Rescue Operations After Bismarck's Sinking

[phil gollin]

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Vic, you are spouting rubbish again (that is not "personal" - that is fact).

A WW2 British destroyer Flotilla, in general did NOT operate together, it was an administrative unit. When ships sailed it was preferred, if operationally possible, for all ships to be near enough fully fuelled, i.e. all other things being equal all ships of the same class would have roughly the same operational range (depending on state of engines, fouling, etc.....). So your idea that "In a destroyer flotilla there are no circumstances under which the whole flotilla would be short of fuel" is, as a first approximation, rubbish. OF COURSE, different classes, different actual fuel loads, different usage means that each ship will, in reality, have different remaining amounts of fuel. Different commanders would use their ships in different manners, some trying to keep everyones' remaining fuel about the same, others using up a ship or two with the high speed work and then sending them away for refuelling whilst the others conserved fuel - that was a command decision (both were used).

The destroyers were escorting chasing ships - the idea of rolling bunkering was just not an option. You are imagining an impossible event.

PLEASE justify your ideas on KGV fuel consumption - IF Tovey felt it necessary to put a time limit on leaving off a most important chase I THINK we can assume he had some proper figures to work on.

Your imagining of 25% for bunkering destroyers is rubbish - it would depend on available ports and estimated minimum speeds (in dangerous waters) - a simple % was NOT applied. This was determined on each ship by the Engineering Officer and Navigating Officer who then informed the Captain. IF they could within the bounds of radio silence they would inform their appropriate squadron, fleet or flotilla commander - otherwise it would be the Captain's decision.

In WW2 there were specific states of readiness for engine rooms but actual useage was down to the captain. The captain was NOT answerable for general manouvering - it was his, or his commanders, own responsibility (OUT of combat zones there was guidance - but again the captain was soley responsible).

You ideas on communications are still just not realistic.

There is NOTHING shameful about the Dorsetshire leaving the survivors as long as the Captain believed the U-Boat report - there was nothing else he could do. To imagine otherwise is to ignore all the dreadful examples of the Battle of the Atlantic - one cannot ignore the facts.

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[Vic Dale]

If anyone doubts my calculations they are welcome to present calculations of their own - in fact I encourage it. That is the only way to learn.

I served in an anti-submarine frigate and we operated as part of a squadron. We did not spend all of our time in the squadron, but could be called upon to form up in the event of action. The first thing when we formed up for an operation was certain numbers would be sent to oil and that oiling was a rolling process throughout the squadron, in ones and twos depending on circumstance. The engineers would inform the captain on a daily basis, what stocks we had, but the decision to oil was down to the senior officer, the captain if we were were operating alone or "Daddy D" if in company. The flotilla was an entity we did not concern ourselves about much, but the squadron was a fighting unit. Vian had destroyers of the 4th flotilla under his command and as "Daddy D" he would have sent vessels to oil when they needed it and unless he had something else on his mind he would not have let them get below 25% and would probably have sent them off sooner, having that 25% margin allowed for all sorts of contingencies.

I find it odd to say the least, that when Tovey says he will have to break off the chase at 0800 on the 27th when he has documented the fact that 32% of his oil stocks remained at 1500 on the 26th, that it could be thought that a specific limit was not in operation in the Fleet. Even I can make that calculation, but somehow, somebody here seems to think they have better information. It would be nice if they would share it. I would be interested to know what experience this superior knowledge is based upon. I strongly recommend that this person reread the accounts of the Bismarck Chase. The Baron covered this aspect of the chase in sufficient detail to permit calculations. Perhaps he would be able to amend the work so we could all learn from him.

Why would Tovey have detached Repulse to oil before her stocks had run out if he did not intend a rolling oiling pattern for his force? She still had about 65% left.

[MikeBrough]

Vic, Tovey will have had to leave enough fuel to get home AND to carry out evasive manouevres if enemy threats materialised. He must have realised that, after his sinking the Bismarck, the German subs and Condors would be out to get him. Time to get out of Dodge - and quickly.

I'm sure that most of the cruisers and destroyers would have been at even lower fuel levels than the battleships.

