May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1

[dunmunro]

I provided an intelligence "briefing" of the available information so that readers can assess for themselves the probability of PoW keeping station on Hood, when Hood was running at full power.

The RN always ran trials at the rated full continuous power, not at overload power, which was often considerably greater than rated full power, especially on newer designs with fewer boilers.

Hood had undergone a month long refit Feb-March 1941 so her engines could probably have made near full power (as built) but she was ~3500 tons heavier than when she ran trials. My guess is that PoW and Hood had nearly the same maximum speed in late May 1941.

hopefully this won't sidetrack the discussion.

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Wadinga:
Hi Sean,
I do understand that, at this point (overwhelmed by the evidences and perfect matches in Antonio's 23/24 night reconstruction, not having yourself any valid alternative scenario to present), it's much better for your agenda to say that everything is wrong, guess-estimated, undetermined, unclear and hidden by.... "the fog of war".....



@Dunmunro:
Hi Duncan,
thanks for the valuable info. Of course, it can be as you say regarding max speeds, but still the data posted seem to give quite an advantage to Hood (28.8 vs 28 knots at full continuous power as per trials) even if, being a new ship, PoW could probably develop more overload power than Hood.


Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

Sean, you have to acknowledge that those warships cannot have reached the position where Hood wreck lies in the bottom of the ocean by something " magic", ... they were just sailing the ocean, ... like every other ship before and after them.

The exercise I am doing with your help, ... and I will never pretend to be correct by a sea mile, a knot of speed, or a degree of bearing, ... is to re-create an overall map better than the Plan 3 already available, ... from the Suffolk interception position on May 23rd, 1941 at 19.22 until soon after the Hood exploded, ... lets say at 07.00 of that May 24th, 1941 morning, as declared at the beginning of this thread.

You should have realized that I made it already, as I declared on Friday June 27th, 2014 at 8:02 pm ( this thread on page 3 ), so currently I am just working the details on it, double checking all the singular inputs and making minor corrections.
The overall frame is well done since a couple of years.
The Norfolk at 05.41 is where I told you she was many times already, simply because it cannot be anywhere else, ... like the Suffolk before her circle backwards, ... as Capt Ellis later admitted on his own authobiography.

Talking about this naval battle, you do not have to run the risk to be in the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph position regarding the Mayerling events, when his son Rodolfo died, and after he kept on declaring : " Everything is better than the truth ! ".

I may be wrong, ... but often I have the impression that just only touching this naval battle is a disturb for many persons, ... and you preffer to leave the overall knowledge as it is, ... a kind of undefined and only to be correlated to the official version released on war time by Adm Tovey dispatches, ... with no more details to be added here and there, ... no additional considerations to be made.

By the way, did you read my post above :

In this regard the Graham Rhys-Jones book I purchased and currently reading ... is very well done and very fair, ... well supported by good researches, ... providing a lot of evaluations I fully agree with, ... and I am sure he cannot be accused to be a " conspirator " since he was a Royal Navy Officer ... before becoming a book writer ... and his book chapter 11 : " The search for lessons - and scapegoats " is very interesting to be read.

I am sure you have read it as I did now, ... finding a lot of additional considerations to be made about why the declarations and the things went the way we know today, ... so my intuitions were absolutely right because without having read this book, ... and not knowing the RN Admiralty way to act the way Graham Rhys-Jones does, ... I realized the same things that he realized and described, ... very interesting are the new ones ( for me ) about Adm Tovey ( page 225 to 227 ) being himslef under a very careful scrutiny too ... not to talk about the Rodney as well ...

You can trust me I never read this book before and I do not know Graham Rhys-Jones personally ( which shloud be really interesting to do now ) , ... never heard about him until you told me about it, ... but I like to have reached his same level of understanding about how things went in the Admiralty, ... and looking his personal career profile,, ... this is something very valuable for me.

You know that when I work on something I like to reach the deepest level of knowledge possible, and that is exactly what I am going to do and publish one day about this battle.

@ Dunmunro and Herr Nilsson,

do you have Graham Rhys-Jones book : The loss of the Bismarck, an avoidable disaster " Naval Institute Press - 1999.

About the Author : Graham Rhys-Jones

Graham Rhys-Jones was a career Officer in the Royal Navy. An aviation and anti-submarine specialist, serving in the Fleet Air Arm and in surface ships. He commanded a frigate ( HMS Leander ) when it was still fashionable to chase Russians. He held two appointments in Whitehall, and spent two years at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, teaching strategy and operations to senior US and international personnel courses. He later went back as a SECNAV Research fellow in Newport. He lives in Dorset and works now as a defence consultant, writing and lecturing on maritime topics.

https://www.amazon.com/Loss-Bismarck-Av ... 1557505330

Have you read it thru ? Especially the chapter 11 ?

