Rescue Operations After Bismarck's Sinking

[Vic Dale]

Hang on guys.

Captain Martin had a sighting, so forget 20 miles radius. The ships were on the spot and he had asdic, by which he could try to pin point the contact as he moved off. That would be the first act of war. Send out an alert and let others respond or not according to their own dispositions, an air search would have revealed the target had it been near the surface. Martin did not raise the alarm so he was not convinced in his own mind that it was a U-Boat.

Dorsetshire was a ship of war and perfectly capable of playing her part in taking out a U-Boat. Corvettes and trawlers would have been on it right away, so why not a heavy cruiser? What on earth was the point of Martin having Asdic if he wasn't going to use it? Why give him depth charges if he was not going to attempt to use them? I had a long conversation with a destroyer captain a few years ago. He had been a "Daddy D" so he will have known a thing or two and he blew away a lot of myths for me. No captain is ever given a weapon he cannot use. No weapon is ever deployed unless it is to be used.

Not once have I suggested that Martin hang around rescuing Germans whilst destroyers hunted down the enemy. He should have been part of the attack. If there was no possibility of him being part of the hunting group, he should clear off out of it. But he never raised the alarm.

I strongly suggest that people here calm down and actually read my posts before going on the rampage over them.

So again. At the risk of sounding repetitive. If Captain Martin had a real sighting of a U-Boat he should have attacked it - he had the means. After deciding to attack, leave off the rescue, get underway, raise the alarm with other ships and let the senior officer - probably Wake-Walker by this time - decide what precisely to do about it.

I suggest Mr Gollin read about the convoys and how many men were left to drown. Ships were forbidden to turn and rescue men in the water, due to ships being sunk on previous convoys when doing so. It was only after a threat to stop sailing on the convoys that properly fitted out rescue ships were commissioned. Not all convoys had rescue ships even when those properly designated first went into action in January 1941 and prior to that, if there was a rescue ship at all it was usually a small merchantman. A great many men drowned because of inadequate rescue facilities. This caused grumblings on the western side of the Atlantic and in trade unoins. The shipping companies were happy to send their ships, because they were indemnified against the loss of their vessel and cargo, but the men who worked them got nothing. Their pay was stopped the minute the ship went down. An order not to turn and rescue when there was no rescue vessel, doomed the men left in the water and as so many ships were being sunk, the loss of life was appalling. The anger grew to the point that a strike was almost inevitable i something was not done and only in the face of that was it decided that adequate rescue vessels should accompany all convoys. Escorts might rescue if they were not in contact with the enemy, but rarely could they be spared due to the weight of other responsibility they carried. A convoy which relied upon the escorts to carry out rescues would probably lose a great many men. It was about the same time as the trade unions got involved that merchant seamen's pay was increased.

It is noteworthy that although they may disagree with me that the majority of people here can respond without personalising or trying to be abusive, most are very polite and in that they make their points with all the more force. They are a joy to be exchanging ideas with. One among us does not appear to be capable of that and insists on being pig-ignorant. Oh well, I am all for contrasts.

[dunmunro]

Hang on guys.

Captain Martin had a sighting, so forget 20 miles radius. The ships were on the spot and he had asdic, by which he could try to pin point the contact as he moved off. That would be the first act of war. Send out an alert and let others respond or not according to their own dispositions, an air search would have revealed the target had it been near the surface. Martin did not raise the alarm so he was not convinced in his own mind that it was a U-Boat.

Dorsetshire was a ship of war and perfectly capable of playing her part in taking out a U-Boat. Corvettes and trawlers would have been on it right away, so why not a heavy cruiser? What on earth was the point of Martin having Asdic if he wasn't going to use it? Why give him depth charges if he was not going to attempt to use them? I had a long conversation with a destroyer captain a few years ago. He had been a "Daddy D" so he will have known a thing or two and he blew away a lot of myths for me. No captain is ever given a weapon he cannot use. No weapon is ever deployed unless it is to be used.

