Bismarck second hit on PoW : HACS Director

[dunmunro]

Leach's statement:

During the approach "Hood" made - "G.I.C." - followed by - "G.O.B.1" - just before opening fire at 0552 1/2. Range approx. 25,000 yards. "Prince of Wales" opened fire at 0553. "Bismarck" replied with extreme accuracy on "Hood". 2nd or 3rd salvo straddled and fire broke out in "Hood" in the vicinity of the port after 4" gunmounting. Lighter ship engaged "Prince of Wales". "Price of Wales" opening salvo was observed over, 6th was seen to straddle. At this time "Prince of Wales" had five 14" guns in action. "Y" turret would not bear. Fire in "Hood" spread rapidly to the mainmast. A turn of 2 blue at 0555 opened "A" Arcs at "Prince of Wales" ninth salvo. "Hood" had a further 2 blue flying when, at 0600, just after "Bismarck's" 5th salvo, a huge explosion occurred between "Hood's" after funnel and mainmast and she sank in three or four minutes. "Hood" had fired five or six salvos but fall of shot was not seen, possibly because this coincided with firing of "Prince of Wales'" guns.

"Prince of Wales" starboard 5.25" battery was now in action. Course had to be altered to starboard to avoid remains of "Hood"; meanwhile "Bismarck" had shifted main and secondary armament fire quickly and accurately onto "Prince of Wales". A heavy hit was felt almost immediately. And at 0602 compass platform was hit and majority of personnel killed. Navigating Officer was wounded; Commanding Officer unhurt.

First bold = ~0557:30- 0558

2nd bold = HACS hit = 0558-0558:30?

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

this thread is about the second hit ( following the PoW damage report sequence numbering ) on the HACS secondary forward directors.

I have showed you the place it happened on a DoY photo and Tarrant description of this event.

I have provided you the official PoW damage report page about it.

Alberto gave you the reference drawings about it and some more details about the water flooding into the bridge.

Esmond Knight narrative precisely described what he suffered during this events, first the Compass Platform hit that knocked him down and after when he woke up the water ( in direct relation with this hit ) all around him. The water was coming from the 300 gallons of HOT water this shell destroyed, which started falling into the bridges down below causing major inconvenience to the personnel in there before the supply line was stopped.

This case is closed, both for the direction this hit came from as well as for the sequence we can take from Esmond Knight precise references about both occurrences.

There are no chances for this hit to have happened before the compass platform one. It was either together or after.

Capt Leach reported into his narrative it was within the same salvo that hit the compass platform and consequently was a 380 mm one from Bismarck.

The initial PoW damage report mentioned only a 203 mm or a 150 mm possibility, so the modification including the possibility it could have been a 380 mm one was included after, on the final report, it was excluded on the first analysis.

Those are the facts well reported into the official documentation in my hands.

For the PoW turns that morning please refer to Rowell official declaration and maps.

For the other hits occurred and the falsification ( cover up ) you have to wait until I will be done with my works to have my final opinion about it.

@ Dunmunro,

We have no precise timing reference for the PoW secondary fire starting moment and distance.

We only have a generic input on the PoW gunnery plot between 05.57 and 05.58 stating " 5.25 opened fire ".
It has been written they opened fire at 18.600 ( one source ) or at 18.000 yards ( another source ) distance.
The PoW gunnery report stated they only fired a deflection triple.
Firing details about the secondary guns are not comparable with the main guns report.

Many, making an evident error, are correlating those event to the PoW main rangefinder measurements and timing available on the gunnery report, which plotted the main rangefinder measurement only, the one for the 14 inch ( 356 mm ) guns directly managed by Colin McMullen.

It is obviously not correct, since the secondary guns 5.25 inches ( 133 mm ) had their own directors and rangefinders, forward ( 2 ) and aft ( 2 ).

In fact when the forward HACS directors were hit and went out of action, they switched to the after HACS directors and when also those one were hit, they simply ceased fire.

This confirms they were not taking distances and firing directions from the main rangefinder/director managed by McMullen, it is very simple and proven by the real events occurred.

We do not have the secondary HACS directors measurements and timing, which can be different from the main rangefinder ones.

We do not have the firing sequence of the secondary guns, by time, distances evaluated by their directors and total shells fired.

We have only the generic statements about it you reported above, written into the gunnery report and on Capt. Leach narrative.

