Norfolk and suffolk in the Denmark strait!

[Nellie]

I can not understand why Norfolk and Suffolk didn't engage the Prinz Eugen in the Denmark strait, I mean when Bismarck was busy with the British battleships the Norfolk and Suffolk could have pounded the Prinz Eugen, the ships seem to be pretty equal in armament and speed and they were two to one in favor of the british, I think they had damaged her alot.

[Tiornu]

I don't believe they were ever ordered to attack. By the time the battle started, they were well behind the Germans; it would have been difficult to catch up, and Bismarck was between them and Eugen.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao Nellie, Tiornu and all,

@ Nellie,

your point is obvious and everybody, including Admiral Tovey, would have done that.

Those were the orders issued by the British Admiralty for the engagement.

It is not my opinion, it is well written into Captain Leach narrative of the events ( reference signals received from Vice-Adm Holland just before the action ) as well as into the Supplement to the London Gazette written by Admiral Tovey.

Why the orders were never received ( apparently ) by Norfolk/Wake Walker and Suffolk is not known to me yet.

Surely on Norfolk, Suffolk, Hood and PoW they were thinking Bismarck ahead of Prinz Eugen and not vice versa, this was a major error by them.

Only Ltnt Mc Mullen on board PoW recognized correctly Bismarck been back and changed target opening fire at 05.53.

Hood fired to Prinz Eugen thinking it was Bismarck, Norfolk and Suffolk remained at 23.000 and 28.000 meters never closing in.

At 06.02 when Hood was gone and PoW was in serious troubles Norfolk fired 3 salvoes to Bismarck well short, that was it.

At 06.19 Suffolk fired 5 salvoes to Prinz Eugen when thought they were closing distances.

Churchill wanted Captain Leach and Wake-Walker head's from Admiral Tovey, and I think ( and this is my personal opinion ) that if Bismarck was not going to be sunk they were going to run serious troubles.

Than Admiral Tovey did the job and sunk teh Bismarck ( despite some personal troubles with Churchill due to KG V fuel conditions ) and he had some cards to play against Churchill.

He wanted to dismiss from his position because of Churchill roughness and interferences, and I think after a face to face they reached an agreement, Tovey remained in his position and Leach and Wake Walker were safe.

Did I made the scenario clear enough ?

Admiral Reader made something similar to save Kpt Brinnkmann as well versus Hitler.

@ Tiornu,

it woudl be very interesting to know what the Norkolk and Suffolk official war diary says about those orders.
Were they really never received ??
If so why Holland and Tovey made those statement so clear ?
Those were the orders and they knew it well.

Ciao Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao all,

some evidences

Read point 17 from Adm Tovey on this link :

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... tovey.html

17. It was the intention of the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron, that the Hood and Prince of Wales should engage the Bismarck, leaving the Prinz Eugen to the cruisers, but the Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, was not aware that the battlecruiser force was so near; the Norfolk and Suffolk, therefore, shadowing from the eastward and northward respectively at a range of about 15 miles, were not in a position to engage the Prinz Eugen who was now stationed ahead of the Bismarck on a course of 240°.

and on May 24th at 00.32 am on this message from Adm Holland to Prince of Wales :

"Intend both ships ( Hood and PoW ) to engage "Bismarck" and to leave "Prinz Eugen" to "Norfolk" and "Suffolk" = 00.32 ."

Ciao Antonio

[wadinga]

All,
Holland might have liked the idea of Norfolk and Suffolk assisting in the Denmark Strait, but in the circumstances it was impossible. N & S had to remain far enough back from Lutjens to be safe, but had only a 2-3 knot theoretical speed advantage to close to gunnery range. They would have needed hours of pre-warning of Holland's predicted start of engagement time in order to close in at 2-3000 yds an hour. Holland couldn't predict this because his interception was based on the inadequately known relative positions of the forces.

Wake-Walker was giving his position, and that of the Germans relative to him, but he had been sailing at high speed on various evasive courses since his last proper position fix the day before. Holland's position was similarly based on dead reckoning from a fix some time before. The only way they would know where they were relative to one another was when they sighted each other. David Mearns makes it clear in his book, when searching for Hood's wreck, that N & S's estimated position was seriously in error by maybe 14 miles. So Holland's estimate of where Bismarck was was similarly 14 miles out.

