Hello Antonio,
Well I can imagine where this is going,
but here is additional information.
Quoted in John Winton's "The War at Sea" is Instructor Lieutenant-Commander David Paton Suffolk's Plotting Officer whilst shadowing Bismarck. "I had never seen the needle touch thirty knots before, and it was difficult to use the ruler on the Plotting table."
so obviously assistant to Howe.
Re-reading the thread, I still cannot see where you have accepted that PG and Bismarck had to make every bit as large, possibly larger adjustment to their position than Suffolk, when they got a sun sight at 13:46. Marc has reproduced a similar map Dec 1st 2013 below, but it incorporates the German two letter plus numbered square overlay. It shows only PG's track and incorporates the accumulated error in position until they got their sun sight. An enormous position correction of (apparently) tens of miles to the NE. I have previously requested that someone with the necessary knowhow please reproduce at high quality Wegekarte Prinz Eugen Blatte 2 from P77 of the PG KTB so the annotations can be read.
This recorded in the KTB as follows
13:46 The first dead reckoning control since Norway is performed using two sun sightlines. This reveals a considerable error of position of the battle group toward the North East. Fleet orders to take a mid position fix.
German navigation was every bit as bad as the British. that's how it was in 1941. Please can we avoid a detour into how much more wonderful german radar was than British because they could have used the mountains of Iceland as a fix except they didn't beacause their last fix was Norway. Therefore their accumulated error is probably much, much larger than the British who did get a fix the previous day.
All the subsequent maps you have reproduced do not show this original PG track with the position correction, and show information about the British ships' positions Brinkmann could not know at the time. That is because they were created later, and retrospectively incorporate extrapolations back from later sightings and B-Dienst decodings to derive approximate British tracks.
These maps you have used are the german equivalent of Pinchin's Plot, a subsequent rationalisation, retrospectively adjusting the ship's track to smooth out the huge error at 13:56, by adjusting the track before this time, and adding in the estimated tracks of the British.
But at least I have as you can see a well defined track plot of his ship available, with his track and the enemy ones he evaluated.
No, you don't, because you are looking at the wrong plot!
Now when the British produce a similar rationalisation, again based on limited and sometimes contradictory information, you create a Giant Conspiracy and Cover-Up theory.
I'm afraid really don't seem to understand the most basic principles of navigation, that DR error will build up over time, are different in different ships operating independently of each other, and can only be corrected with an external reference eg a sun sight or land sighting. The lats and longs and track recorded and plots of remote units estimated are all wrong in absolute terms and get increasingly wrong until you get that external reference.
We know from David Mearns' analysis that even Hood and PoW, in company with each other had different DR positions. Suffolk and Norfolk were way out of sight of one another and had wildly differing DR errors. Identified only when Ellis realised Bismarck would be on top of Norfolk, if his own DR error was vaguely similar to Norfolk's. He adjusted his position to Norfolk's position (Senior Officer is always right) when they got sight of each other later in the day. PG and Bismarck were together all along, but the battlegroup's combined position is corrected by tens of miles at 13:46.
As an experienced naval officer, Holland realised that just because Suffolk said she was at such and such a location, and Bismarck was 12 miles away this was only a guide. He could see how bad the weather was and how badly this would spoil DR and as you well know position reports included the details of when the last reliable position fix was made the previous day. He knew there was a big ellipse of uncertainty about the cruiser's reported positions and planned as well he could to compensate.
Holland's reputation today does not need your help, if it consists of denigration of the performance of several RN officers, based on ignorance of the reality of 1941 navigation, and a fantastical made-up story of distorted maps, conspiracy, bribery and 70 year cover-up. A sensible explanation, without the benefit of hindsight, of how limited the information he had to go on will suffice.
All the best
wadinga
