Bismarck firing procedures at DS

[Alberto Virtuani]

Bill Jurens wrote: "I.... concluded that anything other than an approximate reconstruction of the Denmark Strait action was probably impossible."

Mr.Jurens, thanks for your explanations. I have to accept your opinion above, even if I (humbly) disagree.

However, forced to choose, wanting to publish an overall interesting book on the "Geant de l'Atlantique", Patrick Toussaint in 2018 (http://www.kbismarck.org/forum/viewtopi ... 795#p80577) chose Antonio's 2005 one, as his reconstruction puts together all the available info in a far better way than anyone else up to now (including Mr.Toussaint himself, who after having chosen the "best" available map, in the text has done some trivial mistakes....).
Of course he could not use Tovey version of facts (or Kennedy's happy novel) to draw a map (as at 06:13 PoW would have possibly rammed Bismarck ), or Pinchin's "Plot" (with its bearing left intentionally "cut" in the middle of the sea...) or the 1990 Baron's map (respecting neither PG battlemap nor PoW salvo plot) as they are proven totally wrong already.
He could have chosen the Baron 70's one (decently correct) but he was able to see the value of Antonio's work (even without recognizing it among his "acknowledgments" )

I'm curious to see what map will be published in your next book on Bismarck, as I'm sure you will not avoid to depict a map of the Denmark Strait battle at all just because only an "approximate reconstruction" of it is possible.....



Bye, Alberto

[HMSVF]

Demanding binary answers is not often the way to move a complex debate forward to a successful conclusion. In fact, it's usually counterproductive.

Hope this helps...

Bill Jurens

It would have helped IF you wouldn't have passed over the obvious relevant passages from PoW's gunnery report, that explain both Capt. Leach's decision to disengage, taken before being hit by the enemy, and the jamming of turret Y after the disengagement process had begun.

The fact that you did not write anything in reply to the quotes from the original documents can produce the impression that you a) either did not see them , b) did not acknoledge them (in the sense that you do not concur with the validity of the text written in the sense discussed here), c) simply chose to ignore them , pursuing other agendas. I sincerely hope that the reality lies somewhere between option a) and b), or is directly centered upon one of these 2 initial variants.

This is essential to the discussion, because with the decision to disengage taken at ~6:00, and with turret Y jammed before 6:05, any attempt to justify an "engagement" out to 6:13 becomes a fools errand.

Hi Alecsandros,

A question that is of interest to me.

POW was in close formation with Hood before her immolation.she skirts round Hoods wreckage and ends up around 14000 yards (?) from her foes. That range seems very short to me (indeed almost Jutlandesque). The Y turret jams at 06:05(?), could not have been the case that Leach initially wanted the open the range but got pummelled in the interim with Y turrets jamming being the final straw.

Mr Bonomi and Virtuani pointed me in the direction of McMullens taped recordings in regards to the action but I still find it difficult to reconcile that Leach found himself in a relatively short range battle with an enemy that already had the range.


Best Wishes


HMSVF

[Bill Jurens]

In response to Alexandros' memo of Mon Oct 01, 2018 5:59 pm (we seem to have no numbering scheme to enable posts to be identified more easily):

I did not respond in detail basically because I have neither the time nor the energy to engage myself extensively in this discussion. It's easy -- as I have seen over the past few hours at least -- to become 'sucked in' to this (apparently nearly) endless vortex of argument. In that regard, I do appreciate the efforts of others who have carried the torch on my behalf.

The bottom line, at least for me, is that a lot of things happened very quickly on Prince of Wales just after Hood was destroyed, with few clocks precisely running and each individual seeing only a part of the entire picture. The only one who really knows what was going on in Leach's mind during the engagement was Leach himself, who is of course now long dead and who -- for obvious reasons -- might have become somewhat distracted during this portion of the engagement itself, and may never have retained a fully clear picture of the situation, even as seen only through his eyes, himself.

