Stern chasing

[Karl Heidenreich]

Antonio Bonomi, Alexandros and Dave Saxton,

Your discussion on PE ranges and identification on their DS foes is precisely what I was talking about scientific, properly supported and inteligent posts here. It is enlighting to read about historic technical events from all of you.

Thanks!

[alecsandros]

So Jaspers got the range right, but got the ships wrong, while Brinkman got the ships right but the range wrong

It's quite curious, as similar errors took place on Bismarck that morning...

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao Alecsandros and all,

I do not know from were you got the impression that Jasper got the ship wrong, ... because he got everything right.

Probably you got confused when Schmundt talks about distances with PoW, .. but than he was criticizing Brinkmann about the distances he was providing for torpedo launch missed by PG, not for the 05.50-3 wrong distances on KTB, ... and Schmundt basically judged the whole things based on that event being poorly precise from Brinkmann and suggested to use Jasper data all the way thru to redo his job.

There was only one ship that got confused and was Hood with Prinz Eugen instead of Bismarck but just for a couple of minutes.

Germans all thought PoW being KG V, but that was a reasonable error all the way thru.

Jasper had a good rangefinder and he used it very well, like Schneider on Bismarck and Mc Mullen on PoW, Hood was a lot penalized.

Brinkmann was asked by Schmundt to redo all his job about battle documentation being not so precise if compared with Jasper reports and measurements that Schmundt judged far superior in precision, it is very simple.

Reimann ( PG Torpedo officer ) had to do same homework as Brinkmann once asked by Schmundt, ... but this is another story.

Despite the use ( selection ) of the ammunitions that Schmundt did not agree,... Jasper was only rewarded for what he did all the way thru.

Other things about what really happened on board Prinz Eugen to be released when a new version of my work will be published,... but not before a couple of years anyway.

Bye Antonio

[alecsandros]

Hi ANtonio,

My puzzle comes from here:

http://www.kbismarck.com/archives/pg003.html

Last section - nr 8 -

" 8. Report of the 1st Artillery Officer.
The assumption by the 1st Artillery Officer [Korvettenkapitän Paulus Jasper] that he is facing heavy cruisers, is incomprehensible.
Particularly from an artillery officer who must answer the opponent effectively, an accurate identification of the opponent's types is a prerequisite, since the choice of shells, and in some cases for outcome of the battle itself, depends on his decision.
In the present case, no adversity resulted. The armor-piercing shell would not have been effective against heavily armored ships. In the present case, it was required to finish off as many superstructures and as much equipment as possible. Base fuze and point fuze shells were capable of this. "

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello Alecsandros,

Ok, now I see, we are on the same spot, ... still the ammunition selection ...and you are correlating it with the ship type initial wrong identification being cruisers and not battleships, ... I understand now.

I think Jasper like may others were confused initially on the incoming ship correct identification, ... from the interception at 05.37, ... until the ALAM sounded on the German ships at 05.47, .... all the way thru the open fire by the British at 05.52 and 30.

In fact if you read the Prinz Eugen battle map, ... the note that they are in battle against battleships is written at 05.53 ... so after the British opened fire, ... and this confirm that probably only at that point they realized they were going to be fighting against british battleships, ...

... but at that point in time Jasper had already ordered the ammunition selection for his guns, ...

Bye Antonio

[alecsandros]

Yes, that's what I thought...

Any thoughts on the initial presumtion of "light cruiser" on board PE and BS at 5:37 ?

After all, this must have been the reason why the identification was wrong all the way to at least 5:53...

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao Alecsandros,

if you read Prinz Eugen KTB here in at page 34, 35, 38 and 44 you have the infos you are looking at directly from Paulus Jasper, Helmut Brinkmann and Paul Schmalenbach.

http://hmshood.com/history/denmarkstrait/resource.htm

clic on :

•Kriegstagebuch Des Kreuzers Prinz Eugen (Prinz Eugen's War Diary, May 1941) - A decent source, but a bit generalised in KzS Brinkmann's main narrative. The reporting of 1st Gunnery Officer Jasper appears to be the most consistent/credible of all.

and open the ZIP file, inside there is the PG KTB on pdf format.

They got them from 32.000 meters with the GHG and thought they were 10.000 tons cruisers, or Emerald class cruisers, only after they opened fire they realized they were battleships.

Bye Antonio

[alecsandros]

I know this,
I don't understand how they confused the 2.

[Dave Saxton]

I know this,
I don't understand how they confused the 2.

