May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by wadinga » Thu Oct 13, 2016 2:39 pm

Hello All,

In the nicest possible way I would like to direct the conversation back towards the thread title, since establishing where Norfolk and Suffolk were next berthed together, is only needed so the idea that an overbearing, cowardly and duplicitious senior officer could get together and dragoon his underling into falsifying records can be insinuated. The underlings tortured conscience could only be saved by a brief, muddled description written many years later, which contradicted some elements of what was reported at the time.

Back at reality;

Antonio, your latest map shows Norfolk travelling 10 miles SE. As you know, and I know, because someone generously sent me a copy of Norfolk's Plan 8 (which is your supposed source) this does not show that at all. The turn away happens a significant amount of time after 03:00 and Norfolk is back on base course sometime before 03:20, when there is a DR fix triangle, isn't there? :wink: The offset is nothing like ten miles. The track recorded is not unrealistic straight lines but looks to have been generated by an early automatic plotter using gyro and revolutions to drive a pen unit across a chart.

The same generous party sent me Suffolk's Strategical plan which shows the navigational correction applied at 08;51 to be on a heading of 288 degrees (my measurement) by about 20 miles. It says "corrected to CS1's 08:00 ref position". Can you explain the relationship between this and your decision to apply.
I told you that communicated geographical positions by Suffolk should be moved 25 sea miles on true bearing 260°-270°west.
I do appreciate you "telling" me things but I also reserve the right to decide whether I think they are correct or not. When you say
Similarly I told you that Norfolk communicated geographical positions should be moved 10 sea miles west on true bearing 230°-240°
does that mean you have compared Norfolk's first estimate to your estimate of Mearn's wreck location?

All the best

wadinga
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Antonio Bonomi » Thu Oct 13, 2016 4:23 pm

Hello everybody,

@ Wdinga,

I am glad someone sent you all those information, ... so we have probably the same material to refer to at this point.

Now lets not mix everything like you are doing above with Suffolk and Norfolk and all their relative bearings one to the other all the way thru the 10 hours from the first sight until the Denmark Strait battle, ... and even after.
I already told you that these data changed several times.

Stay on the example here above for Norfolk and reproduce, ... using what you have now at hand, ... the Norfolk track from 02.56 until 05.41 as I did above, ... making all the changes you think do make sense based on your evaluations and tell me where Norfolk will end up being at 05.41 according to you.

This time, ... given the fact that I showed you everything already, ...should not be a problem at all for you, ... it is going to be just an elementary exercise.

It is your turn now to draw the track of HMS Norfolk from 02.56 until 05.41 : 1.98+ 28.8+30.0+ 20.5=81.28 sea miles ( nm )

Go ahead, ... show us where Norfolk will be at 05.41 according to you and what he did starting from 02.56 ... please.

After we can do all the other parts, ... one at a time ... I have no problems ... :wink:

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )

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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by wadinga » Sat Oct 15, 2016 8:48 pm

Hello Antonio,

Once again you have invited me to create a map for Norfolk,
Stay on the example here above for Norfolk and reproduce, ... using what you have now at hand,
But what I don't have is Norfolk's navigational error. You have described it as
Similarly I told you that Norfolk communicated geographical positions should be moved 10 sea miles west on true bearing 230°-240°
But when I study your latest map you appear to use 10 miles on 246 degrees. Why would it be more than your suggested azimuth range?

I have used an estimate of Hood's actual sinking location and Norfolk's 06:15 estimate from signal is 279 degrees 12nm and for the 06:37 is 274degrees on 13.5nm.

Expanding to Suffolk

0851 (B). Adjusted plot to 0800 Reference Position received at 0832 from C.S. One, the transfer being 290°, 20½ miles.
On your latest map you seem to have used 25 nm on 266 degrees which matches what you suggested
I told you that communicated geographical positions by Suffolk should be moved 25 sea miles on true bearing 260°-270°west.
but not what Suffolk actually thought was right.

