Prinz Eugen towing Bismarck?

[RF]

The hit on the rudder was a fluke, and a very lucky one at that.

Having the Prinz Eugen present puts both ships at risk. Of course the unknown in this is how effective the Eugen's AA fire would have been.

[Steve Crandell]

The hit on the rudder was a fluke, and a very lucky one at that.

Having the Prinz Eugen present puts both ships at risk. Of course the unknown in this is how effective the Eugen's AA fire would have been.

There probably weren't very many navies that would consider one cruiser to be adequate AA support for a major fleet unit. Considering Bismarck's poor level of preparation for AA defense, Prinz Eugene would make at least some difference, but she might also be targeted and hit instead of Bismarck. I guess that could be a good thing, depending on your point of view.

I also suspect that rudder or screw hits were not as lucky as one might think. If you are looking at the ship's length in profile, it would be. However, the ship is maneuvering evasively. That means that torpedoes will often pass close by the bow or stern as the ship turns to evade them, and hits in those places are probably more likely. Also, if the ship is in a radical turn the rudder is going to be over at an acute angle so if it does get hit it will be in a very bad position in which to be jammed.

[Mostlyharmless]

I remembered suggesting the idea of using a destroyer rather than PE as a sea anchor in an earlier thread viewtopic.php?f=13&t=1480&p=28939#p28939

[paul.mercer]

Gentlemen,
A lot has been said over the years in these forums about 'lucky' or 'fluke' hits that sank Hood and crippled Bismarck. I suppose that in reality whether one is firing shells, torpedoes or dropping bombs one is aiming to hit the ship, but not in a specific place, therefore any single hit that instantly sinks or cripples that ship (rather than a successive number of hits) must be considered 'lucky' (or unlucky if one is on the receiving end). I have to agree with the majority regarding PE towing Bismarck, there are pictures of that being done in a exercise in calm waters, but trying to do it it an Atlantic gale is quite another matter and would only have resulted in both ships being caught and sunk.

[alecsandros]

Gentlemen,
A lot has been said over the years in these forums about 'lucky' or 'fluke' hits that sank Hood and crippled Bismarck. I suppose that in reality whether one is firing shells, torpedoes or dropping bombs one is aiming to hit the ship, but not in a specific place, therefore any single hit that instantly sinks or cripples that ship (rather than a successive number of hits) must be considered 'lucky' (or unlucky if one is on the receiving end). I have to agree with the majority regarding PE towing Bismarck, there are pictures of that being done in a exercise in calm waters, but trying to do it it an Atlantic gale is quite another matter and would only have resulted in both ships being caught and sunk.

... IMHO, it was no fluke hit,
as Hood's magazines represented a large volume of the internals of the ship. Calculus shows that a perforating hit through Hood's hull would have between 20% to 30% chance of entering a magazine (381 or 102mm) , depending on inclination and trajectory.

Bismarck probably hit Hood at least one time, if not 2 times before the killing salvo, which landed 1 or 2 shells on Hood. So between 2 to 4 x 380mm hits...

As Hood did not have immunity zone vs 380mm / L52 gunfire, a magazine hit appears to be a disaster waiting to happen.

[RF]

As Hood did not have immunity zone vs 380mm / L52 gunfire, a magazine hit appears to be a disaster waiting to happen.

The verdict on Hood being destroyed by a ''lucky hit'' does need to be qualified in the context of the battle. Holland was caught out of position, which scuppered his original battle plan.

In a straight action between Bismarck and Hood your comment quoted above is right. But at DS Hood was accompanied by POW, Hood opened fire on the wrong ship. Had Holland been able to prepare properly for action then POW should have been the lead ship and both ships fire on the correct target. That way Hood should be reasonably protected as the battle develops and should avoid destruction; the likely result is that Bismarck should be degraded if not crippled.
The actual fatal hit came at a fortuitous moment for Lutjens - POW was hitting Bismarck, the two British ships were turning so their full firepower could be deployed, Kerr presumably had issued orders for target correction. Had that fatal hit not occurred when it did Lutjens would have been in real trouble as the full British firepower would have come in on Bismarck. That is the context of a 'lucky hit.''

