Bismarck speed during last battle

[Herr Nilsson]

On the morning of the last battle a study of the battle chart shows that the ship was definitely being steered tactically.

Which battle chart. There are two for Bismarck's course during that morning.

[Vic Dale]

Whatever Lutjens had on his mind and the decisions he came to during his last fight, would have been in his War Diary, so SKL would have little or no idea what he was doing during those final hours unless he signaled his intentions. It is known that Lutjens had asked for two U-Boat patrol lines to be established during the operation.

The U-Boats were definitely out there in force and at about 2200 on the 26th, half an hour after Bismarck was hit in the rudders, Doenitz sent a general signal,"Emergency. All U-Boats with torpedoes to proceed at once and at full speed towards Bismarck grid square BE29." Ref: Iron Coffins p35. At full speed a U-boat might make 170 miles by the time battle opened and 200 by the time the battle ended, though somewhat less if they encountered very heavy weather. By my reckoning, at least four U-Boats would have been in prime position for attack had the weather been suitable, without too hard a drive. That is without including Boats on passage to join patrol lines, those returning home and those in hunting Wolf packs.

If the Luftwaffe was in range, then so too was the RAF and that would be the most serious threat to Bismarck given her limited speed. There might even be a tactical dead ground where Bismarck was headed, an area the RN would not enter for fear of getting bombed by the Luftwaffe, but where the RAF would have a limited chance of destroying Bismarck, being at full stretch for range. As the weather improved, it might become an aerial battle ground with the RAF trying to get at Bismarck and the Luftwaffe trying to protect her. Over the next couple of days the weather might have improved some and in calmer water it might be possible to effect some sort of temporary repair to the rudders, certainly they could be cut away where necessary and the ship would be able to get underway at reasonable speed. Then she could be escorted to Brest, under heavy air cover.

There was no set time for the next battle. It was pure chance that Rodney managed to form up with KGV the day before and as far as it was known in Bismarck, KGV had been driven off at the Denmark Strait and PoW would not be ready for action for a month, so the sight of two battleships ahead must have come as something of a shock. The battle might not have begun until much later that day, or if the light was bad the next day, but by that time the tactical situation could have become completely different, the weather might have permitted the intervention of aircraft, some ships would definitely have had to oil and a good number of U-Boats might have gathered round the combat area. Tovey might even have had to transfer his flag in order to carry on the operation.

It is all too easy to see the end of Bismarck as a set piece as it actually panned out, but from Lutjens' standpoint he may still have felt he had options, though once he sighted KGV and Rodney his view might have altered some. Nothing is certain here, let me stress. I have simply pointed to a number of possibilities which I would expect a tactician of Lutjen's calibre to have considered - even when the situation may have looked hopeless.

[Vic Dale]

Which battle chart. There are two for Bismarck's course during that morning.

Hi Marc.

This one looks good to me. It is from Russell Grenfell's Bismarck Episode and appears to have been drawn form Admiralty charts.

Last Battle.jpg (75.9 KiB) Viewed 1973 times

[Herr Nilsson]

As you will notice KGV and Rodney charted two totally different courses for Bismarck:

official battle report

c.jpg (229.39 KiB) Viewed 1970 times

[Vic Dale]

We can see that same sort of thing at the Battle of Denmark Strait PG's course is plotted correctly and with good detail and she has plotted PoW's course wrongly. I believe the SO Cruisers gave them a rescrub telling them to go away and do it again using the proper data.

As you will notice KGV and Rodney charted two totally different courses for Bismarck:

c.jpg

Hi Marc.
Rodney steered closer to Bismarck after she opened fire and given the wind direction it is highly likely that her funnel and gun smoke obliterated KGVs view. Not too big a deal if the flagship was firing by radar, but visual contact may have been intermittent, so when making up the final chart it could have been a case of joining the dots in KGV, whilst Rodney went to the top of the class. I doubt that artistic impression played much of a part in forming either chart. One is detailed and the other is a rough guide. Notably, KGV 's chart gets a little more detailed toward 1000 and this seems to be the time when she would have had a clearer view.