Until these anomalies are sorted out drawing a map is very difficult.

All the best

wadinga
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Antonio Bonomi » Sat Oct 15, 2016 10:12 pm

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

NO Sean it is NOT difficult and I showed it to you above.

Now you just have to tell me where the differences or corrections are according to your evaluations, ... assuming they are different than mine I already traced on it ... as it seems from your words.

You just have to put your Norfolk track from 02.56 until 05.41, ... like I did here :
Map_Norfolk_0256_0541.jpg
Map_Norfolk_0256_0541.jpg (124.73 KiB) Viewed 933 times
On a map like this one :
Norfolk_80_nautical_miles.jpg
Norfolk_80_nautical_miles.jpg (81.47 KiB) Viewed 933 times
So we can see according to you where Norfolk sailed from 02.56 until 05.41, ... when she had again the Suffolk on bearing 318-320° from her ( The Plot D/6 or D/C bearing ) ... according to her Strategical map that now you have at hand ... :wink:

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )

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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Antonio Bonomi » Sun Oct 16, 2016 12:07 pm

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

Sean, here following something for you to realize better the overall situation we are evaluating for the HMS Norfolk.

Of course it is in a very small scale from the Plan 3 with a lot of tolerances to be better tuned, ... but in this way you and everybody else should be in condition to definitively realize what we are talking about.

I have placed on the map several measure references, so the reasoning should be facilitated for everybody.
Norfolk_Plan_3_0100_0800_06.jpg
Norfolk_Plan_3_0100_0800_06.jpg (94.33 KiB) Viewed 914 times
NOTE :

1) The track of Norfolk is pretty well defined on Plan 3 as well as on her own Strategical map, including the turn away until 03.20.

2) Norfolk 05.41 position having the enemy at 276°, the Suffolk at 318-320°, using the " Polygon " of PoW plan 4 is defined too.

3) Norfolk 02.56 position is defined either by following her own track backwards from 05.41, ... or by going down from 01.00 until 02.56.

What is key to realize on that 02.29-02.56 timeframe is that Norfolk had the PoW at 02.29 at around 8 sea miles at 298° ( :shock: ) from her while on course 220° ( see map above ), ... while PoW got Norfolk by RD/F radio on true bearing 68° ( :shock: ) while tramsitting the 02.29 msg to Suffolk ... with general visibility being just 1 sea mile ( ref. Suffolk msg at 02.30 am ).

Norfolk got PoW once again at 02.55 while still sailing a 220° course, ... and I am assuming also at around 5 to 8 sea miles from her still on her starboard bow straight ahead more or less, ... but no information about bearing and distance were provided this time from the Norfolk.

Why I assume this ? Very simple, ... since her Type 286 M radar can reach that visibility limit of max 8 sea miles only ( 10.000 yards usual range = 5 sea/nautical miles ) just as Dave Saxton explained us :
... Type 286M had a fixed antenna.
It only saw in the general direction the Norfolk was going, although the beam was about 45* wide.
Its typical range to a surface ship was about 10,000 yards.
more :
Type 286 M radar -> Metric target indication set based upon RAF ASV (Air to Surface Vessel) Mark II set. Type 286M had fixed antennas, with a central Tx and an Rx on either side to give some indication of contact bearing. The antennas were fixed, scanning being achieved by conning the ship.
from here :

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_W ... aval_radar

and ...
Type 286 M radar -> Sea trials indicated that the set could detect a cruiser at six to eight miles, a destroyer from four to seven miles, and a trimmed down submarine at one to one and a half miles. Range accuracy was 200 yards between 1,000 and 20,000 yards. Under actual operating conditions, a trimmed down submarine could only be detected under the most optimum of conditions.
from here :

http://jproc.ca/sari/sarrad2.html

and here :
The Type 286 was a British naval air search radar, derived from the ASV Mark I and available from shortly after the Allied evacuation from Dunkirk in France. It was the first destroyer set, designed for small ships, and was very crude, having no rotating antenna. The target area was scanned by maneuvering the ship. Range = 8 nautical miles (15 km) on cruiser
http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/T/y/Type_286_radar.htm

Consequently with visibility on the area on that moment reduced at 1 sea mile as for Suffolk information at 02.30 ... I doubt it was a visual spot the one made by Norfolk from 8 sea miles at 02.29 ... and I am assuming Norfolk could have taken the PoW just with her own radar Type 286 M ( not confirmed on her own radio messages at 02.29 and 02.55 ) spotting her at the maximum limit ... so at around 8 sea/nautical miles ... :think:

Opinions on the 02.29 and 02.55 Norfolk to PoW close contacts ( both ways ) are welcome ... :wink:

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )

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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Dave Saxton » Sun Oct 16, 2016 2:30 pm

Antonio:
What is key to realize on that 02.29-02.56 timeframe is that Norfolk had the PoW at 02.29 at around 8 sea miles at 298° ( :shock: ) from her while on course 220° ( see map above ), ... while PoW got Norfolk by RD/F radio on true bearing 68° ( :shock: ) while tramsitting the 02.29 msg to Suffolk ... with general visibility being just 1 sea mile ( ref. Suffolk msg at 02.30 am ).
Assuming it was actually POW, either by radar (but not specified as such) or visual, and referencing the maps posted in your last two posts, the 298* bearing must be relative. If the 0229 hours contact is a true bearing then it can not have been BC1 and could not have been obtained via 286 radar.

Assuming the contact was obtained by 286 radar, the bearing resolution was extremely wide. The contact could be from anywhere from within very wide arc off either side of the bow of Norfolk. The way the bearing was narrowed down for type 286M was by using two receiving arrays to the left and right of center and then matching the amplitude of the two pips on the two traces by conning the ship. The accuracy of the bearing contact could perhaps be narrowed down to one or two degrees but don't place too much trust in the precise bearings listed, assuming it a contact obtained from type 286M.

Additionally, there was no IFF system in use at that time, so a radar contact can not be counted on to be an enemy or a friendly ship. It could have been a neutral ship, a destroyer, or could not have been a ship at all. It could have been a phantom contact as well, once again assuming a type 286M radar contact.

As for possible range performance, we can only assume typical ranges with radar because the range of contact depends on the reflective properties of the contact compared to the back ground noise (and internal noise), given the environmental conditions at the time, and several other complex factors. Usually a larger ship will have greater reflective properties than a smaller ship, but not always.
Entering a night sea battle is an awesome business.The enveloping darkness, hiding the enemy's.. seems a living thing, malignant and oppressive.Swishing water at the bow and stern mark an inexorable advance toward an unknown destiny.

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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Steve Crandell » Sun Oct 16, 2016 5:03 pm

Also height above the water for both target and radar antenna. Admittedly that seems irrelevant in the case of the 284M.

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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Antonio Bonomi » Sun Oct 16, 2016 5:39 pm

Hello everybody,

@ Dave Saxton & Steve Crandell,

here in a " snapshot " that particual situation we are talking about, ... so you can all evaluate it better.
Norfolk_PoW_0200_0340_002.jpg
Norfolk_PoW_0200_0340_002.jpg (36.77 KiB) Viewed 889 times
Few considerations.

The PoW RD/F radio bearing to Norfolk was taken at 02.29 exactly, ... and that is a perfect match with the timing Norfolk was radio transmitting, ... that is the main reason why I assume it being pretty reliable.

On that 02.29 message from Norfolk to Suffolk, we have 2 information from Norfolk to be carefully evaluated here.

