should have the prinz eugen stayed with the bismarck ?

[Dave Saxton]

My interuption of his operational orders state the operation's success is contingent on a successful brake out without the enemy been aware.

Breaking out without the enemy becoming aware at all was not likely. The operation continuing can not be dependent on such a circumstance being obtained. In any event an undetected break out was impossible given good visibility. Luetjens had to run the straits as long as the weather was favorable to do such.

One thing he did not rush into battle at Denmark straits, he hesitated.

He really had no other option but to fight. I don't find evidence of hesitation. When first informed by PG of the approach of Holland's battle group he didn't know for certain what was happening. But as the tactical dispositions developed and Hood opened fire, Luetjens ordered a course adjustment to port at 0553 according to some accounts. This would have opened the arcs of fire if correct. As soon as this was completed Lindemann gave permission to fire. The range which Lindemann gave permision to fire was the ideal max range to score the most hits ( about 50% of the max ballistic range). Luetjens had to consider his ammunition stocks. Luetjens had already signaled Brinkmann permission to engage.

Remember to Tp was suppose to a company the BS in a repeat of the earlier ops.

KzS Topp asked to be included but Tirpitz was not originally part of the operation. TP was far from battle ready anyway. It did not even have all of its firecontrol and radar equipment installed yet. It had not carried out any armament trials or practice shoots. Those shoots did not come until June. They showed defects which sent TP back to the yard until Sept.

[Paul L]

Lutjens knew British Cruisers were shadowing him and knew therefore that surprise was lost and other British warships would be en-route . At that point he'd failed to achieve a surprise break out into allied shipping lanes. Ergo mission should have been aborted.

Further he would have to suspect the British would plan to meet him with equal or superior forces , in order to win. At that point he would be again in violation of doctrine. His best option was to double back- attack the shadowing cruiser- break through 'the straits' -and head north to the artic ...resupply; regroup and wait until the British return to port [B-Dienst would have to provide some Intel] and try again....just like 'Berlin'.

British battle groups only had 4-6 days endurance and always had to return to port, which meant any effective radius was low...2-3 days at most. The Germany had pre positioned tankers for their capital ships/PBS which could sortie in 8-10 day legs depending on cruise speed. Provided they met up with a tanker, they could keep that going for weeks or months.

Further the whole idea of surface raider missions in the summer months was foolish and against doctrine. GIUK gap was a workable access route provided the weather was bad - no air patrols- which mostly happened in the fall/spring months. This is why previous raiding missions were conducted during that time period.

Just like Langsdorf at Plate- instead of evading and fighting his way out of a trap- he let himself be maneuvered into a trap.

Its as if retreat was not an option any more....which sounds to me like Hitler.

[Dave Saxton]

Lutjens knew British Cruisers were shadowing him and knew therefore that surprise was lost and other British warships would be en-route . At that point he'd failed to achieve a surprise break out into allied shipping lanes. Ergo mission should have been aborted.

Luetjens didn't enccounter the cruisers until after he was in the straits. Two things could happen at that point: the cruisers could fail to maintain contact. Or they could maintain contact. If they failed to maintain contact then no harm would be incurred and Luetjens will soon breakout into the Atlantic with both his ships. This was what would be expected based on the weather conditions and past experience.

If they maintain contact, however, this actually eliminated the option to turn around and try again a few days later. The cruisers would simply follow them and eventually bring in heavy forces, and how could PG refuel? He could attack the cruisers with Bismarck allowing the Prinz Eugen to slip away and refuel, but why not do that in the Atlantic instead?

Further he would have to suspect the British would plan to meet him with equal or superior forces ,

That could happen north or south of the strait. In the previous enccounter during Berlin, the British did not maintain contact. Furthermore, his Intel told him that the home fleet was still in Scapa at that time.

[Paul L]

The British cruisers had similar endurance to the Bismarck but had been on station since the 16th . They had endurance of 24 days at 16knots so they had maybe 17 days at 16knots or 2800 at 28knots [4 days].