What we have is the timing the HACS directors went out of action, both well after 06.01 and it is demonstrated in this thread for the forward ones, … and easily using the best time reference available ( according to Hood board of Inquiry official statement ) by Hunter-Terry, which reported that the hit of the crane/after funnel, which was the same hit that damaged also the after HACS directors putting them out of action, occurred after 06.01.

The hit on the crane-after funnel-aft HACS directors was surely a 380 mm one, so coming from Bismarck main guns.
Since Bismarck did not fire to PoW with her main 380 mm guns until after Hood blew up and this occurred at 06.00 being well demonstrated by all available primary sources.
Consequently there are no chances for this hit to have happened as you wrote above before 06.00.

So your 05.58/05.58:30 is surely incorrect for the HACS directors to be placed out of action, both for the forward ones ( this thread you were referring to above ) as well as for the aft ones.

Very simple ...

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,


@ Dunmunro,

We have no precise timing reference for the PoW secondary fire starting moment and distance.

We only have a generic input on the PoW gunnery plot between 05.57 and 05.58 stating " 5.25 opened fire ".
It has been written they opened fire at 18.600 ( one source ) or at 18.000 yards ( another source ) distance.
The PoW gunnery report stated they only fired a deflection triple.
Firing details about the secondary guns are not comparable with the main guns report.

Many, making an evident error, are correlating those event to the PoW main rangefinder measurements and timing available on the gunnery report, which plotted the main rangefinder measurement only, the one for the 14 inch ( 356 mm ) guns directly managed by Colin McMullen.

It is obviously not correct, since the secondary guns 5.25 inches ( 133 mm ) had their own directors and rangefinders, forward ( 2 ) and aft.

In fact when the forward HACS directors were hit and went out of action, they switched to the after HACS director and when also this one was hit, they simply ceased fire.

This confirms they were not taking distances and firing directions from the main rangefinder/director managed by McMullen, it is very simple and proven by the real events occurred.

We do not have the secondary HACS directors measurements and timing, which can be different from the main rangefinder ones.

We have only the generic statements about it you reported above, written into the gunnery report and on Capt. Leach narrative.

What we have is the timing the HACS directors went out of action, both well after 06.01 and it is demonstrated in this thread for the forward ones, … and easily using the best time reference available ( according to Hood board of Inquiry official statement ) by Hunter-Terry, which reported that the hit of the crane/after funnel, which was the same hit that damaged also the after HACS director putting it out of action, occurred after 06.01.

The hit on the crane-after funnel-aft HACS director was surely a 380 mm one, so coming from Bismarck.

Since Bismarck did not fire to PoW with her main 380 mm guns until after Hood blew up and this occurred at 06.00 being well demonstrated by all available primary sources, than there are no chances for this hit to be as you incorrectly wrote above before 06.00, … so your 05.58 is surely incorrect for the HACS to be placed out of action, both for the forward ones ( this thread ) as well as for the aft one.

Very simple ...

Bye Antonio

Since the 5.25in guns were firing at the same target at the 14in guns, they could have used the ranges generated by the AFCT plot which in turn was receiving range information based upon 14in shell splash spotting, since RF ranges were not, apparently, reliable. DoY, for example, exchanged 14in gunnery data with the 5.25in HACP and the HACP used 14in data in preference to data from the HADT, when these differed.

The open fire time for the 5.25in guns is very clearly marked.

The 5.25in guns ceased fire not for a lack of ranges but more likely for a lack of deflection data which was interrupted when the HADTs went out of action.

Leach makes a clear distinction between the "heavy hit felt almost immediately" and the compass platform hit. They could not have come from the same salvo as they would have arrived simultaneously and would have not been distinguishable from each other, to Leach, but he would have felt the HADT hit if it had arrived earlier and it was also recorded in the 14in TS because it upset the AFCT.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you wrote :

Since the 5.25in guns were firing at the same target at the 14in guns, they could have used the ranges generated by the AFCT plot which in turn was receiving range information based upon 14in shell splash spotting, since RF ranges were not, apparently, reliable. DoY, for example, exchanged 14in gunnery data with the 5.25in HACP and the HACP used 14in data in preference to data from the HADT, when these differed.

The open fire time for the 5.25in guns is very clearly marked.

