May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1
Moderator: Bill Jurens
Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1
Antonio and Alberto:
You cannot argue on the one hand, that Suffolk was close to Bismarck, and that Norfolk was close to Hood and Bismarck, and then on the other the other hand state that they were too far way to see when Hood and Bismarck opened fire relative to one another.
Please make up your minds and then explain how they could both independently report that Bismarck opened fire about 30 seconds after Hood.
You cannot argue on the one hand, that Suffolk was close to Bismarck, and that Norfolk was close to Hood and Bismarck, and then on the other the other hand state that they were too far way to see when Hood and Bismarck opened fire relative to one another.
Please make up your minds and then explain how they could both independently report that Bismarck opened fire about 30 seconds after Hood.
- Alberto Virtuani
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1
Hi Duncan,
Please, as I said several times, go on and produce YOUR battlemap with the distances that YOU consider good for allowing Suffolk such a good view to Bismarck and Hood salvos......
Bye, Alberto
It's you who has to make up your mind.you wrote: "Please make up your minds....."
The same decision is due from you now: make up your mind and decide 1) which distances you trust: Pinchin's or Antonio's ? 2) do you trust Ellis official report or Ellis autobiography ?I wrote to Sean: 1) According to Pinchin's Plot, Suffolk, at open fire was 21 sm away from Bismarck and 36 sm from Hood (please take the time to measure on the "Plot")
2) According to Antonio's (much more realistic) reconstruction, Suffolk was at 17 sm from Bismarck and 32 sm from Hood ,after her turn away to north due to the "mirage".
3) According to Antonio's Polygon however, she was at 10 sm from Germans BEFORE her turn to north as this is the timing for the Polygon (between 5:35 and 5:41).
Now you have to decide when the turn to north was done, just before (Ellis official report) or just after the open fire (Ellis autobiography)......
Please, as I said several times, go on and produce YOUR battlemap with the distances that YOU consider good for allowing Suffolk such a good view to Bismarck and Hood salvos......
Bye, Alberto
Last edited by Alberto Virtuani on Thu Feb 09, 2017 11:07 pm, edited 1 time in total.
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)
"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
- Antonio Bonomi
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1
Hello everybody,
maybe it is not clear to everybody what Adm G. Lutjens wrote to Germany the same day, so lets put it out once again.
Here it is to be connected with the photo Nh 69722, ... and Jasper gunnery report, ... both fully confirming it.
Until someone finds a more Official and reliable set of evidences /documents, ... those are 2 milestones for the German side timings.
To determine when Bismarck opened fire is enough to know the mathematics, ... and remove 5 minutes from the 06.00.
Consequently Hood explosion : 06.00
Bismarck opening fire : 05.55
Bye Antonio
maybe it is not clear to everybody what Adm G. Lutjens wrote to Germany the same day, so lets put it out once again.
Here it is to be connected with the photo Nh 69722, ... and Jasper gunnery report, ... both fully confirming it.
Until someone finds a more Official and reliable set of evidences /documents, ... those are 2 milestones for the German side timings.
To determine when Bismarck opened fire is enough to know the mathematics, ... and remove 5 minutes from the 06.00.
Consequently Hood explosion : 06.00
Bismarck opening fire : 05.55
Admiral Lutjens statements are clear, ... very clear ...
Bye Antonio
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1
The issue is absolute versus relative timing.Antonio Bonomi wrote:Hello everybody,
maybe it is not clear to everybody what Adm G. Lutjens wrote to Germany the same day, so lets put it out once again.
Here it is to be connected with the photo Nh 69722, ... and Jasper gunnery report, ... both fully confirming it.
Until someone finds a more Official and reliable set of evidences /documents, ... those are 2 milestones for the German side timings.
To determine when Bismarck opened fire is enough to know the mathematics, ... and remove 5 minutes from the 06.00.
Consequently Hood explosion : 06.00
Bismarck opening fire : 05.55
Admiral Lutjens statements are clear, ... very clear ...
Bye Antonio
- Antonio Bonomi
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1
Hello everybody,
@ Dunmunro,
you wrote :
There is only one time, and it is the battle time and in both sides the Hood exploded at 06.00.
You can refer to the dedicated thread with the related pareto analysis on both sides declarations.
