Bismarck Returns to Norway

[José M. Rico]

You guys may find the following excerpt taken from a naval conference between Hitler and Raeder of much interest regarding the current discussion:

Report of the C.-in-C., Navy [Raeder], to the Führer on June 6, 1941, at the Berghof.

1. The course of the Bismarck operation is discussed.- The Führer inquiries why the Fleet Commander [Lütjens] did not return to port after the engagement with the Hood. The C.-in-C., Navy, replies that a break through the northern straits would have been a far more dangerous undertaking than a withdrawal to the Atlantic. The Fleet Commander was doubtless trying to achieve this as long as his fuel supplies permitted, in the hope of shaking off shadowers and finally making for St. Nazaire. Tankers were available in the Atlantic. A return break-through to the north would have incurred great risk of attack from numerous aircraft and light naval forces. The Fleet Commander's original intention of making a big detour before setting course for St. Nazaire is indicated by the fact that he hoped to draw the enemy across the line of submarines established by Group West and the Admiral Commanding Submarines [Dönitz] on May 25. This plan had to be given up when it became clear that the loss of oil was too great to permit such a detour. Even the suggestion from Group West to lie low for some time in a remote area after shaking off the enemy could not be followed.

[RF]

Alecsandros, don't forget to factor in the dodgy state of KGV's 14 inchers and gunnery breakdowns that will get worse the longer the action continues.

[RF]

Jose's post also needs to be seen in the context of Hitler first being told of the Rheinubung sortie, just after Lutjens had left Norway, in which the Fuhrer asked Raeder if the ships could be recalled. It was Raeder who was adament that the ships continue.

Left to the Fuhrer there would have been no Rheinubung.

[alecsandros]

You guys may find the following excerpt taken from a naval conference between Hitler and Raeder of much interest regarding the current discussion:

Aaa,
many thanks, Jose.

This shows how little was known about the British forces and position by the German high command.

Lutjens's decision is difficult to understand because he was a few hours away from the southern end of the strait, and it was extremely unlikely for British forces to block it (as they couldn't get there in time)

[alecsandros]

Alecsandros, don't forget to factor in the dodgy state of KGV's 14 inchers and gunnery breakdowns that will get worse the longer the action continues.

I didn't think about that...

I reckon it would be a head-on chase, with KGV using her forward guns. But not firing very often, as water would come crashing down the bows, and a good firing solution against a ship moving at 28kts and 20km away woudl be very hard to obtain.
Thus firings at 2-3 minutes intervals (by both the Germans and British) would permit, perhaps, to correct errors in loadings...

[Vic Dale]

Hi alecsandros.

I have been looking at your chart and it seems to me you would get a clearer idea of what was on offer for Bismarck using Google earth. Charts can be very difficult to use and do not give a very clear picture over all, due to the fact that we cannot square the circle. In U-Boat HQ, Doenitz used a huge globe so he could, get a clear picture of the tactical situation from U-Boat reports. Using Google earth it is possible to pin point the various ships positions from their reports. I think you'll find that KGV is much closer to Iceland at 0600 and there is a straight course from Bismarck at 0600 to Jan Mayen.

I have plotted it and KGV can just make it if Bismarck can be kept sufficiently far enough away from the Greenland Ice edge. In theory of course, because we don't know what her fuel consumption would work out at in those high latitudes. Very cold water will add as much as two knots to a steam vessel's speed, due to the extra efficiency of her condensers. This may account for the fact that PoW was able to make 29 knots for such a long period. If that was due to cold water, her consumption figures would be different to what we might expect.

Having plotted it more thoroughly, I am now of the opinion that Bismarck would have to be slowed, or forced to deviate from the fastest track in order for her to be intercepted.

At 0600, if Bismarck turns north east immediately, she will have Norfolk and Suffolk some 7 miles ahead of her and PoW on her starboard quarter. The cruisers should definitely maintain that position and get even more ahead, using their superior speed. PoW should be able to follow. Her best speed immediately after the battle was said to be 27knots, but counter flooding and pumping out should bring her speed back up to it's best within a couple of hours, so she would not fall that far behind. Wake-Walker should position his ships so that they are off Bismarck's port bow. PG is now astern of Bismarck and Lutjens will be faced with the choice of where to put her. Astern she could be attacked by PoW and ahead she could be attacked by the two cruisers. Either way it will be a constant dilemma for him.