However, in particular, Holland maintained an absolutely strict radio and radar silence, so as not to frighten Lutjens off, and give himself a chance of interception. This may have been inadvisable in hindsight, who can say? N & S did not know, anymore than Lutjens did, that Holland was in the area, so Holland's trap worked. Because of fleet size imbalance the Kriegsmarine always ran away when facing the Royal Navy except when in a position of considerable superiority. If Lutjens had detected another intercepting force, he might well have run away at a speed 2-3 kts higher than P o W could manage.

If Antonio provides a link to the Denmark Straits maps you can see Suffolk doing a 360 degree turn to avoid getting too close to Lutjens, during the chase.

All the Best

wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao Sean and all,

sorry it took a while to answer to you my friend, very busy at work lately, hope to be more free soon.

Here some links.

To my original work 2 years ago :

http://www.bismarck-class.dk/bismarck/d ... onomi.html

on my updated version of last June :

http://www.bismarck-class.dk/bismarck/h ... attle.html

and on the original Norfolk and Suffolk battle map.

http://www.hmshood.com/denmarkstrait/23 ... xtract.htm

and the Prinz Eugen one :

http://www.hmshood.com/denmarkstrait/PGbattlemap.html


I can anticipate you that very soon a very complete article written by me will be published on a high quality Military History magazine in Italy, with very good text material, drawings and photos, much better than the above.

My questions and doubts are still about Adm Holland intentions so clearly communicated to Captain Leach ( confirmed by Adm Tovey ) not been communicated ( apparently ) to Norfolk and Suffolk.

I know and of course agree about keeping radio silence till interception, but at 05.37 and 05.43 PoW and Hood broke it and before opening fire ( at 05.52 and 30 seconds ) Adm Holland had other 10-15 minutes to play and provide to Norfolk and Suffolk clear instructions on what to do.

Adm Lutjens was expecting the british cruisers to join into the battle as well reported by the Baron Mullenheim-Rechberg.

Suffolk was really 28.000 meters ( so too far back North ) but Norfolk was approaching from east closing in and was 28.000 meters at 05.41 and only 20.000 at 06.02 ( and opened fire on Bismarck ).

The real questions I think are :

1) Did they ever received orders to join in from Adm Holland ?

2) Was the position of Prinz Eugen ahead and not back to Bismarck the decision making factor that catching them by surprise ( they were unaware of that just like Holland/Hood ) kept them out of the engagement ?

As said maybe the answers are into Norfolk and Suffolk war diary, or written into their commanders reports back in England.

Does anybody knows about those documents ?

The Hood board of Inquiry never asked them about this topic.

What do you think ?

Ciao Antonio

[marty1]

Have you already looked through:

ADM 53/114810: NORFOLK, 1941 MAY

ADM 53/115099: SUFFOLK, 1941 MAY

?

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao Marty and all,

NO, and I was not aware about those documents reference numbers.

Can you drive me on the way to get them ?

Thanks in advance.

Ciao Antonio

[marty1]

Ciao Marty and all,
Can you drive me on the way to get them ?

Thanks in advance.

Ciao Antonio

Sure I can drive...but we need to start from Seattle Washington, USA and than drive to England. But we can pack a couple bottles of wine, some cheese and make a go of it.

I'm not sure what's contained in these Admiralty references -- not having seen them. I am only assuming that they are the ships logs for May 1941. But maybe they are actually the commissary lists for May 1941.

I'll see what I can do about finding out the actual contents.

Best Regards
Marty

[wadinga]

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 9suff.html

17. 0542 (B). Received Norfolk's 0541 reporting sighting enemy, followed by Prince of Wales' 0537 and Hood's 0543. The mean of these placed the enemy some 280º, 14 miles from Suffolk's plot position, and sights obtained shortly afterwards confirmed this. As, however, the Battle Cruiser Squadron was now in touch with the enemy, no amending position report was made at this point.

Enemy appeared to be approaching, and in case he had reversed course at 0538 (being "turned" by the Battle Cruiser Squadron), Suffolk circled to keep northward of enemy. It was soon realised, however, that the enemy was not approaching, the appearance being due to mirage, which also explains the similar (false) appearances at 0325.

Reports.- Made reports at 0447, 0456, 0522, 0533 and 0538 during the above phase.

Phase 0550 (B) to 0851 (B)

18. 0550 (B). Suffolk's course 220º, 29 knots, following the enemy.