[alecsandros]

As Hood did not have immunity zone vs 380mm / L52 gunfire, a magazine hit appears to be a disaster waiting to happen.

The verdict on Hood being destroyed by a ''lucky hit'' does need to be qualified in the context of the battle. Holland was caught out of position, which scuppered his original battle plan.

In a straight action between Bismarck and Hood your comment quoted above is right. But at DS Hood was accompanied by POW, Hood opened fire on the wrong ship. Had Holland been able to prepare properly for action then POW should have been the lead ship and both ships fire on the correct target. That way Hood should be reasonably protected as the battle develops and should avoid destruction; the likely result is that Bismarck should be degraded if not crippled.
The actual fatal hit came at a fortuitous moment for Lutjens - POW was hitting Bismarck, the two British ships were turning so their full firepower could be deployed, Kerr presumably had issued orders for target correction. Had that fatal hit not occurred when it did Lutjens would have been in real trouble as the full British firepower would have come in on Bismarck. That is the context of a 'lucky hit.''

I do not think so.
Holland and Leach were fed with false data about their immunity zones. It is unclear to me if they actualy belived those figures or not.
Holland expected Hood to be immune to 15" gunfire down to 15km, and Leach on Prince of Wales down to 12km.

Holland was in command, so he was expected to take the lead.

No matter how Holland approached, Hood would still be in the lead, would still have disfunctional fire control, and would still be targeted by Bismarck as primary target (Kriegsmarine doctrine was to fire on the ship with largest caliber guns).

Bismarck straddled on semi-salvo 3, and fro then onwards it continously straddled HOod until final destruction.

Any one of the 12 semi-salvos fired versus Hood in the 5 minutes interval could have destroyed Holland's flagship, as it did not have immunity zone.

[Steve Crandell]

Any one of the 12 semi-salvos fired versus Hood in the 5 minutes interval could have destroyed Holland's flagship, as it did not have immunity zone.

Yes, and any one of Hood's salvos could have destroyed Prinz Eugene.

[Dave Saxton]

This is O/T to the current debate here, but in reply to Alex's comment:

Holland and Leach were fed with false data about their immunity zones. It is unclear to me if they actualy belived those figures or not.
Holland expected Hood to be immune to 15" gunfire down to 15km, and Leach on Prince of Wales down to 12km.

Such data was not uncommon at the time. Only the German data such as the Krupp Atlas of Penetration and the GKdos100 data was close to the reality we know of now. There was a serious underestimation of the power of modern battleship guns against vertical armour among most but the German data sets. For example, official USN guidelines for fighting Japanese BB-11 (Yamato) suggested that South Dakota would be safe against BB-11 down 14,000 yards given a target angle of 30* from the normal or more. It was thought that Yamato had 16" guns at the time, but even against 16" guns 14,000 yards was well .... Yet there it is. A penciled in note in the BB59 gunnery manual suggested that the best ranges to fight a Yamato was starting at 30,000 yards and reducing to 15,000 yards.


Even more O/T perhaps, but some other very interesting factors for Holland closing range and for Luetjens in holding fire comes from American data. The expected fire effectiveness of a South Dakota vs a Yamato (the 44,000 ton 16" gun version) from gunnery exercise data, indicated that as the range increased from 22,000 yards to 24,000 yards, the time expected to reduce the enemy to 20% combat effectiveness, increased from 37 minutes to 54 minutes (and increase in ammo expended by 30%), assuming undamaged rate of fire and fire control from own battleship. At 18,000 yards it was only about 20 minutes, and at 14,000 yards it was about 11 minutes with about 1/4 as much ammo expended as at 24,000 yards, which is interesting in light of the historical Denmark Strait action. Beyond 28,000 yards it it was expected to take nearly an hour and a half.

