Breaking out without the enemy becoming aware at all was not likely. The operation continuing can not be dependent on such a circumstance being obtained. In any event an undetected break out was impossible given good visibility. Luetjens had to run the straits as long as the weather was favorable to do such.sineatimorar wrote: My interuption of his operational orders state the operation's success is contingent on a successful brake out without the enemy been aware.
One thing he did not rush into battle at Denmark straits, he hesitated.
He really had no other option but to fight. I don't find evidence of hesitation. When first informed by PG of the approach of Holland's battle group he didn't know for certain what was happening. But as the tactical dispositions developed and Hood opened fire, Luetjens ordered a course adjustment to port at 0553 according to some accounts. This would have opened the arcs of fire if correct. As soon as this was completed Lindemann gave permission to fire. The range which Lindemann gave permision to fire was the ideal max range to score the most hits ( about 50% of the max ballistic range). Luetjens had to consider his ammunition stocks. Luetjens had already signaled Brinkmann permission to engage.
Remember to Tp was suppose to a company the BS in a repeat of the earlier ops.
KzS Topp asked to be included but Tirpitz was not originally part of the operation. TP was far from battle ready anyway. It did not even have all of its firecontrol and radar equipment installed yet. It had not carried out any armament trials or practice shoots. Those shoots did not come until June. They showed defects which sent TP back to the yard until Sept.