I think you're looking for a humanitarian ideal that just wasn't possible in wartime. Yes, there may have been examples of temporary truces (Arnhem, Cassino) but trusting the enemy NOT to sink a big juicy target.. Don't think so. What if one U-boat hadn't got the order to stand off? Just one.

[phil gollin]

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Vic,

Your experience and that of the early WW2 escorting destroyers are different.

You were on an operation, the escorting destroyers had to escort their charges (if they could) - totally different.

"Rolling oiling" was NOT practiced by fleet destroyers on an operation (see below).

Even late war when the escort oiling force came into operation, the manner of support groups being oiled (as opposed to the escort groups) was much more a matter of all ships running low and then a general fill-up.

Post-war is NOT early war.

[Vic Dale]

At 19knots KGV could steam 1,000 miles on 25% fuel stocks. To Loch Ewe where she went to fuel was 720 miles, Scapa Flow was 820miles miles. Gibraltar was 760 miles and Londonderry 580 miles. If fuel had been that urgent for KGV she would have put in to Londonderry. KGV was the hardest pressed as regards fuel. As flagship she had to be in on the fight if at all possible. Other ships had been rotated to fuel as needed. So the 25% margin was in operation as I stated earlier.

On May 22nd Norfolk left Hvalfiord for the Denmark Strait. The patrol would be maintained at economical speeds, though with due regard to U-Boats, so she would have kept to 19nots, burning fuel at one third of the rate at 30 knots. She carried 3,200 tons of fuel and at 30knots would burn 1.5 tons per hour, at 19knots 0.5 tons. She will have steamed 86 hours on patrol at 19 knots (43 tons) and 84 hours at 30knots (1176 tons)after Bismarck was first sighted, making a total expenditure of 1219 tons. She carried 3200 tons, so 1981 would have remained at 1030 on the 27th. She was the most hard pressed cruiser in the Home Fleet.

Norfolk was ordered to take Suffolk's place on the Denmark Strait patrol, so that she could return and fuel in readiness for anything that might be impending. ( From; The Bismarck Episode - Russell Grenfell). Dorsetshire was escorting convoy SL74 at a speed of about 8 knots until 1030 on the 26th, so she will have had plenty of fuel.

Force H had sailed from Gibraltar and had steamed 1200 miles by the time Bismarck went down. So they would not be very hard pressed for fuel. So we could easily add Sheffield to the rescue.

I have already said that the humanitarianism we have come to know in our more enlightened times probably did not apply in 1941. My point is that far too little was done if there was a serious attempt being made to rescue Bismarck's survivors. No scrambling nets, no life rafts and Dorsetshire moving off before she completed the task, leaving many hundreds to die. The watery excuse of a U-Boat sighting simply does not wash, because there was more than enough hardware about to deal with it and no alarm was raised. To my mind, Captain Martin's remarks about the U-Boat were little more than an attempt to soothe his crew who were outraged that the operation was halted so soon. Lookouts are duty bound to report all observations and those sightings are recorded in the Bridge log. A quick look at the sea state that day will tell us that no one would have recognised a periscope feather against all the breaking waves. In Tovey's Action Report, he says,"Dorsetshire sighted a suspicious object, which might have been a U-boat, and ships were compelled to abandon the work of rescue." See the full report on the Hood website.

I have also said that I believe Martin was not operating on his own behalf, but under orders from a senior officer, or according to some Secret Standing Order. We also need to consider Martin's over reaction to Joe Brookes' courageous act.

[phil gollin]

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Vic

You are repeating non-realistic expectations

[Vic Dale]

I am not simply repeating, I am restating my case, the bulk of which no one has been able to properly refute.

A lot of flak has been fired in my direction lately and I need to make clear that my position has not altered, despite plenty of new information and ideas being presented by myself and others.

Statements have been made as though they are fact, which fly right in the face of statements and reports from officers present during the operation. So far nothing has been presented to say that more could not have been done and as it stands the so called rescue attempt could never have taken all of those men out of the water, by the methods employed, despite more than enough ships and equipment being present to get the job done. The Baron said he had a vision of a scrambling net, but it was only a vision and soon he realised it was the slippery single lines or nothing. Some of the lines didn't even have bowlines in them. This is unbelievable.