The 5.25in guns ceased fire not for a lack of ranges but more likely for a lack of deflection data which was interrupted when the HADTs went out of action.

Leach makes a clear distinction between the "heavy hit felt almost immediately" and the compass platform hit. They could not have come from the same salvo as they would have arrived simultaneously and would have not been distinguishable from each other, to Leach, but he would have felt the HADT hit if it had arrived earlier and it was also recorded in the 14in TS because it upset the AFCT.

Since this thread is about the hit on the forward HACS directors, what I care the most here is to establish the correct time and sequence this shell was received there.

There are no more doubts in my personal opinion that this hit was received after the hit on the compass platform and consequently after Bismarck main guns switched target from Hood already exploded to PoW under fire on that moment by Bismarck main guns.

This puts the time after 06.00 for sure, most likely after 06.00 and 50 seconds ( Compass Platform probable received hit time ) or even soon after 06.01 if this shell was not on the same salvo that hit the compass platform.

If you or anybody else would like to talk and discuss about the PoW secondary 5.25 inches ( 133 mm ) firing event during this battle, … with opening fire time, the deflection triple firing methodology and the related spotting time, … than I suggest a dedicated thread to be opened and somebody to study and get the information about the deflection triple firing methodology and related timing of the 5.25 inches ( 133 mm ) guns, so we can learn something more about it and understand what could have happened there.

Unfortunately Capt. J.C. Leach events sequence and related timings have been subject of changes by himself too frequently.
But anyhow, I keep them in the right consideration of course.

In my personal opinion the most possible “ heavy hit “ was the crane+funnel+aft HACS one, because it was a sure Bismarck 380 mm that exploded on board PoW.
No other shell of the 7 hits received on board PoW was comparable as final effect ( detonation ).
But this does not mean anything because the most reliable timing of that hit was established correctly by the Hunter-Terry midshipman taking accurately the battle time and it was surely after 06.01.
Unfortunately they did not record the Compass Platform and forward HACS hits time back there, so we can only refer that hit time to the Hood explosion time at 06.00.

So, that " heavy hit " annotation could have been another hit, ... or a wrong event time sequence by Capt. Leach on his narrative.

Bye Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote: "Leach makes a clear distinction between the "heavy hit felt almost immediately" and the compass platform hit. They could not have come from the same salvo as they would have arrived simultaneously and would have not been distinguishable from each other, to Leach, but he would have felt the HADT hit if it had arrived earlier and it was also recorded in the 14in TS because it upset the AFCT."

However the forward directors hit arrived for sure later than the CP hit: see Esmond Knight account (as he was listening for the Hood explosion roar, he heard nothing until the CP hit and he was in the water after the CP hit) + the precise Damage Report entry angle of hit n.2 pointing to a timing after 6:01:30, with the ship already turning away.

I agree that this "mysterious" hit aft should be explained but for sure it was not the forward directors one.....

Bye, Alberto

P.S. I just see Antonio has already addressed this last point and I tend (once again) to agree with his above interpretation of events.
Unfortunately, the damage report examined all hit received and the only ones that came on board while the ship was sailing a 280° course are the n.1 (CP) and the n.3 (crane/funnel).... all the others were received when the ship was already disengaging.

[dunmunro]

Dunmunro wrote: "Leach makes a clear distinction between the "heavy hit felt almost immediately" and the compass platform hit. They could not have come from the same salvo as they would have arrived simultaneously and would have not been distinguishable from each other, to Leach, but he would have felt the HADT hit if it had arrived earlier and it was also recorded in the 14in TS because it upset the AFCT."

However the forward directors hit arrived for sure later than the CP hit: see Esmond Knight account (as he was listening for the Hood explosion roar, he heard nothing until the CP hit and he was in the water after the CP hit) + the precise Damage Report entry angle of hit n.2 pointing to a timing after 6:01:30, with the ship already turning away.

I agree that this "mysterious" hit aft should be explained but for sure it was not the forward directors one.....

Bye, Alberto

P.S. I just see Antonio has already addressed this last point and I tend (once again) to agree with his above interpretation of events.
Unfortunately, the damage report examined all hit received and the only ones that came on board while the ship was sailing a 280° course are the n.1 (CP) and the n.3 (crane/funnel).... all the others were received when the ship was already disengaging.