Not once have I suggested that Martin hang around rescuing Germans whilst destroyers hunted down the enemy. He should have been part of the attack. If there was no possibility of him being part of the hunting group, he should clear off out of it. But he never raised the alarm.

I strongly suggest that people here calm down and actually read my posts before going on the rampage over them.

Martin had a warning report, not a sighting report.

AFAIK, neither Dorsetshire or Norfolk had depth charges (based upon photos of both ships), nor do I know of an single instance during WW2 where a RN cruiser participated in a hunt for a u-boat except as distant cover. The idea of a heavy cruiser hunting for a u-boat is simply absurd.

[Vic Dale]

Norfolk carried depth charges as did all cruisers in wartime photos I have. I don't have a good photo of Dorsetshire but I can't see any reason she wouldn't have them if the others did. You do have to look hard to find them and there is no reference to depth charges in the lists of armaments in most books. Usually it was single rack carrying about seven charges.

Have a look here; http://www.world-war.co.uk/Dorset/dorset.php3

in the second to last photo I think you can just about make out the DC rack on the port side of the oerlikon tub.

Here is an account taken from a BBC site of HMS Glasgow having a go at a U-Boat;

The beginning of 1940 saw HMS Glasgow involved in activities against enemy U-boats and on 9th January 1940 'Asdic' contacts were picked up and although depth charges were dropped on the 'target' HMS Edinburgh, steaming 5 cables off the Glasgow's port beam, was unable to confirm the contact and the search was abandoned. On 16th January HMS Glasgow sailed from Rosyth for Scapa Flow, from whence she sailed, in station six cables astern of HMS Edinburgh. The latter hoisted a signal "Investigating contact Starboard side" and aboard the Glasgow the crew went to 'Action Stations' as the cruiser also obtained a firm contact on her starboard beam. A pattern of three depth charges was dropped followed six minutes later with a further pattern of three charges. The attack failed to achieve a successful result and on 15th January when Glasgow returned to Rosyth Captain Pegram expressed his concern as to the lack of efficiency of the 'Asdic' set fitted aboard the cruiser and the lack of an adequate number of depth charges, which thereby compromised his ability to press home an attack on a 'target'.

From this we can see that hunting U-Boats with cruisers was not a late development in the war. There was a precedent.

So on sighting an object he thinks is a U-Boat, Captain Martin does nothing?

[MikeBrough]

I need to do some further research. The following personal history states that, not only did Dorsetshire carry depth-charges, she actually used them to sink a sub off Freetown in '42.

http://www.world-war.co.uk/dorset_fudge.php3

To be fair, the following potted history, while mentioning the sinking of the raider Python, doesn't mention the equally important sinking of 2 U-boats. Is Fudge mis-remembering?

http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono ... tshire.htm

[Vic Dale]

Hi Mike.

Many thanks for your input. If we have a mind to we can all learn a great deal about events, which were not dealt with in much detail in the more popular works and also dislodge some preconceived and incorrect notions about the war at sea. I hope you are enjoying the research as much as I am.

I remember as a child, seeing a photo of a stricken British cruiser with depth charges on her quarter deck and having my eyes opened then to the idea that sub hunting was perhaps not the sole preserve of destroyers. I was much later to learn about the work of sloops, corvettes and trawlers. To us young boys, it was always the destroyer which captured the imagination as the best sub-hunters. We had a lot to learn.

Fudge makes an interesting remark when he says the crew got permission to bring in survivors

"Subsequently, when we got permission from the captain to bring in survivors and leave our stations, we found our ship was rolling so badly it was difficult to keep one's footing on the deck, which was often awash."

Did he mean that the crew asked the Captain for permission to bring in survivors, or was he saying the guns crews got permission to leave their positions and join the rescue?

Another eye opener, is the use of the Walrus. I had not even thought about that. Had it been possible to fly off the Walrus, it could have flown to the British mainland after attempting to spot and sink the U-Boat and remained there until weather conditions permitted it to be picked up at sea.

I have not been able to find any reference to a cruiser sinking a U-Boat, but that does not mean they did not attack them when opportunity presented itself. Possibly the "Kill" which Fudge speaks of was a blind. Oil and rags were often fired from the torpedo tubes after a depth charge attack to convince the attacker that the boat was finished, so they would leave them alone. The kill might have been registered as a possible and maybe there is a record somewhere.

It has been suggested that the depth charges carried by British cruisers were just scare charges. They were MkII charges which could split a U-Boat's hull if exploding within 20 feet of it and rendering the boat unlikely to survive at twice that distance. So having a go was not just play. It really was an act of war, especially from the U-Boat's perspective.

Although much of what Fudge says may sound ambiguous, it is clear that Captain Martin was not taking any chances with his prisoners, putting an armed guard on them.

Warmest regards

[phil gollin]

.

Vic

"We" do not have a lot to learn - YOU do.

You make ridiculous statements, imagine rubbish and libel people based on nothing.

Grow up (you claim to be in your 60s, but act like a 14 year old).

You have no idea how the RN worked in WW2. You have no idea of the realities of The Battle of the Atlantic and have no idea of being responsible for the lives of the sailors under your command.

Cruisers did NOT hunt U-Boats - FACT.

Depth charges oncruisers were for scarecrow tactics or sound ranging NOT hunting U-Boats - FACT.

IF you will keep to the facts you won't be laughed at, and if you keep from imagining libellous motives for the Admiralty you won't be held in contrmpt.

The continual repetition of fictions merely indicates your inability to comprehend.

.

[Herr Nilsson]

I find it odd to say the least, that when Tovey says he will have to break off the chase at 0800 on the 27th when he has documented the fact that 32% of his oil stocks remained at 1500 on the 26th, that it could be thought that a specific limit was not in operation in the Fleet. Even I can make that calculation, but somehow, somebody here seems to think they have better information. It would be nice if they would share it. I would be interested to know what experience this superior knowledge is based upon. I strongly recommend that this person reread the accounts of the Bismarck Chase.

I did:

64. The shortage of fuel in the Home Fleet battleships was a matter of grave anxiety; the King George V had only 1,200 tons (32 per cent) remaining, and the Rodney reported that she would have to part company at 0800 the next morning. When these ships joined company later in the day they had to share an A/S screen of three destroyers - the Somali (Captain Clifford Caslon), Tartar (Commander Lionel P. Skipwith) and Mashona (Commander William H. Selby) and even these were due to leave that night for lack oil fuel. There were known to be several U-Boats in the area and it was safe to assume that every available destroyer and U-boat in the ports of western France would also be ordered to sea. The Admiralty had also warned me to expect heavy air attack. It was therefore essential to allow a sufficient reserve of fuel to enable the battleships to return to United Kingdom ports at a reasonably high speed. The loss of the Hood and the damage to the Prince of Wales had left the King George V as the only effective capital ship remaining in Home waters. I was not prepared to expose her unscreened at low speed to almost certain attack by U-boats unless there was very good prospect of achieving a result commensurate with the risk. I therefore decided that unless the enemy's speed had been reduced, the King George V should return at 2400 on 26th May to refuel.

65. The speed of the King George V was reduced to 22 knots at 1705 on 26th May to economise fuel, and the Rodney, who had by then been overhauled, was formed astern.
...

also:

chasefuel.JPG (40.08 KiB) Viewed 2372 times

and:

86. The shortage of oil fuel in the King George V and the Rodney had become acute. It was not merely a matter of having sufficient oil to reach one of our harbours: I had to consider the possibility of damage to fuel tanks by a near miss from a bomb or a hit by a torpedo; this might easily result in the ship being stopped in an area where U-boats were known to be concentrating, and where I had been warned to expect heavy air attack. Further gunfire would do little to hasten the Bismarck's end. I therefore decided to break off the action with King George V and Rodney, and instructed any ships still with torpedoes to use them on the Bismarck.

