What If Bismarck Had Escaped?

[Terje Langoy]

“There is a huge difference between a hyperbole and a strawman. The first as I said is an obvious exageration not meant to be taken seriously. The latter is a distortion of someone elses position and indicates a lack of understanding or a deliberate attempt to mislead.”

I´ve just been given a lesson in rhetorics. Fantastic.

“I'm not sure what tea spoons have to do with anything here or why it's my burden.”

Oh, but of course you´re not sure.

“If you had stated it was an exageration of words to that effect I would have agreed with you. However you twisted it into something entirely different and I called you on it.”

Brest being bombed flat is entirely different from Germans letting Brest be bombed flat. Got it.

“It was an exaggeration (not to be taken seriously) but to illustrate a point that was serious. Now whether or not that point is correct is an open topic.”

Actually its not. The Twins were not being bombed flat.

“Yes. But in that case if you disagreed you should have argued against the point rather than misrepresenting his position.”

I did make a post arguing against that point.

“I simply don't see where you got one from the other. I will admit that my statement lacked a certain amount of clarity.“

You did make a point about the campaign in the East being vital. And I stated the Battle of the Atlantic was equally important. You did insinuate that the ships at Brest would be target practice for the RAF because the Germans had more important priorities elsewhere. I disagreed with you. And just for the record that target practice thing is indeed hyperbole - to illustrate a serious point.

“Perhaps I should have made it clear that the only place the RAF and RN could have significant impact in a critical area was the Battle of the Atlantic and bombing Germany. “

German efforts in these critical areas are of course significant to them as well, let´s not forget.

“Alter the situation? It clearly will. Gain Germany any signficant advantage? I don't think so especially in the long term.”

I did not say they will gain an advantage, I said they are not likely to abandon Atlantic sorties at this point, especially if they have yet to suffer failure - which happen to be the presumption of this thread.

“You are the one who started making statments about things altering the situation.”

And above you agree it will alter the situation. Then you move on to tell how it will be countered by superior Allied resources and more surprisingly a German command that consider their protection while at Brest less important. If they are to be bombed to pieces at Brest then it does not alter the situation, does it?

“How else can we tell if they will change things for the better or worse or just make them different other than applying hindsight.”

Obviously by the same means that presume a successful Bismarck sortie still will see a Channel Dash in early 1942.

“So rather than generating a logical fact based argument against my points you attack me. That's suppose to impress people? It rather points to the lack of fact and logic to counter my position.”

... it was actually a response to this logical fact based argument:

“Then you won't have any trouble documenting the number of times Tirpitz broke into the Atlantic.”

...an argument that seems to excel at both facts and logic.

“However the question we are trying to answer is what effect this would have had.”

I will grant you an Allied victory, that is inevitable, but I do not buy the idea that the ships will retreat back to Germany or Norway while they still enjoy success in the Atlantic.

“To do so we must look at how the war developed”

If the Bismarck makes port at Brest the development on the naval front takes a new direction. From earlier postings I have argued the Germans would pursuit their objectives in the Atlantic, this at least until a major defeat is to occur. To be able to continue in the Atlantic the navy need provide for the safety of their ships while at Brest.

“Indeed if they are lost sortieing in 42 then the Murmansk convoys become far easier and the Soviet position stronger.”

And if the battleships are relocated to Norway instead then the British will have more resources to strengthen the Murmansk convoys seeing these resources are no longer needed in the Atlantic.

“The German plan for Barbarossa required winning in 41 indeed by the early fall of 41. When they didn't then it became clear if they didn't in 42 they would be handing the initiative over to the Soviets which they simply could not afford.”

But they could afford to hand over the initiative in the Atlantic? No, you did of course not say that - but it is nonetheless a question of merit.

Despite the fact I have pointed out it was Hitler, and him alone, to order the ships back to Germany, against the naval staff´s advice,

The surface navy was used in Norwegian waters was it not? It is perhaps worthwhile examing what happened there then.

you refuse to consider the naval staff being forced to ride shotgun after 1941.

This is not at all clear. Perhaps the phrase "ride shotgun" has a different meaning over there, standard US usage simply makes no sense in this context.

