Rescue Operations After Bismarck's Sinking

[phil gollin]

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Vic,

I am not talking down to you, merely pointing out the falseness of your position, IF you choose to ignore war experience then you are free to, but you will be criticised for it.

A cruiser does NOT hunt a U-Boat, and no "hunting groups" existed.

Re. scrambling nets - you do know how much freeboard the Counties had, don't you ?

I will REPEAT, as you do not seem to understand, NO ship is going to get rid of its life saving equipment (Carley Floats) whilst there is the possibility of a U-Boat attack.

Your idea of a "humanitarian appeal" is laughable based on both previous experience in the North Atlantic and in practical terms of communication and trust.

There is NO possibility of the events, if truly reported, being considered a "war crime".

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[Vic Dale]

The destroyers which had delivered Bismarck to the C-in-C were close enough to form a hunting group, it only takes three to do the job and as the boat can only do 7 knots maximum below the surface, they would not use a lot of fuel hunting her.

Maori was already on the scene as were other units of the 4th flotilla. Rodney also had three destroyers at one time, so a hunting group focused on a positive sighting could have been found. Ark Royal was close enough to send an anti-sub flight as well and that was possibly the best and quickest way to get the U-Boat. But no alert was ever sounded. Dorsetshire never even put a marker float over the side. There are certain rather urgent procedures established for when an enemy unit is spotted and no less urgent when it is a U-boat. A U-Boat is spotted and the RN does nothing about it? I can't accept that.

Cruisers do not hunt submarines eh? Really? This didn't occur to me until Phil raised it, but have a look on the stern of British Cruisers of the time and you will see depth charge racks. I am pretty sure that Dorsetshire carried depth charges, as did others of her class, so very likely she carried Asdic too and could have started the hunt herself. That was always the problem for U-Boatmen, if they did attack a warship they had to be sure to sink her or she would turn on them. Dorsetshire had been on escort duty for convoy SL74. I can't imagine what good she would have been to them without depth charges and the ability to use them.

Norfolk had depth charges too. She was on the scene. Wake-Walker could have earned a few brownie points with Pound and Churchill after losing Bismarck and failing to order PoW to re-engage. Of course they would not want to use depth charges with men in the water in case they knocked them out and caused them to drown - don't want to cheat old Neptune eh? Forgive me if I sound flip, but really; a warship fully armed for war and does nothing about a U-Boat sighting. What a coup that would have been for Captain Martin. He puts the last torpedoes into the Bismarck - and remember that at the time this was thought to be the cause of Bismarck's end - then he goes on to sink a U-Boat. What a man! He would have been everyone's favourite and would have been decorated no doubt, tea with the King and all that.

Bismarck and Prinz Eugen both carried depth charges. so the basic rule of thumb here is; if you can float, make in excess of ten knots and carry depth charges and you have means to locate, you can indeed go hunting U-Boats. I would not wish people to think I am trying to come across as any sort of fount of knowledge here. I have been learning about this matter ever since I opened my eyes to it for the first time a few days ago, when I initiated this thread.

Never underestimate the activities of the Diplomatic Corps. They had plenty of ways of making helpful suggestions to the enemy via intermediaries and even had direct lines to Hitler's little chums. He will have been feeling pretty down about the loss of his new toy - nothing like rubbing it in by asking, "What do you want us to do about Bismarck's sailors?" How would the world view a refusal to hold a temporary cease fire to rescue drowning men? How would the US citizen react? Of course there is always the possibility that the man in the street would have said, "Let the bleeders drown!" I often think that the more enlightened attitudes to men from the other side did not extend very far in British society at that time and that attitudes tended to change for the most part only on meeting the enemy. We were an imperial power still and foreigners were considered "not quite the ticket" - Germans even more so.

For a clearer idea, we might have asked Churchill for his view. I doubt he would have wished to see that many saved. He even went for Tovey when he publicly praised Bismarck's crew for the way they conducted themselves in the face of such hopeless odds. Not a very generous man when it came to Germans. It may well be that the decision to take just a small sample came from him.

