The one about the Crane Hit

[wadinga]

Hello Antonio,

Glad to hear you are interested in Coate's account:

I do not mean she was sunk, but was obscured by our superstructure.
I did not see the explosion.

So Hood is not obscured from Coates' viewpoint on the platform by superstructure, he is watching her "fairly closely" and then suddenly she is. How can this happen? Well, Hood could suddenly speed up or PoW could instantly stop, thus putting Hood so far ahead the superstructure gets in the way. Neither seems feasible. Or as seems more likely to me, PoW turns to port, following Holland's intention, announced by his unexecuted flag signal, putting the forward superstructure into Coates' sightline and creating the effect he so precisely describes. As does Alarm Starboard also precisely describe the turn to port, about which the Gunnery Dept was warned by the Compass Platform, before immediately emergency turning to starboard, to avoid Hood's wreck as Geoffrey Brooke so graphically describes. And the germans describe. Leach and Rowell simply forgot about this port turn, but the other witnesses didn't. Since the Enquiry was into Hood's loss, not examining the minutae of PoW's tactics, these minor omissions were irrelevant.

Leach's report of 9th June on the Hood website ADM 267/111. Antonio, do you have different version of this, because the words you quote don't seem to be on the Hood site version.

“Shell “C”—15”: Hit starboard crane; detonation or partial detonation on boat deck.

Damage caused. Starboard crane; after funnel holed; all boat destroyed or damaged; fires started; Type 285 R.D.F. office extensively damaged by splinters and all personnel in it killed or wounded; extensive splinter damage to other compartments below boat deck; numerous important electric leads damaged or out; firemain lead to boat deck cut; two aerial insulators type O.B. smashed and cables parted; remote control cable to type 60 E R severed; port after H.A. Director holed in several places and one rating severely wounded.

Leach states that it was 15" but there is no actual evidence it was. Since the tenet of your case is that he was distorting his reports to minimise his alacrity in "running away as quickly as possible" so as to get subsequently nominated for medals, it would be in his interest to misrepresent 8" hits as 15" ones. Or maybe he just made mistakes like saying hit B was the same salvo as hit A, when we know it arrived at a different angle and therefore different time.

All the best

wadinga

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

no need to change an available milestone both sides we have about this battle, ... Hood exploded at 06.00 and nothing will change that.

Way too many persons " changed " things here on 1941 and after on books, ... it is time to put everything on the right place.

It was a 380 mm shell from Bismarck and Hood exploded at 06.00, ... so this hit occurred after it, ... just as Hunter-Terry stated precisely ( after 06.01 ).

Which HACS directors are you referring to being disabled ( fwd or aft, port or starboard ) and by what ? Which event ?

Please refer to available evidences and not your own opinion ... because it is going to be very important

I suggest you to read carefully the 5.25 thread about this one ...

Bye Antonio

The evidence is that PoW's GAR states that she only fired 3 x 5.25in salvos starting from ~0557:30, and the reason for only firing 3 salvos is that the HADT's were disabled. Further the GAR states a heavy hit after salvo 12 which affected the data from the forward 14in DCT, which is just about the time that the forward HADT had to go out of action. If we accept the GAR salvo timings, as we IMHO must, then the HADT hits had to happen sooner. One way out of this would have been for PE to have made some of the HADT hits, but if not, then Hood must have been destroyed before 0600.

Determining 5.25in ammo consumption was something that would have been easy to do after the battle, so there's no way for the GAR to be wrong on that.

If the hit happened after 0601 then Coates would have had a clear view of Hood exploding.

Implying conspiracy theories doesn't help.

[dunmunro]

Antonio, can you post again the crane hit drawing from the official damage report?

I think we need to carefully measure the trajectory angle of the shell that hit the crane.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

so Coates did not report any turn to port by PoW as it was easy to realize, ... it was only your " deduction ".

So the hit on the forward HACS directors could NOT have occurred there as it is self evident, since PoW was NOT turning, ... and the hit was taken on 260° course T=True.

Consequently if the hit on the forward HACS as we well know was taken after 06.01, ... than the hit on the after directors being taken after it, ... after 06.01 as Hunter-Terry precisely reported.

About the catapult and Walrus area overall situation on that moment, I suggest you to read and compare Ltnt Slade ( managing the catapult ) and Ltnt Bateman ( Walrus pilot ) and compare their events narrative with Hunter-Terry one and his timing first, ... than to Coates ( on same area ) that will appear more clear to you as well after.