Beautiful. That was indeed a most delightful diversion. In its original form my argument actually looked a bit more like this:

Despite the fact I have pointed out it was Hitler, and him alone, to order the ships back to Germany, against the naval staff´s advice, you refuse to consider the naval staff being forced to ride shotgun after 1941.

...a point made to illustrate that superior naval command was no more in the hands of Admiral Raeder after the Channel Dash. This point however seems to have escaped you, perhaps you missed it while you were concerned picking the sentence apart?

I don´t find it is worthwhile to examine what happened in Norway - it presumes an early Channel Dash and I oppose that view - but I do find it regrettable that you are unable to see what is meant with the phrase “ride shotgun”. But since you´ve been kind to offer me definitions on strawmen and hyperboles I can inform you the phrase “ride shotgun” over here mean you are relegated to the passenger seat, as opposed to the driver seat.

“Because if we are looking at impact whether or not the Germans were willing to accept it is not the important thing. It's what happens if they do and what happens if they don't.”

You are the one concerned with impact, not me. I´m more concerned with postings acting on the faulty pretence that the Germans were not willing to accept the risk.

“If Bismarck last but another year and the Germans lose her along with their other battleships during a sortie in early 42 are they really ahead of the game?”

From a historical perspective would you say the German surface ships were ahead of the game in early 1942..?

[lwd]

“There is a huge difference between a hyperbole and a strawman. The first as I said is an obvious exageration not meant to be taken seriously. The latter is a distortion of someone elses position and indicates a lack of understanding or a deliberate attempt to mislead.”
I´ve just been given a lesson in rhetorics. Fantastic.

Well aparently you need it. The implied sarcasm above indicates however that it was probably wasted.

“I'm not sure what tea spoons have to do with anything here or why it's my burden.”
Oh, but of course you´re not sure.

Well that was a useful reply, not. I'm not familiar with that particular idiom or the way in which you used it. In case I wasn't clear enough I was asking exactly what you meant by it. Of course if you prefer to remain obsucre you can continue to reply in that vein.

...
“It was an exaggeration (not to be taken seriously) but to illustrate a point that was serious. Now whether or not that point is correct is an open topic.”
Actually its not. The Twins were not being bombed flat.

It's been acknowled that it was an exageration. I.e the twins weren't being bombed flat. However the point was that they were subject to repeated and potentially damaging bombing and that if Bismarck was there one could expect additional bombing and potentially more damage to the twins as well as Bismarck. Your last reply simply address the exageration and not the point so your statment is hardly convincing.

“Yes. But in that case if you disagreed you should have argued against the point rather than misrepresenting his position.”
I did make a post arguing against that point.

And a fairly good one at least in regards to the historical damage to the twins. That doesn't excuse the strawman.

“I simply don't see where you got one from the other. I will admit that my statement lacked a certain amount of clarity.“
You did make a point about the campaign in the East being vital. And I stated the Battle of the Atlantic was equally important. You did insinuate that the ships at Brest would be target practice for the RAF because the Germans had more important priorities elsewhere. I disagreed with you. And just for the record that target practice thing is indeed hyperbole - to illustrate a serious point.

The battle in the East was in my view and apparently in the view of the Germany at the time much more critical than the battle of the Atlantic. Furthermore the LW could do more in the East than it could in the battle for the Atlantic. You may have disagreed with me but you have not supported that disagreement with much. Nor did I state or imply that the Germans would leave Brest undefended but they would have had a difficult if not impossilbe job defending it to the point where the British couldn't damage the German ships and if they tried they would have left gaps in their defence of Germany and impacted LW operations in the East to such an extent that it would likely have been counter productive.

“Perhaps I should have made it clear that the only place the RAF and RN could have significant impact in a critical area was the Battle of the Atlantic and bombing Germany. “
German efforts in these critical areas are of course significant to them as well, let´s not forget.