[Vic Dale]

It might be useful if Herr Nilsson could indicate where his references came from. They could be anything.

It's hardly surprising that the C-in-C had to reduce to 22 Knots, he had Rodney in tow and as I understand it, 22 knots was her maximum speed. I could be wrong of course.

[Herr Nilsson]

ADM 234/509: Sinking of the 'Bismarck', 27 May 1941: Official Despatches
and
B.R. 1736 (3/50) (Restricted) BattleSummary No. 5: The chase and sinking of the "Bismarck"

[Vic Dale]

Thanks for the references.

It is clear that someone has made a gaff in writing up this report. KGV had Rodney in company and Rodney's maximum speed was 22knots. I recall reading that Dalrymple-Hamilton signaled Tovey, "I'm afraid that your 22 knots is a little faster than mine." When Rodney started to fall back. Clearly KGV reduced speed to 22 knots in response to having the much slower Rodney in company and not because of any concern about fuel. At 22 knots he would not be able to intercept Bismarck at all. Unless she was slowed.

Of course Tovey would need to consider the effects of battle damage, ruptured tanks etc and other contingencies which might slow KGV in the event of her taking hits, but that does not say she was anywhere near short of fuel. If he had been forced to break off the chase at 0800 the next morning he would have sufficient fuel to make 19 knots and would still get to Loch Ewe. It is quite clear that he was not prepared to run stocks below 25% so that KGV would have that margin of safety in the event of taking battle damage.

Earlier I said that warships used this 25% as the limit, before making for a fueling depot, though pointing out that the limit could be exceeded if pressing tactical needs required her to remain on station or at her allotted task. With the possibility of battle damage Tovey was not going to risk KGV coming to a stop, because shelling had emptied her tanks.

I believe it was Churchill who tried to tell Tovey to run the ship out of oil if necessary to get to grips with Bismarck. Tovey rightly refused.

I am very grateful for the detailed input which members are putting into this discussion. We are all seeing things many of us have never seen before, especially with regard to cruisers attacking U-Boats, something which may be hardly believable to some here. But it seems that such a thing became at a fact, when Captain Pegram in Glasgow attacked one and assisted another cruiser when she had a contact. When I first raised this topic, I had not the slightest idea that Dorsetshire herself should attack the suspected U-Boat, but thanks to information provided by helpful members we find that not only did she attack U-Boats, but there is the possibility of her making a claim herself and later for her Walrus.

I think we should approach this with a little caution though. I have thoroughly checked and there is no record of a U-Boat being sunk by a British cruiser, though it seems we do have documentary evidence of cruisers making such attacks. I would not expect to find that cruisers were sent out hunting U-Boats either. Other more suitable craft would be available for that, though they were armed with Depth charge racks which could carry seven charges. I am not certain if they carried reloads. I would expect them to. If they had depth charges the ships would be given the means to use them so an Asdic cabinet would have been provided. It may well be that there is documentary evidence to show what type of set they had. Glasgow certainly had one as did Southampton.

I have just been looking at Belfast's drawings and she had Asdic Type 132 fitted by 1942, so there is a clue to start with.

Captain Martin was known to be a feisty devil, with his promise to ram the Bismarck if he got the chance, so there can be no doubting his offensive spirit. Given that he is credited with attacking U-Boats, I am convinced that he did not take that sighting on 27th of May seriously and if he didn't why move off?

Dorsetshire sailed in company with KGV after Bismarck was sunk and made her way to Loch Ewe. I think there is every possibility that Martin had received the order to concentrate on on the C-in-C and the supposed U-Boat was his release from the rescue.