Apparently a box float was lowered so the men could climb on to it. This makes it even worse, because it cuts the ground right out from under the notion that the navy had to preserve it's floats at all costs - they never went back to recover it.

Had that been 800 British seamen in the water that day - say from Hood - they would have saved the lot. No "suspicious objects" would have got in the way. Had there been a real U-Boat, it would have been attacked. When Hood went down, destroyers were detached from other duties to search the area and they stayed until convinced there were no more to pick up.

[dunmunro]

I am not simply repeating, I am restating my case, the bulk of which no one has been able to properly refute.

A lot of flak has been fired in my direction lately and I need to make clear that my position has not altered, despite plenty of new information and ideas being presented by myself and others.

Statements have been made as though they are fact, which fly right in the face of statements and reports from officers present during the operation. So far nothing has been presented to say that more could not have been done and as it stands the so called rescue attempt could never have taken all of those men out of the water, by the methods employed, despite more than enough ships and equipment being present to get the job done. The Baron said he had a vision of a scrambling net, but it was only a vision and soon he realised it was the slippery single lines or nothing. Some of the lines didn't even have bowlines in them. This is unbelievable.

Apparently a box float was lowered so the men could climb on to it. This makes it even worse, because it cuts the ground right out from under the notion that the navy had to preserve it's floats at all costs - they never went back to recover it.

Had that been 800 British seamen in the water that day - say from Hood - they would have saved the lot. No "suspicious objects" would have got in the way. Had there been a real U-Boat, it would have been attacked. When Hood went down, destroyers were detached from other duties to search the area and they stayed until convinced there were no more to pick up.

There are examples of RN forces leaving RN crews in the water, for example Gloucester off Crete. Tovey's forces were in u-boat infested waters; A u-boat skipper recounted how he had a perfect set-up on either Renown or KGV but had no torpedoes. Additionally the location of the final battle was within range of Luftwaffe air cover. HMS Mashona was sunk by Luftwaffe air attack and she and Tartar were very short of of fuel:
Excerpt from Tarter's letter of proceedings.

4. At that time course was altered to the North Eastward. At 1730 it was decided
to proceed to Londonderry instead of Plymouth, the former being only eighty miles
further.
5. At 0830 on 28th May a four-engined F.W. Condor was sighted astern
evidently shadowing. Other aircraft appeared almost immediately and the first attack
took place at about 0840.
6. Avoiding action was taken on each occasion but the shortage of fuel rendered
high speed for long periods impossible.

So it was imperative that RN forces clear the area ASAP.

[dunmunro]

At 19knots KGV could steam 1,000 miles on 25% fuel stocks. To Loch Ewe where she went to fuel was 720 miles, Scapa Flow was 820miles miles. Gibraltar was 760 miles and Londonderry 580 miles. If fuel had been that urgent for KGV she would have put in to Londonderry. KGV was the hardest pressed as regards fuel. As flagship she had to be in on the fight if at all possible. Other ships had been rotated to fuel as needed. So the 25% margin was in operation as I stated earlier.

On May 22nd Norfolk left Hvalfiord for the Denmark Strait. The patrol would be maintained at economical speeds, though with due regard to U-Boats, so she would have kept to 19nots, burning fuel at one third of the rate at 30 knots. She carried 3,200 tons of fuel and at 30knots would burn 1.5 tons per hour, at 19knots 0.5 tons. She will have steamed 86 hours on patrol at 19 knots (43 tons) and 84 hours at 30knots (1176 tons)after Bismarck was first sighted, making a total expenditure of 1219 tons. She carried 3200 tons, so 1981 would have remained at 1030 on the 27th. She was the most hard pressed cruiser in the Home Fleet.

Norfolk was ordered to take Suffolk's place on the Denmark Strait patrol, so that she could return and fuel in readiness for anything that might be impending. ( From; The Bismarck Episode - Russell Grenfell). Dorsetshire was escorting convoy SL74 at a speed of about 8 knots until 1030 on the 26th, so she will have had plenty of fuel.

