PoW secondary 5.25inch - 133mm guns at DS

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote:"Gaynor's account is completely worthless"

Hi Duncan, please don't dismiss a witness just because it annoys you.
His account is not giving us a perfect timeline (for this we have Hunter-Terry), but his account is very clear, technically competent and reliable. I'm very annoyed by Coates declaration (much less detailed and difficult to understand) but we need however to try to understand why he declared such a strange and never elsewhere reported thing......

The problem with the 5,25" battery is that both Gaynor and Wright declarations are in agreement with the damage report (NO damage at all to both the starboard directors) and they all point to the fact that the battery was well in action when Capt.Leach decided to retreat. Also Brooke account says that the 5,25" was firing every 10 seconds and thus pointing to a rapid fire action, not just the declared "deflection triple".

After what has been incorrectly and intentionally declared regarding the timing of the retreat and the number of working main guns, the doubts and suspects re. the 5,25" are more than justified.

Bye, Alberto

[Herr Nilsson]

Dunmunro wrote:"Gaynor's account is completely worthless"

Hi Duncan, please don't dismiss a witness just because it annoys you.
His account is not giving us a perfect timeline (for this we have Hunter-Terry), but his account is very clear, technically competent and reliable. I'm very annoyed by Coates declaration (much less detailed and difficult to understand) but we need however to try to understand why he declared such a strange and never elsewhere reported thing......

The problem with the 5,25" battery is that both Gaynor and Wright declarations are in agreement with the damage report (NO damage at all to both the starboard directors) and they all point to the fact that the battery was well in action when Capt.Leach decided to retreat. Also Brooke account says that the 5,25" was firing every 10 seconds and thus pointing to a rapid fire action, not just the declared "deflection triple".

After what has been incorrectly and intentionally declared regarding the timing of the retreat and the number of working main guns, the doubts and suspects re. the 5,25" are more than justified.

Bye, Antonio

I thought you are called Alberto ??? ..... sometimes I think there are sockpuppets in this forum

[wadinga]

Hi Marc,

Well spotted but surely all of us have forgotten our own name from time to time.......



All the best

wadinga

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Herr Nilsson:
thanks Marc, it's corrected now. I copied a statement from one of Antonio's previous post and then forgot to change the name..... sorry.

Even if I agree with Antonio on most of his analysis, I guarantee we are not the same person ! I would like to have his knowledge and analytical competency.......

Bye, Alberto


P.S. Sean, can you be a friend witness for my identity at a potential Board of Inquiry (or Court Martial) as the 3 of us met in Portsmouth in 2010 .....?

[Herr Nilsson]

@Alberto

No problem.

@Sean

Yes, you can call me "World Champion".

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you wrote :

Antonio, are you stating that Leach ordered the forward and after starboard HADT to cease fire?
Are you stating that he lied about holding an inquiry to see what happened?
In the past I have used the problems with PoW's HADT's as evidence that PoW was not fully worked up... Imagine; junior officers making mistakes under fire! I guess Captain Leach should have been shot on the spot for allowing that to happen...

Gaynor's account is completely worthless, as it is riddled with huge errors and inaccuracies...

Duncan, what I am stating is very simple.

There was a retreat while in action and the Captain of the newest Royal Navy battleship in need to provide in writing a justification for it.

What did he wrote at 08.00 that same morning, ... only 2 hours after the event, ... in summary/sequence the key points :

1) At 06.00 Hood exploded
2) Bismarck shifted fire immediately to PoW
3) A " violent explosion " was heard on PoW ( Note : we still need to realize this declaration )
4) At 06.02 and 30 seconds the PoW bridge was hit, casualty heavy, Captain unhurt. ( Note : Time corrected backward after )
5) The same salvo placed the forward antiaircraft HACS directors out of action ( Note : the same time was declared here )
6) At this time only 3 of the 10 main 14 inch guns of the PoW were in action ( Note : incorrect )
7) Y turret would not bear. ( Note : incorrect )
8) I decided to break off action and consolidate position and ship.

Now, if you look at the declarations sequence, from point 3 to point 7 there are the reasons of the disengagement ( point 8 ) starting from the main event of Hood explosion ( point 1 ) and in consequence to the PoW being taken immediately under Bismarck main guns fire ( Point 2 ).

The whole events time declared by Capt Leach on this radio message starts at 06.00 and ends at 06.02 and 30 seconds, … in any case everything happening before 06.03. It will be corrected backwards on the May 27, radio message … and this do mean something too.

Now if you follow the declared event logic and analyze point 3, 4 and 5, those are about the PoW being heavily damaged already by at least 3 heavy hits.

Than, points 5, 6 and 7 are related to the supposed reduced fighting efficiency of PoW in that timeframe due to the damages ( secondary directors/guns ), forward main guns ( only 3 of 6 working ) and the Y turret being not usable ( not bear ).

It is clear the intention by Capt Leach to try to sustain a “ proper “ disengagement decision, by listing the damages by important hits received plus the PoW reduced fighting efficiency.

PoW secondary guns/directors out of action status are in the middle of this event sequence declared by Capt Leach supporting his decision taken.

This is ALL I am saying and I think you would agree with me about it ...

NOTE : I listen to all witnesses and look at all documents, ... but I only care about the whole scenario I can take from it, ... with a no side taken approach.
It is NOT easy as you can see ...

Bye Antonio

[Dave Saxton]

No electrical problems identified after a " careful inquiry ".
It was suspected being a mechanical failure, even the locking bolt was evaluated, but not an electrical induced one.

Actually, the fact that they could not find an mechanical problem afterward points directly to an temporary or intermitent electrical problem. Directors are traversed by electro mechanical drive or mechanical systems ultimately driven by some type of electric motors. If there's not a mechnical problem but the mechanism doesn't move, or is jammed, it is most likely the electric motors or their power supplies.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dave Saxton,

No electrical problems identified after a " careful inquiry ".
It was suspected being a mechanical failure, even the locking bolt was evaluated, but not an electrical induced one.

Actually, the fact that they could not find an mechanical problem afterward points directly to an temporary or intermitent electrical problem. Directors are traversed by electro mechanical drive or mechanical systems ultimately driven by some type of electric motors. If there's not a mechnical problem but the mechanism doesn't move, or is jammed, it is most likely the electric motors or their power supplies.

Everything can be and your point is a possibility, .. I will add another one, ... the water, ... that could have caused some electrical problems as well, ... but not knowing the cabling of those wires until the power supply and were the fuses were, ... no one can say it was a short circuit on port+starboard common cables after the junction box, ... some water making shorts ... but NOT causing the fuses ( if any ) to blew up and consequently put the director out of action until substituted, ... the report does not mention anything done neither electrically nor mechanically to the forward starboard director.

Just a " temporarily jamming " was reported on the official documents.

What remain as a fact is that PO J. Gaynor, which was in there does not recall anything happening in there while they were turning away from the enemy.

This is the " KEY " point, ... because that Hit Nr 2, ... came from a 328 T degrees bearing angle more or less, ... while the PoW was on course 260 T degrees.

This means she had well started the turn away since many seconds already, ... and this puts in any case the forward directors going out of action AFTER the disengagement order and NOT BEFORE it, ... assuming Capt Leach and PoW gunnery report being correct about this " temporarily jamming ".

But than we have another problem with those directors and the secondary guns, ... because it has been reported that AFTER the switch over to after control was correctly executed, ... than the crane hit Nr 3 occurred.

PoW damage report demonstrate that the Hit Nr 3 occurred BEFORE the Hit Nr 2 and NOT after it.

More, ... only Capt Leach and PoW Gunnery reported that after the control being switched over the crane hit disabled the after HACS starboard director.

PoW damage report does NOT report that being disabled at ALL ! ... and NOT ONLY ... it proves that the Hit Nr 3 was received on board PoW BEFORE the Hit Nr 2.

So, who is incorrect here ? Capt Leach and the PoW Gunnery Aspect Report ... or PO J. Gaynor and the PoW Official damage report ? ...

One thing is for sure, ... with a PoW secondary guns precise report with open fire, cease fire, distances and shells fired and the reasons of ceasing fire with the related event timing ... all this was not going to be a " mystery " at all, ... but we do not have them today ... why ? ...