I have read most of the documentation that has accumulated over the years regarding this action, with the possible exception of various and sundry 'silver bullets' which may exist, but which have not -- for whatever reasons -- been made generally available. Certainly no 'silver bullet' has been sent to me for commentary.

My general conclusion is that taken in the overall context of the engagement itself -- and making reasonable accommodation for the inevitable effects of the 'fog of war', and the passage of time -- that both sides acted in tactically and strategically responsible ways. Errors of judgement -- much easier to see in retrospect -- may have indeed have taken place on either side, but I see no credible evidence whatsoever of substantive tactical or intestinal incompetence, on the British side, or elsewhere. Seen in retrospect, some decisions and actions on both sides can now be assessed as being 'sub-optimal', but this situation is true in almost any complex situation. Non-deities can never be completely right all of the time. Being almost right most of the time is the best most of us can hope for, and -- if we are selected for good judgement under fire -- as most military commanders or reasonable rank are, being right more often than often is the usual situation.

Bill Jurens

[HMSVF]

In response to Alexandros' memo of Mon Oct 01, 2018 5:59 pm (we seem to have no numbering scheme to enable posts to be identified more easily):

I did not respond in detail basically because I have neither the time nor the energy to engage myself extensively in this discussion. It's easy -- as I have seen over the past few hours at least -- to become 'sucked in' to this (apparently nearly) endless vortex of argument. In that regard, I do appreciate the efforts of others who have carried the torch on my behalf.

The bottom line, at least for me, is that a lot of things happened very quickly on Prince of Wales just after Hood was destroyed, with few clocks precisely running and each individual seeing only a part of the entire picture. The only one who really knows what was going on in Leach's mind during the engagement was Leach himself, who is of course now long dead and who -- for obvious reasons -- might have become somewhat distracted during this portion of the engagement itself, and may never have retained a fully clear picture of the situation, even as seen only through his eyes, himself.

I have read most of the documentation that has accumulated over the years regarding this action, with the possible exception of various and sundry 'silver bullets' which may exist, but which have not -- for whatever reasons -- been made generally available. Certainly no 'silver bullet' has been sent to me for commentary.

My general conclusion is that taken in the overall context of the engagement itself -- and making reasonable accommodation for the inevitable effects of the 'fog of war', and the passage of time -- that both sides acted in tactically and strategically responsible ways. Errors of judgement -- much easier to see in retrospect -- may have indeed have taken place on either side, but I see no credible evidence whatsoever of substantive tactical or intestinal incompetence, on the British side, or elsewhere. Seen in retrospect, some decisions and actions on both sides can now be assessed as being 'sub-optimal', but this situation is true in almost any complex situation. Non-deities can never be completely right all of the time. Being almost right most of the time is the best most of us can hope for, and -- if we are selected for good judgement under fire -- as most military commanders or reasonable rank are, being right more often than often is the usual situation.

Bill Jurens

Hi Mr Jurens,


I think you raise valid points. Leach didn’t have the Mk1 retro scope fitted to POW and the time frame is incredibly short. Having worked in critical life/death situations it’s amazing how quickly time goes and how much you go into “auto pilot” when dealing with them. The evaluation occurs after with the debrief,you play the cards you have at the time.

Personally I’m not a fan of absolutes for the simple reason that human experience depends on,erm humans! Which means they are fallible and there experiences of an event can vary somewhat. It’s not that they are lying,it’s that they have processed the scenario differently to others,hence the differing accounts and inconsistencies.

I suppose there is also the issue of trying to apply quantitative data to what is also a qualative issue.


Just my personal opinion of course .

[alecsandros]

POW was in close formation with Hood before her immolation.she skirts round Hoods wreckage and ends up around 14000 yards (?) from her foes. That range seems very short to me (indeed almost Jutlandesque). The Y turret jams at 06:05(?), could not have been the case that Leach initially wanted the open the range but got pummelled in the interim with Y turrets jamming being the final straw.

This has been discussed some time ago, with some strength. I wouldn't rule out the possibility of trying to get back to a more convenient range,
if it weren't Leach himself who, in his explanation for disengagement, presented his arguments for doing so.

