Hello everybody,
@ Dunmunro,
I have never used the word " criminal " simply because I do not think they considered in that way what they were doing.
It has been just a matter on that being considered in between necessary or convenient for everybody due to the war going on.
You have to consider that from a certain point onward, the Officers themselves were not going to be able to do that successfully on their own, and that is the worst part of it if we look at it with today eyes.
They have been coordinated and helped on doing the cover up of all this, it is evident from the reports content itself, the modifications done, the documents " created " on purpose not controlled and accepted, the documents never showed since they were demonstrating that what was released was incorrect.
You asked before, and I was ready to explain you :
Antonio, were all the Prinz Eugen reports greeted with satisfaction by the KM Command ? Were those also "innocent errors" or were the Prinz Eugen officers entangled in Tovey's monstrous web of lies and deceit?
Prinz Eugen officers reports, like every for every Navy Officer in command position involved in action in war during WW2 in any Navy that I know, have been subject to close scrutiny by their superior once in harbor.
You can refer to Schmundt, Brinkmann, Reimann, Carls, Schniewind letters about the operation and the reports/maps and actions taken.
There is a main difference compared to what happened on Royal Navy Admiralty once PoW, Norfolk and Suffolk went home after Rheinubung.
Prinz Eugen did NOT retreat in front of the enemy, but engaged, opened fire and scored decisive hits.
There was nothing to be hidden on the German side, no Articles of War and nobody with the intention to put Brinkmann under a court martial after a careful scrutiny of his actions.
Some considerations were done by Schmundt about Prinz Eugen utilization against battleships and were explained by Carls and Schneiwind defending Brinkmann actions, since they were successful at the end and ordered directly by Adm Lutjens at sea; an easy and due task by Schmundt given the procedures in place for the cruisers.
The missing launch of torpedoes by Prinz Eugen were explained by an error in distance evaluation by the responsible Officer ( with a produced map by Reimann ) due to lack of a dedicate rangefinder. Solution was to install a dedicated 3 m rangefinder on all heavy units with torpedo tubes installed.
Much different on the Royal Navy side, were you had the newest battleship retreating while engaged in battle after less than 2 minutes, once alone ...
...
... than you had a Flag Officer loosing time to engage the enemy at first, ... and after Hood explosion retreating even before PoW did, ...
... and NOT opening fire in support of PoW under concentrated enemy fire, even if in condition to do it given his distance from the enemy ...
... than you had another heavy cruiser making a turn north delaying his engagement at first, soon after the “ Enemy in Sight ! “ radio message by PoW ...
Prinz Eugen Officers had the usual careful scrutiny, nothing more, nothing less ... the Royal Navy Officers instead of a well deserved inquiry given the above reasons ... got ALL rewarded with a medal for it ...
Bye Antonio
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )