Did Hood fire back turrets on DS ?

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao all,

Could Hood fire back turrets ??

When in the battle ??

Did Hood do it ??

If so against who ??

What about PoW ??


Ciao Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao all,

well this post did not have a lot of attention

Anyway, maybe adding this piece of information it can be that someone gets interested

My current calculations below :

At 05.53, beginning of action with British ships on course 300° degrees

Hood fired 337 degrees while on course 300 degrees. So forward turrets bearing 37 degrees to the right. Aft turrets CAN potentially fire for 7 degrees ( 30 was the blind area if they can bear 150 degrees as 30+150=180 ). So 37-30= 7 YES

PoW fired 335 degrees while on course 300 degrees. So forward turrets bearing 35 degrees to the right. Aft turret CANNOT potentially fire for 10 degrees ( 45 was the blind area if they can bear 135 degrees as 45+135=180 ). So 35-45= -10 NO

At 05.55, after the first turn of 20 degrees to port, now on 280° degrees

I assume Hood fired 330 degrees while on course 280 degrees. So forward turrets bearing 50 degrees to the right. Aft turrets CAN potentially fire for 20 degrees ( 30 was the blind area if they can bear 150 degrees as 30+150=180 ). So 50-30= 20 YES

PoW fired 332 degrees while on course 280 degrees. So forward turrets bearing 52 degrees to the right. Aft turret CAN potentially fire for 7 degrees ( 45 was the blind area if they can bear 135 degrees as 45+135=180 ). So 52-45= 7 YES.
And in fact after her 9th salvo Prince of wales did fire the aft Y turret too as reported by Captain Leach narrative on ADM 116-4352 I am just reading carefully.

Consequently :

according to the above calculations I made the other turn of 20 degrees to port ordered at 05.59 on course 260 degrees was only to make PoW aft turrets ( that already fired ) only more comfortable on doing it, while Hood was a lot better positioned on firing to Prinz Eugen due to her more rotation angles. In case Hood changed to Bismarck ( to me never happened ) that was even better as Bismarck was behind so better angles for Hood on the aft.

Now some questions I asked do have responses, while others do require more infos and study.

Opinions welcome anyway, now some data are there usable by everybody to make considerations.

Ciao Antonio

[RF]

My understanding is that Hood fired on Prinz Eugen from A and B turrets. Although Holland evidently realised his original identification error and ordered target reselection Hood never fired on Bismarck from these turrets. Turrets X and Y I believe were unsighted right up to the point of Hood's destruction.

[Vic Dale]

I find it hard to see RF's reasoning here.

If Hood could fire with all four turrets on PG, who was 3000m ahead of the Bismarck, then Hood could easily range on Bismarck.

A-Arcs remained closed in PoW until salvo 9 when a turn of 20 degrees to port opened them soon after 0557. PG recorded Hood's salvoes as falling; one short and ahead to port, one short close to port putting the decks awash and correct for line and one over to starboard adjacent to the after 105mm Flak. Subesequent salvoes were reported as falling in the wake.

A crack gunnery ship like Hood would not loose the target for line under the prevailing conditions. Course and speed of own ship and target were steady, so there was nothing to upset the gunnery-solution for line. PG would most certainly have been straddled and very likely hit if the Hood had continued firing at her. PG's course remained steady until 4 minutes after Hood blew up, so it is clear that Hood shifted fire after the 3rd salvo.

Very likely it was observation of the fall of Bismarck's 2nd salvo which convinced VA. Holland that they had the wrong target and that fire should be shifted "one ship right." There is no reason why Hood could not fire with all four turrets from that time and I believe that she did so was observed in PoW.