Poor old Joe Brookes probably got it in the neck because he could have put Captain Martin in the soup with Churchill for exceeding his brief. Someone might have to be chucked back.

[MikeBrough]

Vic, I'm not going to get involved in the discussions about whether the RN could have picked up more survivors. I find it difficult to imagine the mindset of the time so I'm not going to judge actions or inactions.

A few thoughts on your post, though.

1. I believe the destroyers were all short of fuel, as were the bigger ships. Hunting subs consumes more fuel than you'd think - lots of sprinting.
2. RN cruisers, including HMS Norfolk, did NOT carry depth-charges. In fact, I'm not aware of any WW2 cruisers (PE) or battleships (Bismarck) carrying depth-charges, but I'm not as familar with navies other than the RN so I'm happy to be corrected on this.
3. Dorsetshire's convoying duties would NOT have included hunting subs - she would have been there to help fend off the Prinz Eugens etc.
4. You said that a cease-fire could have been arranged. I don't think you're familiar with the problems with communications 70 years ago. Even if the officer on the spot could contact London who could then contact Herr Hitler, how do you think he was going to get the message out to his U-boat commanders? And how long do you think that would take? No mobile phones or Twitter back then.

[phil gollin]

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Vic,

The destroyers were there to protect the big ships and even so had to leave to refuel

The Dorsetshire was there to pick up survivors - the U-Boat alert put an end to that. NO other ship would be sent to the area once a U-Boat was suspected. THIS WAS NOT SOME SORT OF BIAS - it was as a result ofwar experience and clear thinking.

Rayner (one of the best escort group commanders) was of the opinion that in a open one-on-one contest between a destroyer (NOT cruiser) and a U-Boat, the U-Boat held ALL the advantages.

The depth charges on cruisers were "scarecrow" devices - (in addition they could be used for sound range and bearing). Show me ONE example of an RN cruiser actively hunting a U-Boat.

Re depth-charging people in the water - you do know that the incident in the Cruel Sea (book and film) where the corvette drops depth charges amongst a group of merchant seaman survivors to attack a U-Boat was based on a REAL event ?

The idea of Bismarck going sub hunting is laughable.

Your ideas over communications with the Germans just goes into La-La land.

I'm sorry, but your ideas are, basically, rubbish.

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[MikeBrough]

My apologies, Vic. After a bit more examination of photos (with a magnifying glass - my eyes aren't what they were), I've noticed some racks on the sterns of a couple of British cruisers and on (eek!) Bismarck during her working up exercises in the Baltic!

I really can't imagine any circumstances under which a cruiser or battleship would employ them (scare tactics?) but they were there, at least in the early stages of the war.

I've NEVER seen them mentioned in the armaments listings in any reference book but they ARE there in the photos.

Does anyone know whether they were ever used by anything bigger than a destroyer?

[Vic Dale]

Too bad Phil feels he has to resort to abuse to make a useful reply. I would have expected better.

Radio communications were being intercepted all the time and had the will been there to make the appeal, it could have been made in the clear. After all if you wish to make a pr coup, there's no need to keep it quiet. Equally if you are bent on a humanitarian act that too can go out in the clear.

In any event, that sighting was fictitious. Let Captain Martin make his report and then let the powers that be decide if there is fuel enough to do the job. When a vessel is said to be in need of fuel, it means that there is no longer enough to maintain high speed for any length of time. There is a reserve figure of about 30% below which they will not go before they break off regular duties to bunker. The consumption curves show that at cruising speed a vessel uses fuel at a very much lower rate, so if there is a need to remain on station it can be done.

Sub hunting does not require high speed or sprinting as has been suggested. All three ships sweep in triangulation with asdic until an echo is returned. Then two ships hold the contact whilst one steams through the crossover point and drops the pattern. U-Boats could not make more than 7 knots when submerged, so there is no need to go haring about. If you watch documentary footage of a sub hunt, the ships are often hove too for long periods, so as to give the asdic cabinet a chance to listen for the fainter echoes. Asdic will not work above 15knots and in fact the transducer would have to be lifted into the hull if higher speed was required. Low speeds and buckets of patience.