Indeed I would think that obvious. But from the German point of view the most critical thing has got to be the survival of the German armies in the East. The safety of Germany second. The defence of Brest third. The allocation of resources should reflect this. Certainly one they wouldn't want to leave any of the above undefended but it makes no sense to put the preponderence of the LW or at least its fighter arm in and around Brest. It should also be noted that shifting the LW support from one area to another is going to take days to weeks. The British on the otherhand have a simpler problem. They need only decide on how to allocate the bomer command between hitting targets in France and in Germany. Fighter command can't really support raids on Germany so it's either defend Britain or escort raids on Brest. Furthermore both fighter command and bomber comand can for the most part be retasked on a daily basis from the same airfields. In some cases the retasking could be hourly.

And above you agree it will alter the situation. Then you move on to tell how it will be countered by superior Allied resources and more surprisingly a German command that consider their protection while at Brest less important. If they are to be bombed to pieces at Brest then it does not alter the situation, does it?

It will alter the situation in any case. The British at the very least will alter the deployments of the RN and the use of the RAF. Furthermore my statement about the Germans considering the protection of Brest less important was in regards to Germany and the East in this scenario with regards to the historical case they would probably consider the protection of Brest more important. However the British simply can commit more resources in this area than the Germans can considering their other commitments.

“How else can we tell if they will change things for the better or worse or just make them different other than applying hindsight.”
Obviously by the same means that presume a successful Bismarck sortie still will see a Channel Dash in early 1942.

You lost me with this one.

...
“However the question we are trying to answer is what effect this would have had.”
I will grant you an Allied victory, that is inevitable, but I do not buy the idea that the ships will retreat back to Germany or Norway while they still enjoy success in the Atlantic.

Nor have I suggested that this is what would happen. It is a possiblity especially as time goes on but they might well have sortied in 42. If they did there's a good chance they get sunk. If they don't and they stay at Brest then as the air raids intensify then as time goes on they are likely to suffer increasing damage and the chance of them being in condition to sortied declines with each passing day. The odds are that if they are in Brest that by the end of 43 they are sitting on the bottom. The Germans are likely to recognise this at some point if they haven't been sunk and pull them back prior to that.

“To do so we must look at how the war developed”
If the Bismarck makes port at Brest the development on the naval front takes a new direction. From earlier postings I have argued the Germans would pursuit their objectives in the Atlantic, this at least until a major defeat is to occur. To be able to continue in the Atlantic the navy need provide for the safety of their ships while at Brest.

They likely would try and your last sentence highlites one of their problems. The navy might need to provide for said safty but they are incapable of doing so. The LW has to be the main contributer and they have other priorities.

“Indeed if they are lost sortieing in 42 then the Murmansk convoys become far easier and the Soviet position stronger.”
And if the battleships are relocated to Norway instead then the British will have more resources to strengthen the Murmansk convoys seeing these resources are no longer needed in the Atlantic.

Not really. If all 4 battleships are in Norway then the allies have to keep 8 or so of their own battleships available. Perhaps even more given that they will need to be escorting the convoys and that there were a lot of uboats and planes used to attack these convoys.

“The German plan for Barbarossa required winning in 41 indeed by the early fall of 41. When they didn't then it became clear if they didn't in 42 they would be handing the initiative over to the Soviets which they simply could not afford.”
But they could afford to hand over the initiative in the Atlantic? No, you did of course not say that - but it is nonetheless a question of merit.

Could they avoid it? While the German ships are in Brest they threaten a breakout. Once they are out it is no longer a threat and the initiative is up in the air. However unless they make it back intact the allies now have the initiative as there is no longer a threat or if they make it back damaged there is no immediate threat.

Despite the fact I have pointed out it was Hitler, and him alone, to order the ships back to Germany, against the naval staff´s advice,

He may indeed have issued the order but the naval opinion was hardly unanimous was it?

Beautiful. That was indeed a most delightful diversion. In its original form my argument actually looked a bit more like this:

A diversion? Not at all or at least not intended so.

Despite the fact I have pointed out it was Hitler, and him alone, to order the ships back to Germany, against the naval staff´s advice, you refuse to consider the naval staff being forced to ride shotgun after 1941.
...a point made to illustrate that superior naval command was no more in the hands of Admiral Raeder after the Channel Dash. This point however seems to have escaped you, perhaps you missed it while you were concerned picking the sentence apart?