He came pretty close to the reality doing good researches on the Official Archives he supported his book with ... already on 1999, ... I am just going a lot deeper ... following the same path and just providing more evidence.

Surely Graham Rhys-Jones cannot be defined a " constructor of conspiracy and cover up theories ", ... but I like your opinion now about the fact that he reached a lot of my same conclusions about how things really went and why that happened.


Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hello Antonio,

Having studied Graham Rhys-Jones' book I can confirm that in no way does he get anywhere near reaching your "reality". He does alledge some desire for court martial amongst certain individuals at the Admiralty, abandoned when blocked by Tovey. No different to Tovey's recollection first aired in Ludovic Kennedy's book.

The conspiracy of falsified documents, collusion between officers and deception in order to win decorations described on this website is nowhere even hinted at in this excellent book.

Alberto, I am sure Antonio has shown you the original PoW action plots and the Norfolk and Suffolk strategical maps. You know the former do not show any of the actual movements of the cruisers and therefore the positions Antonio has used are only D/R and not real.

We also know that back projecting a Norfolk which is too close the to PoW at 05:41 will produce a Norfolk which is too close at 02:29.

All the best

wadinga

[Alberto Virtuani]

Wadinga wrote: "We also know that back projecting a Norfolk which is too close the to PoW at 05:41 will produce a Norfolk which is too close at 02:29."

Hi Sean,
of course that's true. However Antonio positioning both at 5:41 and at 2:29 is carefully based on evidences, including the available official documents from both sides, and his reconstruction is by far the best work I have seen up to now, possibly the only serious attempt to draw a precise map.

I'm still curious to see where you would position Norfolk from 2:29 till 5:41 compared to Hood, Bismarck and Suffolk and respecting all the relative positions.....


Bye, Alberto

P.S. please don't answer "as per the Pinchin's Plot" as it has already been demonstrated that "the Plot" is an incorrect map (we can possibly debate whether it was intentionally incorrectly drawn or not and why.....)

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi all,
just to be back on something "productive" instead of always debating the same "biased" points (I myself do apologize for that....), I would like to go back to the destroyers movements from 23:18 till 2:15, that are still quite mysterious for me.


Thanks to Marc (Herr Nilsson) we know that the screen No.4 was a kind of "option 2"(see: viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6323&start=270) formation with more or less parallel courses in front of the battleships.
@Marc: do you have any further detail about this screen No.4, specifically about the distances at which the destroyers should be deployed (among themselves and related to the main group) according to it ? Do they have any relation with the previous Holland's intentions to deploy them at 70° bearing and 7 sm (or visibility) distance ?

@all: does anybody know, based on the "fighting instructions" (or contemporary escort procedures), whether usually the destroyers would alter course following the "blue pendant" order related to the battleships or whether they usually do in a different way when the main group is turning, in order to preserve (as far as possible) the "screen No.4" deployment ?
@Duncan, Mr. Cag & Sean: have you ever seen/studied examples of a "screen No.4" similar formation evolutions during an action in WWII ?


Based on the positions at 00:18 (assuming they could have reached a "perfect" screen No.4 configuration) and on the destroyers maneuvers, we can then try to imagine how they were positioned at 2:03.
My main doubt is that, turning together by blue pendant (from a screen ahead position) the destroyers would be deployed after the turn on the left side of Hood, with the most southward possibly some 10 miles astern.... thus IMHO probably unable to resume a screen No.4 exact positioning by 2:03, even assuming they could increase speed to 30 knots (that seems unlikely based on Holland previous message to them at 20:55)......


Any information that can help solving these doubts ?


Bye, Alberto

[Cag]

Hi All

Hi Alberto I'm afraid although I have tried to find something in the archives catalogues that show both destroyer screen patterns and zig zag patterns as of yet I have been unsuccessful sorry.

You have a good question there but I could only hazard a guess that it would depend entirely on whether or not the screen stationing order was still in force upon the turn.

If it was then it would seem logical that the ships, including Hood and PoW, would turn so as to keep the formation (Which is why I thought PoW would still be to starboard of Hood if the 090° bearing station order was also still in force).

If the screening order was recinded or altered in anticipation of the turn then I think the destroyer leader (May on Electra) would have to be informed as to what the new orders were which would be transmitted to the rest of the screen so that they knew what to do prior to any turn.

If it's ok may I ask Antonio a question? During my work on the signalled cruiser positions I plotted PoW 200° course back from Leach's 02.56 position from Bismarck (Northwest or 315° 15nm) and when projected back it did look like the big ship seen by Norfolk at 02.29 would by PoW plot to have been, as Leach suggests, PoW.

Norfolk was on a course of 220° and PoW 200° when one factors in the logs of both ships as regards distances travelled etc the Norfolk and PoW should have been within visual distance with one another or at least crossed paths about 03.10 to 03.20 or so is this correct?