From Seeking the Bubble p.156-157 by Esmond Knight:

The first salvo from the Hood fell just astern of Bismarck one could
see the great towering columns of water spurting into the air. Almost
simultaneously we saw those brilliant flashes and the same jet-black
smoke belching from Bismarck, as she, in turn, opened with her first
returning salvo. Now followed the most exciting moments that I am
likely to experience those desperate and precious seconds racing past
while guns were reloaded and the enemy's first salvo was roaring to
meet us. Suddenly one became conscious of that unmistakable noise,
which produced a horrible sinking feeling inside one a noise growing in a
gradual crescendo something like the approach of an underground train,
getting louder and louder and filling the air, suddenly to cease as the first
great spouts of water rose just astern of the Hood. I looked over at
George he was thinking the same as I was "Just a little too close to be
comfortable, wasn't it ?" The next moment might have been hours ; it was
impossible to measure time, except that one could remember that heavy
concussion as we got off salvo after salvo. I could see that our own falls
of shot must have been embarrassing to the enemy, since they were
certainly falling in line, but a little towards their stern. Then again that
horrible rushing noise, and suddenly an enormous geyser of sea-water
rising on our starboard side as a shell from Bismarck fell just short. This
seemed to hang in the air for a second or two, then fell in a soaking cascade
across the bridge. At intervals there was an ear-splitting crack as H.E.
shells from Prinz Eugen, exploding practically overhead, rained showers
of shrapnel on to the decks and into the sea around. The enemy had
certainly got the range taped.



SEEKING THE BUBBLE 157

We were racing on, on the same course, and tearing my eyes from the

?reat form of Bismarck which now appeared in clear detail in my glasses,
ran to the other side of the ship, where, to my horror, I saw a great
fire burning on the boat-deck of the Hood. They would have a job to
put that out. Then, as one looked, there at last was the little signal
being hoisted in the Hood, ordering us to carry out the prearranged
manoeuvre. At last it had come, but at this moment the incredible
happened: there had been that rushing sound which had ominously
ceased, and then, as I looked, a great sprouting explosion burst from
the centre of the Hood, enormous tongues of pale red flame shot into the
air, while dense clouds of whitish-yellow smoke burst upwards, and
gigantic pieces of brightly burning debris were hurled hundreds of feet
into the air. I just did not believe what I saw the Hood had literally
been blown to pieces, and just before she was totally enveloped in that
ghastly pall of smoke I saw her fire her last salvo. I felt quite sick inside
and turned away and looked towards George, where he was standing
with his hands hanging limply to his sides, staring like a man in a dream.
"Well, that's the end of her." "What's that?" "Hood's gone!" I turned
back and looked again, with a weak feeling in my knees the smoke had
cleared, and the Hood was no more; there was nothing to be seen of her.
It was fantastic, one just could not grasp it.

I think that almost simultaneously our own gunnery department had
registered a direct hit with at least two shells on Bismarck, for she altered
course away, and one could see smoke issuing from her after-deck.

From this moment on everything seems hazy, except that I remember
again hearing that great rushing noise, like the approach of a cyclone, and
having a quite irrelevant dream about listening to the band in Hyde Park,
and then being conscious of a high ringing noise in my head and slowly
coming to. I had the sensation that I was dying. It was a strange feeling,
and one that made me feel rather sad no more. There was a lot of water
swishing about I was lying on my side with a great weight on top of
me. What on earth had happened? Things did not seem quite right
somehow; then, like a wave breaking over me, it all came back. Again
the deck below me was shuddering under the vibration of another salvo;
there were muffled voices, and shouts of "Stretcher-bearer!" and "Clear
the way there!" I raised enough breath to let out a squeaky, "Georgie,
old boy, can you get me out?" Strong hands lifted the dead men off
me; there was a horrible smell of blood, and the uncanny noise
that men make when they are dying. Somehow or other I fum-
bled down those ladders I knew so well everything feeling quite
unfamiliar and dream-like. Below decks I was conscious of water rushing
in the passages, the smell of the sick-bay, and the efficient bustle of the
ship's doctors as they attended to that sudden, rather unnerving rush of
casualties. "Hallo! What are you doing here?" It was the voice of the
P.M.O. speaking. I asked him if he knew the Hood had gone. "Open
your eyes, old boy." I did so with difficulty, but I could not see him. I
was lying in a bed with my clothes on sticky and hot, with rough ban-
dages round my face again a great roar which shook the ship as the
fight was carried on ... the smell of iodine and ether, the sure touch of
a medical attendant when he could spare time to give one another shot
of morphia, the familiar voice of the Gunnery Officer, telling the ship's...