If destroyers can drop a pattern of depth charges, then so too can a cruiser. In case people here are still not convinced, here is a bit of info I got from the BBC;

09 Jan 1940 - 19 Jan 1940: Glasgow tackles the U-boats

The beginning of 1940 saw HMS Glasgow involved in activities against enemy U-boats and on 9th January 1940 'Asdic' contacts were picked up and although depth charges were dropped on the 'target' HMS Edinburgh, steaming 5 cables off the Glasgow's port beam, was unable to confirm the contact and the search was abandoned. On 16th January HMS Glasgow sailed from Rosyth for Scapa Flow, from whence she sailed, in station six cables astern of HMS Edinburgh. The latter hoisted a signal "Investigating contact Starboard side" and aboard the Glasgow the crew went to 'Action Stations' as the cruiser also obtained a firm contact on her starboard beam. A pattern of three depth charges was dropped followed six minutes later with a further pattern of three charges. The attack failed to achieve a successful result and on 15th January when Glasgow returned to Rosyth Captain Pegram expressed his concern as to the lack of efficiency of the 'Asdic' set fitted aboard the cruiser and the lack of an adequate number of depth charges, which thereby compromised his ability to press home an attack on a 'target'.

[Gudbrandur]

It was closer to the Germans to save there own. What did the Germans do to save the 800 or so from the Bismarck.? Where did all the uboats go, thretening the rescue operation of there own Kammeraten.?

[phil gollin]

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Vic, I do not know where you getting your info, but it is mostly rubbish.

The RN was NOT in the habit of just making these sort of decisions off-the-cuff, nor would they even think of doing such a thing.

The U-Boat sighting was regarded as genuine - once that happened there was NOTHING that could be done - NO warship would hang around.

There were "official reserves" - but they were NOT used, each fleet had their requirements set by the staff, and different operations would have different levels. Normally oil levels were communicated to the Admiral/Senior Captain whose navigating Officer would keep track of approx. available mileage.

Your ideas on Asdic attacks is only one (NOT a wartime one I recognise, but that is not to say it wasn't used). In general attacks were made at high speed because of the possibility of damage from exploding depth charges. The late war "creeping attack" (much later than May 1941) only worked because of better Asdic and the fact that the attacking ship(s) accelerated as fast as possible once the charges had been dropped. Strangely enough Cruisers NEVER did any such thing.

The Glascow report is NOT a proper attack - merely a scarecrow exercise.


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[Vic Dale]

Phil. I ask you once again. Please keep the personal acrimony out of it and stick to the discussion. You are creating more heat than light here. Try thinking about others who might be lurking with ideas of their own. I hope like me that you would welcome their contributions to the discussion, but they may well be put off if they are timid and think their material is going to be rubbished simply because you don't agree with it. If you are getting angry it's time you found something else to do. You are a bully. Have a little think about that and try to do something about it.

If depth charge attacks had to be made at high speed, how did the little corvettes with a maximum speed of 16 knots, or the trawlers with less than 12 knots get away with dropping patterns? I have the impression that Hollywood has coloured certain impressions about sub hunting. It was a very slow and painstaking job. Ships might sit for hours just listening. Listening to echoes bouncing of the boat's hull is one aspect of the hunt listening to it's motors is another and chasing about at full speed is not the best way to do it. As I have a said, if Asdic is to be used - and I know of no other way to locate a U-Boat in 1941, then speed must be kept below fifteen knots, otherwise the transducer housing will take damage. It is not practical to keep hoisting and lowering the thing, so all ships involved in the hunt would keep their speeds below fifteen knots. That is a sort of iron law if you like.

The attacking vessel would not come in to drop charges at increased speed either, otherwise it would announce it's intentions to the target which could turn out of the line of attack. Don't forget that a fast approach would require considerable distance to effect the turn and then to build up speed. The U-boat's commander would have plenty of time to turn his vessel at right angles to the attack and move off.