Force H had sailed from Gibraltar and had steamed 1200 miles by the time Bismarck went down. So they would not be very hard pressed for fuel. So we could easily add Sheffield to the rescue.

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Your fuel consumption figures are way off. Fuel consumption of Norfolk at ~30 knots was about 25-28 tons/hr and about 8-10 tons/hr at 19 knots.

I have calculated KGV's fuel consumption:Based upon Tovey's official report:

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 9tovey.htm

, I worked out KGV's speed, and fuel consumption, based upon that speed. The average speed was 22.3

knots over 154.7 hours including 31.9 hours at a steady 27 knots! KGV steamed for 68 sustained hours at

an average speed of over 26 knots...Fuel consumption was 3412 .49 tons, over 3445nm (based upon Tovey's

report), based upon the figures in R&R (p284), clean bottom, temperate waters) where consumption =

Knots, consumption in tons/hr:

14, 8.2
16, 9.4
18, 11.9
20, 15
22, 19.1
24, 24.6
26, 31.8
27, 36

Hours Consumption tons Miles Speed

9 11.9 107.1 162 18
13.1 11.9 155.89 235.8 18
1.25 28 35 31.25 25
31.9 36 1148.4 861.3 27
5.7 24.6 189 136.8 24
5.25 36 189 147.75 27
24.9 28 697.2 622.5 25
3.5 19.1 66.85 77 22
3.9 17 66.3 81.9 21
8.4 13.5 95.76 159.6 19
0.25 11.4 2.85 4.4 17.5
0.4 13.5 5.4 3.6 19
0.6 15 9 12 20
0.25 8.2 2.05 3.5 14

3.1 13.5 41.85 58.9 19
0.9 10.6 9.54 15.3 17
43.8 13.5 591.3 832.2 19
3412.49 3445.8

Given that KGV was critically low on fuel, these figures must be accurate, since the endurance figures

quoted in the Ensign booklet and G&D, would have meant that KGV would have run out of fuel.

Now, if I had used the 6 months out of dock figures, the fuel situation would have been even tighter:

14, 9.2
16, 10.8
18, 13.3
20, 16.6
22, 21
24, 26.8
26, 34.3
27, 38 (interpolated)
28, 42

especially as, KGV would have burnt a few tons raising steam and leaving harbour:

9 13.3 119.7 162 18
13.1 13.3 174.23 235.8 18
1.25 30.5 38.125 31.25 25
31.9 38 1212.2 861.3 27
5.7 26.8 199.5 136.8 24
5.25 38 199.5 147.75 27
24.9 30.5 759.45 622.5 25
3.5 21 73.5 77 22
3.9 18.5 72.15 81.9 21
8.4 15.2 109.2 159.6 19
0.25 13 3.25 4.4 17.5
0.4 15.2 6.08 3.6 19
0.6 16.6 9.96 12 20
0.25 9.2 2.3 3.5 14

3.1 15.2 47.12 58.9 19
0.9 12 10.8 15.3 17
43.8 15.2 665.76 832.2 19
3702.825 3445.8

Total mile steamed = 3445.8nm

PoW returned to Iceland with less than 100 tons of fuel remaining and KGV, the flagship of the RN Home fleet, returned to the UK with less than 300 tons of fuel remaining. Tovey, in fact, kept up the pursuit longer than he should have and had a perilously small fuel reserve left and his other ships, especially the destroyers were also critically short of fuel which directly led to Mashona's loss. Sheffield was the only ship in Force H that had an AW radar, and as such she was vital to Ark Royal's ability to detect incoming Luftwaffe air raids. Detaching her would have greatly reduced Ark Royal's utility as a carrier and rendered her vulnerable to air attack. Additionally, we should remember that Ark Royal was ultimately sunk by a U-boat despite being heaving screened by destroyers and having good ASW air cover. We know that there were u-boats in the vicinity of Bismarck's sinking and the RN's overriding imperative was the safety of their own ships, just as it was S&Gs when they left Glorious', Ardent and Acasta's crew to die.