In reality it is not so difficult to realize the reason why we do not have it ... but we can still do ALL our evaluations and analysis even without it ...

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you wrote :

Antonio, are you stating that Leach ordered the forward and after starboard HADT to cease fire?
Are you stating that he lied about holding an inquiry to see what happened?
In the past I have used the problems with PoW's HADT's as evidence that PoW was not fully worked up... Imagine; junior officers making mistakes under fire! I guess Captain Leach should have been shot on the spot for allowing that to happen...

Gaynor's account is completely worthless, as it is riddled with huge errors and inaccuracies...

Duncan, what I am stating is very simple.

There was a retreat while in action and the Captain of the newest Royal Navy battleship in need to provide in writing a justification for it.

What did he wrote at 08.00 that same morning, ... only 2 hours after the event, ... in summary/sequence the key points :

1) At 06.00 Hood exploded
2) Bismarck shifted fire immediately to PoW
3) A " violent explosion " was heard on PoW ( Note : we still need to realize this declaration )
4) At 06.02 and 30 seconds the PoW bridge was hit, casualty heavy, Captain unhurt. ( Note : Time corrected backward after )
5) The same salvo placed the forward antiaircraft HACS directors out of action ( Note : the same time was declared here )
6) At this time only 3 of the 10 main 14 inch guns of the PoW were in action ( Note : incorrect )
7) Y turret would not bear. ( Note : incorrect )
8) I decided to break off action and consolidate position and ship.

Now, if you look at the declarations sequence, from point 3 to point 7 there are the reasons of the disengagement ( point 8 ) starting from the main event of Hood explosion ( point 1 ) and in consequence to the PoW being taken immediately under Bismarck main guns fire ( Point 2 ).

The whole events time declared by Capt Leach on this radio message starts at 06.00 and ends at 06.02 and 30 seconds, … in any case everything happening before 06.03. It will be corrected backwards on the May 27, radio message … and this do mean something too.

Now if you follow the declared event logic and analyze point 3, 4 and 5, those are about the PoW being heavily damaged already by at least 3 heavy hits.

Than, points 5, 6 and 7 are related to the supposed reduced fighting efficiency of PoW in that timeframe due to the damages ( secondary directors/guns ), forward main guns ( only 3 of 6 working ) and the Y turret being not usable ( not bear ).

It is clear the intention by Capt Leach to try to sustain a “ proper “ disengagement decision, by listing the damages by important hits received plus the PoW reduced fighting efficiency.

PoW secondary guns/directors out of action status are in the middle of this event sequence declared by Capt Leach supporting his decision taken.

This is ALL I am saying and I think you would agree with me about it ...

NOTE : I listen to all witnesses and look at all documents, ... but I only care about the whole scenario I can take from it, ... with a no side taken approach.
It is NOT easy as you can see ...

Bye Antonio

Antonio, can you provide a link to the PoW radio messages?

#3 states a violent explosion...the only possible violent explosions are the crane hit (which disabled the after HADTs) or the forward HADT hit.

We know that the AFCT team recorded at hit at ~0559:10.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

now you seem starting the right reasoning path, ... lets see were you will end up now ...

The correct sequence of the received hits is a very important factor ... it was Hit 1, ... than Hit 3, ... than Hit 2, ...

Here the link to the PoW radio messages from page 51 on the " DS and RN Articles of War " thread, on November 2013 :

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=5830&start=750

You have May 24th, ... than May 27th, ... and finally the June 4th Captain Leach narrative.

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

I marked some obvious errors in red and the subsequent corrections in green. Note how twice the '3' was transmitted instead of '5' in the first message and again in the 2nd message and this was only partially corrected in the 2nd message, but fully corrected later.

Note also how parts of the message are out of sequence - this is almost certainly because of the time needed to transmit this lengthy and complex message, which would have posed great challenges to the signalling team, would have required retransmission several times - no email or text messages in 1941! I have bolded several passages which are relevant.

From : Prince of Wales
To : Admiralty
Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet
Rear Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron - CS1

Time/Sent: 08.00 of May 24th, 1941

At 05.53-30 seconds PRINCE OF WALES opened fire, range 23,000.
BISMARCK opened fire immediately on HOOD.
HOOD opened fire just before PRINCE OF WALES.
PRINCE EUGEN engaged PRINCE OF WALES.
BISMARCK fire extremely accurate - straddling HOOD on second or third salvo.
Fire immediately broke out in HOOD near after port 4inch A.A. twin mount, spreading rapidly to mainmast.
At 06.00 an explosion occurred between the after funnel and the mainmast in HOOD and she sank within 3 to 4 minutes.
HOOD had fired 3 to 4 salves prior to being sunk.
Destroyer picked up only 3 survivors from HOOD, a midshipman, a signalman and a seaman.
PRINCE OF WALES straddled on 6th.
PRINCE OF WALES was astern of HOOD and had to manoeuvre to avoid parts of HOOD. BISMARCK immediately shifted fire to PRINCE OF WALES and almost immediately a violent explosion was heard in PRINCE OF WALES.
At 06.02-30 seconds the bridge of the PRINCE OF WALES was hit, casualties, heavy, Captain unhurt.
Same salvo placed both forward antiaircraft directors out of action.
At this time only 3 (three) of the 10 (ten) 14inch guns of the PRINCE OF WALES were in action. Y turret would not bear.
I decided to break off action and consolidate position and ship.
I therefore turned away firing Y turret in local control on the turn and making smoke.
BISMARCK alto turned to follow but immediately thereafter broke off action.
PRINCE OF WALES fired a total of eighteen 14nch gun salvos and three secondary battery salvos. PRINCE OF WALES then took station astern...

From : Prince of Wales
To : Admiralty
Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet
Rear Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron - CS1

Time/Sent: from 09.48 until 10.29 of May 27th, 1941

Your 2317B/25?

Burnt camouflage account has been compiled from preliminary examination record,
Further scrutiny? May disclose some minor inaccuracies
At 05.35/24 Hood and Prince of Wales in close order course 240° 28 knots sighted enemy hulls down on similar course bearing 335°, Bismarck astern lighter ship. Within gun range turns brought the enemy 30°.
Hood ordered G ( ? ) I C just before opening fire at 05.53. Range approximately 25.000 yards.
Prince of Wales opened fire at 05.53 and ½ ( 30 seconds ). Bismarck replied with extreme accuracy on Hood, second or third salvo straddled and fire broke out in Hood in vicinity port aft 4 inch mounting.
Lighter ship engaged by Prince of Wales.
Prince of Wales’s opening salvo at Bismarck observed over, sixth seen to straddle.
At this time Prince of Wales had 3 (three) 14inch guns in action. Y turret would not bear.
Fire in Hood spreading rapidly to main mast.
A turn for 2 blue opened a valve at Prince of Wales 9 th salvo ( 4 main guns more from this moment onward ) and Hood has a further 2 blue flying when she was straddled again and at 06.00 a huge explosion occurred between after funnel and main mast. ( 2 blue = turn to port 20° together )
She sank in 3 to 4 minutes.
Prince of Wales saw whole incident.
Hood had fired 5 to 6 salvos but falling shot was not seen possibly because this coincided with the firing of Prince of Wales’s guns.
Prince of Wales starboard 5.25 inch battery was now in action.
Course had to be altered starboard to avoid remains of Hood; meanwhile Bismarck shifted main and secondary fire quickly and accurately to Prince of Wales.
A heavy hit was felt almost immediately and at 06.02 compass platform was hit, and majority of personnel killed.
Navigating Officer was wounded; Commander Officer unhurt.
Same salvoes put both 5.25 directors out of action.
Considered expedient to break off action and consolidate position and ship, after being manoeuvered round remains of HMS Hood, turned away behind spelt smoke screen.
Y turrets fired in local during turn as smoke disagreed with after director.
Enemy followed but turned away after a rocket salvo.
HMS Prince of Wales fired 18 main armament salvoes and 3 from secondary armament.
Target was crossed and re-crossed and 3 straddles observed.
No hits seen.