You can check out the Glasgow story here; http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peoples ... 3908.shtml

The RN most certainly was in the habit of making lightening decisions when gaining any sight of the enemy. Had there been any substance to Captain Martin's tale about the U-Boat sighting, one of the first things he would have been asked at the post-operational conference would be " Did you consider attacking it?" Any commanding officer who did not turn to attack an enemy which presented itself, would be considered lacking in offensive spirit. There is no precedent for a vessel sighting the enemy and doing nothing about it, except where subterfuge or superior force might be the over riding factor. Even then, observation would be expected. A cruiser might not be able to attack a battleship, but it can keep most certainly it in sight.

It is possible that Captain Martin had used all of his depth charges, but that would not stop him trying to locate the U-Boat and sitting over the top of it until suitable force could be brought to bear. In the event he did nothing and nobody questioned it.

Extract from Wickipedia;
"The Royal Navy Type D depth charge was designated the Mark VII by 1939. Initial sinking speed was 7 ft/s (2.1 m/s) with a terminal velocity of 9.9 ft/s (3.0 m/s) at a depth of 250 ft (76 m) if rolled off the stern, or upon water contact from a depth charge thrower Cast iron weights of 150 lb were attached to the Mark VII at the end of 1940 to increase sinking velocity to 16.8 ft/s (5.1 m/s). New hydrostatic pistols increased the maximum detonation depth to 900 ft (270 m). The Mark VII's 290 lb (130 kg) Amatol charge was estimated capable of splitting a 7⁄8 in (22 mm) submarine pressure hull at a distance of 20 ft (6.1 m), and forcing the submarine to surface at twice that. Change of explosive to Torpex (or Minol) at the end of 1942 was estimated to increase those distances to 26 and 52 ft (7.9 and 16 m)."

At 9kts a vessel moves 5ft per second (fps). The sink rate of 7 fps woud take a charge 7 seconds to reach 50 feet giving a distance of vessel travel of 35 feet. If the heavier charge was used the vessel would travel 15 feet for every foot of depth

A U-Boat trying to evade detection woud tend to go deep, say about 4 to 500 feet (130 to 170m). This deep the charges would be less effective, as the standard charge had a depth limit of 250 feet for the hydrostatic pistol.

At this depth, the attacking vessel proceeding at 9knots would make 140 feet distance from the bursting charge and would be quite safe. With this type of charge, the most that could be acheived would be to keep the boat submerged at depth and attacking vessels would remain on the spot until it was forced to surface. That is the theory anyway and if the accounts of U-Boat men are to be believed this is precisely what they encountered a lot of the time - those who lived to tell.

With the heavier type of charge now using Torpex and cast iron weights, introduced at the end of 1940 - and maybe not yet standardised throughout the fleet by May '41- the sink rate would be twice that of the normal charge and the damage potential increased by about 30%. Using the above attacking speed and depth, the vessel would make only 70 feet in the given time. That might be a bit dangerous, but if that was as deep as the boat had gone there would be no problem increasing speed if it was available, if not the charge would still, burst more than 250 feet away, though the shock transmitted through water would still be powerful. No doubt there will have been a table prepared to show the captain his safe attacking speed.

[phil gollin]

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I will call rubbish "rubbish" if it is so.

Try reading the Western Approaches files and CAFOs for anti-submarine tactics.

Ships did NOT just "sit for hours listening" - they would be dead. Passive listening was used, but rarely ( I have only seen TWO claims for a U-Boat being discovered by passive means - there may well be a few more ???? ).

ANY running of a ship over a U-Boat would have been regarded as a possible attack.

"Post-operational Conference " - what is one of those ? Certainly not normal.

ANY cruiser captain considering actively going after a U-Boat would have been an idiot.

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[Vic Dale]

Phil doesn't seem to be able to form sufficient words to express himself without being unpleasant, so his contribution is no longer needed. He can make it if he feels like it but he will get no further replies from me.