[Vic Dale]

Hi Duncan.

Many thanks for your detailed input. I was thinking of doing something similar myself, using Tovey's report as I did notice that it contained times when varying speeds were employed, so not racing about at 30 knots all the time. However time is very short at present, so I didn't get round to it, anyway the detail you have put into your contribution is extremely helpful.

Had KGVs situation for oil been dangerous, she could have oiled at Londonderry, instead she went to Lock Ewe 165 miles farther on. As I noted earlier, KGV had 32% stocks remaining at 1500 on the 26th, If she continued the chase until 0800 on the 26th she would have had 25%, so the margin for safety is irrefutable, despite my inaccuracy in calculating KGV's actual performance. It should be noted that after Bismarck was torpedoed on the 28th, KGV never went above 20 knots, so I doubt that she was even down to 25% by the time she broke off the action, though I would need to check to be sure.

Had any ship been critical for fuel in the battle area, she could have put in to Plymouth to oil. Plymouth was definitely within striking distance of the Luftwaffe, but a special air operation employing heavy fighter cover to protect the ships would have kept them fairly safe. Had oiling at Plymouth been necessary, the C-in-C could have ordered the extra fighter cover. That's how the KM ships remained relatively safe despite being so close to RAF bases, which flew day and night raids against them.

You speak of Crete, but the biggest problem for the Fleet operating there was lack of air cover and in that situation they would have been sitting ducks. That was a very different situation to that in which the rescue ships found themselves that morning. If the Luftwaffe was such a threat, why did they not intervene during the battle or before. They had had plenty of warning. Aircraft were not a a very great threat that day.

PoW was not on the scene that day. She had expended huge amounts of fuel haring off after Bismarck on the 25th after contact was broken and considering that she had sailed on the 21st, it is hardly surprising that she was low on fuel. The point is she was detached to oil in good time to get to an oiling port. It is possible that the demands of that day, caused her to be held on operational duty to a point well below her safety margin. It appears that she was searching to the north with Victorious after the bogus DF fix had sent Tovey's ships to the north,after that she was detached to oil. Very possibly, since searching to the north carried PoW in the direction of an oiling port, Captain Leach decided it was safe to remain with the hunt. He describes the events;

"At 1540 "Price of Wales" signalled her intention to maintain present course until 2000 and then to proceed to Hvals Fjord to refuel.
At 1730 course was altered to investigate masts sighted on the horizon, which turned out to be "Norfolk" on an easterly course. She informed "Prince of Wales" that she was working on the assumption that enemy was proceeding to Brest.
Lack of fuel prevented "Prince of Wales" taking any further part in the operations, and at 2000 course was set for Hvals Fjord."

Using your excellent tables I see that PoW - new ship fresh bottom etc - would have burned 15 tons per hour at 20 knots. 100 tons of oil meant six and a half hours steaming at 20 knots. 20 knots is reckoned to be the safe speed for passage when U-Boats are about, at lower speeds an irregular zig zag would fox the predictors.

These vessels carried huge quantities of oil, so that they could operate far and wide. Having that margin of 25% when fueling became mandatory, meant that they could if necessary, remain on station or patrol for that bit longer and then make for the oiling port at a more economical speed. It is all too easy to get an exaggerated impression when we read words to the effect, "Owing to shortage of oil we had to break off the action."

With regard to that U-Boat, U-74 was on the scene and did see ships around the battle area. He tried to line up for a shot but the sea was far too rough. He surfaced close to the site of Bismarck's sinking, but was forced to crash-dive when he sighted an aircraft. Such was the effectiveness of aircraft when sent against U-Boats. You can read more here:
http://www.uboat.net/articles/index.html?article=25

There is another site I have found, which deals with the abortive rescue. They are not too complimentary about Captain Martin and whilst I do not subscribe to much of what they say, there are some interesting insights and observations as to this officer's character. You can read about him here;
http://nineteenkeys.blogspot.co.uk/2010 ... truth.html

I believe his daughter has something to say too, though in his defence of course.