My bolding. So there was water on the ADO position from shell splashes and not necessarily from the HADT hit. Knight's account seems to imply that PoW was under 38cm fire before Hood sank, but also that there was shrapnel and shell bursts over the ADO/ALOs, possibly from the HADT hit, which he may have confused with airbursts.

https://archive.org/stream/seekingbubbl ... 6/mode/2up

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Dunmunro: very interesting, however we know for sure that no heavy shell was fired at PoW before Hood was lost. Could this water come from a short and very bad directed shell from BS during her adjustment salvos ? Possibly, in any case this water would have gone out of the bridge by the time Esmond Knight was hurt.

I don't think Knight was unable to make the difference between shells exploding around the ship and the terrible noise and vibration of a shell hitting the ship at few meters from his position, bouncing on the roof of the charthouse (sounding like a giant drum), destroying the water tanks and the side plating of the director support..... And he heard nothing as the hit came after the CP one.

PoW_hit_nr2_01.jpg (119.31 KiB) Viewed 4500 times

IMG_6304.JPG (105.22 KiB) Viewed 4500 times

Final proof for this last statement is the damage report entry angle, precisely calculated by the dockyard experts as they saw that the shell penetrated the circular hole in the support of the fwd HALA directors and hit the roof of the charthouse in the port forward corner thus certifying that the hit came on board with an angle not compatible with the 280° course of the ship.
Their analysis, based on the precise impact location of the shell, (please see above the extracts from the damage report that I had already posted) demonstrates that the ship was sailing on a 260° course when she received this hit, therefore when she was already disengaging.

As you see, there is no way to move this hit before the CP one, that happened for sure with the ship on a 280° course (see other thread re. CP hit).

Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Leaving aside the angle of entry, it is possible that Knight was wounded by the HADT hit, rather than the CP hit.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

since the shell angle of entry is a very important parameter not subject to opinions, ...
... adding Esmond Knight declaration about the Compass Platform hit ( Nr 1 ) being the one that knocked him down, ...
.... and also the fact that he found himself inside " A LOT OF " water when he woke up, ... being this a direct consequence on his bridge by the hit Nr 2 ...
... we can easily realize that it is NOT possible that he was injured by the HACS hit ( Nr 2 ) ... but only by the Compass Platform one ( Nr 1 ).

just as Alberto wrote above, ... this hit was received after the Compass Platform one, ... while HMS Prince of Wales was already disengaging turning away to port, so after 06.01 and 30 seconds referencing Rowell PoW official battle maps ( 3 of them ).

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

All,

From the Official Report on the DCT hit quoted in Tarrant's KGV book

"Splinters from this hit killed and wounded men in the exposed air defence station, situated below and just forward of the director support"

From Geoffrey Brookes' Alarm Starboard,
"Sub-Lieutenant Knight, RNVR was one of several casualties on the Air Defence Position, was knocked unconscious and blinded (though eventually recovering some sight). This was presumably by the 15" shell that hit the supporting structure of the two secondary directors......"

Why would the man rendered unconscious by a hit be able to determine where the shell landed? Especially since it was behind him as he stared at the wreck of the Hood.

These other reputable sources blame the DCT hit for Knight's injuries.

Since PoW was on 260T when the hit happened and yet the CP hit occurred when she was on 280 then they did not happen simultaneously. The DCT hit happened shortly after the 5.25 opened fire, as recorded in the Gunnery Record, therefore it was when PoW had turned after Hood onto 260T, unrecorded by Rowell.

Knight might be in water from the tank when he woke up if it was the DCT hit that knocked him down. Or it might have been from shell splashes from 8" HE bursting on water impact.

There are no measurable holes or shell fragments to definitively identify a 15" hit.

All the best

wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

those are the only statements I agree about what you wrote above :

Since PoW was on 260T when the hit happened and yet the CP hit occurred when she was on 280T, then they did not happen simultaneously.

and

There are no measurable holes or shell fragments to definitively identify a 15" hit ( 380 mm from Bismarck ).

Now please provide us some more " food for thoughts " ..