0553 (B). Heavy gun flashes bearing 185º. Half a minute later Bismarck opened fire to port.

0556½ (B). Prinz Eugen opened fire to port.

0559 (B). Hood blew up.

0600 (B). Enemy bore 208º.

0605 (B). Course and speed as requisite to keep on enemy's starboard quarter.

0612 (B). Firing ceased, except for some A.A. fire by Bismarck. During the action three hits were observed on Bismarck from the heavy ships' fire.

0615 (B) and 0616 (B). Enemy (bearing 210º) altered course to starboard.

19. 0616 (B). Although the plot showed the enemy to be outside gun range, Prinz Eugen appeared at this time to be closing (now realised probably due to mirage), and at the same time Type 284 reported an echo at range 19,000 yards while trained on the Prinz Eugen.

0619 (B). Opened fire (six broadsides) using Type 284 range (initially 19,400 yards).

0623 (B). Type 284 ranges started decreasing rapidly.

0624 (B). Type 284 range 12,400 yards.
Ceased fire as there was clearly something wrong.

A large aircraft had just been sighted closing the ship from the enemy's direction, which turned across the line of fire at about six miles distant at 0624½, and it was then appreciated that this aircraft (not showing I.F.F.) was the object on which Type 284 had been ranging while trained on the enemy.

So, Holland did not issue instructions to Suffolk and Norfolk, although in the 20 minutes or so the action lasted, little he could have told them to do would have made much difference. He was probably surprised to find Bismarck was so far to the west of him since Wake Walker's reports had been telling him Lutjens was 14 miles further east than he was. (See above for understandable dead reckoning errors). He was therefore probably a bit busy considering how he was going to fight his action, approaching from such a poor angle, and maybe decided to rely on Wake-Walker's initiative in attacking without specific instructions.

If Bismarck continued to the South West, neither Norfolk or Suffolk could close much, (Suffolk was on 220 deg at 29 knots) and if the Germans turned one or other would be in gun range in moments. Norfolk did close and attempt to engage but her shots fell very short, suggesting her estimated open fire range was way out. Due to the very clear conditions both Suffolk and Norfolk were probably wildly underestimating their distances to Bismarck. If as Antonio estimates Norfolk was really at 20000 yds by 06:02 this was within easy 8" gun range and yet all her shots fell short, probably suggesting she was actually much farther away. Antonio's estimate (I guess based based on her reports) says she closed 4 miles in 21 minutes which is 12 miles an hour closing rate- quite astonishing when your target is itself moving at 29 knots.

Estimating visual target distances at sea accurately is not easy at much over 10 miles despite what the gunnery nuts arguing how easy it is to hit at 30,000 yds plus are saying on other threads.

As you can see from the quote above, Suffolk actually turned away, thinking Lutjens had turned back on her and she was closing at 58 knots which would not be aggressive but suicidal.

If Bismarck had turned and gone after P o W after Hood was sunk, Norfolk would quickly have been in range and might have provided useful covering fire.

All Holland could have done for instructions for Wake Walker was send "Engage the enemy more closely". Hmmm, like the sound of that, but I'm not sure it's original.

Sorry if this info removes the need for your "Thelma and Louise" trip across the States.

All the Best
wadinga

[marty1]

Well that saves me the trouble. Sounds like the Hood Web site already has dug into at least the Sulfolk's official battle report.

[marty1]

sorry -- who the hell are Thelma & Louise?

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao Sean, Marty and all,

I see what you are saying and I knew well of course the ADM 234-509 HMS Suffolk document.

But that is a very minimal extract of the things that Suffolk commander could have observed and reported about this battle.

Same thing do apply to Norfolk and her Officers including Wake-Walker.

I cannot beleive the only reported informations of Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker about this engagement were only the ones contained into ADM 116-4351 which are only few phrases.

That is why I was so interested on those 2 addittional documents ( I saw now that the references are into HMS Hood website documents but they are not there available like many others, hopefully they will be there soon ).

If Vice-Adm Holland did not issue any direction to Norfolk and Suffolk that is were the error occurred, unless somebody else ( Admiralty ? ) was supposed to do it, as Adm Tovey apparently was aware about Holland plans ( did he knew it before of after having talked with Capt. Leach while back after the battle ? ).

Still remain the fact that Churchill was mad about what happened and wanted to pursue both Leach and Wake-Walker, why ?