You know I have everything ... ... but I like to take your listed statement to show something to Duncan :

@ Dunmunro,

Damage caused. Starboard crane; after funnel holed; all boat destroyed or damaged; fires started; Type 285 R.D.F. office extensively damaged by splinters and all personnel in it killed or wounded; extensive splinter damage to other compartments below boat deck; numerous important electric leads damaged or out; firemain lead to boat deck cut; two aerial insulators type O.B. smashed and cables parted; remote control cable to type 60 E R severed; PORT after H.A. Director holed in several places and one rating severely wounded.

Now, which HACS director have been declared being hit after on subsequent reports ? Port or Starboard ?

It is very intriguing here ... the directors being hit are always on the port side ... while the ones controlling the fire of the secondary guns during the engagement were the starboard ones ... and both went " out of order " for very " curious reasons " ... NOT reported on any damage report ...

A detailed secondary guns report is NOT contained into the GAR ... with open fire, cease fire, shells fired etc etc ...

Tarrant correctly confirms the " PORT " and the Walrus damages too :

A 15" shell hit the post of the starboard crane. Impact was approximately 10 foot above the Boat Deck level on the top inboard side of the post. A large fragment of the crane post was projected downwards onto the Upper Deck, which was dished to a maximum depth of .75 inches over an area 3.4 ft in diameter. After striking the crane post the shell was deflected upwards and burst against the base of the after funnel. A 5ft hole was ripped in the funnel plating and splinters were showered over the Boat Deck to a distance of 57ft from the point of burst. Splinter damage caused 37 holes in the Boat Deck over an area of 20 sq ft. Splinters that penetrated the Boat Deck killed and wounded men in the Type 284 radar room, while another struck the Upper Deck in the Wardroom and was deflected upwards and out through the side plating of the hull. A large number of electric cables were severed. A large number of splinters passed through the after funnel, damaging the port side engine room exhaust, and the PORT after 5.25" inch director, severely wounding one of the crew.Two boats stowed on the Boat Deck were destroyed, two were badly damaged and seven lightly damaged. Some were set on fire, but were quickly extinguished. Shell fragments riddled the Walrus, which was about to be launched. Because of the danger of fire from the petrol tanks, the Walrus was jettisoned over the side.

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

:

@ Dunmunro,

Damage caused. Starboard crane; after funnel holed; all boat destroyed or damaged; fires started; Type 285 R.D.F. office extensively damaged by splinters and all personnel in it killed or wounded; extensive splinter damage to other compartments below boat deck; numerous important electric leads damaged or out; firemain lead to boat deck cut; two aerial insulators type O.B. smashed and cables parted; remote control cable to type 60 E R severed; PORT after H.A. Director holed in several places and one rating severely wounded.

Now, which HACS director have been declared being hit after on subsequent reports ? Port or Starboard ?

It is very intriguing here ... the directors being hit are always on the port side ... while the ones controlling the fire of the secondary guns during the engagement were the starboard ones ... and both went " out of order " for very " curious reasons " ... NOT reported on any damage report ...

A detailed secondary guns report is NOT contained into the GAR ... with open fire, cease fire, shells fired etc etc ...

Bye Antonio

There was no damage to either starboard HA director:

7. The 5.25-in. armament opened fire at a range of 18,600 yards. After firing a deflection triple, a 15-in. shell passed through the superstructure supporting the H.A. directors.

The shot caused the director to jam temporarily in training and the Control Officer of the latter ordered all turrets to go into "aft control". This was carried out, but about the same time a 15-in. shell burst on the boat deck and seriously upset the after starboard H.A. director. The crew of this director had already been considerably blasted by "Y" turret firing on a forward bearing. The 15-in. shell burst threw the Control Officer off his feet, broke his telephone lead, and a splinter hit his earphones and very slightly wounded him. By the time he had regained control of the situation, the target was lost behind smoke astern.

A careful inquiry has been held into the reason why the fore H.A. director jammed and no satisfactory explanation has been arrived at; the director was found to be "free" after the action and it is possible that the locking bolt jumped down and the Control Officer was too hasty in ordering "after control." This fact has not, however, been proved and it is also possible that the severe shaking the director had caused it to "bind" temporarily in training.

but both were effectively disabled - note that the damage to the port directors is not mentioned above, because it wasn't relevant to the gunnery situation.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

very interesting, ... BOTH out of action for very " curious reasons ".

But while the forward starboard HACS was at least mentioned into the PoW damage report just as curiosity since they declared it jammed temporarly, ... the one starboard aft was NOT mentioned into the official PoW damage report, ... they only mentioned the port aft one being hit by splinters.