That's not at all what the term "ride shotgun" implies over here. I'm pretty sure the term originated in the western part of the US as well so I'm curious if it's evolved to mean something esle over there. In any case was "supeiror naval command" ever in Raeder's hands? Certainly Hitler had some impact on Bismarck's orders did he not?

I don´t find it is worthwhile to examine what happened in Norway - it presumes an early Channel Dash and I oppose that view

But of course it does not. Again I may have been unclear but when I talked about looking at what happened in Norway I was refering more to the tactical level. In particular how quickly German sorties were identified and the ships located and the RN reaction to them.

- but I do find it regrettable that you are unable to see what is meant with the phrase “ride shotgun”. But since you´ve been kind to offer me definitions on strawmen and hyperboles I can inform you the phrase “ride shotgun” over here mean you are relegated to the passenger seat, as opposed to the driver seat.

Ah similar meanings but clearly different connotations. "Riding shotgun" an imply guarding or riding in the seat next to the driver (often prefered to the back seat in a car for instance). The lack of control implication is not there.

“Because if we are looking at impact whether or not the Germans were willing to accept it is not the important thing. It's what happens if they do and what happens if they don't.”
You are the one concerned with impact, not me. I´m more concerned with postings acting on the faulty pretence that the Germans were not willing to accept the risk.

The question framed in the title is one of impact. To address it one has to look at multiple alternatives and the impact of them. Certainly their willingness to accept risk will impact which alternatives are the most likely but that's an intermediate consideration. Furthrmore as you point out the critical point is what will Hitler risk. It matters very little if the KM will accept the risk if Hitler won't.

“If Bismarck last but another year and the Germans lose her along with their other battleships during a sortie in early 42 are they really ahead of the game?”
From a historical perspective would you say the German surface ships were ahead of the game in early 1942..?

Irrelevant, indeed the question is not even well enough formed to provide a reasonable answer to it.

[Bgile]

To me, "riding shotgun" means to protect the person you are riding with. I believe it originates in the US "wild west" when a man was assigned to ride next to the driver in a stage coach, and carried a shotgun to protect the coach and it's occupants. Of course, it's since expanded to mean to accompany someone. Not sure how it relates to German admirals.

[lwd]

To me, "riding shotgun" means to protect the person you are riding with. I believe it originates in the US "wild west" when a man was assigned to ride next to the driver in a stage coach, and carried a shotgun to protect the coach and it's occupants.

Exactly.

Of course, it's since expanded to mean to accompany someone. Not sure how it relates to German admirals.

Now that he's explained the "not in the driver's seat" implications it makes some sense but I'm not sure that the Channel dash was where that changed.

[Terje Langoy]

“Well aparently you need it.”

I´m just grateful you found an opportunity to share them with me.

“I'm not familiar with that particular idiom or the way in which you used it. In case I wasn't clear enough I was asking exactly what you meant by it. Of course if you prefer to remain obsucre you can continue to reply in that vein."

I fear this ain´t going anywhere productive. I have clearly overestimated you and for that I apologize. I shall strive to keep my response free of phrases, idioms and strawmen.

“However the point was that they were subject to repeated and potentially damaging bombing and that if Bismarck was there one could expect additional bombing and potentially more damage to the twins as well as Bismarck."

A point that did not escape me. But I do believe German countermeasures will increase accordingly. Most people I ever find myself in discussion with would have figured that was my implication pretty soon. You´re not one of them.

“Your last reply simply address the exageration and not the point so your statment is hardly convincing.”

Obvioulsy you´re a hard man to convince. I am too.

“The battle in the East was in my view and apparently in the view of the Germany at the time much more critical than the battle of the Atlantic.”

And the surface ships were not successful in the Atlantic either, as seen with the Bismarck sortie.

"Furthermore the LW could do more in the East than it could in the battle for the Atlantic."

Not if the air cover of Brest was a pivot point in the Atlantic campaign.

“You may have disagreed with me but you have not supported that disagreement with much.”