First, the 298° bearing that even if we consider it relative, ... is not the correct match with the 68° from PoW to Norfolk on that moment, ... :think:

Second, the 8 sea miles we do not know if it is by radar or visual, ... even if visibility was 1 sea mile, ... so it must have been obtained with the use of the Type 286 M radar in some way, ... but to do that the Norfolk should have been advancing in a zig-zag mode, ... due to the 45° radar straight bow coverage you explained me Dave, ... :think:

Thanks for you help here ...

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )

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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Antonio Bonomi » Sun Oct 16, 2016 7:15 pm

Hello everybody,

@ all,

here some help and clarifications directly from Capt. J.C. Leach on HMS Prince of Wales.
At 01.47 B.C.1 signalled : " If battlecruisers turn 200 degs. at 02.05 destroyers continue to search to the northward."

Difficulty was experienced in passing this signal to destroyers owing to visibility, and it is uncertain whether it was received by all of them.
Course was altered by blue pendant to 200 degs.
At 02.03, B.C.1 then ordered "Prince of Wales" to search with type 284 from 020 degs. To 140 degs. as type 284 would not bear beyond 070 degs. Permission was requested to use type 281, but this was refused.

Chance of encounter before daylight was now slight and B.C.1 gave permission for personnel to be rested while on the present course.

Speed was increased to 26 knots at 02.14 and 27 knots at 02.22.
Visibility was now about 5 miles and after a long gap in enemy reports "Suffolk" regained touch by R.D/F at 02.56, her report putting the enemy about 15 miles to the northwest of the battlecruiser force.

The large unknown vessel reported by "Norfolk" at 02.29 appears from the plot to be "Prince of Wales".

Regular D/F bearings were now being obtained from "Norfolk" and "Suffolk" and passed to B.C.1.

Course was altered by blue pendant to 220 degs. at 03.21 and 240 degs. at 03.42.
At 03.53 speed was increased to 28 knots.
Enemy was considered to be 20 miles to the northwest at 04.00.
Visibility continued to improve and by 04.30 was about 12 miles.
From here :

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... #P391Leach

So we know now that on the PoW and Norfolk area the visibility was around 5 sea miles soon after 02.22, ... while on Suffolk area it was only 1 sea mile at 02.30.

Capt. Leach himself by plotting the 02.29 radio message of Norfolk realized that the " large vessel " Norfolk saw at 8 sea miles from her was ... the HMS Prince of Wales ... of course, ... and they plotted her at 68° true bearing from them, ... we should assume it was for sure at more than 5 sea miles ( visibility limit on that moment according to PoW ) since they did not see the Norfolk, ... that assumed the " large vessel " ( the PoW of course ) being at 8 sea miles ... while into an area of 5 sea miles visibility ... so it must have been taken with her Type 286 M radar operating at maximum range into a poor visibility area ... :think:

Opinions welcome ...

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )

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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by wadinga » Sun Oct 16, 2016 8:22 pm

Hello Antonio and all,

Antonio has said, despite previously being challenged by Duncan
What is key to realize on that 02.29-02.56 timeframe is that Norfolk had the PoW at 02.29 at around 8 sea miles at 298°
No. There is absolutely no evidence for this and distorting the navigational error shift for Norfolk from 10 nautical miles on 230-240T (Antonio's own estimate) or mine 270T, and using 246T instead so as to put her about 8 miles from PoW is not acceptable. The visual bearing of an identifiable object from Norfolk 298T makes no sense in this context. Also the M/F D/F of Norfolk's transmission from 02:29 is 068T but gives no distance. Norfolk could have been 20 miles not 8.

Dave, Having read up a little I believe M/F D/F bearings are less precise at shorter distances than at longer ones, because there is a less steep drop in signal strength as one approaches the null when changing azimuth. Do you have an opinion?