Now you will tell me that the damages were not so severe, ... even if it has been still hit by light splinters as you can read declared ONLY on the PoW GAR report :

The 15-in. shell burst threw the Control Officer off his feet, broke his telephone lead,and a splinter hit his earphones and very slightly wounded him. By the time he had regained control of the situation, the target was lost behind smoke astern.

and Capt Leach narrative :

The same salvo severed all fire control leads to the port forward H.A. Director and put the starboard forward H.A. Director out of action temporarily jamming it in training. The control officer of the latter ordered all turrets to go into "After Control". This was carried out, but, about the same time a 15" shell burst on the boat deck and seriously upset the starboard after H.A. Director. The crew of this director had already been considerably blasted by "Y" Turret firing on a forward bearing. The 15" shell burst threw the control officer off his feet and broke his telephone lead. By the time he was again through to the H.A.C.P. The target was lost behind smoke astern.

Now EVERY shell analysis at the end had an evaluation about the impact on fighting efficiency.

Why on this shell there is NO mention about the after starboard director being hit and being damaged ? Going temporarly " OUT of ACTION " just like the forward starboard one declared being jammed temporarily by the Hit Nr. 2 ?

Why they do mention only one director ( without S is singular ) and NOT directors = plural ( so 2 ) being temporarily OUT of ACTION ?

Following your logic the after HACS starboard one was more important to be listed for the lost of fighting efficiency due to the light damages ?

But on the official PoW damage report one finds ONLY the port after HACS being temporarily out of action, ref. Tarrant and Capt Leach above.

To be noticed that on both 24 and 27 May, 1941 radio messages Capt Leach ONLY reported the 2 forward HACS directors being damaged and out of action

Something is NOT right here ... ... just like the main guns out of action ... there are " incorrect " data also for the secondary guns/directors ... of course it was an important factor to define the real fighting efficiency of PoW when she retreated from the battle ...

For Geoffrey Brooke ( page 56 ) and F.O. Busch, ... the secondary guns of PoW were firing when PoW passed Hood smoke pall, ... and also Capt Leach reported that of course ... so Duncan ... what do you think now about all this ?

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

very interesting, ... BOTH out of action for very " curious reasons ".

But while the forward starboard HACS was at least mentioned into the PoW damage report just as curiosity since they declared it jammed temporarly, ... the one starboard aft was NOT mentioned into the official PoW damage report, ... they only mentioned the port aft one being hit by splinters.

Now you will tell me that the damages were not so severe, ... even if it has been still hit by light splinters as you can read declared ONLY on the PoW GAR report :

The 15-in. shell burst threw the Control Officer off his feet, broke his telephone lead,and a splinter hit his earphones and very slightly wounded him. By the time he had regained control of the situation, the target was lost behind smoke astern.

and Capt Leach narrative :

The same salvo severed all fire control leads to the port forward H.A. Director and put the starboard forward H.A. Director out of action temporarily jamming it in training. The control officer of the latter ordered all turrets to go into "After Control". This was carried out, but, about the same time a 15" shell burst on the boat deck and seriously upset the starboard after H.A. Director. The crew of this director had already been considerably blasted by "Y" Turret firing on a forward bearing. The 15" shell burst threw the control officer off his feet and broke his telephone lead. By the time he was again through to the H.A.C.P. The target was lost behind smoke astern.

Now EVERY shell analysis at the end had an evaluation about the impact on fighting efficiency.

Why on this shell there is NO mention about the after starboard director being hit and being damaged ? Going temporarly " OUT of ACTION " just like the forward starboard one declared being jammed temporarily by the Hit Nr. 2 ?

Why they do mention only one director ( without S is singular ) and NOT directors = plural ( so 2 ) being temporarily OUT of ACTION ?

Following your logic the after HACS starboard one was more important to be listed for the lost of fighting efficiency due to the light damages ?

But on the official PoW damage report one finds ONLY the port after HACS being temporarily out of action, ref. Tarrant and Capt Leach above.

To be noticed that on both 24 and 27 May, 1941 radio messages Capt Leach ONLY reported the 2 forward HACS directors being damaged and out of action

Something is NOT right here ... ... just like the main guns out of action ... there are " incorrect " data also for the secondary guns/directors ... of course it was an important factor to define the real fighting efficiency of PoW when she retreated from the battle ...

For Geoffrey Brooke ( page 56 ) and F.O. Busch, ... the secondary guns of PoW were firing when PoW passed Hood smoke pall, ... and also Capt Leach reported that of course ... so Duncan ... what do you think now about all this ?