I said that I think German priorities would be different. If you can´t relate to that then there´s really not much more I can do.

“Nor did I state or imply that the Germans would leave Brest undefended“

It was not you to imply it. But it was you to call me out on my response to it.

“but they would have had a difficult if not impossible job defending it to the point where the British couldn't damage the German ships and if they tried they would have left gaps in their defence of Germany and impacted LW operations in the East to such an extent that it would likely have been counter productive.”

As it would be counterproductive to the Brest situation and the Atlantic campaign to proceed as you suggest.

“Indeed I would think that obvious. But from the German point of view the most critical thing has got to be the survival of the German armies in the East. The safety of Germany second. The defence of Brest third.”

The Brest situation represent a huge point of interest for the RAF and a decisive point for the German surface navy in the Atlantic situation. It is a choice to be evaluated by the German command. I believe the survival of this campaign would weigh quite a bit heavier if they did experience success here.

“Furthermore my statement about the Germans considering the protection of Brest less important was in regards to Germany and the East in this scenario with regards to the historical case they would probably consider the protection of Brest more important.”

It would make Brest a frontline in the Battle against Britain.

“However the British simply can commit more resources in this area than the Germans can considering their other commitments.”

That´s down to what is being required from Luftwaffe in the period between being damaged and being repaired. If the British efforts at Brest comes with severe losses but no appreciable results the situation cannot withstand time.

“Nor have I suggested that this is what would happen. It is a possiblity especially as time goes on but they might well have sortied in 42. If they did there's a good chance they get sunk.”

Yes and I don´t argue with you on the last point, I´m saying German ships most likely will continue to sortie until a defeat occur. When this will happen is a different matter.

“If they don't and they stay at Brest then as the air raids intensify then as time goes on they are likely to suffer increasing damage and the chance of them being in condition to sortied declines with each passing day.”

They don´t stay at Brest if they can sortie.

“They likely would try and your last sentence highlites one of their problems. The navy might need to provide for said safety but they are incapable of doing so.”

I think not. They are not incapable of doing so if they deem it more important. Other threatres may suffer but that is basically your scenario reversed. It is ultimately down to priorities being made in German command.

“While the German ships are in Brest they threaten a breakout. Once they are out it is no longer a threat and the initiative is up in the air.“

So a successful breakout is not a threat?

“However unless they make it back intact the allies now have the initiative as there is no longer a threat or if they make it back damaged there is no immediate threat.”

Which is the ultimate cost of conducting this type of warfare. It may reap reward, it may cost deerly.

“He may indeed have issued the order but the naval opinion was hardly unanimous was it?”

“Against the advice of most senior officers...” suggest they most certainly did not approve it.

“That's not at all what the term "ride shotgun" implies over here. I'm pretty sure the term originated in the western part of the US as well so I'm curious if it's evolved to mean something esle over there.”

From the look of it, it most certainly has. However this is obviously a case of the blind leading the blind so now that it has been sorted out, let´s move on...

“In any case was "superior naval command" ever in Raeder's hands? Certainly Hitler had some impact on Bismarck's orders did he not?”

Not as to her deployment in the Atlantic.

“But of course it does not. Again I may have been unclear but when I talked about looking at what happened in Norway I was refering more to the tactical level. In particular how quickly German sorties were identified and the ships located and the RN reaction to them.”

Being stationary in a fjord tend to make that job easier.

The question framed in the title is one of impact. To address it one has to look at multiple alternatives and the impact of them. Certainly their willingness to accept risk will impact which alternatives are the most likely but that's an intermediate consideration. Furthrmore as you point out the critical point is what will Hitler risk. It matters very little if the KM will accept the risk if Hitler won't.

The Bismarck sortie is a turning point for the surface warfare in the Atlantic. The question formed in the title delay a German defeat in the Atlantic. It is so forth wrong to act on the presumption the Germans have their ships retreat in a Channel Dash in early 1942.

“From a historical perspective would you say the German surface ships were ahead of the game in early 1942..?”

“Irrelevant, indeed the question is not even well enough formed to provide a reasonable answer to it.”

Is this question well enough formed to provide a reasonable answer to it?