[alecsandros]

The only one who really knows what was going on in Leach's mind during the engagement was Leach himself, who is of course now long dead and who -- for obvious reasons -- might have become somewhat distracted during this portion of the engagement itself, and may never have retained a fully clear picture of the situation, even as seen only through his eyes, himself.

Do you think the justification for the decision to disengage was written while shell-shocked ?

[Bill Jurens]

No. I suspect his mind was clear enough after the fact -- i.e. when writing post-action reports, etc. If not, he wouldn't have retained command-level positions. But is is possible -- perhaps even likely -- that his memory of precisely how things happened during the action was impaired due to his injuries and the sheer overload of it all. So his memory might be clear, or not, and might be correct, or not. And his account might vary from time to time as different memories were recalled and recovered during different attempts to describe the situation.

If asked, I could write quite clear accounts of what happened at a Christmas party last year, but that doesn't make them correct, and it certainly doesn't mean that my imperfect and perhaps somewhat distorted memories are due to shell-shock. This would be especially true in the instance where something unusual, e.g. a fire in the stove, occurred. The strength of such an event might somewhat distort my other memories of other things that took place around the same time.

Memory, especially uncorroborated, is never perfect and sometimes misleading, but this is not necessarily due to shell-shock, etc.

Testis Unis, Testis Nullis...

Bill Jurens

[alecsandros]

Problem is that Leach's justification is centered upon Hood's loss. The 3 points of the justification (a, b, c) are tied (in his report) to Hood's demise.
a and b , according to his own report, were manifest before the action started; c was the only one somewhat tied to future events.

[dunmunro]

Problem is that Leach's justification is centered upon Hood's loss. The 3 points of the justification (a, b, c) are tied (in his report) to Hood's demise.
a and b , according to his own report, were manifest before the action started; c was the only one somewhat tied to future events.

And this:
Leach:

In all circumstances I did not consider it sound tactics to continue single handed the engagement with the two German ships, both of whom might be expected to be at the peak of their efficiency.

As I have argued at length, PoW was fighting two opponents, and her secondary armament was out of action (two minutes prior to Hood's loss if you accept the 0600 timing), so we have PoW with ~7 effective guns versus ~34 on the KM side, and a single hit from any of those 34 guns could knock out PoW's forward 14in DCT.

[alecsandros]

As I have argued at length, PoW was fighting two opponents, and her secondary armament was out of action (two minutes prior to Hood's loss if you accept the 0600 timing), so we have PoW with ~7 effective guns versus ~34 on the KM side, and a single hit from any of those 34 guns could knock out PoW's forward 14in DCT.

The debate is about Leach's intentions after Hood's demise, not about the opportunity (or utility or 'appropriateness') of his disengagement.

[dunmunro]

As I have argued at length, PoW was fighting two opponents, and her secondary armament was out of action (two minutes prior to Hood's loss if you accept the 0600 timing), so we have PoW with ~7 effective guns versus ~34 on the KM side, and a single hit from any of those 34 guns could knock out PoW's forward 14in DCT.

The debate is about Leach's intentions after Hood's demise, not about the opportunity (or utility or 'appropriateness') of his disengagement.

There was a RN heavy cruiser squadron nearby, commanded by a rear admiral who was within visual distance of PoW. It really wouldn't have been a sound decision to continue the action under such long odds, when reinforcements are at hand, along with a senior officer who could wield command of the combined force.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

Alberto asked a very simple question,

all of you have a simple answer to give: did you produce your own version of the battle map, that reconciliates the available FACTS ?

Yes or No.

What you are trying to do is to answer " No, but neither has Antonio ".

Only that Antonio already did ...

http://www.kbismarck.org/forum/viewtopi ... 840#p80636

I think that Alecsandros has put it in a very simple way. Lets see now what is going to be published next and by whom.

Patrick Toussaint on his interesting book already did it and used my map even if the text is not so correct.

http://www.kbismarck.org/forum/viewtopi ... 795#p80577

Regarding this question by Herr Nillson,

The question is does Antonio‘s battle reconstruction put in context all available info (official tracks, photos, film and official reports + reliable accounts) ?