Norfolk was on a collision course from east as you can see at 05.41 while Suffolk was following at safe distance of 28.000 meters.

While Suffolk cannot close much on Bismarck and Prinz Eugen due to delta speed only, Norfolk was intercepting from east on a very acute collision course track.

At 05.59 just before Hood blew up Norfolk was closing in and was at 20.000 meters just at 4.000 meters more distant than Hood and PoW ( at 16.000 meters on that moment ) and closing into the battle very fast with apparently clear intentions to engage.
Within a couple of minutes everything changed, and Norfolk made a course change keeping safe distance from Bismarck opening fire very poorly with 3 salvoes while PoW was under a thunderstorm of shells that hit her 7 times within 3 minutes only ( 06.02 till 06.04 ).

While Lutjens directed Prinz Eugen very clearly and well thru the battle, apparently the 2 british cruisers were left on their own initiative, .. is this possible ?

Soon you will see my last map realization which will be very useful to evaluate distances and angle of approaches for all 6 ships as it is done perfectly to scale.

Well, ... Thelma and Louise, .. that was a good movie that could have set a good suggestion for me and Marty ( I like both the girls in there ).. but I do not like the end,... better in some other way.

Ciao My friends and talk to you soon Antonio

[wadinga]

All,
I have seen a standard Deck log for Suffolk for the Month of May at PRO but it did not go into tactical details. These reports may be all there is.

Antonio refers to Wake-Walker's comments at the Board of Enquiry, but does not mention

3. Will you please tell us what the range and inclination was?

I have the track charts with me; the range was about 30,000 yards.
4. And what was the angle of inclination?

I think about forty to the right.

I believe Antonio's maps are very good for the main forces but the cruisers were further astern. WW is saying he was 30,000 yds away from Hood at 06:00, which does not fit with Antonio's map saying he was at 20,000 yds from Bismarck at 06:02. As I pointed out, he can't have been closing on Bismarck at a rate of 12 kts from any location astern of Bismarck's beam

We have a useful measurement of Norfolk's range just after 06:00. John Campbell gives the maximum range of the British 8" gun as 30,000 yards, and yet all Norfolk's salvoes fell considerably short. They were trying to hit Bismarck, not waste ammunition, so they obviously gave up when they ran out of elevation. Norfolk was probably over 30,000 yds from Bismarck, and roughly the same range from Hood.

Holland didn't bother to send instructions to WW because he (WW) wasn't at the battle, he was well out of range, hadn't got the speed advantage and couldn't take part unless Lutjens turned.

Antonio says

While Lutjens directed Prinz Eugen very clearly and well thru the battle, apparently the 2 british cruisers were left on their own initiative, .. is this possible ?

I don't understand this at all. Lutjens didn't order PG to close and investigate the GHG contact, he didn't order her to open fire, he didn't make a distribution of fire order before the action started and he didn't tell her to stop zigzagging around and disrupting Bismarck's and her own fire, whilst dodging imaginary torpedoes. The only instruction was to switch targets to P o W, presumeably because her splashes were confusing Bismarck's spotting.

All the Best
wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao Sean,

well now you will understand better why I am so interested to find out more informations ( official ones hopefully ) from Norfolk and Suffolk original war diaries and battle map tracks details :

Just look into this at page 43 ( look at Diagram B ) as we know Rear-Admiral Wake Walker was on board HMS Norfolk that is reported on graphics at 11 sea miles from Bismarck and at 10 sea miles from Hood at 06.00 ( when Hood exploded ) :

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... _to59.html

and at page 46 by Captain Phillips at 10 miles from Hood on board Norfolk of course.

We are talking the ADM 116-4351 as you can see which is the main reference used by teh board of inquiry.

Read also the point 5 Notes of evidences.

So 11 sea miles are 1852x11= 20.372 meters or 22.300 yards approx.

This si consistent with teh Norfolk and Suffolk battle map we have too once you make the correct proportions in scale.

So my map is exact according to available evidences and Wake-Walker should have explained why he reported 30.000 yads when on drawings the ship he was on board is reported at 22.300 yards.

Those are the questions I would like to respond using new documents when available .

Wake Walker was there,.. and we need to find out what really happened as it was so poorly reported, ... WHY

Now I have to go for dinner,.. later about Lutjens my friend.

Ciao Antonio