PoW secondary 5.25inch - 133mm guns at DS

[dunmunro]

@Duncan: thanks for clarifying that the gunnery officer is unaware of the secondary armament status during an engagement.

However, don't you find a bit strange that no detail on the 5,25" shooting is recorded anywhere ?
Was it this normal not to take care about the number of salvos and the exact number of expended shells for the secondary armament aboard a RN vessel ?

Bye, Alberto

A typical 5.25in report would provide details of ammo use and performance of the individual turrets and HADTs and the open fire range but not much info on each salvo, however given the fact that only 3 salvos were fired and the fact that the causes for only 3 salvos being fired are detailed along with the range at open fire, the report is actually complete. If the Admiralty wasn't satisfied they only had to send a query for more info, and they would also query requisitions from PoW for more replacement 5.25in ammo than she reported expending. The fact that no such queries occurred is a very strong indication that the report was correct and was acceptable to the Admiralty.

Why would Leach or anyone else hide information on 5.25in ammunition use? Surely, if more 5.25in ammo was fired in local control it would be in Leach's interest to report it (as was his legal duty to do so) as he reported the firing the 14in guns in local control.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

you are right, ... a lot of ridiculous events on this battle reports, ... surely NOT at the level of the standard Royal Navy traditions.

@ Dunmunro,

I have the declaration of a First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy, Sir Henry Leach, admitting in writing on a book that his father was supposed to be court martialed by Adm Pound/Churchill for the retreat at Denmark Strait ... Adm Tovey saved him ... and at the end he was awarded with a medal.

Was this incorrect as well ? Was Adm Henry Leach suffering for something like Adm Tovey ?

Can you explain me which were the reasons associated to that supposed court martial for Capt J.C. Leach ?

I think they have a lot to do with those radio messages and his actions at Denmark Strait, ... were he panicked after having received a single hit and retreated after 1 minute a fully working newest Royal Navy battleship from the engagement she was into ... and after was sending incorrect radio messages trying to justify himself for what he had just done ... trying to sell a " proper " set of reasons why he had to do that.
Just to remain on thread, ... the statements about the directors and the missing data about the secondary are among the trials to confuse the real events and save himself from a sure inquiry and a very probable court martial.

This is the reason why he sent those radio messages that way ... NO errors Duncan, ... he tried to sell another story.


@ Alberto,

you are right my friend, usually the Royal Navy warships do retain all the data about the gunnery, very precisely.

In this case they cannot " invent " like for the track plot, ... blood or something else, ... in fact we have just listen to Allen telling us the truth about the track plot and how it was saved together with all the real course data used after by Rowell ... Sean please take not about this one for your convenience ...

In this case we do have all the main guns data, very precisely ... unless the final 3 local control salvoes ...that since determine the retreat precisely, ... have been recorded just a bit " less precisely " ... but we have fixed it forever now ...

But the secondary are almost totally missed, ... otherwise it was NOT possible to try to sustain the content of the radio messages sent before ... since the exact secondary guns data will have demonstrated how another part of Capt Leach declared events were incorrect ... on top of the incorrect main guns data ... just too much to cover ... better avoid it ... and in fact we do not have them.

Here for you the summary data for 2 similar battleships on similar battles :

1 ) King George V on May 27th, 1941 : 339 shells of 14 inches and 660 shells of 5.25 inches

2 ) Duke of York on December 26th, 1943 : 446 shells of 14 inches and 686 shells of 5.25 inches

Now surely our British friend can explain us why we do not have similar data for HMS Prince of Wales on May 24th, 1941 for the secondary fired shells ...

I think I know the reason ... it is the same of the incorrect data of the starboard directors ... and it has to do with the real cease fire time of PoW secondary guns ... well after the turn away from the enemy while on course 260 degrees already retreating ... probably only due to the smoke screen ... just like for the main guns directors.


YES, ... definitively Sean is right, ... this is NOT serious for a Navy ... we are well inside the ridiculous ...

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

you are right, ... a lot of ridiculous events on this battle reports, ... surely NOT at the level of the standard Royal Navy traditions.

