contrary to German standard naval operating procedures that prescribed that lighter units, such as cruisers, be positioned on the lee (protected) side of battleships. Admiral Lutjens was not a coward, and he never would have left the Prinz Eugen in that predicament nor blatantly disobeyed naval directives.
The Baron made no mention of such a turn in his description of the battle, nor did any other Bismarck survivor. Neither did Brinkmann, Schmalenbach, Busch, nor for that matter, any other Prinz Eugen crew member, make any mention of such a turn by the Bismarck during the battle. You would think that, if the Bismarck had actually made such a significant turn away from the Prince of Wales during the height of the battle, there would have been some mention made of it.
There are no photographs showing the Bismarck in the process of any turns or crossing the wake of the Prinz Eugen, either at the beginning or the end of the period when the Bismarck was purportedly on the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen. Nor are there any photographs showing the Bismarck passing to the rear of the Prinz Eugen. Surely Lagemann would have caught these dramatic scenes on film if they had actually occurred.
All of the six photographs with the Bismarck off the starboard side of the Prinz Eugen show the Bismarck already at least 500-600 yards away from the cruiser. How did the Bismarck get in that position without having been caught on film? It must have taken the Bismarck at least 5-6 minutes to reach that distance, and Lagemann was snapping pictures at the average rate of about one per minute throughout the entire battle sequence. So why no photographs?
The purported second crossover at 0608 also has some problems. Some believe that the Bismarck was directly off port beam at 0609, as shown in the broadside view of the Bismarck. Backing off 100 yards travel from 0608 to 0609, that would put the bow of the Bismarck overlapping the stern of the Prinz Eugen at 0608, which is of course ridiculous. Also, the short time indicated for the return of the Bismarck to the port side of the Prinz Eugen is not plausible.
One important aspect of the battle to remember is that the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were always traveling in the same general southwesterly direction toward their objective, even considering the few short turns by the Prinz Eugen. The relative gain by the Bismarck over the Prinz Eugen therefore remains at 100 yards per minute, except that the small turns made by the Prinz Eugen allowed the Bismarck to gain an additional 200-300 yards over the Prinz Eugen.
In an attempt to quantify to process of arranging all of the battle photographs of the Bismarck in their proper chronological sequence, I devised a time-distance analysis technique that precludes the random placement of the photographs in any improper order. No one has yet been able to arrange the photographs in any logical sequence that meets the time constraints of the battle without correcting the orientation of the six reversed photographs.
One final bit of evidence, which seems to have been disregarded by many, is the Prinz Eugen Speed Chart. That graph shows the Prinz Eugen traveling at a steady speed of 27.0 knots (900 yards per minute) throughout the engagement. At 0610.0, immediately after the cease fire, the Prinz Eugen increased her speed to 32.5 knots (1100 yards per minute) for 10 minutes until 0620.0, when she dropped her speed to 30.5 knots (1030 yards per minute).
This clearly indicates that by 0610.0 the Bismarck had gained 600 yards on the Prinz Eugen and that the cruiser needed the extra speed to catch up with the flagship and again take the lead of the German squadron. With a speed differential of 2.5 knots (80 yards per minute) over the Bismarck, which was still traveling at 30.0 knots, the Prinz Eugen closed the 600-yard gap between the two ships in 8 minutes and then moved ahead of the flagship before settling back to a speed of 30.5 knots at 0620.0.
Lagemann waited until the Prinz Eugen was abreast of the Bismarck before resuming his photography of the flagship with a series of views showing the Bismarck as the cruiser passed the flagship to move up to the lead of the German squadron again. The Bismarck was still on the port side of the Prinz Eugen where she had been continuously since the beginning of the battle.
Some have tried to place the broadside view of the Bismarck at the point where the Bismarck fired her last salvo at the Prince of Wales at 0609.0. If the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen had been side-by-side at that time, there would have been no need for the Prinz Eugen to increase her speed to 32.5 knots and maintain that speed for ten full minutes as shown in the Prinz Eugen Speed Chart.
Based on all of the above evidence, I have concluded that the Prinz Eugen fired 6 salvos at the Hood from 0555.0 to 0557.0 and then fired an additional 22 salvos at the Prince of Wales from 0558.0 until 0605.0 when she had to hold her fire to avoid shooting over the Bismarck.
After the Hood blew up at 0600.0, the Bismarck also switched targets to the Prince of Wales, immediately taking the British battleship under fire at about 0600.5. For the next two minutes, both sides exchanged fire at a furious pace, but it was now the Prince of Wales which was outnumbered in firepower.
The Prince of Wales took four heavy 15-inch gun hits from the Bismarck in those two minutes as well as an additional three 8-inch gun hits from the Prinz Eugen since the cruiser opened fire. One hit by the Bismarck at 0602.0 wiped out the compass platform and killed everyone at that station except Captain Leach and a rating. This apparently caused a temporary loss of command and control of the ship as well as central fire control over her main guns.
While the other hits were significant, they did not seriously affect the fighting capability of the Prince of Wales, but under the circumstances, the Prince of Wales turned away from the action. According to the Prince of Wales Salvo Plot, the Prince of Wales sailed a meandering course to the southwest for several minutes. Three salvos were fired by the after turret of the Prince of Wales under local control, probably at about 0606-0607, after which the ship retreated from the scene to the south on a course of 160 degrees under a smoke screen,
The Bismarck maintained the course of 210 degrees as she took on the Prince of Wales after the Hood had blown up. Even as the Prince of Wales turned away, the Bismarck still maintained her position on the port side of the Prinz Eugen. At about 0605.0, the Bismarck passed the Prinz Eugen off the port beam of the cruiser, and at 0609.0, the Bismarck ceased fire on the retreating Prince of Wales. The Bismarck made no crossovers and no turns whatsoever.
After the Bismarck ceased fire at 0609.0, Admiral Lutjens ordered Prinz Eugen to move up and again take the lead of the German squadron. The Prinz Eugen's Speed Chart shows that the cruiser increased her speed from 27.0 knots to 32.5 knots at 0610.0 and maintained that speed for ten minutes until 0620.0 when she dropped her speed down to 30.5 knots after catching up to the Bismarck and again taking the lead of the German squadron.
The German squadron then headed south to break out into the North Atlantic with the Prinz Eugen at the lead to end Phase Two of the Battle. Some hours later, the Prinz Eugen was detached to begin commerce raiding on her own, and the Bismarck subsequently eluded the Royal Navy to begin her voyage to St. Nazaire in France for necessary repairs. The Bismarck was later located, crippled in an aerial torpedo attack, and sunk three days later.
Hope that this clarifies the situation.
Bob