Lying between Iceland and the Faroes are three cruisers, Arethusa, Birmingham and Manchester. They should be directed to make good speed and seek a position to the north of the direct line to Jan Mayen. They should arrive just before Bismarck at about 2330. If Bismarck is delayed they should wait and form up in the Greenland side of Bismarck's line of advance. The intention being to cause Lutjens to try and avoid contact with these unknown ships. Steering him closer toward Iceland would make it easier for Tovey to make contact on that basis, Tovey could gamble on it coming off and reduce speed to conserve oil.

I have demonstrated earlier that it would be entirely possible to launch aircraft attacks from Scotland, so a rolling programme of attacks with bombs and torpedoes should be underway from about 1400 onwards. Evasive action alone on the part of Lutjens squadron would be extremely useful in delaying Bismarck. There is always the possibility of the ships being hit and if an attack coincided with clear visibility there is a very good chance of gaining a strike and slowing the squadron.

If PG is sent ahead of Bismarck she will come in for attention from Norfolk and Suffolk. Lutjens will not have the luxury of having her out of the way so his flagship's firing arcs are clear. The two ships could attack from ahead and Bismarck would be able to do very little about it, unless she was going to fire over PG's head, a very dangerous undertaking. Also, PG's profile might interfere with the gunnery radar. We might ask whether Lutjens would choose open order or close order for the squadron. With ships ahead and astern, it might be as well to have the squadron advance in line abreast, with PG to starboard. That would prevent The cruisers getting at her and Bismarck would have a clear line of fire if PoW intervened. However this could be disasterous in the event of a torpedo bomber attack, when the ships would need to maneuver. Also ships abreast make a very good target for torpedo attack, if one is missed ahead the other will likely get it.

The key consideration in all of this is, Lutjens did not know where the heavy units of the Home Fleet actually were. For all he knew, Tovey was already on his way to stopper the eastern exit in readiness for Holland's interception. His battle report said he had turned away a battleship, either KGV or Renown. That shows how poorly he was being served by his intelligence services. With so little known he could only advance and try to make a French port.

[alecsandros]

Hi Vic,
It's true, actual Earth curvature does modify the route... I worked only with that map projection. Important details may have slipped my mind, but it your calculation also point out the necessity to slow Bismarck down, than it shouldn't be that far off.

Indeed, the 3 British cruisers (Birmingham, Arethusa, Manchester) could play a part in the chase. At 30kts, they could take positions along Bismarck's route, and even pose torpedo threats.

The possible air attacks in the strait would be very difficult to conduct - though not impossible. The key element would be time, and time would be very short.
The German squadron would require about 12 hours, at 27kts, to reach the northern part of the strait, and another 2 hours to get out of Swordfish range (presuming they would be located in Iceland). This would give a total of 14 hours to execute an attack.

But for this to happen, the Swordfishes:
- would need to be assembled in Scottland (at least 2-3 hour)
- would require extra fuel tanks to be added (at least 1 hour) (as their range was 880km, and the flight would be at least 1200km long)
- would require about 7 hours to fly to Iceland
- would require refueling and arming there (1 hour)
- would reqire 1-2 hours flight towards the GErmans

TOTAL: ~ 12 hours, if everything works out perfectly...

===

I'll reply to the last paragraph separately...

[alecsandros]

The key consideration in all of this is, Lutjens did not know where the heavy units of the Home Fleet actually were. For all he knew, Tovey was already on his way to stopper the eastern exit in readiness for Holland's interception. His battle report said he had turned away a battleship, either KGV or Renown. That shows how poorly he was being served by his intelligence services. With so little known he could only advance and try to make a French port.

I think this touches on the very essence of the key decisions Lutjens made.

I have looked into Bismarck's reconstructed log, for hints onto the info available to Lutjens on the morning of the 24th.
Some elements are there, and could have served him right.