@ Dunmunro,

I have the declaration of a First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy, Sir Henry Leach, admitting in writing on a book that his father was supposed to be court martialed by Adm Pound/Churchill for the retreat at Denmark Strait ... Adm Tovey saved him ... and at the end he was awarded with a medal.

Was this incorrect as well ? Was Adm Henry Leach suffering for something like Adm Tovey ?

Can you explain me which were the reasons associated to that supposed court martial for Capt J.C. Leach ?

I think they have a lot to do with those radio messages and his actions at Denmark Strait, ... were he panicked after having received a single hit and retreated after 1 minute a fully working newest Royal Navy battleship from the engagement she was into ... and after was sending incorrect radio messages trying to justify himself for what he had just done ... trying to sell a " proper " set of reasons why he had to do that.
Just to remain on thread, ... the statements about the directors and the missing data about the secondary are among the trials to confuse the real events and save himself from a sure inquiry and a very probable court martial.

This is the reason why he sent those radio messages that way ... NO errors Duncan, ... he tried to sell another story.

Henry Leach's statement is based upon statements from Admiral Tovey not direct information from his father. Ludovic Kennedy had this to say about Tovey:

In fairness to Pound, it should be said that in later life Tovey’s
memory let him down, and he was apt to exaggerate. The
occasion of his having forgotten that he had asked the Admiralty
not to send their own interpretation of D/F bearings has already
been related in note 2 of Chapter 7 (pp. 149 to 174). Again in
1954 he was under the impression he had received the signal
about the King George V being towed home before Ark R0yal’s last
attack and decided that ‘if Ark Royal failed to damage the Bzkmarck
. . . to disobey the signal and turn back while we still had
enough oil to get back to an English port’. In another letter in
the same year he imagined that the signal had ordered him to
continue the chase ‘up to the shores of France’. (Tovey to
Roskill, ll Nov. 1954, and 20 Nov. 1954.) I
His secretary of the time, now Rear-Admiral R. W. Paffard,
writes of these events as follows:
‘. . . I think his memory only began to play tricks after he had
suddenly retired from all public life and virtually became a
hermit. With no current interests and nobody to talk to other
than his wife, it was understandable that he brooded more
and more on the "past, and particularly on the controversial
aspects of his command of the Home Fleet; and Lady Tovey, (
in constant pain from arthritis, and always by nature inclined ’
to put the worst construction on everything, undoubtedly.
nurtured his resentment and encouraged him to magnify the
disagreements he had had with Churchill and Pound.’ '(Letter to the author, 5 May 1973.)

Pursuit, Epilogue note 2, p284. '

The threatened court martial may have been a innocent inquiry from the Admiralty, or it may have never been threatened at all. Since no primary sources have been uncovered to support it you can hardly build a credible history around it.

Antonio, if you continue in this line of attack on Leach you risk damaging your own reputation as a naval historian. I have already shown how the first radio message was sent out of sequence and and how errors in radio morse code signals were commonplace.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

sorry Duncan, the damage to his own reputation has been done by the action at first and after by what he wrote by Capt. J.C. Leach himself.

What the others have done after, unfortunately only confirms what happened in reality that can be easily still re-constructed with the available evidence, like that shameful radio message on May 24th, 1941 at 08.00.

Adm Tovey whas NOT suffering for " dementia " when on July 1941 he accepted from RearAdm Wake-Walker and reported PoW disengaging at 06.13, another shameful page about this all story, ... together with " The Plot " one, ... which is by far the most shameful I have ever found on many years of history researches.

Using Ludovic Kennedy to try to sustain something about this battle is useless, you are talking an author that on late 1970's, with the official documents de-secreted, still wrote PoW retreating at 06.13 adding to it " after 21 minutes of battle ".
I will avoid to add what he incorrectly wrote about Holland and mostly about Wake-Walker to sustain this all cover-up, were Holland being a scapegoat, ... and the others with medals.
No comments is needed here about his overall credibility.

