How important was sinking in final battle?

[Bgile]

I will try to put this another way. The longer Bismarck stays afloat, the more of her crew are killed by British shelling. The sooner she sinks, the more likely it will be for British ships to be there to rescue those who make it into the water.

Unfortunately many of her crew died because the escape routes were almost all rendered impassable by battle damage.

[lwd]

It may not have been clear to whoever ordered the scuttling exactly what the status of the Bismarck was. Indeed some of what I've read suggest that the scuttling order was given conditionally before the Bismarck was completely silenced. The Germans needed to make very sure that Bismarck was not salvageable by the British and as has been pointed out even pictures of boarding parties on her would be a big propaganda coup.

[Vic Dale]

Precisely my point.

The engineers of all people would know the trim state of the ship and her ability to float and supply the ship's command with a flow of information, regarding the center of bouyancy, metacentric height etc. Engineering in a warship is just as intricate as the calculations for firing the guns. It is the engineering department which would make the judgement if orders from the ship's command could not be got. Lt. Junack decided to scuttle on his own authority and he as an engineer would know the state of the ship. If scuttling charges caused the ship to sink like a stone, he would bear full responsibility for the deaths of many hundreds more men. He would decided exactly how many charges to set in order to acheive certain sinking, but slowly enough for the safety of the crew.

The main charges were not on sea-cocks, but on the ship's main condenser castings. They would shatter and cause the engine rooms to flood rapidly through 10 foot wide openings in the hull. If sinking was simply in doubt only the one may need to be fired to make sure. If there was no likelihood of the ship sinking then all three would be blown. Flooding all three engine rooms would lower the free board to such an extent that open doors on the upper deck would cause the ship to rapidly fill.

That the ship capsised indicates that flooding to the lower compartments was not great. If there was severe flooding below, the weight of water which had entered the ship through upper deck openings would be unable to counterbalance it and the ship would have settled on more of an even keel. The condition of the ship as described by survivors emerging after cease fire, roughly matches the list to port caused by the hit on the starboard side at Denmark Strait, though with the port side now below water due to flooding in the engine rooms. She is also down by the stern and with her bow beginning to lift, whilst most of the damage and any hits below a water would be confined to the forward sections of the ship.

Abandon ship stations requires that what remains of the ship in terms of stability and ability to float is maintained to the last so that the maximum number of men get safely away. Power supply is also maintained so that the crew have lit passageways through which to escape. It does not become every man for himself until the men go into the water. This is how the Officers and NCOs were able to maintain order until the last.

Key ratings would remain below fulfulling their functions until told to come up or would at least be instructed to remain for a limited period of time. Abandon ship is not a panic, but is a structured evolution just like any other action in the ship's routine. We exercised Abandon Ship stations frequently. Each man has a function; readying boats and life rafts, moving wounded, prising jammed doors open, maintaining essential functions or simply keeping clear of other men at work.

Vic Dale

[JtD]

Scuttling a ship to hasten it's sinking is different from scuttling a ship to sink it. No doubt the Germans found it necessary to hasten the sinking of Bismarck, meaning there is little doubt that the end of the ship wasn't just 5 minutes away. However, there is little doubt for me that the Germans would not have managed to keep her afloat or even bring her back to port, even if the British had done nothing more to prevent it.

[tnemelckram]

Thank you every body for the good responses to the OP.

Her's a link to the Baron's book section about the sinking that gives some perspective from on board Bismark at the time (for those who haven't read it yet)

http://www.world-war.co.uk/index.php3

[Herr Nilsson]

.... but with the potential propaganda effect that close-range photography of the damaged and sinking battleship might have had when published in the British press. Certainly, the well-known photo of Blucher capsizing during World War I represented an embarassment to the Germans then, and it is unlikely that they were very happy with the photos obtained and published after Graf Spee was scuttled during World War II.
....

I agree, but I'm still wondering why there are almost no pictures of the final battle.

[Vic Dale]

I watched a documentary about the Bismarck last night and one of the primary concerns from the British side was that the Germans should not get tugs out and tow the wreck away for repair.

Vic Dale

[Bgile]

I watched a documentary about the Bismarck last night and one of the primary concerns from the British side was that the Germans should not get tugs out and tow the wreck away for repair.

Vic Dale

The fact that the myth that Bismarck (or any ship) was unsinkable persists to this day doesn't mean it is correct. You could make a video and I'm fairly sure you would say much the same thing. The interesting thing is I don't recall any claims about that for Yamato, and she was clearly much harder to sink.

It might have been a good thing if she had been towed back to port. The only available dry dock would have been tied up indefinitely and wouldn't have been available to the twins, and Bismarck would probably never have gone to sea again, having taken up a large number of resources to attempt repair and probably eventually being scrapped there after being hit by several really big bombs. Besides, from a selfish point of view I would know much more about the damage done in the final battle.

[tnemelckram]

Hi Bgile!

1.

The fact that the myth that Bismarck (or any ship) was unsinkable persists to this day doesn't mean it is correct. You could make a video and I'm fairly sure you would say much the same thing.

I agree generally with this but with some refinement, as follows:

Although nothing is "unsinkable", Bismarck was real, real, real, . . . (etc.) hard to sink for various reasons having to do with the combination of her armor and compartmentalization. The error in the myth is that there was nothing remarkable about how difficult it would be to make her unable to perform her mission, or on larger scale to put her beyond a salvage or repair that would enable her to do anything useful or meaningful again.

