What If Bismarck Had Escaped?

[lwd]

Even given this

...This shows Tirpitz was capable of action in late Sep 41. It

It's not at all clear that this is correct:

So I guess it's a matter of how "prepared" you want the ship to be. June 1941 would be a bad time for the British fleet, and so would be Sept 1941.
In either case, Bismarck and Tirpitz could have attacked together 2-4 months after the historical events took place.

For one thing Bismarck is going to take a while to repair. Then there's the question of whether or not she takes additional damage while in Brest. Based on what happened to the twins and the extra notiriety that Bismarck had this seems very likely. Again if you look at the historical time lines even given your acclerated trial and training period it's unlikely that a breakout is going to be possible before October of 41. What problems do you see for the RN in that time frame compared to May of 41?

[Terje Langoy]

... it would seem rather odd that the Germans should not act accordingly if adding a third battleship at Brest. It is not hard to predict the most probable enemy response nor too hard to determine a proper countermeasure. If the Bismarck make port after sinking the Hood then her continued safety becomes a matter of great significance, both in military terms and for propaganda reasons. I do not believe the Luftwaffe will leave the skies above Brest uncontested - it will probably make the job harder for Allied pilots instead - furthermore it would divert even more attention away from Germany, something the Bomber Command did not appreciate.

This is the third post, or so, to presume the Tirpitz leave for Brest. Despite this I have yet to suggest she be transferred here. I did however act on the presumption she inherited the role of the Bismarck to be deployed for raider warfare in the Atlantic. And that is an entirely different bowl of soup. For what its worth the tactical advantage of the Tirpitz, being it a break out or transfer to Norway, would be her ability to act as diversion for the Home Fleet. For sure she cannot be left unattended. Though the Royal Navy be the greatest it will prove potentially disastrous for them to gather their forces off Brest. By this time the Japanese situation is getting difficult and the battle for the Mediterranean is still pending. And if the US should dispatch a few battleships, let alone any of their valuable aircraft carriers, to the Atlantic then the Pacific campaign may suffer.

It is also a well established fact the German battleships would run in circles around most of the capital British ships. Let´s not forget it was not the King George V or the Rodney that doomed the Bismarck, they merely finished the job after receiving a wounded battleship on a silver plattern - an incredible achievement made by a carrier-based Fairey Swordfish in a final attack. This was hardly the efficient way to deal with a vigilant battleship at large in the Atlantic and did prove the British had severe problems bringing battle upon a single battleship even if they had a fix on her position. Detection is the first step in a larger process. That said, the British would ultimately succeed and sink the German threat. Their resources exceeded the Germans to a point where this became an inevitable fact, a predicament obvious to Admiral Raeder already at the outbreak of war. Nonetheless that does not mean he should not try to make the best use of his ships.

There´s little reason to believe the Bismarck-sortie closed the GIUK-gap for good. Whether the Tirpitz could break out successful or not is an uncertain question and IMO her prospects were just as good as those of her predeccessor, might even be better if the Home Fleet was to be preoccupied outside Brest. That is the very essence of diversionary action, the strategy Raeder so eagerly pursued. A ship more somewhere means a ship less elsewhere. However after the channel dash Admiral Raeder left the drivers seat and the ships were reduced to deterrents, stationary targets to be destroyed by midget attacks and Tallboy bombs. I´d say the British navy received unexpected help when Hitler decided to remove his capital ships from the Atlantic theatre.

[lwd]

... it would seem rather odd that the Germans should not act accordingly if adding a third battleship at Brest. It is not hard to predict the most probable enemy response nor too hard to determine a proper countermeasure. If the Bismarck make port after sinking the Hood then her continued safety becomes a matter of great significance, both in military terms and for propaganda reasons. I do not believe the Luftwaffe will leave the skies above Brest uncontested - it will probably make the job harder for Allied pilots instead - furthermore it would divert even more attention away from Germany, something the Bomber Command did not appreciate.

But that of course is only looking at part of the equation. The LW had other and arguably more important concerns during this time period. There was this little matter of Barbarossa. Furthermore it's not clear that bomber command wouldn't appreciate the change. Brest was an easier target in many ways than Germany and if they could do what the RN didn't that's rather a feather in their caps is it not. In addition how much of their figher force could the LW afford to pull out of Germany to protect Brest? If they pull too much out bomber command gets a free ride there.

This is the third post, or so, to presume the Tirpitz leave for Brest.

But they don't have to. Breaking out into the Atlantic is much more difficult by way of Norway in late 41 and even more so in 42 than it was in May of 41. The RN is fully capable of putting tasks forces together than can simultaneously take on Tirpitz in the north and the German ships in Brest.

By this time the Japanese situation is getting difficult

Indeed POW and Repulse probably don't get sent to the Pacfic. Compared to the historical situation this isn't really a loss is it? The British may keep their carriers out of the Indian ocean as well. Again this isn't a loss compared to the historical situation now is it.

and the battle for the Mediterranean is still pending.

The old British battleships proved adequate in the Med especially early in the war.

And if the US should dispatch a few battleships, let alone any of their valuable aircraft carriers, to the Atlantic then the Pacific campaign may suffer.

The US had fast battleships operating continuously in the Atlantic and Ranger never left it except for brief excursions into the Med.

It is also a well established fact the German battleships would run in circles around most of the capital British ships.

Between KGV, POW, Renown, and Repulse the British had a force that could run down Bismarck and the Twins. Nelson, Rodny, and the QE's operating in pairs would have been more than a match for Tirpitz and capable of containing her if she was detected early enough which was almost guaranteed. Then there are the British carriers and depending on time frame more KGVs.

Let´s not forget it was not the King George V or the Rodney that doomed the Bismarck, they merely finished the job after receiving a wounded battleship on a silver plattern - an incredible achievement made by a carrier-based Fairey Swordfish in a final attack.

Nor should we forget that Bismarck was lucky to survive Denmark strait. Or for that matter that the British would still have carriers available.

This was hardly the efficient way to deal with a vigilant battleship at large in the Atlantic

Actually damaging a battleship via air attack then finishing it off with surface action isn't that inefficient.

... Nonetheless that does not mean he should not try to make the best use of his ships.

Indeed the question is what is the "best use"? The odds on them getting home after a sortie into the Atlantic decrease pretty constantly with time. By 42 they are low enough that I don't think it's a worth while risk. Following the example of Tirpitz may be better.

There´s little reason to believe the Bismarck-sortie closed the GIUK-gap for good.

Closed it no. Made an already difficult operation more difficult clearly. The Bismarck sortie clearly affected it particularly the roll up of support ships but the increased avaialbility of ships and planes in general and radar equiped ones in particular are the key.

Whether the Tirpitz could break out successful or not is an uncertain question and IMO her prospects were just as good as those of her predeccessor, might even be better if the Home Fleet was to be preoccupied outside Brest. ...

I rather disagree especially if you are talking 42 or later.

[Terje Langoy]

I´m referring to the part of the equation that other posts seems to neglect. I disagree on the statement that the British would be allowed to bomb Brest completely unopposed. Luftwaffe as well as the RAF had other concerns but this is utimately down to priorities being made on both sides. It is a feather added to the German cap if the Bismarck was to escape the full fury of the Royal Navy, a victory not to be sold cheap once the ship reaches safety at Brest. That is the sort of thing that tends to make a difference.

It may be more difficult for the Tirpitz to break out into the Atlantic later but it is not impossible. Though British countermeasures would have improved it is nonetheless a choice the Germans were free to make. They still held the initiative and so if the Tirpitz was to be deployed in the Atlantic then that was a risk to be accepted. History prove Admiral Raeder accepted that risk.

In hindsight the British losses to the Japanese situation may not have occurred. But then again the Royal Navy did not base their decisions on lessons drawn from the history books. The old battleships in the Mediterranean would prove themselves adequate for as long as they stayed here. Bottom line is that the British had areas of interest outside the Atlantic - which was sort of my point. Forces will be dispersed.