Bye Antonio

Antonio, if a gun crew are all killed by splinters, but the gun is undamaged, then there will no mention of that gun in the damage report.

The Starboard after HADT was not damaged but the control officer suffered some damage...

The port forward HADT was the only HADT to suffer long lasting damage. The starboard forward HADT was probably being inspected for damage to try and determine the cause of it's jamming, when the radio message was being prepared. As I've stated before, radio messages in 1941 are necessarily brief and not always accurate because of problems with transmission, encoding, decoding and transliteration errors...no email or text messages in 1941!

The fact that the 5.25in guns were firing when Hood sank, indicates that the timing for Hood's explosion is incorrect.

[alecsandros]

The fact that the 5.25in guns were firing when Hood sank, indicates that the timing for Hood's explosion is incorrect.

Why ?

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you are not following the PoW official damage guidelines method to analyze each hit received and the impact of the warship fighting efficiency.

PoW received the hit Nr 2 and the port HACS was damaged. Since also the starboard HACS forward director went temporarily out of action, into the hit analysis as well as into the final fighting efficiency evaluations for this hit BOTH directors ( HACS ) have been mentioned and correctly reported.

PoW received this hit Nr 3, surely the port HACS director ( the one Hunter-Terry was into ) received splinters and went temporarily out of action. But as reported by Capt. Leach and into the PoW gunnery report, also the starboard HACS was hit by some splinters and went temporarily out of action as well ( read above ).

Now why into the PoW official damage report there is NO mention about the after starboard HACS director damages and being temporarily out of action status at all ?

Why that difference, since BOTH the HACS starboard directors were impacting the fighting efficiency of the PoW, ... and both suffered problems apparently, ... but while the forward only a temporarily jamming, ... the after also direct hit ( this hit ) splinters as reported ( NOT by the official damage report but by leach and the GAR), ... why that difference ?

If you think about it, ... the after HACS starboard director going OUT of ACTION really impacted PoW fighting efficiency, ... being the cause of her cease fire for the 5.25 inch guns, ... much more than the forward HACS starboard director, ... since the " switch over to aft control " process was done correctly from forward to aft as reported.

So again my question stand : why it was NOT reported by the official PoW damage report ...

It is self evident that we have another clear case of official documentation mismatch, ... like on other cases about this battle, ... so you better NOT to take anything for granted by try to think in the Latin way : CUI PRODEST ? ( Who took advantage of all this ? )

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hello Again Antonio,

We seem to have drifted away from the two points I made: You responded on one as follows:

o Coates did not report any turn to port by PoW as it was easy to realize, ... it was only your " deduction ".

So the hit on the forward HACS directors could NOT have occurred there as it is self evident, since PoW was NOT turning, ... and the hit was taken on 260° course T=True.

Consequently if the hit on the forward HACS as we well know was taken after 06.01, ... than the hit on the after directors being taken after it, ... after 06.01 as Hunter-Terry precisely reported.

About the catapult and Walrus area overall situation on that moment, I suggest you to read and compare Ltnt Slade ( managing the catapult ) and Ltnt Bateman ( Walrus pilot ) and compare their events narrative with Hunter-Terry one and his timing first, ... than to Coates ( on same area ) that will appear more clear to you as well after.

Can you say what is wrong with my deduction? It seems perfectly reasonable to me and fits Paul Cadogan's scenario nicely. What other possibilities are there for what he saw? Telling me that because not fit your scenario and therefore must be wrong is not indicative of an open mind. I have reviewed the two other witnesses in the catapult area and they have nothing of note to say and do not contradict Coates in any way.

On the second point about your quote about definite 15" splinters associated with this crane hit, where the words you used don't appear in the version on the Hood website is

You know I have everything ...

supposed to mean you do have another version of this statement but won't show it?

I think Geoffrey Brooke gives a good description of the difficulties the starboard aft HA/DCT suffered. More from Y turret muzzle blast than anything else. It's a shame your enthusiasm for his account has waned since I introduced you to it. Presumably because nothing in it supports your hypothesis.

All the best

wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

Coates declarations needs to be associated to the other witnesses. He did not provide any timing to his events, other did and were very precise.
You wrote he declared PoW was turning to port and it is NOT correct, he never reported that.
Hunter-Terry wrote that statement with an associate precise battle timing. That is a fact, ... your one just an unsupported " deduction " so far.
You can trust who you want and follow the " theory " you like the best of course.
I follow the official timing reported by the majority of the witnesses, in particular Hood explosion at 06.00 and Hunter-Terry timing on the PoW retreat events after, so far the most reliable ones.