Once again we are presented with a map showing Norfolk racing off 10 miles to the SE when there is no evidence for it on the plan included in W-W report (Plan 8). When you study the thumbnail kindly provided by Marc on page 35 of the Plot thread Mon Oct 27, 2014 1:55 pm it is clear there is no ten mile diversion. Instead of working toward a required conclusion, Wake-Walker guilty, I have been trying to compare Norfolk's position using the 08:00 DR position from her log with the position for 08:00 on Plan 8. Unfortunately the version I have has an incomplete latitude grid and deriving this position is proving difficult. As far as I can see the Plan 8 is all DR, ie no navigational correction applied as it is shown on the Suffolk Strategical Map. On the Suffolk Strategical Map a shift must be applied to her track from before this point:
0851 (B). Adjusted plot to 0800 Reference Position received at 0832 from C.S. One, the transfer being 290°, 20½ miles.
Norfolk's log implies an improved position for 12:00 (Obs long at 10:00) in terms of longitude only and only by 20:00 has the DR position been improved by a sight at 14:50. Unlike Suffolk's track, no shift can be seen at 14:50 or at any other time. Norfolk's track on Plan 8 cannot be positioned accurately relative to PoW unless you use the point at 06:30 when PoW took up formation directly astern of Norfolk.

All the best

wadinga
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Antonio Bonomi » Sun Oct 16, 2016 9:18 pm

hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

you wrote :
... so as to put her about 8 miles from PoW is not acceptable.
Well Sean this is NOT what RearAdm W.F. Wake-Walker reported even on his own report once at home :
WW_early_night_own_report.jpg
WW_early_night_own_report.jpg (60.82 KiB) Viewed 866 times
He was sure that the " large unknown vessel " was at 8 sea miles, ... confirming it, ... even if he had understood by that time that it was NOT the HMS Suffolk like he thought at first, ... and even after at 02.55 ... but not immediately after 02.56 Suffolk radio message, ... since he almost immediately turned away until 03.20, ... as we can all read on his own messages, plan and on his report after at home in June 1941.

Guess what he thougth that warship was, ... :wink: ... and lets see if on board Norfolk they had an idea of which warship could have been, ... lets check if on board the HMS Norfolk we had some other inputs about that occurrence and ... YES we do ! :dance:

Here for your evaluation now, the HMS Norfolk Gunnery Officer Lieutenant Commander Duncan Lachlan Johnston report about that occurrence at 02.35 am :
Norfolk_Gunnery_0235_Bismarck_May_24th.jpg
Norfolk_Gunnery_0235_Bismarck_May_24th.jpg (15.26 KiB) Viewed 866 times
Sighted means ... he saw that warship ... :shock: ... from what distance according to you ?

Here above you wrote me that it was : " ... not acceptable ... " to put PoW at 8 sea miles from Norfolk at 02.29 ... on a 5 sea miles visibility area according to Capt Leach on that moment ... so according to you now at what distance LtntCdr Johnston from Norfolk saw ( sighted ) that warship at 02.35 am ?

You stated above :
Norfolk could have been 20 miles not 8.
I like your response here now ... at what distance that warship could have been " sighted " in that area of 5 sea miles visibility according to Capt Leach, ... because now the 8 sea miles seems over estimated to me ... :think:

In summary ... RearAdm Wake-Walker thougth it was Suffolk that morning ... his Gunnery Officer thought it was the enemy ( Bismarck ) and wrote it on his report after, ... and Capt Leach realized they were talking about his warship, ... the HMS Prince of Wales.

Very interesting, ... and never explained by anybody yet, ... :think:

Last but not least, you are absolutely wrong about this statement :
Norfolk's track on Plan 8 cannot be positioned accurately relative to PoW unless you use the point at 06:30 when PoW took up formation directly astern of Norfolk.


Norfolk track can be positioned accurately knowing her track from her Strategical plan and some key points like the 05.41 and the 02.29/02.56, ... and the 03.20 too, ... with her bearings from PoW and from Suffolk ( double checked with the PoW to Suffolk too ), ... and that is exactly what I did.