I´m not trying to convince anyone the Germans were about to succeed in their raider warfare, merely point out that the threat was far from eliminated.

[lwd]

... I disagree on the statement that the British would be allowed to bomb Brest completely unopposed.

That appears to be a strawman to me. I haven't seen anyone suggesting it.

Luftwaffe as well as the RAF had other concerns but this is utimately down to priorities being made on both sides. It is a feather added to the German cap if the Bismarck was to escape the full fury of the Royal Navy, a victory not to be sold cheap once the ship reaches safety at Brest. That is the sort of thing that tends to make a difference.

But the war in the east is vital to Germany winning. Likewise the Battle of the Atlantic is vital to the British. Thus the British will see damaging the Bismarck as more important that the Germans will see diverting much of the LW to her defence. The proximaty of Brest to Britian also means that escorts are possible. Combine this with the shorter travel over German territory and indeed shorter overall flight times compared to those to and from Germany and you have a situtation where RAF losses should go down or at least not exceed the historical losses by much.

It may be more difficult for the Tirpitz to break out into the Atlantic later but it is not impossible. Though British countermeasures would have improved it is nonetheless a choice the Germans were free to make. They still held the initiative and so if the Tirpitz was to be deployed in the Atlantic then that was a risk to be accepted. History prove Admiral Raeder accepted that risk.

How many German surface ships broke into the Atlantic in 1942 and after? How did their sorties go? Sure the Germans could send her out but if she gets heavily damaged or sunk that frees up even more British forces and if she gets damaged very far from a German port her odds of making it home become very small. It's far from clear it's woth the risk and certainly in the historical case she never broke into the Atlantic. Note that for at least part of the period there were indeed US fast battleships postioned to intercept her if she tried.

In hindsight the British losses to the Japanese situation may not have occurred. But then again the Royal Navy did not base their decisions on lessons drawn from the history books.

Indeed but the Atlantic has to be more important than the Pacfic to the British. Given that they can't send a fast battleship and battle cruiser that way when confronted by 4 German fast battleships. At least not until they have 4 KGVs operational.

The old battleships in the Mediterranean would prove themselves adequate for as long as they stayed here. Bottom line is that the British had areas of interest outside the Atlantic - which was sort of my point. Forces will be dispersed.

But likely not as disperesed as historical. Given the Germany first strategy the US may also have more ships in the Atlantic for as long as the German ships are a threat. Indeed a carrier strike vs Brest becomes a definite possiblity and USN dive bombers are a good more dangerous to the German ships than Bomer command. British tropedo bombers attacking at night could also be a real threat in 42.

I´m not trying to convince anyone the Germans were about to succeed in their raider warfare, merely point out that the threat was far from eliminated.

Agreed not eliminated, at least not likely until they stry to sortie or enough air power is committed.

[Terje Langoy]

“That appears to be a strawman to me. I haven't seen anyone suggesting it.”

Does that mean that “being bombed flat” is a more correct statement? It is as much a strawman but clearly this managed to slip past the philistine tendencies of yours. By all means call every strawman you see but I won`t be fooled by cheap rhetorics.

“The war in the East is vital to Germany winning. Likewise the Battle of the Atlantic is vital to the British.”

It is outlandish to believe a successful sortie by the Bismarck should not boost German morale in the Atlantic. To the contrary it would most probably strengthen Hitlers confidence in his surface ships. The Barbarossa campaign may be an important one but even this would be influenced by the Battle of the Atlantic, a fact the Germans were able to conceive.

“How many German surface ships broke into the Atlantic in 1942 and after?”

Is this a serious question..?

“It's far from clear it's worth the risk and certainly in the historical case she never broke into the Atlantic.”

What you personally consider an acceptable risk is irrelevant, the German navy did accept it. Admiral Raeder adviced against the ships being withdrawn from Brest and this ought to serve some clue as to the further intentions of the navy before Hitler intervened and ordered the ships back to Germany.