[Steve Crandell]

Dave,

Can you indicate when this USN info was published? I don't think it conforms very well to the study Bill Jurens did of a very large number of practice shoots right up to the end of the war. I think there was a large increase in hit probability as the gunnery radar got better.

[Dave Saxton]

Dave,

Can you indicate when this USN info was published? I don't think it conforms very well to the study Bill Jurens did of a very large number of practice shoots right up to the end of the war. I think there was a large increase in hit probability as the gunnery radar got better.

The BB59 manual I have is dated 1945 and includes historic 1945 operational plans. However, Cmd. Morss states that these data were available mid 1944 to Adm Lee and Adm Lee based his tactical preparations and the instructions given to the battle line on these data. Morss argues that Lee would have closed range to 20,000 yards in any BB action late war.

Take solace that it is noted: “The effect of radar was not included in the preparation of these (late war) diagrams.” Nonetheless, just above this it is noted that the effect of air spotting was, and that this was “assumed to return long range fire control to full effectiveness.”

Fire control effectiveness was not the main determinant of the fire effect diagrams, however: “Notice the fall- off in equivalent hits due to normal shell dispersion.” So it was how the shells flew which of course radar can not have any effect upon.

A 1983 USN Proceedings article looked at the dispersion question and hit probabilities. The findings of this study are rather interesting. It was found that almost 70% of shots will fall within the first standard deviation of the typical dispersion. It is noted that: “Oldendorf also had the dispersion tables working for him due to the positioning of the American and Japanese forces at Surigao Strait.” I take this to mean that the best chance of scoring hits are if the MPI is off by about the value of the first standard deviation at any given battle range. Being spot on could result in a lot of near misses and the few hits being only in the target ship’s upper works. I doubt that such nuance was thought of during WW2 though.

[Steve Crandell]

Dave,

I believe all that means is that 70% of the shells will land within one standard deviation of the center of the pattern. Have you read Bill Jurens and Brad Fischer's two part series on Fast Battleship Gunnery during WWII?

[alecsandros]

Any one of the 12 semi-salvos fired versus Hood in the 5 minutes interval could have destroyed Holland's flagship, as it did not have immunity zone.

Yes, and any one of Hood's salvos could have destroyed Prinz Eugene.

... with the mention that Hood did not straddle Prinz Eugen, so the probability of a hit in historical conditions was minimal to non-existent.

[alecsandros]

Even more O/T perhaps, but some other very interesting factors for Holland closing range and for Luetjens in holding fire comes from American data.

... Also , British battleship doctrine called for a 12 - 17km battle range... That's probably where Holland was hoping to arrive.

Interestingly enough, Hood started her final turn (during which she was destroyed) when range was ~ 16km from Bismarck.

Given the rate of approach, she would have completed her turn and arrive in parallel course with Bismarck with range ~ 15km, exactly the minimal IZ expected by Holland vs 15" artillery...

[paulcadogan]

... with the mention that Hood did not straddle Prinz Eugen, so the probability of a hit in historical conditions was minimal to non-existent.

Alecsandros my friend....

(Though I'm contributing to going off on a tangent from this thread title..... )

Gotta say ---Hood was firing 2-gun (semi) salvos that (from the photo evidence we have) had a pretty close spread. With those it's not so easy to straddle! One semi-salvo (probably her third) landed short, slightly off the bow within 50 m of Prinz Eugen (according to Jasper and Busch) putting her decks awash (ie. suggesting more that just spray) with collapsing water. The one on the photo was an over (possibly her 4th semi-salvo) which, had probably passed very close over the ship to land where they did.

I'd hardly call that minimal to non-existent...(until the spotting top hit did its thing) PG was in danger and Capt. Brinkmann (and later Adm Schmundt) knew it!