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )

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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by dunmunro » Sun Oct 16, 2016 9:40 pm

Antonio Bonomi wrote:hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

you wrote :
... so as to put her about 8 miles from PoW is not acceptable.
Well Sean this is NOT what RearAdm W.F. Wake-Walker reported even on his own report once at home :
WW_early_night_own_report.jpg
He was sure that the " large unknown vessel " was at 8 sea miles, ... confirming it, ... even if he had understood by that time that it was NOT the HMS Suffolk like he thought at first, ... and even after at 02.55 ... but not immediately after when he turned away until 03.20, ... as we can all read on his own messages and on his report after at home in June 1941.

Guess what he thougth that warship was, ... and lets see if on board Norfolk they had an idea of which warship could have been, ... lets check if on board the HMS Norfolk we had some other inputs about that occurrence and ... YES we do ! :dance:

Here for your evaluation now, the HMS Norfolk Gunnery Officer Lieutenant Commander Duncan Lachlan Johnston report about that occurrence at 02.35 am :
Norfolk_Gunnery_0235_Bismarck_May_24th.jpg
Sighted means ... he saw that warship ... :shock: ... from what distance according to you ?

Here above you wrote me that it was : " ... not acceptable ... " to put PoW at 8 sea miles from Norfolk at 02.29 ... on a 5 sea miles visibility area according to Capt Leach on that moment ... so according to you now at what distance LtntCdr Johnston from Norfolk saw ( sighted ) that warship at 02.35 am ?

You stated above :
Norfolk could have been 20 miles not 8.
I like your response here now ... at what distance that warship could have been " sighted " in that area of 5 sea miles visibility according to Capt Leach, ... because now the 8 sea miles seems over estimated to me ... :think:

In summary ... RearAdm Wake-Walker thougth it was Suffolk that morning ... his Gunnery Officer thought it was the enemy ( Bismarck ) and wrote it on his report after, ... and Capt Leach realized they were talking about his warship, ... the HMS Prince of Wales.

Very interesting, ... and never explained by anybody yet, ... :think:

Bye Antonio :D
Antonio, it's rather difficult to discuss this topic when you won't reveal the extent of your sources.

Some things are of great interest though, especially the time variation in HMS Norfolk Gunnery Officer Lieutenant Commander Duncan Lachlan Johnston report - 0229 versus 0235 in Johnson's report. This shows that Johnston's timing of the gunnery action between Holland and Lutjen's was likely similarly delayed which gives more credence to his reported ranges. Secondly, it seems possible that Johnston viewed the contact at 0229 thought the DCT, and his 298 bearing was likely quite accurate.

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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Antonio Bonomi » Sun Oct 16, 2016 10:18 pm

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

I just found that input from Ltnt Cdr Johnston, reading again thru the CS1 documents attached on the ADM 234-509.

The Plan 3 you kindly provided us shows basically the Norfolk Strategical plot track just incorrectly positioned if referred to Hood/PoW as everybody should have perfectly realized by now.

Hood and PoW, just like Suffolk and Bismarck_Prinz Eugen on Plan 3 are absolutely incorrect also as tracks, ... but NOT the Norfolk one.

ALL of them are incorrectly relatively positioned one versus the other on the Plan 3, consequently the scenario is incorrect as overall final result.

Now it should be clear to everybody that I am going backward using the Hood and PoW correct track as base reference, ... correctly positioned on the map longitude/latitude references, ... and after correlate it as best as we can with the Norfolk one ... and ... just as you can see ... we are now discovering a very different scenario on how that night the events occurred and why.

Your help being crucial to deeply understand them as best as we can.

You wrote :
Some things are of great interest though, especially the time variation in HMS Norfolk Gunnery Officer Lieutenant Commander Duncan Lachlan Johnston report - 0229 versus 0235 in Johnson's report. This shows that Johnston's timing of the gunnery action between Holland and Lutjen's was likely similarly delayed which gives more credence to his reported ranges. Secondly, it seems possible that Johnston viewed the contact at 0229 thought the DCT, and his 298 bearing was likely quite accurate.