That Ted Briggs did not think the after guns had opened, may be due to battle nerves and the altering of perceptions which is common in battle. He spoke of notiving his nerves receding and form of calm detachment coming over him. That in itself is an expression of altered perception. He noticed PoW firing on Hood's starboard quarter even though he could not see her and it is easily possible that he mistook some of Hood's salvoes fired from aft, for the fire of PoW. The close-order of the squadron may well have caused this confusion. If the main battery was firing from fore and aft symultaneously, the distinction between fore and aft may have been lost due to the 100 yard separation between fore and aft turrets in the very long Hood.

PoW did not shift target during the action, though I think it is likely that Holland may have intended PoW to engage PG after Hood shifted fire to Bismarck. That may be the reasoning behind the signal for a turn to port ("Blue 2") at 0600 which was never executed. There does not seem to be a good reason for such a turn at this time as the safe range for Hood was still 2 minutes away at current rate of closure and target bearing was steady. So to my mind it is more than likely that PoW would have been ordered to shift target "one ship Left" if Hood had lasted longer.

Prior to the opening of battle PoW received a "concentration" signal which meant concentration of the ships of the squadron and there was no "concentration of fire" ordered. It seems that Holland intended a ship-for-ship engagement, with Hood taking the lead ship, which in Hood was thought at the time to be Bismarck. This I believe led to Captain Leach accepting his target (the right hand ship - Bismarck) without for asking confirmation that the squadron was concentrating on Bismarck. A concentration order would have caused Leach to shift target to PG when he saw that Hood was firing on her, though probably not without asking for confirmation of the Admiral's intentions.

Vic Dale

[Bgile]

I think Hood was firing at PE up until the former was sunk. I think it's possible Hood's aft turrets were unable to train far enough forward to apply the correct lead to PE.

[dunmunro]

There may have also been concerns about blast from the 15" guns causing casualties amongst the after 4" gun crews, and maybe amongst the after HADCT.

[Vic Dale]

Holland was over heard to order a shift of target, so although Schmalenbach in PG reported Hood's guns trained on him the whole time this is not correct. Also it is clear that Hood's fire wandered off line by a very large degree after three salvoes which bracketed PG and secured her for line. There is nothing in the ship's relative courses to cause any problem to the gunnery solution in Hood, so this has to be the time when fire was shifted to Bismarck.

Holland ordered the fire on the boat deck to be allowed to burn itself out, so there was no concern for the safety of fire crews with regard to Hood's own unnery and those still alive on the boat deck would have to find shelter. Fire-gongs sited at various positions where gun blast could pose a danger, would sound when a slavo was due to go out and people exposed would have time to take cover. Ting-Ting - "Duck! - " Ting-Ting - "Boom!!!" Then up and get on with your life. When the guns fire, there is little concern for personell in exposed positions. If they don't like it they have to keep their heads down. I was blown backwards through a door one time when our ship was firing on an after bearing, because I was not paying attention to the armament broadcast.

Concern for a director whose only function was Fire Control is ruled out. Such a position is pre-stressed to ensure it can take a shaking and part of the ship's gunnery trials includes close fire with A-Arcs bridged to assess poundage on structures. There are tables for this sort of thing and they are used in the event that A-Arcs have to be bridged during action. I have the feeling that they may well have been bridged during this action too.

Vic Dale

[RF]

I think Hood was firing at PE up until the former was sunk. I think it's possible Hood's aft turrets were unable to train far enough forward to apply the correct lead to PE.

This is also my understanding of the situation.

Also I am not clear why Holland would wish to target PE with POW given that Bismarck was the threat, particulary to Hood. POW could target PE with its secondary guns once they were in range. Otherwise a battleship is a more important target than a cruiser.

[Vic Dale]

In his Post Action Report, Captain Leach states that he thought his squadron would be able to deal effectively with both units of the enemy squadron, so clearly the intention to engage both ships is established. It was known that PG was an extremely fast vessel, so if she was not put under fire early she would likely get away. Holland's primary task was to stop the enemy "squadron" getting into the Atlantic to attack merchant shipping. if Bismarck was stopped whilst PG was left to do as she pleased, although a major naval victory might be secured, it would mark only a partial success. It was essential to stop them both.