I do not know from where the Hood website took that version, you can ask Frank Allen or Paul Bevand about it.
I have the official PoW damage documentation and I report what is written in there.
The official version stated it was a 15 inch shell after the splinters analysis, no doubts.
So your personal opinion about a 8 inch ( 203 mm ) stated above is incorrect.

I do not doubt the after starboard HACS director suffered for the PoW Y turret blast, ... since salvo 9th as reported onwards.
What I doubt is that it was damaged the way it has been reported by Capt. Leach and into the PoW Gunnery report for the very simple reason I reported above to Duncan :

@ Dunmunro,

you are not following the PoW official damage guidelines method to analyze each hit received and the impact of the warship fighting efficiency.

PoW received the hit Nr 2 and the port HACS was damaged. Since also the starboard HACS forward director went temporarily out of action, into the hit analysis as well as into the final fighting efficiency evaluations for this hit BOTH directors ( HACS ) have been mentioned and correctly reported.

PoW received this hit Nr 3, surely the port HACS director ( the one Hunter-Terry was into ) received splinters and went temporarily out of action. But as reported by Capt. Leach and into the PoW gunnery report, also the starboard HACS was hit by some splinters and went temporarily out of action as well ( read above ).

Now why into the PoW official damage report there is NO mention about the after starboard HACS director damages and being temporarily out of action status at all ?

Why that difference, since BOTH the HACS starboard directors were impacting the fighting efficiency of the PoW, ... and both suffered problems apparently, ... but while the forward only a temporarily jamming, ... the after also direct hit ( this hit ) splinters as reported ( NOT by the official damage report but by leach and the GAR), ... why that difference ?

If you think about it, ... the after HACS starboard director going OUT of ACTION really impacted PoW fighting efficiency, ... being the cause of her cease fire for the 5.25 inch guns, ... much more than the forward HACS starboard director, ... since the " switch over to aft control " process was done correctly from forward to aft as reported.

So again my question stand : why it was NOT reported by the official PoW damage report ...

It is self evident that we have another clear case of official documentation mismatch, ... like on other cases about this battle, ... so you better NOT to take anything for granted by try to think in the Latin way : CUI PRODEST ? ( Who took advantage of all this ? )

Bye Antonio

... and I ask to you as well : CUI PRODEST ? ( Who took advantage of all this ? )

It is clear in my personal opinion, ... who took advantage of it ... in the same way it was done initially for the main guns as well.
Of course it was the same one that wanted to try to demonstrate that the fighting efficiency of the main guns was reduced, ... trying to demonstrate that also the secondary guns fighting efficiency was reduced to zero ... at a certain point of the battle ... that caused the reports to be written ( or NOT written ) the way we have them today.

Of course it is ONLY my personal opinion ...

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

I do not doubt the after starboard HACS director suffered for the PoW Y turret blast, ... since salvo 9th as reported onwards.
What I doubt is that it was damaged the way it has been reported by Capt. Leach and into the PoW Gunnery report for the very simple reason I reported above to Duncan :



you are not following the PoW official damage guidelines method to analyze each hit received and the impact of the warship fighting efficiency.

PoW received the hit Nr 2 and the port HACS was damaged. Since also the starboard HACS forward director went temporarily out of action, into the hit analysis as well as into the final fighting efficiency evaluations for this hit BOTH directors ( HACS ) have been mentioned and correctly reported.

PoW received this hit Nr 3, surely the port HACS director ( the one Hunter-Terry was into ) received splinters and went temporarily out of action. But as reported by Capt. Leach and into the PoW gunnery report, also the starboard HACS was hit by some splinters and went temporarily out of action as well ( read above ).

Neither the damage report nor the GAR states that the starboard after HADT was hit by splinters. The GAR states that the CO of the HADT was hit by splinters - so this was a personnel problem not a damage problem and so was not mentioned in the damage report:

7. The 5.25-in. armament opened fire at a range of 18,600 yards. After firing a deflection triple, a 15-in. shell passed through the superstructure supporting the H.A. directors.

The shot caused the director to jam temporarily in training and the Control Officer of the latter ordered all turrets to go into "aft control". This was carried out, but about the same time a 15-in. shell burst on the boat deck and seriously upset the after starboard H.A. director. The crew of this director had already been considerably blasted by "Y" turret firing on a forward bearing. The 15-in. shell burst threw the Control Officer off his feet, broke his telephone lead, and a splinter hit his earphones and very slightly wounded him. By the time he had regained control of the situation, the target was lost behind smoke astern.