Note how all the errors are now corrected:

Appendix to "HMS Prince of Wales" NO.001.B. dated 4th June, 1941.
TO : The Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet
Copy to Rear Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron – CS1
SECRET
During the approach "Hood" made - "G.I.C." - followed by - "G.O.B.1" - just before opening fire at 0552 1/2. Range approx. 25,000 yards. "Prince of Wales" opened fire at 0553. "Bismarck" replied with extreme accuracy on "Hood". 2nd or 3rd salvo straddled and fire broke out in "Hood" in the vicinity of the port after 4" gun mounting. Lighter ship engaged "Prince of Wales". "Price of Wales" opening salvo was observed over, 6th was seen to straddle.
At this time "Prince of Wales" had 5 (five) 14" guns in action. "Y" turret would not bear.
Fire in "Hood" spread rapidly to the mainmast. A turn of 2 blue at 0555 opened "A" Arcs at "Prince of Wales" ninth salvo ( 4 main guns more from this moment onward 5+4 = 9 ). "Hood" had a further 2 blue flying when, at 0600, just after "Bismarck's" 5th salvo, a huge explosion occurred between "Hood's" after funnel and mainmast and she sank in three or four minutes. "Hood" had fired five or six salvos but fall of shot was not seen, possibly because this coincided with firing of "Prince of Wales'" guns.
"Prince of Wales" starboard 5.25" battery was now in action. Course had to be altered to starboard to avoid remains of "Hood"; meanwhile "Bismarck" had shifted main and secondary armament fire quickly and accurately onto "Prince of Wales". A heavy hit was felt almost immediately.
And at 0602 compass platform was hit and majority of personnel killed. Navigating Officer was wounded; Commanding Officer unhurt.
The same salvo severed all fire control leads to the port forward H.A. Director and put the starboard forward H.A. Director out of action temporarily jamming it in training. The control officer of the latter ordered all turrets to go into "After Control". This was carried out, but, about the same time a 15" shell burst on the boat deck and seriously upset the starboard after H.A. Director. The crew of this director had already been considerably blasted by "Y" Turret firing on a forward bearing. The 15" shell burst threw the control officer off his feet and broke his telephone lead. By the time he was again through to the H.A.C.P. The target was lost behind smoke astern.
It was considered expedient to break off the action and consolidate the position, and the ship, after being manoeuvred round the remains of "Hood", turned away behind a smoke screen. "Y" Turret fired in local during the turn as smoke blanked the after director.
It now seems probable that the enemy turned away at the same time as "Prince of Wales" and about two enemy salvos were seen short during this period.
The "Prince of Wales" fired 18 main armament salvos. The target was crossed and recrossed and three straddles observed. No hits were seen. True range on opening fire was 25,000 yards. The true range on ceasing fire was 14,500 yards.
The 5.25" opened fire at a range of 18,000 yards but only fired 3 salvos.
"Y" Turret's shell ring jammed during the turn away and the turret was out of action until 0825.
After retiring on a course of about 160 degs. "Prince of Wales" circled to port, steadying up on a course of 250 degs.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient servant,
(Signed) J.C.Leach Captain, Royal Navy

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

I saw your corrections, but to avoid any mismatch or error on copy them here in, I just put here some original scans, so we can read in there the exact words.

The difference among them are of course what clearly define Capt. Leach real intentions while communicating initially to the Admiraly ( May 24th, 1941 ) ... on his own first " re-adjustment " done 3 days after ( May 27th, 1941 ) ... and on his own " final version " into his narrative ( June 4th, 1941 ) written after a careful overall evaluation probably jointly done, according to the established and needed cover up, ... since it was the one attached to Adm Tovey dispatches.

Here for you May 24th, 1941 radio message :

PoW_radio_msg_May_24_0800.jpg (151.2 KiB) Viewed 3384 times

PoW_radio_msg_0800.jpg (101.1 KiB) Viewed 3384 times

on the next post May 27th, 1941.