The following are intel received on board Bismarck from Group North:
21.5.41
photo recon at 20May 12:50, Scapa: 1 carrier, 3 battleships (one of them probably "Hood")
22.5.41
20:45hours photo recon shows Scapa to have the same composition as on the 20.5.41
23.5.41 21:54 hours: photo recon on Scapa scratched because of weather.

===

24th of May 5:50 - Bismarck engages PoW and Hood. Hood is destroyed, PoW, damaged, mantains contact.

===
Piecing together the info Lutjens had previously from Group North reports, he must have deducted that there were 2 more capital ships out in the open. One of them a carrier, and the other a battleship. [which was precisely what was happening - with KGV and Victorious in pursuit]
As he was well aware of the distance from Scapa to the northern part of the strait, about 1500km coming from the eastern part of Iceland, it should have been obvious to him that, if the other 2 capital ships were in pursuit, then:
1) they wre steaming behind Hood and "Renown or KGV", and would try to intercept later during the day, or
2) they would be trying to seal off the northern exit of the Denmark Strait, while leaving the Faeroes gap to be sealed by lighter forces + aircraft and submarines.

In the first case, Lutjens could have doubled back on his on route and mantain the distance from his pursuers
In the second case, he must have done the math.
And that was:
- time of detection: 23rd of May, 19:22 (first contact by Norfolk)
- time of Scapa Flow forces to react: a few hours required to raise steam
- most early time for all heavy forces to exit the harbor: 00:00 on the 24th of May
- time required to travel 1500km in order to seal the northern exit: 33hours at 24kts; 29 hours at 28kts. At 28kts, the force would arive there at 5:00 in the morning of the 25th, at the earliest.

This should be compared to the ~ 12 hours required by Bismarck to travel back through the strait. (or at about 18:00 hours on the 24th of May)

===

But, as you said, he must have feared air attacks, and possible unknown enemy forces which may have been blocking his path..

[tommy303]

Hood and Prince of Wales left Scapa to cover the Denmark Strait passage on 22 May, based on the assumption that the Germans had left Norway under cover of heavy weather, and Tovey sailed shortly thereafter, so British battle squadrons had been at sea and moving into intercept positions long before Suffolk first made contact with Bismarck.

[RNfanDan]

It would be a catastrophic breakdown in communications, equipment and logistics which let Bismarck through the net ...

And this was some 9-10 months BEFORE Op. Cerberus ("The Channel Dash"),-- when not one, but THREE-- major Kriegsmarine units SUCCESSFULLY ran the length of the entire English Channel, essentially unmolested, through waters about as finite and well-navigated as could be imagined. Tracked by radar and with their course, speed and destination known (The North Sea), and with their ships largely unable to maneuver freely in confined waters, the German squadron was attacked by artillery, aircraft (both RAF and FAA), and surface vessels, but to no avail.

Now let's move this pathetic (for the UK) scenario northwest, to the remote waters around Greenland, Iceland and west of Scotland-- near lands and in seas where NO significant quantity of RN coastal-forces craft, communications facilities or radar networks existed, FAR fewer (if any) airfields and available with land-based attack squadrons, so closely stationed along Lutjens' potential escape route as there were in southern England, and where the number of guns, ammunition, torpedoes and bombs were far more scarce.

What are the odds that the British would

...let Bismarck through the net

?

Without any intention of appearing facetious, I wouldn't make that bet if I had a pram filled with counterfeit currency at my disposal.

These kinds of wild-hair forays are not part of enlightened discussion of historical events---rather, they are merely fanciful speculation, suitable perhaps for war-gaming and electronic interactive software programs.

[tommy303]

I think we forget one essential factor--it is not so much what we know now, or what the British knew of their own strengths and weaknesses along the line of Luetjens retreat should he head back to Norway, but what Luetjens knew. German intelligence told him that there was little in his way and that no heavy units were at sea, yet he had just fought two capital ships, and must have been wondering what else intel had failed to notice. Furthermore, his orders were to break into the Atlantic, and this he had done; to turn back now, if he made it home, would mean having to do it all over again.