If PG was to be stopped she should be engaged as quickly as possible to stop or slow her so that she could be sunk either by the heavy units or finished off by the cruisers which were known to be shadowing astern. This I believe was Holland's intention as he signalled PoW to engage the target to the right whilst Hood took the left. Faulty ship recognition may have caused Holland to think Bismarck was the leading ship and perhaps especially so, as the cruisers had failed to notify him of the "number change" during the night. Had he known that PG was the leading ship it is pretty certain that he would have tasked his weakest unit to engage her whilst Hood dealt with Bismarck.

PoW was a very new and untried weapon though more or less fully worked up. Everyone was well drilled and keen as mustard, but they had had no battle experience as a unit, whereas Hood had been in commission for a good while and had sailed under war conditions for some time with a number of bouts of action behind her. The main questions would be; how well would PoW's gunnery gunnery team acquit itself and how would the ship and crew stand up to battle damage? It wsas known aslo that PoW had dockyard specialists aboard working on the engines and the guns which were not entirely satisfactory at the time.

If the squadron was going to enegage ship for ship, as it seems Holland clearly intended by his order to PoW to take the right hand target, then PG would have been PoW's target from the outset, a task she might easily handle and having despatched or badly damaged the crusier could come in and play her part in finishing off the German heavy unit.

Hood took the leading ship as her target and when Bismarck's salvoes began to land close to the flagship, it became clear that Hood was "firing at the wrong ship" and a shift of target became necessary. Now both British ships were firing on the German flagship, whilst her consort was left untouched. That is a situation which would probably not last for long and had Hood been able to continue the fight it seems likely that PoW would have been ordered to shift target.

I personally think the shift of target in Hood came early and if so, the tactical situation which developed when Hood's boat deck RU lockers were hit, may have caused Holland to think the German Flagship required a concentration of fire for a time to force her to turn away, which it seems she did at about 0600, about the time Hood blew up.

With Bismarck heading west at 280 deg. and with PG maintaining 220 deg. the German squadron would begin to diverge and if that continued PG would most certainly get away. As soon as Bismarck settled to her new course, it is most likely that Holland would have ordered PoW to shift fire to her.

I don't think there is any chance that Hood fired at PG the whole time and I believe the source of this idea comes from Lt Schmalenbach, PG's 2nd Artillery Officer, who says he saw Hood's guns pointing at him the whole time. Firstly he would not have had his eye on Hood the whole time. He had action duties to perform which would take his attention away. He says that he saw Hood's guns fire at PG just as her bows began to lift and by this time Hood was slewing to port. It is likely then, that his intitial observations matched his last observation and he has simply drawn a conclusion. Secondly there are the reports in PG as to Hood's fall of shot which found the cruiser for line at the second salvo and bracketed the ship by the third and thereafter her shells were seen falling in PG's wake. A crack gunnery ship like Hood does not lose the target for line when the firing ship and the target are on such steady and predictable courses at known speeds.

If PG and Bismark could hit Hood, she would most certainly have had them and if Hood had fired at PG throughout, the cruiser would have been forced to turn away or get hit.

Vic Dale

[Bgile]

Holland clearly intended to concentrate the fire of both of his ships on Bismarck. Here are a couple quotes from the HMS Hood website:

"By 0552 hours, the range had decreased to roughly 25,000 yards / 12.3 nm / 22.8 km. The British vessels were now on a heading of 300º, a further turn of 20º towards the enemy having been executed at 0549. At 0550, Holland gave the order 'G.S.B. 337 L1' directing Hood and Prince of Wales to both engage the left hand German ship bearing 337º, which was presumed to be Bismarck. In reality, it was Prinz Eugen. Aboard Prince of Wales the mistake was realised fairly quickly. Gunnery Officer, Lieutenant Commander Colin McMullen, correctly identified the right-hand ship as Bismarck and ordered her to be targeted. Despite this correct identification, he had a difficult time in obtaining accurate ranges until just prior to the time fire was opened."

and:

"As the ships grew closer, the spotters in Hood realised their mistake. VADM Holland was informed and only moments before opening fire, he ordered 'GOB1' directing that fire be switched to the right hand German ship, Bismarck. This order was definitely communicated to Prince of Wales. It is also believed to have been meant for his own ship as well. Despite this, Hood's target remained the left hand ship, Prinz Eugen. The reason for this failure to switch targets is not exactly known. It may not have been possible to switch over quickly enough or there may have been communications problems."