I tend to doubt that Adm. Marschall was that conscious about the threat from the air. After all he did go after a couple of aircraft carriers. I had it in mind to highlight the lack of a rescue on that occasion too, to try and give balance to this idea that everyone was a humanitarian in those days. That is my whole point in raising this issue. I am convinced that a sample only would be taken as I believe was ordered when Scharnhorst went down. The luvvey Duvvey relationship between British and Germans only came into being after the war and acts of gallantry toward survivors of either side were rare.

With regard to Capt. Martin's reaction to Joe Brookes; in the world of spooks there is an iron rule, "Never risk your life or your career for a Joe" and perhaps Martin charging Brookes with leaving his ship without permission was the only way he could get him for risking his life for a German. Which, if you think about it makes sense. Brookes was a bright young thing possibly on his way to command and to rob Britain and the navy of his talent in time of war, because he tried to save one of the enemy could be considered an act of treason.

This is a very complex question, involving varying shades of appearance and intent. On the one hand Martin would have been right to move out if his ship was in real danger. If it was thought that U-Boats were about then Dorsetshire actually steamed into danger.

1. If safety of his ship was the over riding factor why start a rescue operation in the first place? Had she been attacked, moving away from the drowning men would not have saved her. It is only possible to avoid running torpedoes at speed.

2. If Martin thought it was a U-Boat he should have tried to attack it. Attack is the best form of defence and in any event he should have raised the alarm and got some aircraft over it at the very least.

3. Had there been no U-Boat, how long would Martin have stayed?

4. Why were no scrambling nets deployed, or carley rafts dropped over the side so they could be picked up later?

5. Was it only a sample of those men that was required?

6. How could anyone steam away and leave those men to drown who had any intention of rescuing them?

[phil gollin]

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Vic,

STOP wasting peoples' time - IF you read answers above you will find answers to your questions.

YOUR expectations fly directly in the face of British experience and practice in the Atlantic.

How about ;

- What effect did the U-Boats think their presence in the area would have ?

- Did they worry about the effect on Bismarck survivors ?

- Did Doenitz think about radioing the Admiralty to say that no British ships would be harmed ?

- Did Doenitz contact Spain, Portugal or Ireland to send out rescue ships ?

- Did Doenitz arrange for long-range Condor aircraft to be loaded with inflatable lifeboats to drop to survivors ?

Such questions seem just as relevant.

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[Vic Dale]

- What effect did the U-Boats think their presence in the area would have ?

- Did they worry about the effect on Bismarck survivors ?

- Did Doenitz think about radioing the Admiralty to say that no British ships would be harmed ?

- Did Doenitz contact Spain, Portugal or Ireland to send out rescue ships ?

- Did Doenitz arrange for long-range Condor aircraft to be loaded with inflatable lifeboats to drop to survivors ?

Such questions seem just as relevant.

The above questions are perfectly relevant with regard to the rescue. Not nearly enough was done by anybody that day it seems, with the exception of those hauling on ropes, the officers and crew of Tartar and captain Kentrat of U 74.

I believe Spain was alerted and sent a vessel to conduct a rescue.

I am not sure whether or not Kentrat of U 74 was aware of survivors when he was preparing to attack. It appears from his account that sight of them came later and that all he saw was wreckage and dead bodies. He speaks of hearing the sounds of a ship sinking and then seeing battleships and cruisers and lots of wreckage including life jackets. So he may have arrived on the scene quite late. After the ships had gone he searched all day finding only one yellow raft with three survivors aboard.

To me, it seems that there was a callous lack of regard for men floundering about in the water after their ship was sunk, on both sides during the war. The men of the merchant fleet were left to sort themselves out, until the threat of a mutiny made the Admiralty think again and commission specifically designated rescue ships for use on convoys.

Despite Mr Gollin's petty and repetitive epithets, he makes some very good points, though no amount of flinging mud on the German's for their lack of effort in rescuing drowning men, will absolve the British for theirs. In that sad tale about desperately trying to rescue those men and reluctantly having to break off because of a U-Boat, we have been sold a pup and it's high time that was recognised.