Who stated they had been received with the same salvo and both shells were 380 mm from Bismarck ?

Why ?

Bye Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

Wadinga wrote: "Since PoW was on 260T when the hit happened and yet the CP hit occurred when she was on 280 then they did not happen simultaneously. The DCT hit happened shortly after the 5.25 opened fire, as recorded in the Gunnery Record, therefore it was when PoW had turned after Hood onto 260T, unrecorded by Rowell. "

Hi Sean, I agree with your first statement: the 2 hits were not simultaneous.

However PoW was never on 260° course before she started her disengagement at 6:01:30. Please consider that Rowell (Navigating Officer of PoW in compass platform together with the Captain) did NOT forget to record a change of course to 260° (that would have been strange but still possible in such battle conditions). He did mention the signal for the 260° course from Hood and clearly said it was NEVER executed. No theory, albeit interesting, can dismiss this clear evidence (from the officer who better than everyone else should know if a change of course turn occurred or not) without producing a more strong (which one ?) opposite evidence.

Therefore there is no margin at all to say that PoW started a 20° to port turn before being hit, as it was said several times.

Bye, Alberto

[wadinga]

Hello Alberto,

As with Antonio, you can repeat as many times as you like that there was no turn to follow Hood, but I am more interested in what the witnesses say:

From Esmond Knight, quoted by Antonio himself

because practically immediately after that we altered course and the shell which came through the Compass Platform was the one that knocked me out. I don't remember much more after that.

Knight could be mistaken about which shell hurt him, he was watching Hood's agony from the unengaged side and the hit was behind him, but he says there was a turn before the CP hit. If PoW was on 280T at this time, as you maintain, then the CP hit cannot occur.But it occurred. Attempts have been made to pretend the emergency turn to avoid Hood's wreck lasted a few seconds only, but this is impossible in 35,000 ton battleship. Once you start turning, you're turning.

Now Knight records this turn, the avoidance turn witnessed by several British and German individuals which takes PoW off the only course on which the CP hit can occur. Or it may be that the turn he describes is only the turn after Hood onto 260T. Which is the only thing thing that makes the emergency turn necessary.

Leach and Rowell do not say they did not execute a turn after Hood, they do not say they did. They only say Hood's signal was not executed by her signalmen. Which considering they might all be dead is not surprising.

All the best

wadinga

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Wadinga,
hi Sean, as you say yourself, what Knight refers to may be the avoidance turn (that happened for sure making th ship rolling but did not affect too much the overall course) or may be the 260° course change......

However, please don't play with Rowell words : he was the Navigating officer, he was in Compass Platform with the Captain and he said the signal for the turn to 260° was never executed by Hood.
If for any reason this turn was ordered on PoW bridge for any reason (Leach mutiny ??? , need to keep station behind Hood turning by herself ???, just manoeuvring error ???), he would have noted it (as well as Leach) after underlining that the signal was not executed. No official PoW map shows this turn (and they are 3 maps !) . The Hood boards of inquiry confirm it .

He did not because NO turn happened from 280° until the disengagement order was given.

If there are no evidences for this turn, I consider this discussion quite unproductive as it lacks any foundation.

Bye, Alberto

[tommy303]

Never say never.

In the Royal Navy an order for a turn, or any other action pertaining to a squadron, is done as a flag hoist. Hoisting the signal is preparatory. When the Admiral has judged the time to be correct to begin the desired turn, he will inform his flag captain, who will turn to the chief yeoman of signals saying "Execute," and the CYS will order "Down flag_____". The signalmen will then lower the flag hoist and that action is the Execution signal. Thus on Hood the order for the turn had been hoisted, but never lowered because of the hit in the forward superstructure. This does not mean that Hood had not begun her turn, just that the Execution of the signal had not been made due the hit forward which appears to have been in the area of the flag signal station.

On Prince of Wales, it is likely that Leach never gave the order to begin the turn, but this does not mean that a turn to port had not begun. In the Conning Tower, the OOW with the helmsman would have had standing orders to maintain the ship's place in the formation, guiding on the flagship. Thus if the flagship turned, the OOW would order the helmsman to alter course to maintain formation. If Hood had begun her turn, the OOW in the conning tower would have begun turning the POW so as to maintain formation with HOOD without awaiting orders from Leach on the compass platform.