Terje Langoy wrote:I did not know I was in a debate with Schopenhauer.
????
“Actually I'd consider it more of hyperbole. An exageration meant to illustrate a point but not be taken seriously. As such I didn't see any real need for me to comment on it.”
Being it a strawman or hyperbole it does however insinuate something.
There is a huge difference between a hyperbole and a strawman. The first as I said is an obvious exageration not meant to be taken seriously. The latter is a distortion of someone elses position and indicates a lack of understanding or a deliberate attempt to mislead.
Whether you need to have things served on a tea spoon is your burden.
I'm not sure what tea spoons have to do with anything here or why it's my "burden".
The fact you did not see any need to comment on it does not mean other don´t see the need. I did.
That's fine however. If you had stated it was an exageration of words to that effect I would have agreed with you. However you twisted it into something entirely different and I called you on it.
The hyperbole which I did respond to obviously did not missrepresent my position.
Agreed. Nor did I imply it did. Indeed it's a critical difference between it and a strawman.
It was merely an exaggeration to prove a point not to be taken seriously.
No. It was an exaggeration (not to be taken seriously) but to illustrate a point that was serious. Now whether or not that point is correct is an open topic.
Have it occurred to you I might have taken it seriously?
Yes. But in that case if you disagreed you should have argued against the point rather than misrepresenting his position. Or if you thought that he really meant the LW wouldn't oppose the RAF asked him if that was the case.
“It is outlandish to believe a successful sortie by the Bismarck should not boost German morale in the Atlantic.”
“Where have I stated or implied that it wouldn't?”
When you said the Battle of the Atlantic was vital to the British and that they likely would pour more resources into neutralizing the threat than the Germans would to protect it.
I simply don't see where you got one from the other. I will admit that my statement lacked a certain amount of clarity. Perhaps I should have made it cleaer that the only place the RAF and RN could have significant impact in a critical area was the Battle of the Atlantic and bombing Germany. Given that the RAF can committ greater resources there as the LW and to a minor extent the KM can have considerable impact in the East.
That is where you said it. Acting under the persumption of this thread, the Bismarck arrives at Brest, you don´t think it will alter the Atlantic situation. I do.
Alter the situation? It clearly will. Gain Germany any signficant advantage? I don't think so especially in the long term.
“To the contrary it would most probably strengthen Hitlers confidence in his surface ships.”
“It might indeed. That's not necessarily a good thing for Germany however is it?”
And so you must resort to the wisdom of hindsight.
You are the one who started making statments about things altering the situation. How else can we tell if they will change things for the better or worse or just make them different other than applying hindsight. Indeed the situation has already changed if Bismarck makes it too Brest.
You call for strawmen now and then but turn to the rhetorics of a four-year old boy to make your own points. I am not impressed.
So rather than generating a logical fact based argument against my points you attack me. That's suppose to impress people? It rather points to the lack of fact and logic to counter my position.
...Likewise Germany had to win in the Atlantic if she was ever to defeat Britain.
Perhaps in deed probably. But in 1942 the threat was Soviet armies advancing on Germany or British bombers scattering a few bombs around Germany. Also if they won in the east then theoretically this would open up many of the resources they lacked. At least that seems to have been the thinking on the part of Hitler. Or maybe he just couldn't figure out how to defeat Great Britian so went on to something else.
The need to win in the East must not be on account of losing in the West. A dictum by Admiral Raeder, made in 1941, should display the naval attitude towards the Battle of the Atlantic:
“Decisive offensive warfare against merchant ships is the only way to conquer Britain; German surface forces may gradually be destroyed but this must not prevent them from operating against shipping.”
If the Bismarck had not been lost it could only serve to boost the belief that German battleships still could prove decisive in the Atlantic, and I don´t think Admiral Raeder would neglect to emphasize this in his reports to Hitler nor do I think he would accept that his ships be thrown to the wolves at such a vital moment in the Atlantic campaign.
I don't have any arguement with this. However the question we are trying to answer is what effect this would have had. To do so we must look at how the war developed and when one looks at the forces that became available to the allied navies in 1942 it is clear that German surface units weren't going to have a huge effect on the battle of the Atlantic. Indeed if they are lost sortieing in 42 then the Murmansk convoys become far easier and the Soviet position stronger.
“On the otherhand the RAF couldn't be used any more profitably than against Germany in the West and the Battle of the Atlantic.”
That´s true but it still does not guarantee that the Germans will not allocate as much resources as can be found in order to protect Brest. Priorities may be different if the Germans see a larger profit in the surface ships operating in the Atlantic theatre. Bismarck´s survival suggest they would.
The Germans have 3 important areas to consider for LW deployment in this case. 1) Brest, 2) Germany 3) the East. 3 is clearly the most important. The German plan for Barbarossa required winning in 41 indeed by the early fall of 41. When they didn't then it became clear if they didn't in 42 they would be handing the initiative over to the Soviets which they simply could not afford. So clearly they need to put the preponderence of the LW in the East. Furthermore it would be politically unacceptable not to have significant defenceive forces protecting Germany especially if they are getting attacked there. The logical conclusion is that they are varry limited as to what resources they can commit to Brest.
Despite the fact I have pointed out it was Hitler, and him alone, to order the ships back to Germany, against the naval staff´s advice,
The surface navy was used in Norwegian waters was it not? It is perhaps worthwhile examing what happened there then.
you refuse to consider the naval staff being forced to ride shotgun after 1941.
This is not at all clear. Perhaps the phrase "ride shotgun" has a different meaning over there, standard US usage simply makes no sense in this context.
“What you personally consider an acceptable risk is irrelevant, the German navy did accept it.”
“Did they? Then you won't have any trouble documenting the number of times Tirpitz broke into the Atlantic.”
This comment makes a pretty lousy point. It is below us both and for the sake of a continued debate I hope it can be avoided in the future.
One can say that about your line of comentary as well. Because if we are looking at impact whether or not the Germans were willing to accept it is not the important thing. It's what happens if they do and what happens if they don't.
Or did you mean keeping the twins at Brest? Certainly the KM seems to have been willing to do it past the time of the Channel dash but would they have continued to do so in the face of increaseing allied air raids and naval strength?
Allied air raids actually decreased after June 1941.
But would that situation exist with the Bismarck there as well? Furthermore would it hold long into 42?
Once the Twins became operational they would undoubtedly attempt to breakout, as was the naval agenda.
The question is at what point would such an attmept be made. Would they wait for all three ships to become operational? or any two of them? or would they let them sortie individually. The latter sounds unlikely as I believe you've stated at least one was operational most of the latter months of 41. So we are looking at what a sortie sometime in 42 perhaps February at the earliest? If Bismarck last but another year and the Germans loose her along with their other battleships during a sortie in early 42 are they really ahead of the game? I think rather the British may be ahead in this one although the Japanese may be the big loosers.
... The so-called “fleet in being” was the curse of the Imperial Navy, a lesson Raeder was determined not to repeat.
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That sounds like a good topic for another thread.