[madmike]

hi everyone just a little bit more to think about. When you say the Royal navy, At that time (and in most ways even today) you are talking about the whole RN. What i mean is the royal navy at that time included, The RAN,RNZN,RCN,ect just about Every navy that had the prefix,ROYAL. WAS the ROYAL NAVY...Their officers and crews were british trained, Their Ships(MOST) were British built. And in 1941-42 Most of the RAN and RNZN s ships were operating in the Atlantic/Med. I know that doesnt add any battleships/battle cruisers or carriers, but it does add some heavy and light cruisers as well a destroyers. For patrol work in the GIUK gap or off france.

[lwd]

“That appears to be a strawman to me. I haven't seen anyone suggesting it.”
Does that mean that “being bombed flat” is a more correct statement? It is as much a strawman but clearly this managed to slip past the philistine tendencies of yours.

Actually I'd consider it more of hyperbole. An exageration meant to illustrate a point but not be taken seriously. As such I didn't see any real need for me to comment on it.

By all means call every strawman you see but I won`t be fooled by cheap rhetorics.

A strawman is a "cheap rhetoric". By definition it missrepresents an opponents position and does so in a way that is easy to refute.

“The war in the East is vital to Germany winning. Likewise the Battle of the Atlantic is vital to the British.”
It is outlandish to believe a successful sortie by the Bismarck should not boost German morale in the Atlantic.

Here is another example of a straw man. Where have I stated or implied that it wouldn't?

To the contrary it would most probably strengthen Hitlers confidence in his surface ships.

It might indeed. That's not necessarily a good thing for Germany however is it?

The Barbarossa campaign may be an important one but even this would be influenced by the Battle of the Atlantic, a fact the Germans were able to conceive.

Indeed. But the influence of the Battle of the Atlantic on Barbarossa is hardly instantaneous nor is it critical. The Germans needed to win in the East quickly if they were to win at all. It can be reasonably argued that after 42 it was too late some have even suggested earlier dates. The LW was in turn critical to this effort. On the otherhand the RAF couldn't be used any more profitably than against Germany in the West and the Battle of the Atlantic. Basing would be essentially identical for these and shifting missions back and forth as view necessary or desireable was clearly possible. Thus at any one point in time the RAF should be able to devote a much greater percentage of it's resources to attacking the German ships at Brest. If that does indeed prove to tough a nut to crack because the LW has concentrated there they can shift the effort back to bombing Germany from the same bases or ones very near by. The LW then has to decide whether or not to maintain it's defences over Brest or shift back to defending Germany. If they choose the latter the RAF can shift again. To cover both the Germans need to allocate a disporportunate amount of the LW to the West which means it isn't in the critical battles in the East.

“How many German surface ships broke into the Atlantic in 1942 and after?”
Is this a serious question..?

Indeed it is. I'm aware that there were a number of engagments in the Arctic but can't remember hearing much about surface engagments in the Atlantic after or for that matter during 42.

“It's far from clear it's worth the risk and certainly in the historical case she never broke into the Atlantic.”
What you personally consider an acceptable risk is irrelevant, the German navy did accept it.

Did they? Then you won't have any trouble documenting the number of times Tirpitz broke into the Atlantic. Or did you mean keeping the twins at Brest? Certainly the KM seems to have been willing to do it past the time of the Channel dash but would they have continued to do so in the face of increaseing allied air raids and naval strength?

Admiral Raeder adviced against the ships being withdrawn from Brest and this ought to serve some clue as to the further intentions of the navy before Hitler intervened and ordered the ships back to Germany.

Certianly it's a clue but it's not clear whether they were to serve as a "fleet in being" there or whether a sortie was actually invisioned any time in the near future. Then of course there's the question of what they would have done 6 months or a year latter in the face of ever increasing allied force and capability in the Atlantic.

[Dave Saxton]

The war in the East is vital to Germany winning. Likewise the Battle of the Atlantic is vital to the British.