Bismarck cruise at 19 knots allows her 18 days endurance of which she had already consumed 5 days by the end of the 23rd. That reduces her endurance from 4500 @ 28knts to maybe 3300@ 28knots, nearly 5 days. Yes with luck shadowing ; the Home fleet might catch up with carrier several cruiser and BB ; but such a clash would likely happen off Norway with LW and U boat counter attacks.

What's more likely is that Lutjens would detect the zigzag British cruisers and give them the slip , just like he did historically. With 30 hours undetected, Lutjens just does what he did in "Berlin".... spends a week tooling around the artic sea before he made the second break through. At that point the British fleets have returned to port, so he breaks out into the North Atlantic.

http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ ... 1/m12.html

Anyway that's what the 'wise and prudent' Lutjens would do.

[sineatimorar]

In response to Dave saxton points. With the the weather been bad as it was, a reasonable chances of slipping thru would have been expected. Advances in radar performance on the allied side made this almost impossible. It is not reasonable to expect Lutjen to be aware of this. ( be careful of 20/20 hine sight ).

It is clearly indicated that avoidance of expected hunting groups of RN ships was vital to success of operation. Therefore the Denmark interception should have been considered a failure to complete the brake out evolution.
It would have been considered impossible to complete or continue with orginal plan at that point.

Finally, please refer to pages of the Baron's account, 26 thru to 31 inclusive. ( pdf file version).
The orginal idea for this operation was as a direct consequence of British tactics in escorting convoys with battleships. Orginaly all four german battlewagons were to be involved. No heavy cruisers mentioned.
As operational events occured later in the time line this turned out not to be possible and the eventual plan included the PG. Further information contained in this reference indicates that the often and incorrect assumption that stated purpose of the existing German capitalship fleet was as 'Commerce raiders' was neither planned for or designed for before August 1939. If this had been the case their would have been no need to issue the 'fleet Directive 1' in August 1939 given notice that the 'fleet in 'toto' or in total was to commence duties in support of the economic blockade of supply lines of the U.K. If their 'designed purpose' had been as raiders then there would not have been any need to direct the 'fleet to a specfic purpose if they were already operationally carrying out orders for such purpose in the first place.

Please note that the term 'pocket battleship' was a allied invention only. Germany never considered theses ships anything other than a heavy gunned armoured Cruisers. An exercise to get around a restrictive treaty.

[Dave Saxton]

In response to Dave saxton points. With the the weather been bad as it was, a reasonable chances of slipping thru would have been expected. Advances in radar performance on the allied side made this almost impossible. It is not reasonable to expect Lutjen to be aware of this. ( be careful of 20/20 hine sight )..

Exactly why turning around and delaying or aborting the breakout just because of enccountering cruisers would have been silly.

Nonetheless, with the passage of a few hours Luetjens deduced that the enemy was shadowing by means of radar. We know this by his own reports. In fact Luetjens (incorrectly) assumed that the enemy radar was effective to 35 km (18.8 miles). Therefore he would expect it unlikely to shake the prusuit just by back tracking back into the Artic. That's not 20/20 hindsight.

[alecsandros]

Therefore he would expect it unlikely to shake the prusuit just by back tracking back into the Artic. That's not 20/20 hindsight.

But Bismarck's range was considerably larger than the cruiser's, and it was unlikely the British units would have abandoned their patrol area after observing the Germans to head north.

I also think that Luetjens was in a hurry throughout Rheinubung - and he made bad decisions.

[Dave Saxton]

No, they would have stuck to Bismarck like glue.

[alecsandros]

No, they would have stuck to Bismarck like glue.

I doubt that Dave,
it's much more difficult to track the enemy in the open ocean than to patrol a strait. Losing Bismarck in the Arctic meant certain loss of the enemy, while continued patrol in the strait would ensure detection even for later attempts.
SUffolk was low on fuel (went to refuel on the 25th), NOrfolk did not have the radar capabilities of her sister - thus tracking the enemy in the Arctic was extremely unlikely.