Out of the 24 inputs, ... 16 are 06.00, ... 2 are 05.59 and 4 are 06.01 ( should be 06.00 ), ... and 2 are out of this world ( both British side inputs ).
Consequently you can definitively rule out your trial to move 2 minutes before the 06.00 the Hood explosion time, ... it is totally unsupported, ... neither on the " what if " or the " Hypothetical Naval scenarios " you have room to discuss it, ... surely not on the real historical time, ... the Denmark Strait one and only battle time.
Bye Antonio
@ Dunmunro,
you wrote :
This is an issue only for you or maybe for the ones that wants and are trying to change this battle timing at any cost in order to fit their needs.The issue is absolute versus relative timing.
There is only one time, and it is the battle time and in both sides the Hood exploded at 06.00.
You can refer to the dedicated thread with the related pareto analysis on both sides declarations.
viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6314&start=225Gaussian distribution of the 24 above listed inputs :
2 are 05.59 ( Ellis and Wake-Walker : their warships war diary tell 06.00 and 06.02 )
3 are between 05.59 and 06.01 --> we can assume 06.00 average
13 are 06.00
4 are 06.01 (Germans all copied by the same error on BS KTB; should be 06.00 )
1 is 06.02 ( Norfolk war diary; Wake-Walker declared 05.59 )
1 is 06.05 (PoW war diary; all others PoW evidences, witnesses, maps etc … tell 06.00 )
Out of the 24 inputs, ... 16 are 06.00, ... 2 are 05.59 and 4 are 06.01 ( should be 06.00 ), ... and 2 are out of this world ( both British side inputs ).
Consequently you can definitively rule out your trial to move 2 minutes before the 06.00 the Hood explosion time, ... it is totally unsupported, ... neither on the " what if " or the " Hypothetical Naval scenarios " you have room to discuss it, ... surely not on the real historical time, ... the Denmark Strait one and only battle time.
Bye Antonio
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1
Hi Antonio,
What's wrong with Polygon of Perfidy? It's a polygon, and you allege perfidy. It's a better description IMHO than "accurate" or "true" or even "better". The map you presented above shows a course between two Suffolk positions of 215 degrees when she steered no further south than 220T. Which of your positions is wrong? Is it both?
Thanks once again to Herr Nilsson for presenting original material whether it supports the case or no. Why exactly would it be necessary to give the precise time of Hood's sinking in a afternoon report to Mission control? What difference does it make to them whether it is the explosion or the final disappearance of the bow or stern sections that happens at a particular time? They need to know Hood is sunk, period. About 6 am, after about 5 minutes of battle, that is all the significant information they need. It would be really interesting to see the whole of the typescript for the event from PG KTB. One wonders why the time block has been neatly excised from the rest of the line, in the version we have seen. Is it perhaps to give a misleading impression? Ulrich Rudolfsky is not confused: he clearly translates 06:01:20 as Hood explodes time. This is the official German record. However this conversation should be elsewhere.
For Alberto: I have never placed any value on Ellis' vague and muddled recollections from his autobiography. His report, log and witness recollections from Suffolk crew all confirm he was distant from Bismarck. It is patently obvious he muddled the distance to the ghost target of the Sunderland, with the far greater unmeasurable distance to the real enemy. However, on a day where extreme visibility applied and Bismarck's image was lifted by coldwater mirage, like the much more distant mountains of Greenland, he could clearly see the enemy.
All the best
wadinga
What's wrong with Polygon of Perfidy? It's a polygon, and you allege perfidy. It's a better description IMHO than "accurate" or "true" or even "better". The map you presented above shows a course between two Suffolk positions of 215 degrees when she steered no further south than 220T. Which of your positions is wrong? Is it both?
Thanks once again to Herr Nilsson for presenting original material whether it supports the case or no. Why exactly would it be necessary to give the precise time of Hood's sinking in a afternoon report to Mission control? What difference does it make to them whether it is the explosion or the final disappearance of the bow or stern sections that happens at a particular time? They need to know Hood is sunk, period. About 6 am, after about 5 minutes of battle, that is all the significant information they need. It would be really interesting to see the whole of the typescript for the event from PG KTB. One wonders why the time block has been neatly excised from the rest of the line, in the version we have seen. Is it perhaps to give a misleading impression? Ulrich Rudolfsky is not confused: he clearly translates 06:01:20 as Hood explodes time. This is the official German record. However this conversation should be elsewhere.