Germany started the war in the east and that is mainly why they lost the war. It was probably the biggest blunder in all military history. They didn't have to invade Russia. Hitler of course was hell bent on doing it, but it wasn't necessary.

The second sentence is absolutely correct and represented the best long term avenue to Germany winning the war in conjuction with a Med based strategy.

The OKM didn't abandon strategies involving the big ships in the battle on the Atlantic. An operation was planned to essentially repeat the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen operation with Tirpitz and Hipper, but Hitler would not agree to this until after the successful completion of Barbarossa. They planned on slipping Luetzow out in 1943 before Hitler's irrational reaction to Barents Sea changed things too.

[lwd]

The war in the East is vital to Germany winning. Likewise the Battle of the Atlantic is vital to the British.

Germany started the war in the east and that is mainly why they lost the war.

Getting into a war with Britain when they didn't have to, had no realistic way of forcing a conclusion, and wasn't required to fulfull thier long term strategy could also be considered a very serious error.

It was probably the biggest blunder in all military history.

I woldn't go that far. Indeed PH was probably a worse one.

They didn't have to invade Russia. Hitler of course was hell bent on doing it, but it wasn't necessary.

In that regard they didn't have to go to war at all.

The second sentence is absolutely correct and represented the best long term avenue to Germany winning the war in conjuction with a Med based strategy.

Depends on where your POD is. Not attacking Poland leads to some interesting options though the best don't result in a world war. As for the Battle of the Atlantic and a Med based strategy at best they are still a long shot.

The OKM didn't abandon strategies involving the big ships in the battle on the Atlantic. An operation was planned to essentially repeat the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen operation with Tirpitz and Hipper, but Hitler would not agree to this until after the successful completion of Barbarossa. They planned on slipping Luetzow out in 1943 before Hitler's irrational reaction to Barents Sea changed things too.

They may not have given up on them but how likely were they to be successful. When you look at that assets that become available in 43 to the allies does Lutzow have any significant chance of even getting into the Atlantic much less having success there?

[Terje Langoy]

I did not know I was in a debate with Schopenhauer.

“Actually I'd consider it more of hyperbole. An exageration meant to illustrate a point but not be taken seriously. As such I didn't see any real need for me to comment on it.”

Being it a strawman or hyperbole it does however insinuate something. Whether you need to have things served on a tea spoon is your burden. The fact you did not see any need to comment on it does not mean other don´t see the need. I did.

“A strawman is a cheap rhetoric. By definition it missrepresents an opponents position and does so in a way that is easy to refute.”

The hyperbole which I did respond to obviously did not missrepresent my position. It was merely an exaggeration to prove a point not to be taken seriously. Have it occurred to you I might have taken it seriously?

“It is outlandish to believe a successful sortie by the Bismarck should not boost German morale in the Atlantic.”

“Where have I stated or implied that it wouldn't?”

When you said the Battle of the Atlantic was vital to the British and that they likely would pour more resources into neutralizing the threat than the Germans would to protect it. That is where you said it. Acting under the persumption of this thread, the Bismarck arrives at Brest, you don´t think it will alter the Atlantic situation. I do.

“To the contrary it would most probably strengthen Hitlers confidence in his surface ships.”

“It might indeed. That's not necessarily a good thing for Germany however is it?”

And so you must resort to the wisdom of hindsight. You call for strawmen now and then but turn to the rhetorics of a four-year old boy to make your own points. I am not impressed.

“The Barbarossa campaign may be an important one but even this would be influenced by the Battle of the Atlantic, a fact the Germans were able to conceive.”

“Indeed. But the influence of the Battle of the Atlantic on Barbarossa is hardly instantaneous nor is it critical. The Germans needed to win in the East quickly if they were to win at all.“

Likewise Germany had to win in the Atlantic if she was ever to defeat Britain. The need to win in the East must not be on account of losing in the West. A dictum by Admiral Raeder, made in 1941, should display the naval attitude towards the Battle of the Atlantic:

“Decisive offensive warfare against merchant ships is the only way to conquer Britain; German surface forces may gradually be destroyed but this must not prevent them from operating against shipping.”