Captain Martin did not do nearly enough to convince me that the rescue operation was anything more than taking a sample of Bismarck's crew. He used single lines when scrambling nets would have got the job done far quicker and he did not even have the decency to drop his carley rafts. The way to see that question is to ask; "How many life rafts would the ships in the area have contributed had the stricken ship been one of ours?"

The U-Boat sighting does not figure in any battle report and I doubt that it is even entered in Dorsetshire's log. No U-Boat alarm was raised with other vessels and at a time when Britain could have lost the Battle of the Atlantic.

Did he attempt to gain contact using his Asdic? Did he do anything to try and get an air strike launched against the target? Did he raise it at all with any other ship? Did he put any sort of marker down for aircraft? The answer to all these questions is a resounding NO. And he didn't even get questioned about it.

I believed that watery tale for 55 years, but having taken a fresh look, I believe it no longer.

[RNfanDan]

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You live in a fantasy world where ships are immune to torpedoes and destroyers always kill U-Boats.

The RN had MORE than enough bitter evidence of the fallacy of such beliefs.

Once the captain received the report of the periscope he near-enough had NO choice about his actions.

Ships do NOT get rid of their life saving gear when there is an enemy submarine in the immediate area.

Cruisers do not instantly accelerate so immediate action to get underway was required and only the very strongest men would be able to hold on to scrambling nets at only a knot or two - basically as soon as the ship starts moving the survivors are lost.

A strange world you li[v]e in.

Phil, I would like to add to your reply with the following:

1. Most, if not all the destroyers in attendance (or near enough to render rescue assistance), were already critically short of fuel. They would have had none left to even consider expending, putting-down a U-boat. Consider Tartar and Mashona, relentlessly bombed by the Luftwaffe after the Bismarck's sinking-- so low on fuel they could not proceed at anything close to their normal speed as they made for safety. They were exposed for an inordinately long time to air attacks as a direct result of their need to conserve fuel, and Mashona paid the price. War is Hell.

2. If every remaining survivor were to have been rescued---unlikely enough, even without threat of attacks by their countrymen on their would-be rescuers' ships---it is not realistic to expect that German air crews or U-boat commanders would refrain from attacking---even if STUFFED FULL of their surviving Bismarck mates, and flying plain-language pendants advertising that fact. Without hesitancy, even the most professional and chivalrous of air and naval officers would not hesitate for a second, to attempt sinking such targets. War is Hell.

3. Peacetime humanitarian mores and wartime military directives have NEVER mixed well. War is Hell.

@Vic: You can see things others apparently cannot, even those not previously visible to you (at least, until an important anniversary just happens along to clarify your "vision"); but can you see a common theme, among the above three passages? Hint: War is Hell.

My apologies, Phil...

[MikeBrough]

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2. If every remaining survivor were to have been rescued---unlikely enough, even without threat of attacks by their countrymen on their would-be rescuers' ships---it is not realistic to expect that German air crews or U-boat commanders would refrain from attacking---even if STUFFED FULL of their surviving Bismarck mates, and flying plain-language pendants advertising that fact. Without hesitancy, even the most professional and chivalrous of air and naval officers would not hesitate for a second, to attempt sinking such targets. War is Hell.

In the harsh calculus of war, those German sailors were already lost to the German war effort. SInking a RN cruiser, even if full of rescuees, would reduce the risk of more being lost in the long term.

As you say, Dan. War is hell.

[Vic Dale]

Once more, people cannot resist having a personal dig. Bitching detracts from the whole tone of the discussion and in my view lowers the quality of the forum. There is plenty to discuss and contributors have raised a number of important points which have caused me at least to look again and learn a little more. We can agree or disagree, but please let us behave like gentlemen and women.

In a destroyer flotilla there are no circumstances under which the whole flotilla would be short of fuel, much less critically so. Fueling is a rolling process whereby vessels are rotated to bunker, so that the flotilla can carry out it's duties without interruption and be ready to react immediately to any threat, or an opportunity to close with the enemy and try to sink him.