To be useful for her mission, her upperworks functions (guns, communications, navigation etc.) were essential. There was nothing remarkable about the protection of her upperworks. This is practically proven by the final battle and strongly suggested by the impact that the hits from PoW had on her mission capability. Although I appreciate the contributions of everybody on this topic, I have seen nothing to suggest that she had been rendered anything other that useless for all purposes by Tovey's bombardment, and that Tovey well knew that when he withdrew.

When you add in the fact that her mission had to be performed on seas that were totally hostile and friendless, she becomes even more vulnerable to mission kill than the normal battleship.


2.

It might have been a good thing if she had been towed back to port. The only available dry dock would have been tied up indefinitely and wouldn't have been available to the twins, and Bismarck would probably never have gone to sea again, having taken up a large number of resources to attempt repair and probably eventually being scrapped there after being hit by several really big bombs

Again I agree with you generally because it is nonsense to say that the Germans could have repaired her so that she could be useful as a battleship again. After the final battle, her only value to the Germans was as scrap iron for tanks or maybe another warship or maybe a bunch of submarines. I don't think they would have gone to the trouble of recovering and towing in her hulk for those purposes because no rational person would say that it is worth it. My only quibble with you would be if you were suggesting that there was any possible benefit at all to the Germans in towing her back (which you may not be saying in the first place because it is not apparent in what I quoted from you ). I think that on the face of Bismarck's unsunk condition after the final battle the Germans would have rejected any recovery out of hand.


3.

The interesting thing is I don't recall any claims about that for Yamato, and she was clearly much harder to sink.

The only quibble here is with the "clearly much". But I would put my money down next to yours on an even money bet that Yamato was "harder" to sink than Bismarck (setting aside the practical problems with setting up the conditions to decide such a bet). And continuing the theme of item 1 above, I bet even money that she would have been harder to "mission kill". It would have been somewhat harder to damage her upperworks to that extent (particularly the guns) but I think that Yamato's mission had more scope and flexibility that would have allowed her to continue to be useful with more upperwork damage than Bismarck under more circumstances.

[Bgile]

I agree. The reason I used the word "clearly" was just due to the Yamato's greater internal volume and much thicker armor. Her turrets would have been harder to disable, although side and rear shots could have done it. I think Yamato's TDS was better as well, even with it's defects, just because it was so deep. Bismarck doesn't seem to have been tested against full size torpedo warheads hitting below her armor belt. I'm not convinced any hits were achieved by a "normal" torpedo until Dorsetshire fired hers after Bismarck was already sinking. The twins were tested, and didn't do any better than you'd expect.

[RF]

The fact that the myth that Bismarck (or any ship) was unsinkable persists to this day doesn't mean it is correct.

This myth is pure hyperbole, often brought up by people to overstate the effectiveness of the vessel as a battleship, along with claims that it was the most powerful battleship in the world. Bismarck certainly was powerful - the qualification comes with the combination of speed, hitting power and armour - but not the equal of an entire British navy. And quite rightly, as pointed out here on this thread, it cannot operate at its best when in an isolated situation. The DS battle amptly demonstrated this, with the role played by Prinz Eugen. Would Bismarck have triumphed at DS without Prinz Eugen?

[tommy303]

Bismarck doesn't seem to have been tested against full size torpedo warheads hitting below her armor belt

I believe Bismarck's side defence scheme was tested with full sized warheads on a full scale mockup built onto a target vessel, which is how they arrived at the design they eventually employed with Bismarck.

[Bgile]

I meant "tested" in the actual combat sense. I presume S&G were also tested? US schemes were tested as well and almost always failed to provide total protection. Something always seems to go wrong, even if the protection scheme helps.

[lwd]

Also consider by late war most torpedoes (even that arial ones) packed more punch than the TDSs were designed for.

[tnemelckram]

Thanks to everybody for their input on this thread. I'd like to re-focus on my original premise.

Avoiding hindsight as much as possible:
a. Whether boarding the Bismarck would be worthwhile for intelligence purposes;
b. Whether that reward outweighed the risks; and
c. Whether this presented any practical difficulties.

1. First, as to risk v. reward, I think that the last ten or so posts have ruled out any risk that the Germans would be able to benefit by recovering the hulk and that earlier posts established that she would have sunk anyway in the near future. That in and of itself was not a reason to sink her immediately and forego the intelligence opportunity.

Nor was pride a factor. I suggested only keeping destroyers on the scene so that if their crews could not board in a reasonable time, they could instead sink her with torpedoes.

Some have raised the question of the risk to boarding crews from fires, detonations and armed disgruntled "dead ender" crew members. Bill Jurens' post seems to say that boarding was an accepted and long standing procedure and that the risks of doing so were acceptable. I accept him as the most knowledgeable authority on this Board and based on his excellent and convincing analysis of the loss of the Hood, a sound and thorough thinker as well. If this accurately states his opinion then I think that the risk to the boarders was an acceptable wartime risk. You have to take some risks - look at the 1415 souls on the Hood whose potential loss was deemed an acceptable risk.


2. However, Mr. Jurens said that boarding was not likely to produce any worthwhile intelligence. I'm going to go out on a limb and (gently) disagree with him here. I think to the contrary, with Tirpitz in the offing as the next headache to tie up a substantial part of the British fleet, there was a good chance that boarding her sister would find something worthwhile in the future about Tirpitz. What does everybody else think (as well as Mr. Jurens) with this thought added?


3. I'm still curious about everybody's thoughts about other practical difficulties. Here's a few I can think of:
(a) the fires might not die down quickly enough to allow a thorough enough intelligence inspection;
(b) the fires and risk of detonations might still be enough of a risk to make boarding suicidal as opposed to a reasonable risk; and
(c) the destroyers might not have the right personnel with the right skills (or enough of them) to do a meaningful inspection, and it would probably take to long to get such people to the scene from other places.