If the Bismarck had not been lost it could only serve to boost the belief that German battleships still could prove decisive in the Atlantic, and I don´t think Admiral Raeder would neglect to emphasize this in his reports to Hitler nor do I think he would accept that his ships be thrown to the wolves at such a vital moment in the Atlantic campaign.

“On the otherhand the RAF couldn't be used any more profitably than against Germany in the West and the Battle of the Atlantic.”

That´s true but it still does not guarantee that the Germans will not allocate as much resources as can be found in order to protect Brest. Priorities may be different if the Germans see a larger profit in the surface ships operating in the Atlantic theatre. Bismarck´s survival suggest they would.

“How many German surface ships broke into the Atlantic in 1942 and after?”

Is this a serious question..?

Indeed it is.

Despite the fact I have pointed out it was Hitler, and him alone, to order the ships back to Germany, against the naval staff´s advice, you refuse to consider the naval staff being forced to ride shotgun after 1941.

“What you personally consider an acceptable risk is irrelevant, the German navy did accept it.”

“Did they? Then you won't have any trouble documenting the number of times Tirpitz broke into the Atlantic.”

This comment makes a pretty lousy point. It is below us both and for the sake of a continued debate I hope it can be avoided in the future.

Or did you mean keeping the twins at Brest? Certainly the KM seems to have been willing to do it past the time of the Channel dash but would they have continued to do so in the face of increaseing allied air raids and naval strength?

Allied air raids actually decreased after June 1941. Once the Twins became operational they would undoubtedly attempt to breakout, as was the naval agenda. In his memoirs Admiral Raeder made a pretty interesting note concerning the submarine success in the Atlantic 1942. He wrote:

“Results would have been even greater if the German heavy forces had not been required to return to their bases in accordance with orders.”

... and this he write years after the war has ended. What is there to suggest he would think otherwise in the midst of war? For me it seems the German ships would be deployed offensive until the point they would all be overwhelmed and sunk, if Raeder could have it his way. The so-called “fleet in being” was the curse of the Imperial Navy, a lesson Raeder was determined not to repeat.

[Dave Saxton]

Getting into a war with Britain when they didn't have to, had no realistic way of forcing a conclusion, and wasn't required to fulfull thier long term strategy could also be considered a very serious error.
.................In that regard they didn't have to go to war at all.
......... Not attacking Poland leads to some interesting options though the best don't result in a world war. As for the Battle of the Atlantic and a Med based strategy at best they are still a long shot.......

Your shifting the context of the discussion away from the Battle of the Atlantic and strategic options in 1940/1941 all the way back to the Invasion of Poland. Hitler thought he could get away with it, but Britain and France declared war on Germany. Germany didn't overtly seek a war against Britain and France. Nobody claimed that the Germans would ultimately be successful in a more naval based strategy after the BoB, but it certainly had a greater chance of success than invading Russia! They had already succeeded in the east for the time being through the nonagression pact and they were being supplied with resources by Russia. Even success against Russia does nothing to help the unresolved situation in the west. What a momumental blunder!

[lwd]

I did not know I was in a debate with Schopenhauer.

????

“Actually I'd consider it more of hyperbole. An exageration meant to illustrate a point but not be taken seriously. As such I didn't see any real need for me to comment on it.”

Being it a strawman or hyperbole it does however insinuate something.

There is a huge difference between a hyperbole and a strawman. The first as I said is an obvious exageration not meant to be taken seriously. The latter is a distortion of someone elses position and indicates a lack of understanding or a deliberate attempt to mislead.

Whether you need to have things served on a tea spoon is your burden.

I'm not sure what tea spoons have to do with anything here or why it's my "burden".

The fact you did not see any need to comment on it does not mean other don´t see the need. I did.

That's fine however. If you had stated it was an exageration of words to that effect I would have agreed with you. However you twisted it into something entirely different and I called you on it.

The hyperbole which I did respond to obviously did not missrepresent my position.