[Vic Dale]

To Bgile.

I think you are right after all.

I have been looking at the "F/C Signals Made on the F/C Wave" document and that contains details which are missing in the Gunnery Narrative.

I am assuming that "GIC" abbreviates "Group is to Concentrate"

And " 2 v 1" means "Two versus One"

In the Narrative GOB 1 was said to have been signalled, but in "F/C Signals" it says;

"0552 2v1 GOB - 1" Which I take to mean "Shift target one ship right - 2 versus 1" Concentrate.

So it seems Holland really did intend to concentrate his fire.

This throws a different light on the matter, because if Hood's fire was supposed to be directed at the "right ship" it is unlikely that Hood's fire was directed at PG by intent and that a communication error occured between the ship's command and the gunnery department or within the gunnery department itself.

Possibly Holland watching for the fall of shot on Bismarck and not seeing any, at first assumed that the fall was "over" and not visble as is often the case. The narrow field of view through the ship's high intensity optics plus the wide (3000m) separation of the two German ships, may have caused the spotters to miss the fact that their shells were falling visibly near PG and not invisibly near Bismarck. Holland responsible for his whole squadron and observing the ships of the enemy squadron as a whole may well have been the one who spotted the error and then ordered the shift of target in Hood.

How soon did he spot the mistake and how long did it take to run down the cause of shells landing near PG, ie who was firing on her? Ted Briggs remembers the Admiral speaking to the spotting top and he may have asked where they observed the last fall of shot and on receiving the reply, "2 Over and correct for line." The Admiral ordered the shift of target "One ship right." His "flat monotonous tone" may well have concealed the fact that he was absolutely seething, but at the same time mindful that he should display no sign of displeasure, lest he make some of the men under his command nervous.

From the way the signals were made, it seems clear that Holland himself knew which ship was which at "open fire" (GOB - 1 - 2v1) and ordered his squadron to conentrate on Bismarck.

In PG they describe one salvo falling to port-ahead, the next falling to port-close and correct for line, putting the decks awash and the third falling to starboard-aft and again correct for line. Hood had bracketed the target by her 3rd salvo and pieces of her shells were later discovered on the decks of PG. After this Hood's shells were seen to fall in the ship's wake. Hood would not have lost the target for line, so it means that the error was spotted at salvo 3 and fire shifted to Bismarck.

Taking PoW's salvoes as a guide;

2 at 0553, 2 at 0554, 2 at 0555, 2 at 0556 - Blue 2 Squadron Turns - one near the end of 0557, 2 at 0558, 2 at 0559 etc ,

we could assume for Hood as follows;

1 at 0552, 2 at 0553 - "shift target" - 2 at 0555, 2 at 0556 - 0557 "Blue 2" executed, squadron turns 20 degrees to port - 2 at 0558 2 at 0559 - destruction.

This makes for a possible 13 salvoes fired by Hood - 9 of two guns each from the forward turrets and 4 of 4 guns fired from fore and aft. That a maximum of 10 salvoes were observed may be explained by battle smoke and distraction by action duties.

Looking once more at the angle of view from PoW it seems very likely that the flash from "X" guns could have been masked by the flash from "Y" guns. As the electrical "bridge" in the firing cartridge in each breech was remotely controlled from the TS, all four guns would go off at exactly the same time, or not at all. There could be all sorts of reasons why a particular gun did not meet a salvo, bad drill, faulty cartridge, or a safety interlock failing to close, but given the rather sedate nature of the gun duel at this early stage of the battle it is most likely that failure to observe is the logical explanation for "X" turret not being seen to fire on one of the salvoes allotted to it.