Bye Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

here the May 27th, 1941 ones from the National Archives - Public Record Office :

PoW_May_27_radio_message_01.jpg (176.89 KiB) Viewed 3382 times

PoW_May_27_radio_message_02.jpg (127.05 KiB) Viewed 3382 times

Bye Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hell everybody,

here Captain John Catteral Leach narrative on June 4th, 1941 from the Hood website.

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... #P391Leach

It is important to read carefully the first page before the May 24 event narrative, ... because it is there where Capt. J.C. Leach changes and defines the different reasons that he wanted to be associated to his retreat, ... not anymore the damages occurred or the reduced fighting efficiency like at first declared on may 24th, 1941 radio message, ... but a new series of reasons, ... those ones :

3. Some explanation remains to be made as to my decision to break off the engagement after the sinking of H.M.S. "Hood" - a decision which clearly invites most critical examination.

Prior to the disaster to the "Hood" I felt confident that together we could deal adequately with "Bismarck" and her consort.

The sinking of "Hood" obviously changed the immediate situation, and there were three further considerations requiring to be weighed up, of which the first two had been in my mind before action was joined.

Namely:

(a). The practical certainty that owing to mechanical "teething troubles" a full output from the main armament was not to be expected.

(b). The working up of the Ship after commissioning had only just reached a stage where I felt able to report to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, that I considered her reasonably fit to take part in service operations. This was the first occasion on which she had done so. From the gunnery point of view the personnel was (sic) immensely keen and well drilled, but inexperienced.

(c). The likelihood of a decisive concentration being effected at a later stage.

In all circumstances I did not consider it sound tactics to continue single handed the engagement with the two German ships, both of whom might be expected to be at the peak of their efficiency.

Accordingly I turned away and broke off the action pending a more favorable opportunity.

It is in this " changing " scenario of reasons he was producing to support his retreat in front of the enemy while engaged that we need to evaluate the few information we have about the secondary guns and related HACS directors.

Capt. Leach initially used them to sustain a " reduced fighting efficiency " occurrence, ... declaring both forward directors out of action.

All the way thru the different declarations the reasons why they ceased fire has been changed and supported adding to the initial forward directors only being disabled, ... the after one on June narrative, ... in synch with the PoW Gunnery Aspect report declarations, that do NOT contain more precise supporting data about the secondary guns.

Problem is that all this is absolutely NOT supported by the PoW damage report ... both for the forward directors timing of event due to the shell type and the incoming enemy shell direction ... as well as for the after one were the starboard director damage is not even mentioned, ... but if occurred, .. was surely happening BEFORE the forward directors being disabled, ... so we can realize a clearly unsupported scenario being declared, ... while the real secondary guns data and directors eventual disabling time were NOT made available, even if existing of course.

This is the reason why, ... correlating those data and declarations with the ones we can read above on the main guns ( from 3 to 7 to 9 ) ... to the declarations about the Y turret being NOT available at first and after declared available before the disengagement ... and to the received enemy hit sequence surely incorrect and used to sustain the HACS director going out of action ... makes this all story inconsistent to say the least.

The truth about all this is NOT what has been declared, ... this is for sure ... the reality was clearly different than reported ...

But we do know the reasons behind all this ...

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hello Antonio,

I will leave you to add your now traditional criticism of those elements of his account which do not suit your scenario but Geoffrey Brooke (he has sold his book and doesn't to sell a New Perspective [omnia dicta fortiora si dicta Latina] in "Alarm Starboard" says

Sub-Lieutenant Knight, RNVR one of the several casualties on the Air defence position, was knocked unconscious and blinded ( although eventually recovering some sight). This was presumably by the 15" shell (sic) that hit the supporting structureof the two secondary armament directors nearby, putting the STARBOARD one out of action

My sic my CAPS

The port director was disabled but unimportant, whereas here is a member of the gunnery team pointing out the starboard unit was rendered U/S, just like the electrician, Clift, who subsequently repaired it.

The same quote neatly points out, as do others, that Knight and the others injured or killed in the ADO position were hurt by hit B, the 8" from PG, and since Knight does not remember the CP hit A before he was hit, this indicates hit B occurred first, that PoW was on 260T at the time, and therefore she had turned to comply with Hood's movements and the Conspiracy timeline is fatally compromised.

All the best

wadinga