Agreed. Nor did I imply it did. Indeed it's a critical difference between it and a strawman.

It was merely an exaggeration to prove a point not to be taken seriously.

No. It was an exaggeration (not to be taken seriously) but to illustrate a point that was serious. Now whether or not that point is correct is an open topic.

Have it occurred to you I might have taken it seriously?

Yes. But in that case if you disagreed you should have argued against the point rather than misrepresenting his position. Or if you thought that he really meant the LW wouldn't oppose the RAF asked him if that was the case.

“It is outlandish to believe a successful sortie by the Bismarck should not boost German morale in the Atlantic.”
“Where have I stated or implied that it wouldn't?”
When you said the Battle of the Atlantic was vital to the British and that they likely would pour more resources into neutralizing the threat than the Germans would to protect it.

I simply don't see where you got one from the other. I will admit that my statement lacked a certain amount of clarity. Perhaps I should have made it cleaer that the only place the RAF and RN could have significant impact in a critical area was the Battle of the Atlantic and bombing Germany. Given that the RAF can committ greater resources there as the LW and to a minor extent the KM can have considerable impact in the East.

That is where you said it. Acting under the persumption of this thread, the Bismarck arrives at Brest, you don´t think it will alter the Atlantic situation. I do.

Alter the situation? It clearly will. Gain Germany any signficant advantage? I don't think so especially in the long term.

“To the contrary it would most probably strengthen Hitlers confidence in his surface ships.”
“It might indeed. That's not necessarily a good thing for Germany however is it?”
And so you must resort to the wisdom of hindsight.

You are the one who started making statments about things altering the situation. How else can we tell if they will change things for the better or worse or just make them different other than applying hindsight. Indeed the situation has already changed if Bismarck makes it too Brest.

You call for strawmen now and then but turn to the rhetorics of a four-year old boy to make your own points. I am not impressed.

So rather than generating a logical fact based argument against my points you attack me. That's suppose to impress people? It rather points to the lack of fact and logic to counter my position.

...Likewise Germany had to win in the Atlantic if she was ever to defeat Britain.

Perhaps in deed probably. But in 1942 the threat was Soviet armies advancing on Germany or British bombers scattering a few bombs around Germany. Also if they won in the east then theoretically this would open up many of the resources they lacked. At least that seems to have been the thinking on the part of Hitler. Or maybe he just couldn't figure out how to defeat Great Britian so went on to something else.

The need to win in the East must not be on account of losing in the West. A dictum by Admiral Raeder, made in 1941, should display the naval attitude towards the Battle of the Atlantic:
“Decisive offensive warfare against merchant ships is the only way to conquer Britain; German surface forces may gradually be destroyed but this must not prevent them from operating against shipping.”
If the Bismarck had not been lost it could only serve to boost the belief that German battleships still could prove decisive in the Atlantic, and I don´t think Admiral Raeder would neglect to emphasize this in his reports to Hitler nor do I think he would accept that his ships be thrown to the wolves at such a vital moment in the Atlantic campaign.

I don't have any arguement with this. However the question we are trying to answer is what effect this would have had. To do so we must look at how the war developed and when one looks at the forces that became available to the allied navies in 1942 it is clear that German surface units weren't going to have a huge effect on the battle of the Atlantic. Indeed if they are lost sortieing in 42 then the Murmansk convoys become far easier and the Soviet position stronger.

“On the otherhand the RAF couldn't be used any more profitably than against Germany in the West and the Battle of the Atlantic.”
That´s true but it still does not guarantee that the Germans will not allocate as much resources as can be found in order to protect Brest. Priorities may be different if the Germans see a larger profit in the surface ships operating in the Atlantic theatre. Bismarck´s survival suggest they would.

The Germans have 3 important areas to consider for LW deployment in this case. 1) Brest, 2) Germany 3) the East. 3 is clearly the most important. The German plan for Barbarossa required winning in 41 indeed by the early fall of 41. When they didn't then it became clear if they didn't in 42 they would be handing the initiative over to the Soviets which they simply could not afford. So clearly they need to put the preponderence of the LW in the East. Furthermore it would be politically unacceptable not to have significant defenceive forces protecting Germany especially if they are getting attacked there. The logical conclusion is that they are varry limited as to what resources they can commit to Brest.