[Dave Saxton]

SUffolk was low on fuel (went to refuel on the 25th), NOrfolk did not have the radar capabilities of her sister - thus tracking the enemy in the Arctic was extremely unlikely.

Luetjens doesn't know that. All he knows is that he has two shadowers with radar that he thinks can track him to 35 km. He doesn't know Holland is entering the strait from the south.

I think it unlikely that W-W once he has Bismarck in contact would deliberately let it go. His job becomes to maitain contact once he makes contact. Burnett let Scharnhorst go because he knew it was after the convoy. Who knows what Bismarck might do? They might not get another chance.

[Paul L]

In response to Dave saxton points. With the the weather been bad as it was, a reasonable chances of slipping thru would have been expected. Advances in radar performance on the allied side made this almost impossible. It is not reasonable to expect Lutjen to be aware of this. ( be careful of 20/20 hine sight )..

Exactly why turning around and delaying or aborting the breakout just because of enccountering cruisers would have been silly.

Nonetheless, with the passage of a few hours Luetjens deduced that the enemy was shadowing by means of radar. We know this by his own reports. In fact Luetjens (incorrectly) assumed that the enemy radar was effective to 35 km (18.8 miles). Therefore he would expect it unlikely to shake the prusuit just by back tracking back into the Artic. That's not 20/20 hindsight.

This doesn't matter since A) by doubling back to the Artic Lutjens is trying to fur full his mission [surprise break out] & B) Lutjens deduces that the Radar Cruiser has a fixed mount [forward only] and is able to give it the slip by maneuvering at night. Same thing would happen if he doubles back north of Iceland.

[Dave Saxton]

[ B) Lutjens deduces that the Radar Cruiser has a fixed mount [forward only] and is able to give it the slip by maneuvering at night. Same thing would happen if he doubles back north of Iceland.

When did he deduce this? Suffolk's 284 radar and the one that was being used to shadow was not fixed forward.

[tommy303]

[ B) Lutjens deduces that the Radar Cruiser has a fixed mount [forward only] and is able to give it the slip by maneuvering at night. Same thing would happen if he doubles back north of Iceland.

As Dave says, Suffolk did not have a fixed radar mount, although I believe the narrow sector dead astern was wooded. In any event, at the time of year, heading back into the arctic would have been heading back into daylight. One of the major reasons for heading on a more southerly course after the battle was to move into longer periods of true night. Around Iceland in that time of year, night is only about 3.5 hours of twilight with the afterglow of the sun being the closest one comes to night time.

[Paul L]

Friedman "British Cruisers" pp365 notes reports initial versions of type 285 radar outfit ATN antenna and it wasn't until the Type 286P and PQ had rotating antenna -out fit ATQ. On Page 240 it is explained that the early type 286 /286M radars were also fixed with the 50o search either side of dead ahead. Norfolk was fitted with these radars.

pp234 he reports ;The Suffolk was fitted with Type 279 that was fixed on the main gun director and constant and difficult communication was required for the two [[radar and gun director]to coordinate the radar on a particular barring which would -reportedly- take some time.

O'Hara reports {German Fleet at War 1939-1945] the Suffolk zigzagging to avoid possible U-boats . At each end of this maneuver the Suffolk would lose radar contact with Bismarck, because of the above mentioned limitations of these systems. Using the ships GHG hydrophones, Lutjens then deduced these maneuvers and timed BS escape maneuver with one such zigzag . [pp85]

[alecsandros]

. One of the major reasons for heading on a more southerly course after the battle was to move into longer periods of true night. Around Iceland in that time of year, night is only about 3.5 hours of twilight with the afterglow of the sun being the closest one comes to night time.

... The Arctic was a good hiding place. Ice floes, fog banks, etc, made spotting and tracking an enemy very difficult.

With Norfolk and SUffolk in contact, it was clear that the surprise element of Rheinubung was lost. Pressing forward was a very risky manouvre, especialy as the strait was quite long and enemy ships could be vectored in around the exit. Aerial recon on Scapa was not possible on the 23rd due to bad weather, adding to the uncertainties Luetjens faced in the evening of the 23rd.