Lucky us we have many original documents still available, so neither Leach nor Wake-Walker nor Ellis will be left with the " cover up " they had for more than 70 years.

Nothing personal, ... but they were career Officers on the Royal Navy ... and what they did was NOT according to what was supposed to be, ... differently than Holland that did it until the end with courage and honor.

What the Admiralty and the British historians did after is another story ... smelling bad too, ... but we have plenty of it during WW2.

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

sorry Duncan, the damage to his own reputation has been done by the action at first and after by what he wrote by Capt. J.C. Leach himself.

What the others have done after, unfortunately only confirms what happened in reality that can be easily still re-constructed with the available evidence, like that shameful radio message on May 24th, 1941 at 08.00.

Adm Tovey whas NOT suffering for " dementia " when on July 1941 he accepted from RearAdm Wake-Walker and reported PoW disengaging at 06.13, another shameful page about this all story, ... together with " The Plot " one, ... which is by far the most shameful I have ever found on many years of history researches.

Using Ludovic Kennedy to try to sustain something about this battle is useless, you are talking an author that on late 1970's, with the official documents de-secreted, still wrote PoW retreating at 06.13 adding to it " after 21 minutes of battle ".
I will avoid to add what he incorrectly wrote about Holland and mostly about Wake-Walker to sustain this all cover-up, were Holland being a scapegoat, ... and the others with medals.
No comments is needed here about his overall credibility.

Lucky us we have many original documents still available, so neither Leach nor Wake-Walker nor Ellis will be left with the " cover up " they had for more than 70 years.

Nothing personal, ... but they were career Officers on the Royal Navy ... and what they did was NOT according to what was supposed to be, ... differently than Holland that did it until the end with courage and honor.

What the Admiralty and the British historians did after is another story ... smelling bad too, ... but we have plenty of it during WW2.

Bye Antonio

Antonio you gave us the RN ship's war diary information:

PoW gives a cease fire time of 0611, Suffolk 0612 and Norfolk 0614...is it any wonder that Tovey states 0613 in his despatch?

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=5830&p=58808&hilit=0611#p58808

Trying to reconstruct what happened and when is not easy and Tovey had to reconcile conflicting reports and data and Kennedy after him.

Antonio, you gave us the radio messages on the 24th and 27th which show clearly how parts of the message transmitted on the 24th were compiled out of sequence with several transcription errors.

The only source we have for a possible Leach court martial is from Tovey years after the war, at a time when his own secretary states that his memory was failing and that he was prone to exaggerate. No other source exists for this contention.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote: "The only source we have for a possible Leach court martial is from Tovey years after the war, at a time when his own secretary states that his memory was failing and that he was prone to exaggerate. No other source exists for this contention."

Come on, Duncan, we have all read Tarrant's book where there is this photo, offered from Capt.Leach son (former First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Leach)

Tarrant_page_61_Leach_photo_caption.jpg (100.04 KiB) Viewed 3160 times

Everybody in the Navy environment was apparently aware of the story, and his son felt the need to defend the memory of his father !

Bye, Alberto

[Herr Nilsson]

Everybody in the Navy environment was apparently aware of the story....

For example?

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

you can enjoy the reading Marc ... ... I avoid to put here the IWM link of McMullen, ... were you can find in direct words the same concept.

Churchill_01.jpg (132.23 KiB) Viewed 3137 times

Court_Martial.jpg (32.61 KiB) Viewed 3137 times

http://www.naval-review.com/issues/1980s/1980-3.pdf

http://familytreemaker.genealogy.com/us ... 06text.txt

http://cdn.worldheritage.org/articles/F ... ake-Walker

http://webatomics.com/jason/Images/dissertation.pdf


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Tovey ... aron_Tovey


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederic_Wake-Walker


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Leach ... y_officer)

http://books.google.it/books?id=9-g7AwA ... ch&f=false


http://books.google.it/books?id=LIaDXoU ... ch&f=false


@ Dunmunro,

you wrote :

Antonio, you gave us the radio messages on the 24th and 27th which show clearly how parts of the message transmitted on the 24th were compiled out of sequence with several transcription errors.