I realise that it did not happen due to position errors in both ships but I presume that Holland would have known that Norfolk was to port of him and closing?

I also found an interesting passage in the John G Pike book Bamboo Years, we know thanks to Leach's report and PoW log that at 03.53 PoW increased speed to 28 knots and at 04.00 Bismarck was estimated to be about 20nm northwest, Pike was a midshipman on the port ADP on PoW and in his book he writes

" The news that the Bismarck had been relocated required yet another mental adjustment but this time we felt sure that action was imminent. At 4am we were told that the enemy squadron was less than 20 miles away to starboard and, at our present course and speed we would probably intercept within two hours and, to underline this there was a sudden increase in vibration as we increased speed to 28 knots. As the minutes slipped away, I looked forward on the port side past the bridge to watch the reassuring sight of the Hood churning out a huge broad wake as she forged on at almost full speed, her large forward battle ensign slightly obscured by Funnel haze."

I realise that memory is flawed and things are written sometimes for impact rather than factuality but if he remembers looking to port to see Hood is he wrong on the timing of it being minutes after 04.00 or does this confirm the switch at 04.50?

Best wishes
Cag.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Mr.Cag,

you wrote: "....it would depend entirely on whether or not the screen stationing order was still in force upon the turn."

You are absolutely right and it's a pity that Capt.Leach's narrative is not giving any info re. the destroyers stationing after the turns to north, until their detachment.

you wrote: "....the archives catalogues that show both destroyer screen patterns and zig zag patterns...."

Would you kindly be able to post as much as possible re.these destroyer screen patterns, with any relevant info about the relative distances required ? I would be very interested in studying them.....

you wrote: " ....if he remembers looking to port to see Hood is he wrong on the timing of it being minutes after 04.00 or does this confirm the switch at 04.50?"

After 2:03 PoW would have seen Hood on her starboard beam and after 03:42 on her starboard bow, until the change of relative positions (started at 04:50 and over by 05:05). However, reading this extract of the account, can it be just a bit "compressed" in time (several minutes slipped away....), receiving the news of the enemy at 04:00 and looking at the Hood over port bow after 05:10, when Holland had already ordered for the second time the first degree of readiness, with the Hood battle ensign flying ?


Bye, Alberto

[wadinga]

Hello Cag,

I am glad to see somebody else attempting to independently realise Norfolk's track. I believe you have both Norfolk and Suffolk's strategical maps to which I did not have access when the debate raged through 80 pages of the "Plot Thread". These were kept secret at that time because they completely discredit the straight line D/R tracks for the cruisers and consequently their 05:41 and 05:37 positions drawn on PoW's own "tidied up" action plot submitted as part of Leach's Report. This actually shows Norfolk less than 10 miles and bearing about 010T from PoW at 05:41, which is clearly nonsensical.

If you go to the Plot Thread and use the "jump to function to go page 30 and scroll to Wed Sep 24, 2014 12:51 pm you will see a thumbnail fragment of the original of PoW's plot (northern segment), in this case with original hand written timing marks but no scale to verify the distances claimed and bearings drawn to random points. Geometry_02.jpg This is the evidence(s) for the Diamond of Death shown just below.

If you further jump to Page 34 you will see the tidied version of the southern section of PoW's action plot called PoW_4June1941_0535_Noon.jpg The same imaginary, inaccurate straight line representations of N & S move away from their inaccurate positions relative to PoW from the previous sheet.

Jump to Page 35 for a larger segment of PoW's original action plot and a tiny part of Norfolk's strategical map, (in case it revealed too much).

Later bits of various vessel's logs were reproduced. You can plough through the 30 plus following pages but in these items above you have useful evidence and you have the strategical maps which were kept largely secret at the time.

Destroyer screen ops are all speculative guesswork, when the BCF turned south they may have turned outwards, starboard units to starboard and port to port and their smaller, quicker turning circles allowed them to get back ahead to screen the big ships. i suspect no-one will ever know........

All the best

wadinga

[Cag]

Hi All

Thanks very much Wadinga for pointing me toward those and to Antonio and Herr Nilsson for posting.

No I'm afraid I haven't access to the Norfolk and Suffolk strategical maps ( I wish I had!) I have the official copies of the Pinchin map and PoW map and have been using those to work out the battle map and the signalled cruiser positions Ellis biography and PoW and Norfolk and Suffolk logs and Leach's report and the map kindly posted by dunmonro to work out how the scene looked to Holland/Leach as they studied their plots.

I agree that we may not know for sure how things exactly happened with the destroyers etc without further evidence and information but with all the effort being put in by everybody we may at least have a better understanding of the thought processes and work done by those who were actually involved. It would also be really interesting to work out where Lütjens thought he and others where too (I'm sure Antonio is onto that too!).

I do think it important to work out the cruisers positions and then overlay the BC1 track seperately over the top, as the cruisers knew each others positions but not BC1 or at points Bismarck's.

As always thanks to all and best wishes
Cag.

[Cag]

Hi All

Sorry Alberto missed your post, I've searched the archive catalogue of the National Archives and cannot find any references to zig zag or screen patterns I'm afraid, I'm still searching but even in books dedicated to destroyers I've found no pattern info as of yet but will let you know if I find anything.

Yes it is quite possible that there has been compressed time there but his recollection is quite good, he was injured in the compass platform shell exit explosion and knew quite well those midshipmen who died.

Best wishes
Cag

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

even if we had used the Suffolk and Norfolk strategical maps to evaluate " The Plot ", the result was going to be absolutely the same.

The KEY to solve both " The Plot " as well as the overall map ( including the battle map ) are the various BEARINGS one can obtain from the radio messages ( RN units ), the various maps ( ALL ), the books ( F.O. Busch ), the war diaries ( RN units ) and the KTB ( Prinz Eugen ), ... etc etc ...

The 05.41 is one of the KEY Checkpoints I have determined on this re-construction, it is the connection point between the overall map thru " The Plot " and the battle map.

You are incorrect if you think that my Polygon based on the PoW Plan 4 is based only on the PoW maps as you wrote above.

The bearings I have used to make the " Polygon " are coming from several different official sources that you should know pretty well at this time from " The Plot " thread.

1) PoW to Bismarck 334° is the bearing from the enemy radio interception report of PoW at 05.37, it was 335° at 05.43.
2) PoW to Suffolk 350° is the bearing from PoW Plan 4 and PoW maps at 05.35.
3) Norfolk to Bismarck 276° is the bearing from the Norfolk enemy interception report at 05.41.
4) Norfolk to Suffolk 318°-320° is the bearing from Norfolk strategical map at 05.41 and "The Plot " D/C or D/6 from Pinchin.
5) Suffolk to Bismarck 195°at 05.41 is obtained after tracing the map and respecting the 203° at 05.20 plus the 185° at 05.53 from Suffolk radio messages, evaluating the course alterations of Suffolk and Bismarck in between. It is also the opposite of F.O. Busch 15° to the Suffolk mast.

On the opposite side from Prinz Eugen from F.O. Busch book we have :

A) From Prinz Eugen to Norfolk 96°, the opposite of 276° = a perfect match !
B) From Prinz Eugen to PoW 135°, the opposite of 334°-335° = a perfect match !
C) From Prinz Eugen to Suffolk 15°, the opposite of 195° ( between 203°-05.20 and 185°-05.53) = another match !

Those are the references for my " Polygon " I have traced on the PoW Plan 4 map, simply following the Royal Navy Admiralty Tactical Staff and Duties division of the Historical Section on their 1948 example contained into the Battle Summary Nr. 5.

Of course having more information and the German opposite site ones, I made a more precise work.

The remaining bearing, between PoW and Norfolk ( 18° ), is ONLY a matter of geometry at this point, and you well know it is NOT an opinion but it is made with geometrical laws.

Similarly, once you have the " Polygon " made and one of the distances, you can obtain ALL the other ones.

Polygon_ref_PoW_Plan_4_01.jpg (61.06 KiB) Viewed 1053 times

Once you have fixed the 05.41 on the PoW track, you can position as I did the Norfolk track from her strategical plot and go backwards until 02.29, ... and if also there you have a match with PoW as I did with another bearing ( 68°) there, then you are done.

For double check verification you control the error factor on the 2 points at 05.41 and 02.29 versus the Norfolk communicated geographical position as I did, and once also this one is a perfect match, ... then the job is finished for the Norfolk track is correctly positioned there on top of the PoW one.

If you disagree on something I wrote above or you have a better and different solution, supported by your analysis and data, please show it to me and we can compare the works and the final results.

Bye Antonio

[Herr Nilsson]

What's the point of time of the polygon?

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

you asked :

What's the point of time of the polygon?

As I wrote above :

The 05.41 is one of the KEY Checkpoints I have determined on this re-construction, it is the connection point between the overall map thru " The Plot " and the battle map.

By the way, I asked you ( and Dunmunro ) here above : Do you have Graham Rhys-Jones book : The loss of the Bismarck, an avoidable disaster " Naval Institute Press - 1999. Have you read thru it the Chapter 11 ?

@ CAG,

I see what you mean and that is possible.

I strongly suggest you to start from a defined point/geographical map like I did before placing on it the cruisers tracks.

I admire your attitude on wanting to work on the in order to understand the full details.

Any help you may need, just feel free to ask me.

Bye Antonio

[Herr Nilsson]

I understand, thank you.

And no, I haven't.