A careful inquiry has been held into the reason why the fore H.A. director jammed and no satisfactory explanation has been arrived at; the director was found to be "free" after the action and it is possible that the locking bolt jumped down and the Control Officer was too hasty in ordering "after control." This fact has not, however, been proved and it is also possible that the severe shaking the director had caused it to "bind" temporarily in training.

OTOH, the crew of the forward starboard HADT director reported that the HADT had frozen in train after the hit to the superstructure, and so it was mentioned in the damage report. As I have stated to you before, equipment that fails to function because of personnel casualties will not likely to be mentioned in a damage report, as the damage report is only concerned with damage to the ship's structure, and not crew casualties.

I really don't understand what you are trying to insinuate.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

lets make it a very simple question for you.

HIT Nr 2 - The forward starboard HACS director had problems, NOT DIRECTLY related to the shell hit ( just jamming ), ... went out of action and WAS reported into the PoW damage report, since reduced the fighting efficiency of the ship.

HIT Nr 3 - The after starboard HACS director had problems, THIS TIME DIRECTLY related to the shell hit splinters as reported, ... went out of action and WAS NOT reported into the PoW damage report, even if it reduced the fighting efficiency of the ship much more than the forward one, ... since it caused the starboard secondary battery to cease fire apparently.

Why this happened in your opinion ?

I have already told you my one.

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

lets make it a very simple question for you.

HIT Nr 2 - The forward starboard HACS director had problems, NOT DIRECTLY related to the shell hit ( just jamming ), ... went out of action and WAS reported into the PoW damage report, since reduced the fighting efficiency of the ship.

HIT Nr 3 - The after starboard HACS director had problems, THIS TIME DIRECTLY related to the shell hit splinters as reported, ... went out of action and WAS NOT reported into the PoW damage report, even if it reduced the fighting efficiency of the ship much more than the forward one, ... since it caused the starboard secondary battery to cease fire apparently.

Why this happened in your opinion ?

I have already told you my one.

Bye Antonio

Hit nr 2: The crew reported that the starboard HADT jammed as a direct result of the hit! Consequently it was discussed in the damage report...

Hit nr3: There was a crew casualty but no damage to the starboard HADT; consequently it was not discussed in the damage report...

I have already stated that damage reports only consider physical damage to the ship, and they do not directly deal with equipment failures due to crew casualties.

I already gave you an extreme example of a gun going out of action because the crew was killed by splinters; this will not be discussed in a damage report unless the gun itself is also damaged, or reported to be damaged.

There's no underlying conspiracy or cover-up here, but a simple and direct situation where one HADT went out of action simultaneously with a hit on the supporting structure, and the HADT crew reported that it was due to the hit and thus it was inspected for damage and therefore reported in the damage report. The other HADT went out of action because of a crew casualty and so was not discussed in the damage report.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

here what we are talking about on starboard after HACS director :

... the telephone lead ...

tech-066_HACS_Figure-1.jpg (91.76 KiB) Viewed 3054 times

... and those earphones ...

The_Royal_Navy_during_the_Second_World_War_A3883.jpg (65.43 KiB) Viewed 3054 times

Now some questions :

1 ) do you think those were part of the warship ? Equipment into the HACS director ?
2) do you think that the reason why they become broken/unusable, even if only temporarily, should be associated to the effects of the hit Nr 3 ?
3) do you think it was a direct result of it, ... due to the Hit blast effect and splinters, ... just like the jamming into the forward one ... or not ?

based of your responses we can than discuss about this hit being correctly reported into ALL reports ( Leach, PoW Gunnery and PoW damage report ) ... and than we can move on realizing the correct timing of this event, ... since the timing of all this was not recorded into the PoW gunnery report.

So realize when it occurred based on the available timing we have about the hit into the starboard crane, ...and we have not much room for " fantasy " there, ... since it was surely a 380 mm shell from Bismarck.

Consequently landing after the Hood blew up, ... after the compass platform hit, ... and after the Hit Nr 2 as it was reported by Capt Leach and PoW gunnery report, ... since the switch over from fwd to aft HACS director control was executed correctly as reported ( Leach, PoW gunnery and PoW damage report ), ... and than the after starboard HACS director went out of action causing the secondary to cease fire.

So well after 06.01, ... and in fact Ltnt A. Hunter-Terry precise timing puts this event well after 06.01 ...

Bye Antonio