“If Bismarck last but another year and the Germans lose her along with their other battleships during a sortie in early 42 are they really ahead of the game?”

[lwd]

Snipping out the personal remarks:

.... But I do believe German countermeasures will increase accordingly.

Indeed. I haven't contested this although you keep repeating it. The quesiton is would they be able to increase them enough to prevent damage to the German battleships without leaving serious weaknesses elsewhere? Given that the RAF can concentrate on either Germany or France and that there is a campaign in the East to support and the relative capablities of the two air forces I don't think so. Then in 42 you have the USN and USAAF showing up to further tilt t hings.

“The battle in the East was in my view and apparently in the view of the Germany at the time much more critical than the battle of the Atlantic.”
And the surface ships were not successful in the Atlantic either, as seen with the Bismarck sortie.

Surface ships had seen some success in the Atlantic. Indeed even if Bismarck makes it back the Twins earlier cruise could be viewed as more successful. So it's not clear how much if any the equation has chanded in this regard.

"Furthermore the LW could do more in the East than it could in the battle for the Atlantic."
Not if the air cover of Brest was a pivot point in the Atlantic campaign.

Yes even if it was misjudged that "air cover of Brest was a povot point in the Atlantic campaign". Furthermore there's no solid reason for assuming it would be.

“You may have disagreed with me but you have not supported that disagreement with much.”
I said that I think German priorities would be different. If you can´t relate to that then there´s really not much more I can do.

That's so vague it's meaningless. Of course if things change so would German priorities. But how much and in what direction? You seem to be proposing a huge swing with little support for it.

“Nor did I state or imply that the Germans would leave Brest undefended“
It was not you to imply it. But it was you to call me out on my response to it.

I don't see where anyone else implied it either. Thus "responding" to it was responding to a strawman.

“but they would have had a difficult if not impossible job defending it to the point where the British couldn't damage the German ships and if they tried they would have left gaps in their defence of Germany and impacted LW operations in the East to such an extent that it would likely have been counter productive.”
As it would be counterproductive to the Brest situation and the Atlantic campaign to proceed as you suggest.

It doesn't help Germany much if Britian is running critically short of supplies but there's a Soviet army just outside Berlin does it?

“Indeed I would think that obvious. But from the German point of view the most critical thing has got to be the survival of the German armies in the East. The safety of Germany second. The defence of Brest third.”
The Brest situation represent a huge point of interest for the RAF and a decisive point for the German surface navy in the Atlantic situation. It is a choice to be evaluated by the German command. I believe the survival of this campaign would weigh quite a bit heavier if they did experience success here.

Why? Consider that by the time Bismarck made it home Barbarossa would be almost ready to get underway and the LW would have been tasked with that effort. The spectatular success of the German armies early in that campaign and the hope of taking the Soviets out in a single campaign wouldn't fade until September at the earliest and probably later. In Brest the battleships would likely still be under repair. Then with the German armies approaching Moscow in October are they really going to pull back the LW? Especially considering once October arrives the weather isn't going to be all that cooperative as far as flying goes for either the RAF or the LW near Brest. Once the weather improves again the KM is facing both the RN and the USN. The RAF is being reinforced by the USAAF and the Germans are hopeing to take out the Soviets again. Perhaps it would help if you suggest just how much more effort the LW would put into the defence of Brest.

...
“However the British simply can commit more resources in this area than the Germans can considering their other commitments.”
That´s down to what is being required from Luftwaffe in the period between being damaged and being repaired. If the British efforts at Brest comes with severe losses but no appreciable results the situation cannot withstand time.

EArly in the war Bomber command took pretty bad losses for little effect as it was. Flying over Brest where there will be less warning, less enemy territory to cross, shorter distances to home (or emergency) fields, and the possibility of escort by British fighters it seems unlikely that they are going to suffer a great deal more losses. Now whether they do a great deal more damage is another question, but given the accuracy of high level bombing at the time the more targets in the box the more likely they are to get hits.

“Nor have I suggested that this is what would happen. It is a possiblity especially as time goes on but they might well have sortied in 42. If they did there's a good chance they get sunk.”
Yes and I don´t argue with you on the last point, I´m saying German ships most likely will continue to sortie until a defeat occur. When this will happen is a different matter.
“If they don't and they stay at Brest then as the air raids intensify then as time goes on they are likely to suffer increasing damage and the chance of them being in condition to sortied declines with each passing day.”
They don´t stay at Brest if they can sortie.

What do you mean by the latter? They don't stay at Brest if they all can sortied or if only one can or what? By the way what's Tirpitz doing? So what are the impacts you forsee happening here?

“They likely would try and your last sentence highlites one of their problems. The navy might need to provide for said safety but they are incapable of doing so.”
I think not. They are not incapable of doing so if they deem it more important. Other threatres may suffer but that is basically your scenario reversed. It is ultimately down to priorities being made in German command.

No. You are forgetting there are two players in this game.

“While the German ships are in Brest they threaten a breakout. Once they are out it is no longer a threat and the initiative is up in the air.“
So a successful breakout is not a threat?

If they are sitting in Brest there's a chance that they can break out at any time and the British must constantly be on guard for this. Once they break out things are simplified especially if the British have a good idea where they are. If they are caught and either heavily damaged or sunk much of the threat goes away.

“He may indeed have issued the order but the naval opinion was hardly unanimous was it?”
“Against the advice of most senior officers...” suggest they most certainly did not approve it.

No, it suggest that some did not approve.

“In any case was "superior naval command" ever in Raeder's hands? Certainly Hitler had some impact on Bismarck's orders did he not?”
Not as to her deployment in the Atlantic.

He didn't? Wasn't it due to that there was a clause about not engageing enemy capital ships? Didn't he approve the operation?

“But of course it does not. Again I may have been unclear but when I talked about looking at what happened in Norway I was refering more to the tactical level. In particular how quickly German sorties were identified and the ships located and the RN reaction to them.”
Being stationary in a fjord tend to make that job easier.

???? and being stationary in Brest doesn't?

The question framed in the title is one of impact. To address it one has to look at multiple alternatives and the impact of them. Certainly their willingness to accept risk will impact which alternatives are the most likely but that's an intermediate consideration. Furthrmore as you point out the critical point is what will Hitler risk. It matters very little if the KM will accept the risk if Hitler won't.

The Bismarck sortie is a turning point for the surface warfare in the Atlantic.

No. It was not and could not be any more than the Battle of Jutland was in WWI.

[Terje Langoy]

”But I do believe German countermeasures will increase accordingly”

“Indeed. I haven't contested this although you keep repeating it.”

So when I say countermeasures will increase accordingly it actually meant countermeasures will increase but not enough? The key word here is accordingly. If a sufficient amount of resources cannot be made available then they cannot increase air cover to an appreciable level. In this regard you do contest it when you say they don´t have the resources.

“The question is would they be able to increase them enough to prevent damage to the German battleships without leaving serious weaknesses elsewhere?”

If they decide to increase air cover over Brest then this must be done to a level where it has an effect.

“Surface ships had seen some success in the Atlantic. Indeed even if Bismarck makes it back the Twins earlier cruise could be viewed as more successful.”

From a strategical point of view, maybe. But the Bismarck would have landed a major naval victory and then made it to port evading whatever the Royal Navy could toss at her. Despite she has not sunk a single merchant she can however add the Hood to her list of merits.

“So it's not clear how much if any the equation has chanded in this regard.”

It is not the actual results that matter at this point. It is whether the Germans would see profit, rather than cost, of having their battleships operating in the Atlantic. If Bismarck makes port at Brest then the abscence of defeat speak for continued operations rather than retreat.

Your reply to the next point need context.

"Furthermore the LW could do more in the East than it could in the battle for the Atlantic."

“Not if the air cover of Brest was a pivot point in the Atlantic campaign.”

“Yes even if it was misjudged that air cover of Brest was a pivot point in the Atlantic campaign".

It would be more productive if you could adress the point itself rather than distorting my position by calling it a misjudgement. Why could the Luftwaffe do more for a campaign not yet begun rather than for three battleships at Brest, in dire need of their protection?