That is just your " personalized and incorrect " way to read a clearly written radio message. I read it the way it is written.

About the 06.13, ... well we have discussed enough about it and I am tired to tell you what the Admiralty had to admit to reduce the shame coming from it.

Please go and read the Battle Summary Nr 5 statement referring that input.

Bye Antonio

[Herr Nilsson]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

you can enjoy the reading Marc ... ... I avoid to put here the IWM link of McMullen, ... were you can find in direct words the same concept.

Well, but all have Kennedy in their bibliography.... if there is one at all.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

so, ... you better listen to Colin McMullen words on reel 3 at minute 2 and 50 seconds, ... and here no Ludovic Kennedy involvement.

http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80010751

But surely now the " defender " of what has been done ... will declare that Adm Tovey was suffering for dementia and Adm Pound was sick and crazy ... what about Churchill and Adm Tom Phillips ? ... which kind of illness will you invent about them now ?

Now back on the thread subject, ... we only have the open fire time from PoW gunnery plot ... we have an unreliable declaration of how many shells/salvoes being fired, ... being only a deflection triple ... or 3 salvoes ... while Capt Leach declared they were in action when the compass platform hit was received ... so, fired until the forward directors have been hit ... consequently after 06.01 battle time ... we have a clear reasons for the fwd stb HACS director being disabled due to a jamming ... and an unreliable declaration on the aft stb HACS director being disabled too ... not supported by the damage report and incorrect for the time of the event ...

It smells bad ... very bad ...

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

so, ... you better listen to Colin McMullen words on reel 3 at minute 2 and 50 seconds, ... and here no Ludovic Kennedy involvement.

http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80010751

But surely now the " defender " of what has been done ... will declare that Adm Tovey was suffering for dementia and Adm Pound was sick and crazy ... what about Churchill and Adm Tom Phillips ? ... which kind of illness will you invent about them now ?

Now back on the thread subject, ... we only have the open fire time from PoW gunnery plot ... we have an unreliable declaration of how many shells/salvoes being fired, ... being only a deflection triple ... or 3 salvoes ... while Capt Leach declared they were in action when the compass platform hit was received ... so, fired until the forward directors have been hit ... consequently after 06.01 battle time ... we have a clear reasons for the fwd stb HACS director being disabled due to a jamming ... and an unreliable declaration on the aft stb HACS director being disabled too ... not supported by the damage report and incorrect for the time of the event ...

It smells bad ... very bad ...

Bye Antonio

The McMullen interview was done in 1989, 48 years after the Bismarck episode. (McMullen, doubtless read all the accounts of the actions including Kennedy's which was published in 1974) In fact McMullen states that Tovey told him this directly, but again the only source is Tovey. Here is what Churchill wrote in The Grand Alliance:

The command now passed to Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker
on his bridge in the cruiser Norfolk. It was for him to decide
whether to renew the fight at once or hold on to the enemy till
the Commander-in-Chief should arrive with the King George
V and the aircraft-carrier Victorious. A dominant factor was
the state of the Prince of Wales. This ship had only recently
been commissioned, and scarcely a week had passed since
Captain Leach had been able to report her "fit for battle."
She had been severely mauled, and two of her ten fourteen
ch guns were unserviceable. It was highly doubtful whether
in this condition she was a match for the Bismarck. Admiral
Wake-Walker, therefore, decided not to renew the action, but
to hold the enemy under observation. In this he
was indisputably right. (p.268)

(NOTE THE EDIT IN BOLD - due to a transliteration error on my part... )

So Churchill was hardly condemnatory over W-W or Leach's actions. But perhaps some wartime associates of Churchill can provide evidence drawn from 1941 that he wanted a court martial? Martin Gilbert's biography of Churchill, "Finest Hour" states that Churchill was bitterly disappointed that PoW turned away and that he berated the First Lord and Pound about the Bismarck action and about the situation in the Mediterranean, but there is no mention of court martialling anyone, nor any indication of anything other than Churchill's typical demands for action.