[Herr Nilsson]

It is clear that someone has made a gaff in writing up this report. KGV had Rodney in company and Rodney's maximum speed was 22knots. I recall reading that Dalrymple-Hamilton signaled Tovey, "I'm afraid that your 22 knots is a little faster than mine." When Rodney started to fall back. Clearly KGV reduced speed to 22 knots in response to having the much slower Rodney in company and not because of any concern about fuel. At 22 knots he would not be able to intercept Bismarck at all. Unless she was slowed.

63. The first report of the Bismarck placed her about 130 miles south of me steering a south-westerly course at 22 knots. It was evident that she had too great a lead for the King George V to come up with her unless her speed could be further reduced or she could be deflected from her course; our only hope lay in torpedo attacks by aircraft of the Ark Royal.

...and weren't it Brinkmann and Lindemann?

[phil gollin]

.

Vic,

The only things "we" are seeing here that we haven't seen before are YOUR weird imaginings.

Where do you get you imaginary 25% figure from ?

THAT is NOT how the RN worked in WW2. I have explained how they worked above, but as with so many facts you have been given you ignored them and instead went ahead with your wargames fantasies.


.

[dunmunro]

I need to do some further research. The following personal history states that, not only did Dorsetshire carry depth-charges, she actually used them to sink a sub off Freetown in '42.

http://www.world-war.co.uk/dorset_fudge.php3

To be fair, the following potted history, while mentioning the sinking of the raider Python, doesn't mention the equally important sinking of 2 U-boats. Is Fudge mis-remembering?

http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono ... tshire.htm

Here's a better account of what happened regarding Python and Dorsetshire:

At the end of December HMS Dorsetshire intercepted and surprised the German U boat supply ship Python west of St. Helena, while the latter was providing the submarines U-A and U-68 with fuel. Both U-boats submerged at once, U-A attacked the cruiser with 5 torpedoes, fortunately they all missed. The crew of the Python abandoned ship and the cruiser sunk her, the crew were finally rescued by the submarine U-A.
http://uboat.net/allies/warships/ship/1185.html

The naval staff History, German Capital ships and Raiders, Vol. 1 also has an account of this action. Dorsetshire did not attack or sink either of the u-boats while Python actually scuttled herself. Old sailor's memories are no substitute for accurate naval histories.

Further investigation shows that most County class cruisers carried a single DC rack carrying 7 charges, and these were discharged over the port side aft.

[MikeBrough]

I need to do some further research. The following personal history states that, not only did Dorsetshire carry depth-charges, she actually used them to sink a sub off Freetown in '42.

http://www.world-war.co.uk/dorset_fudge.php3

To be fair, the following potted history, while mentioning the sinking of the raider Python, doesn't mention the equally important sinking of 2 U-boats. Is Fudge mis-remembering?

http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono ... tshire.htm

Here's a better account of what happened regarding Python and Dorsetshire:

At the end of December HMS Dorsetshire intercepted and surprised the German U boat supply ship Python west of St. Helena, while the latter was providing the submarines U-A and U-68 with fuel. Both U-boats submerged at once, U-A attacked the cruiser with 5 torpedoes, fortunately they all missed. The crew of the Python abandoned ship and the cruiser sunk her, the crew were finally rescued by the submarine U-A.
http://uboat.net/allies/warships/ship/1185.html

The naval staff History, German Capital ships and Raiders, Vol. 1 also has an account of this action. Dorsetshire did not attack or sink either of the u-boats while Python actually scuttled herself. Old sailor's memories are no substitute for accurate naval histories.

That's one of the reasons that I find oral histories (Atkinson, Hart etc) great for getting the blood flowing but not so good when it comes to... veracity or the big picture.

Further investigation shows that most County class cruisers carried a single DC rack carrying 7 charges, and these were discharged over the port side aft.

That ties in with the plans and photos in Friedman. Last-ditch and/or scare tactics makes sense.

[tommy303]

..and weren't it Brinkmann and Lindemann?

Oddly enough, I believe both sets of captains had similar exchanges