“Furthermore there's no solid reason for assuming it would be.”

I found my reason above to be solid enough.

“That's so vague it's meaningless. Of course if things change so would German priorities.”

You accept if things change so will German priorities. Then you make points where German priorities have not changed. I prefer being vague rather than contradicting myself.

“I don't see where anyone else implied it either. Thus "responding" to it was responding to a strawman.”

No, that whole strawman thing is your cup of tea, not mine. I was responding to a hyperbole.

“It doesn't help Germany much if Britian is running critically short of supplies but there's a Soviet army just outside Berlin does it?”

The question probably serve a purpose but what could it be?

“Consider that by the time Bismarck made it home Barbarossa would be almost ready to get underway and the LW would have been tasked with that effort.”

The decisions to be made about Luftwaffe resources must be made the day Bismarck arrives at Brest. This situation will reach critical before the Barbarossa campaign has even begun.

“In Brest the battleships would likely still be under repair.”

And without proper air cover this repair period run a constant risk of becoming a permanent failure and a devastating loss to the German navy.

“Then with the German armies approaching Moscow in October are they really going to pull back the LW?”

The Luftwaffe would be needed over Brest several months ahead.

“Perhaps it would help if you suggest just how much more effort the LW would put into the defence of Brest.”

As much as they see neccessary to protect the ships. Vague as it may be this is still a hypothetical question thus I am not in a position to serve you facts and figures.

“Flying over Brest where there will be less warning, less enemy territory to cross, shorter distances to home (or emergency) fields, and the possibility of escort by British fighters it seems unlikely that they are going to suffer a great deal more losses.”

That would depend on how much resources the Luftwaffe can provide.

“They don't stay at Brest if they all can sortied or if only one can or what?”

The requirements to be met before the Germans attempt to breakout is beside the subject at hand. But since context is a very nice thing, let´s put this one into context. You wrote:

“They might well have sortied in 42.”

...to be followed by this:

“If they don't and they stay at Brest”

...whereas I replied they don´t stay at Brest if they can sortie. One would assume it was a suitable response but apparently it should also be decided on which terms they sortie. An interesting turn.

“By the way what's Tirpitz doing?”

The Tirpitz do what the Naval Command order her to do.

“So what are the impacts you forsee happening here?”

I haven´t got the slightest idea. But then again I´m not here to fight a hypothetical war. My concern is that the Channel Dash, though being an alternative, is unlikely to occur based on the proposed scenario in conjunction with the naval attitude of the time. Earlier posts, the one I responded to when I joined this thread, included a Channel Dash and I disagreed on it.

“You are forgetting there are two players in this game.”

It is actually not more difficult than you stating the Russian theatre, an event yet to begin, is more important than the Atlantic campaign, in need of a decision once Bismarck reaches Brest.

“If they are sitting in Brest there's a chance that they can break out at any time and the British must constantly be on guard for this.”

If they are sitting at Brest they are not in a position to do any damage.

“Once they break out things are simplified especially if the British have a good idea where they are.”

If the British does not have a good idea where they are then German ships are in a position where they could do some damage.

“Against the advice of most senior officers ... suggest they most certainly did not approve it.”

“No, it suggest that some did not approve.”

Most suggest majority, some does not. You distorted and missrepresented my position! By definition it would appear that you Sir have become the proud owner of a little strawman. Good for you!

“Not as to her deployment in the Atlantic.”

“He didn't? Wasn't it due to that there was a clause about not engageing enemy capital ships?

No, that clause was in effect before the Rheinubung sortie. That clause was implemented by the Naval Command, not Hitler, of reasons I thought obvious.

“Being stationary in a fjord tend to make that job easier.”

“And being stationary in Brest doesn't?”

Once more, they don´t stay at Brest if they can sortie.

“The Bismarck sortie is a turning point for the surface warfare in the Atlantic.“

“No. It was not and could not be any more than the Battle of Jutland was in WWI.”

Did the Germans continue to use battleships in the Atlantic after the Bismarck episode? If the answer is no, could the Bismarck episode be considered a turning point for the surface warfare in the Atlantic?