Hood to PoW communication at DS

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

we do know that one of the survivors of the HMS Prince of Wales compass platform was : Alfred Edwin Gilbert D.S.M. - Chief Yeoman of Signals - Service no. D/J 99570.

http://www.forcez-survivors.org.uk/biog ... ertae.html

He was not interviewed by the Hood board on Inquiry, ... by neither of them ...

Than we have one of the 3 survivors of HMS Hood : William J. Dundas

http://www.hmshood.com/crew/biography/wjdundas_bio.htm

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... #1stDundas

Midshipman Dundas was employed as Midshipman of the Watch on the upper bridge during the action. The upper bridge was closed in and he had no view aft. His position was amidships at the chart table, and he saw very little.

He was asked few questions by the first board and was too busy to attend at the second board


Then we have : LEADING SIGNALMAN HUBERT ERNEST EDMUND FACKRELL, D/JX 140789, ROYAL NAVY, "H.M.S. PRINCE OF WALES"
Called and cautioned.

417. Are you Leading signalman Hubert Ernest Edmund Fackrell, D/JX 140789, Royal Navy, of "H.M.S. Prince of Wales"?
Yes.
418. Did you see the "Hood" blow up?
Yes, I was in communication with her by box light.

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... m#Fackrell

Nobody asked him what was the subject you were covering on that moment with Hood ... and what also before the explosion ...

Last we have this very important input on HMS Prince of Wales gunnery map at 05.56 : " Hood OUT of ACTION ! "

Hood_out_of_Action_0556.jpg (115.69 KiB) Viewed 4436 times

Now I am an easy minded guy, ... but I keep on thinking, ... how come 2 board of inquiry called to analyze why a warship exploded, ... simply forgot or avoided to ask " key " persons like the above mentioned ones, ... what was exchanged as far as communications between Hood and PoW that morning, especially during the assembly of the battle and the battle itself.

How come nobody asked who wrote that statement on the PoW Gunnery Report : Hood out of action " at 05.56 what that meant ???

Do you find this way to do things being correct ???

Am I the only one asking myself those questions ???

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

My understanding is that "Hood out of Action" refers to a loss of contact with Hood via the FC radio link.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you mean those ones Duncan ?

Hood_PoW_radio_signals_FC.jpg (51.02 KiB) Viewed 4373 times

Hood_PoW_VS_FC_signals.jpg (6.14 KiB) Viewed 4373 times

As you can see those were interrupted much earlier than that battle time

Does anybody have the correct way to fully understand what the above signals mean ???

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

GSB 337 L1 = Fire at left hand German ship bearing 337d

GOB 1 = Shift object one right

(From Battle Summary 5)

[paul.mercer]

Hello everybody,

we do know that one of the survivors of the HMS Prince of Wales compass platform was : Alfred Edwin Gilbert D.S.M. - Chief Yeoman of Signals - Service no. D/J 99570.

http://www.forcez-survivors.org.uk/biog ... ertae.html

He was not interviewed by the Hood board on Inquiry, ... by neither of them ...

Than we have one of the 3 survivors of HMS Hood : William J. Dundas

http://www.hmshood.com/crew/biography/wjdundas_bio.htm

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... #1stDundas

Midshipman Dundas was employed as Midshipman of the Watch on the upper bridge during the action. The upper bridge was closed in and he had no view aft. His position was amidships at the chart table, and he saw very little.

He was asked few questions by the first board and was too busy to attend at the second board


Then we have : LEADING SIGNALMAN HUBERT ERNEST EDMUND FACKRELL, D/JX 140789, ROYAL NAVY, "H.M.S. PRINCE OF WALES"
Called and cautioned.

417. Are you Leading signalman Hubert Ernest Edmund Fackrell, D/JX 140789, Royal Navy, of "H.M.S. Prince of Wales"?
Yes.
418. Did you see the "Hood" blow up?
Yes, I was in communication with her by box light.

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... m#Fackrell

Nobody asked him what was the subject you were covering on that moment with Hood ... and what also before the explosion ...

Last we have this very important input on HMS Prince of Wales gunnery map at 05.56 : " Hood OUT of ACTION ! "

Hood_out_of_Action_0556.jpg

Now I am an easy minded guy, ... but I keep on thinking, ... how come 2 board of inquiry called to analyze why a warship exploded, ... simply forgot or avoided to ask " key " persons like the above mentioned ones, ... what was exchanged as far as communications between Hood and PoW that morning, especially during the assembly of the battle and the battle itself.

How come nobody asked who wrote that statement on the PoW Gunnery Report : Hood out of action " at 05.56 what that meant ???

Do you find this way to do things being correct ???

Am I the only one asking myself those questions ???

Bye Antonio

Gentlemen,
Two things here stand out. One is that a mere Midshipman could be 'too busy' to attend the second enquiry which was presumably held by some pretty senior people.
The second is that there could be a possibility that all the relevant questions were actually asked and were recorded but were not published under some long term secrecy rule -may be we might find out 100 years after the event!

[dunmunro]

In May 1941the RN was fighting a global war, so it is not surprising that some personnel were posted to other duties, on leave, and/or could not be released from the PoW due to pressing obligations.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

Paul Mercer wrote :

Gentlemen,
Two things here stand out. One is that a mere Midshipman could be 'too busy' to attend the second enquiry which was presumably held by some pretty senior people.

The second is that there could be a possibility that all the relevant questions were actually asked and were recorded but were not published under some long term secrecy rule -may be we might find out 100 years after the event!

I agree with you, ... I give a very high possibility on your second option for several key witnesses declarations.

Dunmunro replied :

In May 1941the RN was fighting a global war, so it is not surprising that some personnel were posted to other duties, on leave, and/or could not be released from the PoW due to pressing obligations.

Your statement is partially correct, ... in May 1941 Great Britain had precise needs for war propaganda, ... but this relate directly with Paul second statement above.

So far we have lots of " occurrences " strongly pointing in that direction.

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Dunmunro replied :

In May 1941the RN was fighting a global war, so it is not surprising that some personnel were posted to other duties, on leave, and/or could not be released from the PoW due to pressing obligations.

Your statement is partially correct, ... in May 1941 Great Britain had precise needs for war propaganda, ... but this relate directly with Paul second statement above.

So far we have lots of " occurrences " strongly pointing in that direction.

Bye Antonio

I don't understand the connection between a classified inquiry into the Hood's loss and "war propaganda".

[RF]

In May 1941the RN was fighting a global war, so it is not surprising that some personnel were posted to other duties, on leave, and/or could not be released from the PoW due to pressing obligations.

WW2 only became truly global in December 1941, when Japan and USA became full combatents.

In May 1941 the war was in Europe, Mediterranean, North Africa, East Africa only. RN did have worldwide commitments but the principal combat areas at sea were the Atlantic and the Med.

[dunmunro]

In May 1941the RN was fighting a global war, so it is not surprising that some personnel were posted to other duties, on leave, and/or could not be released from the PoW due to pressing obligations.

WW2 only became truly global in December 1941, when Japan and USA became full combatents.

In May 1941 the war was in Europe, Mediterranean, North Africa, East Africa only. RN did have worldwide commitments but the principal combat areas at sea were the Atlantic and the Med.

A belated reply...

Prior to PH the RN/RAN/RCN/RNZN/RIN was engaged in active operations in the North and South Atlantic, eastern and western Mediterranean, and eastern and western Indian Ocean; HMAS Sydney was lost to Komoran in the eastern IO, for example. I don't recall if there was any active operations in the Pacific prior to PH, but the RN had to maintain a presence there as well.

[dunmunro]

Does anybody have the correct way to fully understand what the above signals mean ???

Bye Antonio

I have added notes in square brackets explaining, AFAIK, the signals:

Ships: Hood 1

Prince of Wales 2

Time Signal

'0103 - 0543 Preliminary testing

'0544 2 v 1 PP GCW ? 43 [ to PoW from Hood time check on Gunnery control frequency....]

v 2 IMI X [ from PoW repeat exercise...]

0546 2 v 1 PP GCW 0548 [ to PoW from Hood time check on Gunnery control frequency at 0548]

V 2 R [from PoW received]

0548 2 v 1 PP GCW 0550[ to PoW from Hood time check on Gunnery control frequency at 0550]

V 2 R [ from PoW received]

0550 2 v 1 GCW 0550 [ to PoW from Hood Gunnery control frequency 0550.... this may be when the clocks are synchronized]

2 INT GCW [PoW Interogatory Gunnery control frequency]

v 2 GCW [from PoW gunnery control frequency...]

'0551 2 GIC [ PoW gunnery concentration]

(approx)

2 v 1 GIC [to PoW from Hood gunnery concentration]

v 2 R [ from PoW recieved]

'0552 2 v 1 GOB - 1 [ to PoW from Hood fire at left hand German ship bearing 337d]

(approx)

R [ received]

-------------- Nil more heard -------

No intercommunication of ranges.

V/S F.C SIGNALS [visual signal Fire Control ]

'0550 GSB 337 - L1 [Fire at left hand German ship bearing 337d]
http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... #fcsignals

All the signals with "PP" and "GCW" in them refer to attempts to synchronize clocks between Hood and PoW; it appears that the attempt was not successful, as the signal for success is 'GWC" but this may have been omitted.

Information from B.R. 791 Wireless Signalling Instructions, Admiralty 1944.