At the risk of sounding repetitive; I don't blame Captain Martin for his decision if he was convinced there was a U-Boat about - and we know there was one somewhere - it is his lack of offensive spirit which I am questioning. If his offensive spirit is beyond reproach then there clearly was no U-Boat sighted.

I am pretty certain that there is something in Admiralty instructions to the effect that U-Boats can only attack in certain weather conditions and torpedoes will not run in heavy weather. A force nine gale might be one of those preventive conditions. During a heavy storm in the Arctic a U-Boat was said to have surfaced near a merchantman and waved to the crew. The Boat could not attack and the merchantman could not use it's gun. Captain Kentrat in U 74 - if anyone bothered to read his account - makes this question of the weather perfectly clear. He could not remain at periscope depth and his torpedoes would not run. He was also well aware of the danger aircraft were to his vessel, hence the crash dive the minute he saw one. With aircraft overhead the boat could be spotted and bombed. If Martin saw a U-Boat, as we are led to believe he was convinced he did, then sounding the alarm might well have brought another kill and another opportunity to choose whether or not to rescue a drowning crew. He will not have been ignorant of the conditions for torpedo attack, as he had been a convoy escort for SL74 until he left it on the 25th. IF Martin really had seen a U-Boat. an alert could well have prevented Kentrat getting home.

Whilst considering the interesting posts various people have made, another thought occurs to me concerning the military value of those rescued. They underwent some pretty intense interrogation in captivity. Perhaps it was for this reason alone that the rescue was initiated. That would make sense of the idea of taking a sample and that probably explains why U-Boat crews were rescued, often in difficult circumstances. A great deal was learned from these crews through cross referenced interviews and also by listening to conversations when crew members got together. I believe the Baron came across with a lot of useful information after his rescue. With that in mind, taking Dorsetshire in to get a sample was worth any risk it may have entailed.

If Mr Gollin thinks this is all such a waste of time, why does he bother replying? He is very welcome to go and do some gardening. Perhaps he thinks his rudeness will get the topic closed.

[phil gollin]

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Vic,

NOW you are being more than just ridiculous, you are libelling people.

"The men of the merchant fleet were left to sort themselves out, until the threat of a mutiny made the Admiralty think again and commission specifically designated rescue ships for use on convoys."

Absolute rubbish - imagined and false.

When will you grow up from pushing plastic ships around on the carpet !

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[MikeBrough]

I'm sorry, Vic but I just don't understand your reasoning. If I were a cruiser's captain, responsible for the lives of many hundreds of men, I would not stay around while destroyers went sub-hunting just to rescue men who, hours before, had been trying to kill me. Even if the chances of my ship being sunk were only 5%, that's 5 chances in a hundred too many.

[dunmunro]

I'm sorry, Vic but I just don't understand your reasoning. If I were a cruiser's captain, responsible for the lives of many hundreds of men, I would not stay around while destroyers went sub-hunting just to rescue men who, hours before, had been trying to kill me. Even if the chances of my ship being sunk were only 5%, that's 5 chances in a hundred too many.

Exactly. The RN would rescue their own as time and opportunity permitted (look up the sinking of Cornwall and Dorsetshire) and it is very fair to say that they would not risk RN ships to pick up KM survivors, if any threat seemed apparent. As we've seen from previous posts neither would the KM risk their ships to pick up RN survivors - war is hell.

Lets say that the RN knew that that a u-boat was somewhere within 20 miles of Bismarck as she was sinking; this represents a circle with a total area of 1257 square miles. Now the RN is supposed to take a few destroyers, all of which are low on fuel and then commence a hunt, in abysmal weather, for submerged u-boat when the position data is so inexact? The odds of them finding a u-boat when the position data is less than exact are so low as to make it a complete waste of time. Later in the war with the advent of air dropped sonobuoys along with surface ship and airborne centimetric radar that could detect a periscope, it might have been possible for a CVE based hunter killer group to patiently hunt and kill a sub when the exact location was not known, but it was not possible in May 1941.