The timing on Johston gunnery report are just an " enigma " ... so " incredible " they still are to me ... :think:

I am with you about the very likely utilization of the DCT by LtntCdr Johnston to see that warship ( which was the PoW ), ... but still that 298°bearing seems to me not possible ... he did not write that bearing on his report by the way ... and this is another " enigma " ... we need to resolve ... :think:

What keeps on coming to my head is that 298° was very likely the Suffolk radio RD/F bearing from Norfolk on that moment and incorrectly assuming that it was Suffolk that vessel, ... it was associated on the 02.29 radio report, ... since nobody else on Norfolk apparently took any bearing of that sighted vessel, ... even at 02.55, ... but this is just my personal opinion of course ... supported by the PoW true radio bearing of Norfolk on that moment ( 02.29 ) that was exactly 68° ... so Norfolk should have used 248° and not 298° ... or just 28° on starboard bow while sailing on a 220° course.

Putting Norfolk with PoW at 298° at 02.29, ... will result to a 7 sea miles more South on her track run, ... and at 05.41 the Norfolk is going to ram into the enemy ... and this is obvioulsy NOT possible.

Using the PoW 68° bearing everything matches ... so ... what is your opinion here ... who will you trust here ? The PoW or the Norfolk ? ... :think:

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )

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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Antonio Bonomi » Mon Oct 17, 2016 6:33 am

Hello everybody,

@ All,

while keep on thinking about the poor visibility at 02.29 am being around 5 sea miles ( according to Capt. Leach ) ....
... and the radars, ...

... both the Norfolk Type 286 M one with her 45° searching area on the bow straight ahead, ... which should result on a 22,5° degrees coveragesSector on port side and the same 22,5° degrees on starboard ( Dave Saxton please confirm this if you can ) ...

... as well as the PoW radar's, ... a statement I read yesterday came back to my mind; this one on Capt. Leach report :
At 02.03, B.C.1 then ordered "Prince of Wales" to search with type 284 from 020 degs. to 140 degs. as type 284 would not bear beyond 070 degs. Permission was requested to use type 281, but this was refused.
So the HMS Prince of Wales at that point ( at 02.03 ) turned ON her radar Type 284 to search that Sector : from 020° to 140° degrees.

But, ... the 68° degrees just falls into that sector, ... so instead of what I was incorrectly assuming for the 68° degrees being a RD/F by radio bearing taken of Norfolk from the PoW at 02.29, ... it can be very likely that it was a Type 284 radar by PoW, ... because the type 284 radar on PoW was switched ON since 26 minutes already.

Now the choiche between the PoW measure at 02.29 ( 68°) compared to the Norfolk one ( 298°), ... moves much more than before on the PoW side ... :think:

@ Dave Saxton,

what do you think Dave about this occurrence from HMS Prince of Wales having the Type 284 switched ON at 02.29 for sure ?

Do you think it can be very likely a radar RD/F spot ?

If that is the case as I think now, ... what kind of precision that measure could have been ?

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )

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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

Post by Alberto Virtuani » Mon Oct 17, 2016 10:31 am

Hi everybody,

@Dave Saxton: Dave, is it possible that the contact got from Norfolk at 2:29 was a single, isolated, 286 radar one without any indication of the bearing ?
Do you know how the reading panel of the 286 was looking like ? Was it giving an (albeit approximate) bearing indication or should the ship been steered anyway to obtain such indication through the 2 side receiving antennas ?

IMO, If the second is the case, possibly Antonio's above interpretation of the facts is correct, with Norfolk getting the last (1:31 AFAIK) message from Suffolk on 298° (DF bearing, not changing a lot until 2:29 due to the cruisers course) and, incorrectly, associating this bearing with the following radar contact at 2:29 (with no radar bearing associated) before the bearing indication could be obtained steering the ship and getting again the contact.....


Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)

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