...Because sonar and radar during WWII could not tell the difference between ship types. Secondly according to Schmalenbach, they could not see the ships clearly due to their own smoke during the few minutes when the enemy was in sight and when the enemy opened fire. They only a had a few mintes to study the enemy visually before the enemy opened fire and during this time frame and they were hampered by their own exhaust smoke.

From the angle the enemy was approaching the ship type must have been difficult to impossible to determine. They probably were thinking in a cruiser mind set as well. Intel ashore had recently informed them that the enemy battleships were probably not at sea. When the mind isn't sure what it is seeing it will often see what it expects to see.

It all happened very quickly if Schmalenbach's times are correct. Only 13 minutes elapsed from the GHG picking up the turbine sounds to the point in time when Hood opened fire.

[James Finlay]

Admiral Lutjens followed orders from on high - his task was to attack convoys and was even reluctant to engage Hood and POW. Lindemann the Captain of Bismarck was all for going after POW. POW 14" bow hit forced the decison to abandon Atlantic convoy foray and instead head for Brest - so POW set the scene for Bismarc'k's fat - and Ark Royal completed that.

Bismarck also had not refuelled in Norway whereas PE had - not a mistake the RN would make. The fuel available in Bismarck to use 'Post the POW bow hit' caused speed to be limited to 21 knots (1000 tons of fuel were inaccessible).

[RF]

Bismarck also had not refuelled in Norway whereas PE had - not a mistake the RN would make. The fuel available in Bismarck to use 'Post the POW bow hit' caused speed to be limited to 21 knots (1000 tons of fuel were inaccessible).

The reason why Lutjens didn't refuel Bismarck in Norway was because the German Fleet orders had indicated that Bismarck would sail from Norway into Arctic waters prior to the attempt to break into the open Atlantic. Close to Jan Mayen island Bismarck was to refuel from the tanker Weissenberg. At Bergen the fuel situation wih PE was more critical so Brinckmann had to refuel there.

In the event the apparently favourable conditions for a breakthrough mean't the excursion to Jan Mayen was abandoned. Insread Bismarck headed for DS - and ran into two cruisers. Going to Jan Mayen as originally envisaged would have been the better option.

[Vic Dale]

I think we need to revisit Lutjens operational orders. Sending heavy warships into the Atlantic was an extremely risky business and on this as on other occasions the operation was intended as supportive action in the already successful U-Boat campaign. The whole strategy rested on interdicting and strangling British commerce. The first and last words were about sinking British merchant ships. No other consideration was to be entertained.

It was considered that as Bismarck was so well protected and powerfully armed, she would be able to engage a single battleship escort and leave Prinz Eugen (PG)to sink the merchantmen. The whole direction of the operation was about sinking merchant ships and not about engaging naval assets, except as an aid to sinking merchantmen.

Lutjens' brief was to get out into the Atlantic, hide and be ready to pounce out of the blue on any convoy, spreading terror and disrupting the flow of goods. As Fleet Commander he would be able to direct U-Boats onto targets which his Arado aircraft had been able to locate. So chasing off after damaged enemy battleships was simply not to be entertained. There would be no tactical or strategic advantage in such an undertaking. Having sunk Hood and seen off PoW, it was Lutjens' job to make the best of the confusion and get the hell out of it. Bismarck had already take three hits, two of them serious, so risking further strikes would be completely idiotic.

Rounding on the shadowing squadron later in the day had two aspects to it, it was intended firstly to get PG safely away and secondly to encourage the British cruisers to keep their distance, a major part in allowing him to shake them off during the night.

Battleship enthusiasts always like to see a good naval punch-up and Bismarck Vs Hood and PoW was about as good as it gets, but to see the action simply in terms of the ships involved is to miss the whole big picture. Britain was on it's knees and if the Battle of the Atlantic did not take a turn for the better, the war with Germany would be lost. Those were the stakes, so the question of PoW getting away or being sunk pales to insignificance beside them.

If Lutjens had been intent on going after PoW, his reduced speed or being disadvantaged by being down at the bow would not have stopped him. The Denmark Strait is a limited seaway and if he had PoW on the run, she would have had only about 60 miles to run before coming against the ice, she would then have to turn and any ground she had made would be lost. Most likely, near misses around her stern would take her rudders out, or PG could come in and torpedo her. Her defects would no doubt increase and as her guns broke down her fire would rapidly fall off. She would be reduced to an unmanageable shambles in an hour or two, ready to be finally sunk by Torpedoes from PG.

Who in their right mid would go down that route? Risking damage with no dockyard facilities near to hand, stooging around exchanging shots one on one with with PoW when the rest of the RN might be bearing down on both ends of the Denmark Strait? That would be pyrrhic victory and a half.