Vic Dale

[Bgile]

Well, Holland initially ordered both ships to concentrate on the left hand target, so I think it was his mistake originally. He attempted to correct it, but PoW ignored the original order and was already shooting at Bismarck and as you say Hood's gunnery department may not have gotten the word.

I think PoW's secondary battery may have been shooting at PE, but it had some FC issues.

[Vic Dale]

To Bgile.

Hood signalled "GOB-1 2v1" at 0552, "Shift target one ship right." Just before Hood opened fire at 0552 1/2. PoW did not fire until 0553:10.

So Leach did nothing of the sort and nor would any Captain ignore "Father's" instructions if he was intent on keeping his command. If he was ordered to fire at the leading ship, he would jolly well do so, or risk a boot up his arse. The Admiral may well have seen something Leach had not seen in the tactical situation. That is why the navy has chain of command. That is also why the squadron had an admiral in command instead of the C-nin-C sailing two "Brown Ships" - ships with independent command. At no time does Leach himself say he ignored BC1's instructions. That sounds like journalistic interpretation to me.

Nelson may well have put his telescope to the "blind eye" but that was when he was fully engaged and winning. A different story altogether.

Vic Dale

[Bgile]

To Bgile.

Hood signalled "GOB-1 2v1" at 0552, "Shift target one ship right." Just before Hood opened fire at 0552 1/2. PoW did not fire until 0553:10.

So Leach did nothing of the sort and nor would any Captain ignore "Father's" instructions if he was intent on keeping his command. If he was ordered to fire at the leading ship, he would jolly well do so, or risk a boot up his arse. The Admiral may well have seen something Leach had not seen in the tactical situation. That is why the navy has chain of command. That is also why the squadron had an admiral in command instead of the C-nin-C sailing two "Brown Ships" - ships with independent command. At no time does Leach himself say he ignored BC1's instructions. That sounds like journalistic interpretation to me.

Nelson may well have put his telescope to the "blind eye" but that was when he was fully engaged and winning. A different story altogether.

Vic Dale

Please try not to be so condescending. I know what a chain of command is, as you well know.

"At 0550, Holland gave the order 'G.S.B. 337 L1' directing Hood and Prince of Wales to both engage the left hand German ship bearing 337º, which was presumed to be Bismarck. In reality, it was Prinz Eugen. Aboard Prince of Wales the mistake was realised fairly quickly. Gunnery Officer, Lieutenant Commander Colin McMullen, correctly identified the right-hand ship as Bismarck and ordered her to be targeted."

If this is not ignoring Holland's instructions, I don't know what is. He had previously expressed his intent to concentrate fire on Bismarck and PoW realized he had made a mistake with his initial order to concentrate on the left hand target. They were following his intent instead of his mistaken order, so they ignored that order and targeted Bismarck. The fact that Holland reversed his command and ordered a switch to the right hand target doesn't change the fact the PoW was going to shoot at that target anyway.

[Vic Dale]

The problem here is, the left hand ship did not bear 337 degrees and nor could it. That was spot-on for Bismarck astern of PG and given two minutes progression, lines up pefectly with PoW's range and bearing of 334 - 335 degrees and 25,000 yards true range (tracked back from known straddles.

"GSB/337/L1 was clearly sent in error either through faulty signalling or reading the chart upside down.

"GOB - 1" would quickly smoothe out the inconsistency and give the correct target to PoW without having to send; the date, time of origin, original content, corrected version and a repeat of the correction.

Leach countering the Admiral's order off his own bat, bears as much relation to reality as Lindemann disobeying Lutjens and opening fire. Both are a mixture of journalistic licence and lower-deck gossip. They make a good story.

Vic Dale