For Alberto: I have never placed any value on Ellis' vague and muddled recollections from his autobiography. His report, log and witness recollections from Suffolk crew all confirm he was distant from Bismarck. It is patently obvious he muddled the distance to the ghost target of the Sunderland, with the far greater unmeasurable distance to the real enemy. However, on a day where extreme visibility applied and Bismarck's image was lifted by coldwater mirage, like the much more distant mountains of Greenland, he could clearly see the enemy.
All the best
wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
- Alberto Virtuani
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1
Hi Sean,Wadinga wrote: "For Alberto: I have never placed any value on Ellis' vague and muddled recollections from his autobiography.... However, on a day where ......Bismarck's image was lifted by coldwater mirage.....he could clearly see the enemy.
"
thanks for your clear answer here. We do need to be direct and open in a fair, productive discussion.
Therefore, whether you trust Pinchin Plot (21 sm from Bismarck and 36 sm from Hood) or Antonio's reconstruction distances after the "circle" away (17 sm from Bismarck, 32 from Hood), you cannot be sure neither 1) that Suffolk was able to spot the VERY first salvo of Hood (thus recording a credible timing) nor to distinguish between the open fire time of the 2 German ships (being almost exactly one behind the other from her position, with no effect of "mirage" being able to split and separate the 2 of them).
Capt.Ellis himself, at the second board, was very skeptical about the reliability of someone on board being able to see any of the 3 hits on Bismarck.....
Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)
"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1
All we are asking from the observers on Suffolk, Norfolk, and PoW is that they record the time of the flash from Hood's first 15in salvo and Bismarck's first 38cm salvo. The Hood's twin gun salvos were produced by burning ~800lb of cordite in a fraction of a second; this produced an intensely brilliant flash that was visible for extreme distances. Bismarck's salvos were even more brilliant (as we can see from the KM photos) and would have been unmistakable. It is just not possible for the these salvos to be missed, nor for their initial times to be recorded incorrectly by two minutes relative to Hood's open fire!Alberto Virtuani wrote:Hi Sean,Wadinga wrote: "For Alberto: I have never placed any value on Ellis' vague and muddled recollections from his autobiography.... However, on a day where ......Bismarck's image was lifted by coldwater mirage.....he could clearly see the enemy.
"
thanks for your clear answer here. We do need to be direct and open in a fair, productive discussion.
Therefore, whether you trust Pinchin Plot (21 sm from Bismarck and 36 sm from Hood) or Antonio's reconstruction distances after the "circle" away (17 sm from Bismarck, 32 from Hood), you cannot be sure neither 1) that Suffolk was able to spot the VERY first salvo of Hood (thus recording a credible timing) nor to distinguish between the open fire time of the 2 German ships (being almost exactly one behind the other from her position, with no effect of "mirage" being able to split and separate the 2 of them).
Capt.Ellis himself, at the second board, was very skeptical about the reliability of someone on board being able to see any of the 3 hits on Bismarck.....
Bye, Alberto
I wonder if someone can post F.O. Busch's description of Hood and Bismarck opening fire? I've been waiting for it to appear here:
http://www.kbismarck.com/prinz-eugen-im ... fecht.html
but the link to the DS battle is, and has been, bad for many months.
- Alberto Virtuani
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1
Hi Duncan,
not to divert this thread that has nothing to do with Bismarck open fire time, I will answer to you and post F.O.Busch 1943 account on the original thread: the "Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos....".
Bye, Alberto
not to divert this thread that has nothing to do with Bismarck open fire time, I will answer to you and post F.O.Busch 1943 account on the original thread: the "Jasper, Schmalenbach and 6 salvos....".
Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)
"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
- Antonio Bonomi
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1
Hello everybody,
@Wadinga,
you wrote :
The map I have presented shows the correct position of Suffolk in relation to Hood/PoW and Norfolk at 2 given times referencing the Norfolk strategical plot bearings.
When you will be able to realize a comparable map where you are going to trace and publish Hood and PoW tracks, ... the Norfolk and the Suffolk tracks on a similar way I did, ... explaining your references, ... I will be glad to evaluate it.