KGV was the most low on fuel that morning, having chased all over the ocean hunting for Bismarck and still having to chase the German. Even then as Tovey put it, he was not going to risk his flagship running out of fuel to get her. Other ships had already been rotated to fuel when they were geting low. PoW being one of them and I believe Suffolk too At 1500 On the afternoon of the 26th, KGV had 32% of her fuel stocks remaining and by 0800 next morning she would have had 25% - if she continued at high speed. Now with Rodney in tow, she was making 22 knots and during the battle she averaged 17 knots. At 19 knots she was probably good for another 4,000 miles, with about 1000 tons of fuel remaining. 25% fuel stocks remaining is about the time when a ship should bunker. This cuts right through through some of the hyberbole which journalists and others have attached to this question.

The same 25% limit would be true of the destroyers, which when in flotilla would rotate two at a time to oil. Piorun was detached to oil as were Tartar and Mashona - Piorun being somewhat smaller than the Tribals may have had less range and may have needed to top up more frequently. They were not critically low on fuel, just in need of fuel, as per Fleet Instructions. There were still a number of detroyers in the vicinity, thirsting for their first U-Boat kill. There were aircraft available too. Ark Royal carried an anti-submarine flight which was used to fly ahead and clear the path of U-Boats.

Mashona when proceeding to oil in company with Tartar, came under heavy air attack and one bomb struck the sea adjacent her boiler room, causing extensive flooding. The ship was eventually scuttled and abandoned. So it seems to me that she had had plenty of room for maneuver but succumbed to a near miss and was not bombed as a sitting duck nearly hove to due to fuel shortage.

The navy does not have it's ships racing all over the ocean when there is no need. Only in battle or when chasing an enemy would they employ high engine revs. Each Captain has to account for every maneuver he makes, it is on the chart and engine revs are also accurately recorded. If he is on passage, he would have to say why, if he exceeded cruising speed. During the whole of my time serving on an A/s frigate, I could probably count the number of times we went onto full speed. The rest of the time we made 9 knots or if making a faster passage 17knots. Speed trials, rescues and other very urgent business would see us at 30 knots.

I was the first to point to the dangers of taking as many as 800 prisoners aboard a single ship the size of Dorsetshire, though she could easily have accommodated them. They were not armed and for the most part exhausted and greatly relieved to have been rescued, if a touch hysterical. Had it been thought they were a risk to the integrity of the ship, arms could have been broken out and they would have been contained. With so many ships in the vicinity much more could have been done against the U-Boat and to save those men.

I never once suggested hospital flag signals to potential attackers, because I never even thought of it. What I suggested was a radio broadcast in the clear to to the German High Command asking, "What do you want us to do about your men in the water." I believe Piorun radioed or signaled Bismarck by lamp in the clear, "I am a Pole!" before engaging her with gunfire. The radio appeal is a side issue and I agree there is not much likelihood of getting such an agreement, from Hitler, or of the British government - especially Churchill making such an appeal. In modern times it is something which should be expected and the War Crimes Commission would and should take a very dim view of such obvious and catastrophic neglect. It simply illustrates my point with more clarity; that in those days during the war at sea there was not the humanitarianism which we have been led to believe. We live in a much more enlightened world these days and it is all too easy to superimpose what we know and feel about internationalism and humanitarianism, on events over 70 years ago. Possibly Bismarck, the pride of Hitler's fleet being sunk with all but a hundred of her crew would make better reading than the alternative.

The xmas football match in the 14-18 war, the Amnesty for wounded at Arnhem 1944 and the touching stories of the treatment of U-Boatmen and Luftwaffe crews after capture, are inspiring to say the least, but leaving those many hundreds of young men to drown or die of exposure as they did is a mark of shame on the Royal Navy.

[Guest]

Gentlemen,

as far as I know, some cruisers (I'm pretty sure for the Dido and the USS San Francisco) did carry a few depth charges. That doesn't make them good ASW ships however. They often lacked ASDIC and carry too few DC. They had neither the accelaration nor the short turning radius of destroyers.

Best,

Francis