[Vic Dale]

Further thought on this question of the ships' speed after the torpedo hit, together with survivors statements, some details of which which I had not until recently been aware, indicate possibly that more was achieved in terms of releasing the jammed rudder.

From the interrogation report of Herbert Manthey, signed by Adm. Westphal at Group West;

"From the main Flak battle station came the announcement: "Rudder stuck hard to starboard". "Ship sails in circle". I don't know how many torpedoes had hit. In my opinion, 1 hit was aft in the rudder assembly and another was followed in the vicinity of compartment VII-VIII. There were wounded at the port - IV gun. I heard via telephone that divers tried to switch the rudder connection assembly [to manual operation]. After approx. 20-30 minutes, came through the ship's telephone: "Manual rudder connected". Shortly thereafter, a second report: "Rudder completely clear". During the rudder fouling, an attempt was made to steer the ship with the screws. According to my recollection, the ship's 24-knot cruising speed dropped considerably after the hit. It sailed in a circle, and by the use of reverse steering with the screws the ship was laid against the seaway (head-to-wind). After the manual rudder was engaged, the ship increased speed first to 13 knots and later to 24 knots."

The timings in this report come as a surprise, but if it is correct, the period during which the ship steamed in circles was limited and as it appears that she made 2 full circles before straightening into the wind, indicates that the divers had managed to get down into the steering compartment and disengage the rudder. That attempts were made to steer the ship by engines alone during this time, indicates that the northwest heading was deliberately selected to aid work in the stern. The manual steering seems to have been quickly coupled, but with this method it would not be possible to steer the ship at speed, so 20 knots would be the limit in flat calm, according to the Baron. In a heavy sea, it would not be possible to hold a course at much more than half that, hence the limit to 12 knots as Bismarck's maximum speed during the night. With the rudder in manual control, the ship could make a course so Northwest must have been a deliberate decision. A ship the size of Bismarck gains full steerage way above five knots in the calm and would hold her course in a storm at 8 to ten knots.

The decision to steer out in to the Atlantic instead of making for France at reduced speed was governed by the ship's inability to dodge torpedoes under manual steering. Out in the storm, the TBs would not be able to launch much of an attack, so even though there was now only a slim chance of avoiding Tovey, certain destruction in the Biscay was avoided. Also the enemy could still be lured over the U-Boat patrols.

From what can be seen on the wreck, it will,have been the starboard rudder which had been freed, the port one remaining jammed, but greatly reduce in size due to the force of the explosion. With the ship under manual steering, she would have been held into the wind at moderate speed so as to keep the mayhem in the rudder compartments to a minimum. Work will have continued to try and free the power steering mechanism from the jammed port rudder and re-couple it to the starboard rudder which could be used. The ship would then be able to steam at full speed under power steering once more. A single rudder might not give the response which both rudders would, but she might still be able to out run the enemy. It does not appear that this had been possible in the allotted time, possibly due to the inability to weld a sledge hammer with sufficient force to drive out the heavy locking pins on the port rudder stock.

The ship did not suffer any damage to her engines, and nor to her rudders as a result of the shelling, so moving at 3 knots during the later stages of the battle was a choice made by the ship's command, possibly still with the belief that the war diary could be transferred, on the blind side.

The course steered by Bismarck during that battle has the appearance of chaotic meandering, but it is also a very good defensive track, very hard to hit and may explain why Tovey could not see enough hits. Bismarck would not be able to fire back very effectively whilst making such turns, but the enemy would be hard pressed to predict her movements. With so many shells fired at what appears to be a sitting target, it is surprising that so few hits were registered.

Had Bismarck's guns survived a while longer, there is the possibility that U-Boats could have intervened. At least one boat did arrive and may have been able to account for one enemy unit had she been there in time. With her guns now out of action, there was no alternative but to scuttle Bismarck, lest she be boarded and taken in tow. She was not that badly damaged when she went down, just disarmed.