Yes or No.

The answer could have been easily found into the HMS Hood documentation resource preface to my 2005 article :

http://hmshood.com/history/denmarkstrai ... trait1.htm

Disclaimer : We present this article as a plausible alternative view of the Battle of the Denmark Strait.

Simply put, we feel that its impossible to ever precisely determine all aspects of this battle with 100% certainty.

Its also problematic to judge the actions of the key commanding officers without knowing exactly what they knew at that time.

Nevertheless, although we may not 100% agree with everything stated, this reconstruction does remain plausible.

It is certainly one of the most thorough and probably accurate reconstructions of this battle.

You, the reader, are invited to make up your own mind by reviewing the original battle documentation after you read this article.

I do not need to add anything to my 2005 battle re-construction, ... and my next version will be a lot improved and enlarged including the " regrettable aftermath " that now is clear enough apparently to everybody, ... with the related " Cover Up " done explained in full details.


Last but not least, ... when we read : " Testis Unis, Testis Nullis " ... ( in reality it should be written : « Testis unus, testis nullus » )

it can be right in a Court of Justice, ... regarding a single witness availability, ... but not reconstructing history where one witness is better than nothing, ... and mostly is a lot better than some intentional lies.


Bye Antonio

[alecsandros]

There was a RN heavy cruiser squadron nearby, commanded by a rear admiral who was within visual distance of PoW. It really wouldn't have been a sound decision to continue the action under such long odds, when reinforcements are at hand, along with a senior officer who could wield command of the combined force.

That is part of the context in which Leach made his decision. ( It's correct that the decision isn't made in a void, but in a context ).
But the question above arose from the time of the decision and justifications for it .

[dunmunro]

Algonquin-R17 wrote: " when I see the two German ships with identical times it seems too much of a coincidence to be accurate"

However 14 minutes look a reasonable duration based on the German official documents, and there are neither evidences nor any logical reason supporting any different timing. As well, we know PG never ceased fire (pag.40) and there is no logical reason why Bismarck should have ceased fire (unnoticed by any witness...) during the action.

There is a plethora of witnesses on the RN side who state that Bismarck opened fire at 0553 and there's a thread devoted to that here:

http://www.kbismarck.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=7736

Brooke in Alarm Starboard, had the best seat in the House, via PoW's after 14in DCT to observe Bismarck and PE's firing after PoW's Y turret went to local control, and Brooke states that Bismarck only fired three more salvos, one salvo possibly being an 8 gun salvo and "... a couple more salvos - probably by radar..."

We have no concrete evidence of how PE's 0555 open fire time correlates to PoW's GAR timing of events via the AFCT salvo chart. Certainly PE's timing for Hood's loss as being 0601:20 should raise some awkward questions by A/A but it doesn't because A/A have established an immutable timing that the evidence must conform to.

There is another thread active to discuss PE''s firing procedures.

This is what Leach states about KM output after ~0603:

...."Y" Turret fired in local during the turn as smoke blanked the after director.

It now seems probable that the enemy turned away at the same time as "Prince of Wales" and about two enemy salvos were seen short during this period...

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,

Dunmunro wrote: "This is what Leach states about KM output after ~0603......"about two enemy salvos were seen short during this period""

...however PG film and photos show at least 9 (most probably 11 or 12) salvos fired after 6:03:30 (Bismarck turn away time). There are 6 semi-salvos in the film (1 full salvo and 4 semi-salvos) and 3 to 6 (semi-)salvos in the photos we have (http://www.kbismarck.org/forum/viewtopi ... 135#p68219). There can even be more, not depicted in any photo, of course. Not less....

The fact that Leach did not see all of them through his own smoke screen means NOTHING at all, as photographic evidence is incontrovertible, at least until this provoking guy will be unable to present his reconstruction of the battle "putting in context" these evidences before 6:03 , and I bet he will never be able to do such a work.


Bye, Alberto