[alecsandros]

Hood and Prince of Wales left Scapa to cover the Denmark Strait passage on 22 May, based on the assumption that the Germans had left Norway under cover of heavy weather, and Tovey sailed shortly thereafter, so British battle squadrons had been at sea and moving into intercept positions long before Suffolk first made contact with Bismarck.

Sorry, I forgot about that

So all in all, the decision to go to France was a product of faulty intel ?

[tommy303]

I would say that at the very least, faulty intelligence from the SKL hampered Luetjens' decision making from the very start. The unfortunate encounter with the Swedish Gotland led Luetjens to suspect correctly that secrecy had been compromised. This led him to put into Bergen, Norway so he could consult with Group North via telephone, rather than use the less secure wireless; while at anchor, Bismarck was spotted and photographed by a British high altitude recon Spitfire sent to check out Bergen in response to a message the British Naval attache in Stockholm citing the Gotland's sighting Bismarck and Prinz Eugen.

Group North's response to Luetjens' concerns was to assure the chief of fleet that naval intelligence had detected no move by the British to indicate they were aware of the intended break out, and that the latest Luftwaffe recon flights indicated that the Home Fleet was still at anchor and that only light forces were to be expected. Even as his squadron approached the Denmark Straits, messages were received reaffirming the lack of response by the British, so the encounter with Hood and Prince of Wales came as a complete surprise. If two heavy units of the Home Fleet had been at sea long enough to intercept him, then what else awaited. To Luetjens, turning back might have seemed far too risky. Besides, it was imperative to detach Prinz Eugen so she could seek out a supply tanker, as the cruiser's high fuel consumption at speed precluded heading back to Norway unless shadowers could be shaken off so as to allow her to refuel up in the arctic.

The attack on Bismarck by torpedo planes from Victorious, after Prinz Eugen was successfully detached, must have confirmed Luetjens' suspicions that the Home Fleet had sortied was even then closing in. The problem was, on the 24th when the decision had to be made, Luetjens had little to go on concerning the location of heavy units. Heading back through the Denmark Straits or making for the Iceland-Faroes channel would have seemed far more dangerous than heading south and east. The weather was clearing to the North and heading back in that direction would have entailed sailing back into almost continuous daylight (there is only about 3.5 hours of twilight and virtually no night that far north that time of year). Heading southeast towards France gave the advantage of at least some night time hours.

[alecsandros]

Ah, thanks for another excellent post, Thomas!

So, all in all, if Lutjens would have been correctly informed onto the position of British heavy ships on the 24th of May 6:00, the most reasonable thing for him to do would have been to return to Norway via the Denmark Strait, and dettach Prinz Eugen on the 25th for meeting with a tanker somewhere in the Arctic ?

[Vic Dale]

Ah, thanks for another excellent post, Thomas!

So, all in all, if Lutjens would have been correctly informed onto the position of British heavy ships on the 24th of May 6:00, the most reasonable thing for him to do would have been to return to Norway via the Denmark Strait, and dettach Prinz Eugen on the 25th for meeting with a tanker somewhere in the Arctic ?

Only if Lutjens could guarantee that Bismarck and PG could make an uninterrupted straight line passage in the direction of Jan Mayen at 28 knots. To my mind that would be far too great a gamble. He could not predict how encounters with aircraft would pan out and any cruiser he encountered would be carrying torpedoes. There were also Holland's destroyers still lurking about.

One thing we have not fully looked into is what to do with Victorious. If Tovey was making for the northern exit, Victorious would be rounding the east coast of Iceland at about the same time Bismarck would be clearing the minefields. If Victorious was detached to proceed in the Direction of Jan Mayen, she would be in prime position to intercept Bismarck with her torpedo bombers and her recce aircraft. She would only need to steam 480 miles to be in position and would therefore not have consumed a great amount of oil.

If Lutjens knew Victorious was heading there, he would not entertain any Idea of going back into the straight. Doubtless, Bismarck's heading would be reported to Tovey by Wake-Walker and with Victorious in company that would be a clear possibility.