Despite the fact I have pointed out it was Hitler, and him alone, to order the ships back to Germany, against the naval staff´s advice,

The surface navy was used in Norwegian waters was it not? It is perhaps worthwhile examing what happened there then.

you refuse to consider the naval staff being forced to ride shotgun after 1941.

This is not at all clear. Perhaps the phrase "ride shotgun" has a different meaning over there, standard US usage simply makes no sense in this context.

“What you personally consider an acceptable risk is irrelevant, the German navy did accept it.”
“Did they? Then you won't have any trouble documenting the number of times Tirpitz broke into the Atlantic.”
This comment makes a pretty lousy point. It is below us both and for the sake of a continued debate I hope it can be avoided in the future.

One can say that about your line of comentary as well. Because if we are looking at impact whether or not the Germans were willing to accept it is not the important thing. It's what happens if they do and what happens if they don't.

Or did you mean keeping the twins at Brest? Certainly the KM seems to have been willing to do it past the time of the Channel dash but would they have continued to do so in the face of increaseing allied air raids and naval strength?

Allied air raids actually decreased after June 1941.

But would that situation exist with the Bismarck there as well? Furthermore would it hold long into 42?

Once the Twins became operational they would undoubtedly attempt to breakout, as was the naval agenda.

The question is at what point would such an attmept be made. Would they wait for all three ships to become operational? or any two of them? or would they let them sortie individually. The latter sounds unlikely as I believe you've stated at least one was operational most of the latter months of 41. So we are looking at what a sortie sometime in 42 perhaps February at the earliest? If Bismarck last but another year and the Germans loose her along with their other battleships during a sortie in early 42 are they really ahead of the game? I think rather the British may be ahead in this one although the Japanese may be the big loosers.

... The so-called “fleet in being” was the curse of the Imperial Navy, a lesson Raeder was determined not to repeat.

[/quote]
That sounds like a good topic for another thread.

[lwd]

...Your shifting the context of the discussion away from the Battle of the Atlantic and strategic options in 1940/1941 all the way back to the Invasion of Poland.

Actually you did that when you made the comment about "in all of military history". I just pointed out bludners I considered of equal or greater import.

Hitler thought he could get away with it, but Britain and France declared war on Germany.

He thought he could get away with it but misjudged Britain and France. Counts as a "blunder" in my book.

but it certainly had a greater chance of success than invading Russia!

Did it? As conducted certainly but if the Germans had behaved differently it's not as clear.

... Even success against Russia does nothing to help the unresolved situation in the west.

But Hitler apparently thought it would. Was this another blunder or part of the same one?

What a momumental blunder!

I'll agree with that one.

[madmike]

Hi everyone, Just a couple of thoughts, No-one is saying that a breakout into the Atlantic by the Tirpitz was IMPOSSIBLE, Just that the chances of success are VERY VERY poor, By 42(mid) the Germans are stretched too far. They are invading Russia and fighting in North Africa(the Russian campaign took most of Rommel's reenforcement) which some could argue caused their(German) first defeat on land. As well as the problem of the different resistance groups in the occupied countries.They just didnt have the resources(men and equipment) to cover the work load they had. Then if you add the support the US would give the RN, with the help of the USN, and what the RN.(Royal Navy, Royal Aus Navy, Royal NZ Navy, Royal Canadian navy,ect,(THE ROYAL NAVY !)), would pull together, Then the sheer numbers push a breakout by Tirpitz into the Atlantic to near suicidal. I know the(near suicide)comment is going to get me caned by alot of people, but the numbers DONT lie. I think by the end of 42, the chances of the Germans being able to breakout in the Atlantic, IN force (a couple battleships at least). Are just too extreme for the German high command(and Hitler)to risk.
just my humble thoughts.