In 1914 Admiral Troubridge was court martialed after a court of inquiry found charges were warranted over his failure to bring the Goeben to action; he was acquitted during the trial but never received another sea going command. Leach did not appear before a board of inquiry, he was not court martialed, did not lose his command, and indeed hosted Churchill and President Roosevelt on board PoW...hardly an indication that he was in official disfavour or that charges were ever considered. In any event, a court of inquiry would have determined if charges were warranted and this would have been the first step in the process towards a court martial, and it would have carefully considered the actual evidence from completed reports and would not have been swayed one way or another by Leach's radio messages.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

of course AFTER the " cover up " decision being taken, ... no one is expecting Churchill declaring anything different, ... he even signed for the medals for them ...

She had been severely mauled, and two (2) of her ten (10) fourteen inch guns were serviceable.

Funny to read that the guns working were down to 2 at that time ... always decreasing .... I even read 1 only working somewhere, ...

... as you can see the Old Lion followed Capt Leach initial message reasons : heavy damages ( severely mauled ) + reduced fighting efficiency ( only 2 guns working )

... Ludovic Kennedy sealed on top of those incorrect reasons the retreat timing invented by Wake-Walker and signed by Adm Tovey being 06.13 ... and ... voila' ... magically the PoW retreated after 21 battle minutes, ... of which 12 minutes in battle alone against the Bismarck ... after 7 hits received ... 13 killed on the compass platform ... and only few ( 2 or 3 or even only 1 ) main guns working ... and the secondary disabled of course ... a vey honorable and PROPER retreat ... ... I should say honorable disengagement ...

Kennedy_DS_02.jpg (210.04 KiB) Viewed 3090 times

Kennedy_DS_01.jpg (89.97 KiB) Viewed 3090 times

NO ! ... ... The reality has been a lot different ...

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Note the edit that I made to my previous post. Churchill actually wrote that two of her 10 guns were unserviceable.

Antonio we have the war diaries from the 3 RN ships showing that open fire is given as ~0553 and ceasefire is given from 0611-614. Tovey picked 0613...

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

NO ! ... you do NOT know from where Admiral John Tovey picked up that shameful timing, ... even declared incorrect by his own Admiralty so shameful it is.

I DO ! ... and I have the full evidence of it in ORIGINAL ...

It was NOT taken from the war diaries that were NOT used to build up the official " cover up " according to the needs.

I am NOT so superficial like you think Duncan, ... just keep in mind that when I state something like this ... since many years ... I have the evidence in my hands about it.

Otherwise, ... I just avoid to make a clear statement and only provide a personal opinion ... surely I do not build up anything on it.

According to you who wrote this statement ? :

I had seen her forced out of action after 10 minutes' engagement, at the end of which her salvoes were falling short and with a very large spread indeed.
As a result of the action she was short of one (1) gun and her bridge was wrecked.

NOTE : I think you would agree that 10 minutes after 05.53 = 06.03

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

NO ! ... you do NOT know from where Admiral John Tovey picked up that shameful timing, ... even declared incorrect by his own Admiralty so shameful it is.

I DO ! ... and I have the full evidence of it in ORIGINAL ...

It was NOT taken from the war diaries that were NOT used to build up the official " cover up " according to the needs.

I am NOT so superficial like you think Duncan, ... just keep in mind that when I state something like this ... since many years ... I have the evidence in my hands about it.

Otherwise, ... I just avoid to make a clear statement and only provide a personal opinion ... surely I do not build up anything on it.

Bye Antonio

Tovey died in 1971...I hope you're not in communication with him, and if not, how do you know how he decided on 0613? The times from the 3 RN ships are there and it seems very likely that Tovey read them. Post war historians, writing at leisure a history of the battle might well question Tovey's decision to state 0613, but in his defence this was an approximation of times recorded by ships on the spot. In any event Tovey's account was only published post war. Only a search of his papers can reveal why he chose that time, and whether or not it was simply a typo or whether he was influenced by the RN ship's timings.