I have done all the work and it is partially posted here above, ... if you like to challenge it, ... do your own work and show us what it is looking like according to you.
Bye Antonio
@Wadinga,
you wrote :
regarding the " polygon ", since it was first traced on the Royal Navy Admiralty Battle Summary Number 5 - Plan 4 on 1948, ... you can call it the RN Admiralty PoW Plan 4 polygon, ... because that is what it is.What's wrong with Polygon of Perfidy? It's a polygon, and you allege perfidy. It's a better description IMHO than "accurate" or "true" or even "better". The map you presented above shows a course between two Suffolk positions of 215 degrees when she steered no further south than 220T. Which of your positions is wrong? Is it both?
The map I have presented shows the correct position of Suffolk in relation to Hood/PoW and Norfolk at 2 given times referencing the Norfolk strategical plot bearings.
When you will be able to realize a comparable map where you are going to trace and publish Hood and PoW tracks, ... the Norfolk and the Suffolk tracks on a similar way I did, ... explaining your references, ... I will be glad to evaluate it.
I have done all the work and it is partially posted here above, ... if you like to challenge it, ... do your own work and show us what it is looking like according to you.
Bye Antonio
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1
Hello Antonio,
Thanks for showing your map again. I derived the co-ordinates for Suffolk's 03:20 and 05:41 positions from it and used a great circle calculator to derive 215T again, just like my protractor. Which of these positions is wrong? Or is it both? Suffolk never steered south of 220T, we know that from reports and her strategic chart.
However if you take Suffolk's radioed position for 03:20 instead of your one, and recreate PoW's guesswork by using your derived position for Suffolk at 05:41 (no real radioed position report), it comes out close to Suffolk's recorded course.
In other words the position shown for Suffolk on both the PoP and the
When W-W knew Suffolk was still not visible when she should have been a little over 10 miles north of him, and was reporting Bismarck ahead of him, he knew this was wrong.
All the best
wadinga
Thanks for showing your map again. I derived the co-ordinates for Suffolk's 03:20 and 05:41 positions from it and used a great circle calculator to derive 215T again, just like my protractor. Which of these positions is wrong? Or is it both? Suffolk never steered south of 220T, we know that from reports and her strategic chart.
However if you take Suffolk's radioed position for 03:20 instead of your one, and recreate PoW's guesswork by using your derived position for Suffolk at 05:41 (no real radioed position report), it comes out close to Suffolk's recorded course.
In other words the position shown for Suffolk on both the PoP and the
is guesswork by PoW's navigator, based on dead reckoning from the last radioed position from hours before for a ship he never saw. The same is true for the positions shown on Norfolk's strategic map, because they were never derived from some unrecorded M/F bearings, but used the same technique.you can call it the RN Admiralty PoW Plan 4 polygon, ... because that is what it is.
When W-W knew Suffolk was still not visible when she should have been a little over 10 miles north of him, and was reporting Bismarck ahead of him, he knew this was wrong.
All the best
wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
- Antonio Bonomi
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Re: May 23/24 night shadowing and interception approach CS1/BC1
Hello everybody,
@ Wadinga,
both position of Suffolk are correct.
When you take and scale down on same scale the Suffolk strategical own plot track, ... and you position it on those 2 ( Norfolk in blue ) + 1 ( PoW in green ) bearings you have a perfect match and you are correctly positioning the Suffolk track on this map too.
This is what I did and this is what I will use and publish in the future on a larger more detailed scale.
It will be a map made with their own ( Suffolk +Norfolk ) original tracks correctly geographically positioned in relation to Hood+PoW and the enemy, which is shown on the Suffolk map of course.
Bye Antonio
@ Wadinga,
both position of Suffolk are correct.
When you take and scale down on same scale the Suffolk strategical own plot track, ... and you position it on those 2 ( Norfolk in blue ) + 1 ( PoW in green ) bearings you have a perfect match and you are correctly positioning the Suffolk track on this map too.
This is what I did and this is what I will use and publish in the future on a larger more detailed scale.
It will be a map made with their own ( Suffolk +Norfolk ) original tracks correctly geographically positioned in relation to Hood+PoW and the enemy, which is shown on the Suffolk map of course.
Bye Antonio
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )