PoW secondary 5.25inch - 133mm guns at DS

[Dave Saxton]

Who would have been responsible for observing and recording the actions of the 5.25s?

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Dave: finally a good question in a thread that is becoming a nice display of desperate fantasies !

I would add : "was McMullen (as PoW guns director) aware of the 5,25" battery and fire direction status, when he sent the boy to Capt.Leach (at let's say 6:02, realizing that the ship was turning away) to tell him that "everything was fine" ?



@Sean: a pity that the damage report leaves no chance at all to the fact that the starboard director was directly affected by the hit, just leaving to Capt.Leach the benefit of the doubt about a possible temporary jamming of the starboard director and found NO electrical problem at all out of the port director cabling (despite the electrician Clift account).
"No electrical problems identified after a " careful inquiry ".


Again the "fantastical" turn to port ???

I had hoped we closed this discussion already: the order for this turn was not executed. Therefore NOBODY ordered the turn from the compass platform as per Rowell account. The only possible theory (just an hypothetical theory, but still possible) is Tommy one, that the officer of the watch independently ordered a turn to keep station behind the Hood that was already changing course AND was unable to lower the flag. The only support to this theory is that Hood rudder (after a catastrophic explosion and the hit on the sea bottom..... ) is still on a turn to port.
Even in this case, as Hood had not yet finished her 20° turn (else the wreck rudder would not still be in turn to port position), the turn of PoW could have been just at start (please consider the reaction time of the OoW realizing that Hood was turning and the delay of PoW reacting to her rudder). It was not for sure a 20° turn to get to the 260° course on which PoW received hit n.2. If it ever happened (again, very low probability), this turn was not affecting the overall ship course as per PoW plot (please see Allen interview, he didn't notice any change of course as Rowell map is based on his plot), just a small adjustment, albeit causing the ship to roll. In this case the rolling was then magnified by the turn and counterturn to avoid Hood remains.

Therefore, as hit n.2 was received when the ship was already on 260° course, it was received when PoW was turning to port to retreat, well after the compass platform one.

Bye, Alberto

[wadinga]

Hello Antonio

From Geoffrey Brooke

........sent his boy messenger down to tell the Captain that the main armament was alright (he did not know it, but at that moment there were 5 guns out of action).

Official Damage Report

Effect on Fighting Efficiency :

Port H.A. director out of action. Starboard H.A. director temporarily out of action.

How does that equal "no chance??"

Once again our expert eye witness gives us the detail from what was understood at the time, and what Leach had to work on at the time.

You cannot close down the initial turn to port discussion, inconvenient though it is for you, becuse there too many clear indications it took place.

All the best

wadinga

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Sean: temporarily out of action (as declared by..... Capt.Leach........ but they found NO damage at all, so , sorry, NO CHANCE.

Wadinga wrote: "You cannot close down the initial turn to port discussion, inconvenient though it is for you, becuse there too many clear indications it took place"

Where ? Just in your attempt to hide an historical truth that annoys you. We have the official PoW battle maps ! Please "try" to disregard these....

Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

here the May 27th, 1941 ones from the National Archives - Public Record Office :

PoW_May_27_radio_message_01.jpg

PoW_May_27_radio_message_02.jpg

Bye Antonio

Antonio, you still don't seem to understand the limitations of communication via long range wireless coded morse code. It took 41 minutes to transmit the May 27 signal in 5 parts! The original message from Leach would have been written by hand in pencil, in multiple parts, and then interpreted by a signalman for transmission. The May 24th signal would have required a similar time to transmit and it is obvious that parts of the May 24 signal were sent out of sequence, just as it is obvious that there were mistakes made in transmission that were later corrected. The idea that Leach set out to deceive the Admiralty with these messages is completely absurd! Did Leach really suggest that the Germans fired rockets? In fact what happened is that over time, Leach was able to assemble a full picture of what transpired and when but as you can imagine some aspects of the action were difficult to place in a precise timeline even then.

However, it is also clear that only three 5.25in salvos were fired.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

I thought we were done with your “ fantastical stuffs “ about the PoW never executed turn to port from 280 T to 260 T and 05.58 Hood explosion.

Unless you provide serious evidences about it, please avoid mentioning again those " fantasies " ... .

Brooke book is very good but full of errors.
He cannot overturn better and more solid evidence we have at hand with his often unreliable and incorrect memories.
He wrote PoW was having 5 guns out of action. YES, but after the turn to port and the Y turret jammed thanking his Captain decision to retreat, so 1 main gun out of action (A1) before the retreat, plus 4 his Captain turn jammed while retreating, … makes 5, but it was AFTER the retreat order, not BEFORE !
In fact Capt Leach on his narrative was forced to admit he had 5+4=9 main guns working before retreating, … so as you can see Brooke is often incorrect.

Esmond Knight told in clear words the board of inquiry which shell made him blind.
Go and read it on Hood board of Inquiry : it was the Compass Platform/Bridge hit. Here as well the case is closed ...

@ Dunmunro,

I have showed you the original radio PoW messages and there are no errors no typo on them.

The point stand, … we moved from one set of reasons for the disengagement, … damages+real reduced fighting efficiency, … to a different set of reasons written on Capt Leach narrative on June 4th, 1941.

In that timeframe all the “ adjustments “ on radio messages and reports were made to progressively change what initially reported on May 24th, 1941 at 8 am.

The secondary armament ceasing fire as well as the reasons for their related HACS directors being declared out of action are inside those " adjustments ".

Curious to realize that everything started being " adjusted/changed " just after Bismarck was sunk … on May 27th, morning ... … what a curious combination as well …

It smells really bad ... more and more ...

Bye Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you wrote :

Antonio, you still don't seem to understand the limitations of communication via long range wireless coded morse code. It took 41 minutes to transmit the May 27 signal in 5 parts!
The original message from Leach would have been written by hand in pencil, in multiple parts, and then interpreted by a signalman for transmission.
The May 24th signal would have required a similar time to transmit and it is obvious that parts of the May 24 signal were sent out of sequence, just as it is obvious that there were mistakes made in transmission that were later corrected.

NO way ! No mistakes at all.
Please, do not even try to sell me this story.
Capt. Leach is responsible for what he wrote and did, exactly like RearAdm W.F. Wake-Walker with his first declaration to the board of inquiry and after with " the Plot ".

The idea that Leach set out to deceive the Admiralty with these messages is completely absurd !
Did Leach really suggest that the Germans fired rockets ?
In fact what happened is that over time, Leach was able to assemble a full picture of what transpired and when but as you can imagine some aspects of the action were difficult to place in a precise timeline even then.

What Capt. Leach did, just like RearAdm Wake-Walker is his historical responsibility, ... from a military stand point, ... and it is there into the official documents.
The fact that they are no longer with us is NOT sufficient to stop the truth to finally surface and be available to everybody.

If you are reduced to try to state that those radio messages has been written incorrectly ... well I think we are at the end of this discussion and the conclusion is obvious, ... at least it is to me.

I know it is shameful ... and hard to accept ... but it is the reality ... and you should accept it as it is.

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Did Leach really suggest that the Germans fired rockets?

Answer please.

Mistakes in signalling were commonplace and often led to tragic mistakes. During the Crete battle mis-communication led to part of the RN battlefleet being detached because a signal was wrong interpreted to mean they were out of AA ammo when they actually had lots left. The errors in PoW's signals were minor in comparison - and no, Leach was not responsible for those mistakes as he could hardly be expected to supervise the transcription and transmission of a radio message.

It is pretty obvious once you begin to look at WW2 signals that mistakes were common. The most famous one being Halsey's interpretation of a signal which included the phrase "...the world wonders..."

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

if you explain to me what you mean with your request with a clear reference, than I maybe able to answer to you.

No problems.

I do understand typo and errors, but this do not apply at all to Capt Leach clear radio message sent at 08.00 am on May 24th, 1941.

The meaning of that message, the phrase sequences and the details written on it do provide a unique interpretation possible.

As I explained you above the only intent of it was to communicate a " proper " set of reasons for his retreat, to try to justify what he did using incorrect statements.

Sorry Duncan, ... you are NOT going to take Capt Leach out of his clear responsibilities once again with the excuse of errors done by somebody else writing a radio message.

They " saved " him on 1941, ... enough is enough, ... no more " cover up " is going to be accepted.

Remember that the British Admiralty/Churchill wanted to court martial Capt. J.C. Leach for what he did during that battle, ... and that request/decision in my opinion was mainly based on the radio messages they received being issued from PoW.

In fact, if you only put yourself into the Admiralty operation room receiving those radio messages, ... there is only one decision you can take, ... and you know it like I do that they were right about it, ... than the war propaganda needs have been considered a TOP priority and it was decided differently.

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hi Antonio,

You really have got a handle on how well Leach covers his tracks eg

From H.M.S. PRINCE OF WALES
Date 27.5.41

Time 1610.


Addressed
Admiralty, C. in C. Home Fleet

Summary of damage. Armament and controls Both forward H.A. directors disabled. Port circuit cut and pedestal canted and strained. Starboard director possibly repairable by ship’s staff. After (corrupt group) office destroyed. One “Walrus” aircraft damaged and jettisoned. Both port S.L. sights destroyed. After half of compass platform severely damaged.

Hull. Following extensively damaged. Forward H.A. director supports.

So by the afternon he was reporting imaginary potential repairs to an unbroken starboard director.The imaginary repairs Clift said he carried out. The electrician was obviously bribed somehow, but the griping about his subsequent career doesn't suggest Leach was favouring him with promotion or special treatment. Damn but Leach was good, it would take a regular Poirot or Columbo to catch him out. Maybe you can put the big "A" on a scan of this 16:10 message to prove he was clever enough to remember to back up his previous lie on 10:29 with a further lie about an imaginary repair.

Or you could cut your losses and accept that Leach told the truth about the HA directors, and fall back on your other position.

All the best

wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

you are right :

So by the afternoon he was reporting : imaginary potential repairs to an unbroken starboard director.

That is exactly my point ... and what the dockyard experts reported in writings : NO repairs needed !

Now that director could have been really " jammed " despite PO J.Gaynor NOT reporting it while in there ... but surely NOT at the same time of the Compass Platform hit ... but later given the shell incoming direction, ... as well reported by the PoW damage report.

But I am sure you will explain me this additional Capt Leach " innocent incorrect mismatch " ... one of the many ...

May 24th radio message ... and the subsequent radio message and narrative leaves no doubt to this Officer real behavior.

I am sorry, ... but it is a proven fact, ... like " The Plot " for Wake-Walker ...

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hi Antonio,

Truly unsurpassed in cunning is Leach. He even says it may be possible for ship's staff to repair it......so there is nothing to find in the dockyard! Using Invisible Mending no doubt!

Why not just nip up there with a pair of cutters and generate a real fault? Probably couldn't get in the space because Clift was in there busily fixing things........... that weren't broken.

P O Gaynor should indeed have been able to see anything untoward. After all he reports seeing Hood blow up in his glasses when he was looking at Bismarck (fish eye lens binoculars 180 degree field of view?). But then PoW was to the "left of Hood" and PoW didn't start shooting until the range was under 15,000 yds. And Esmonde Knight was above him not below him. Oh and PoW hit Bismarck after Hood blew up. According to Gaynor. Duncan has summarised his evidence succinctly.

All the best

wadinga

[dunmunro]

@Dave: finally a good question in a thread that is becoming a nice display of desperate fantasies !

I would add : "was McMullen (as PoW guns director) aware of the 5,25" battery and fire direction status, when he sent the boy to Capt.Leach (at let's say 6:02, realizing that the ship was turning away) to tell him that "everything was fine" ?

McMullen would not have been involved or interested in 5.25in gunnery, except after the fact when writing his report as gunnery officer. His attention was directed exclusively on 14in gunnery direction. 5.25in salvos would have been recorded by a notetaker in the 5.25in HACP, probably a midshipman. Coordination between 14in and 5.25in gunnery would have happened in the Transmitting Station.

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Duncan: thanks for clarifying that the gunnery officer is unaware of the secondary armament status during an engagement.

However, don't you find a bit strange that no detail on the 5,25" shooting is recorded anywhere ?
Was it normal not to take care about the number of salvos and the exact number of expended shells for the secondary armament aboard a RN vessel ?

Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

if you explain to me what you mean with your request with a clear reference, than I maybe able to answer to you.

No problems.

I do understand typo and errors, but this do not apply at all to Capt Leach clear radio message sent at 08.00 am on May 24th, 1941.

The meaning of that message, the phrase sequences and the details written on it do provide a unique interpretation possible.

As I explained you above the only intent of it was to communicate a " proper " set of reasons for his retreat, to try to justify what he did using incorrect statements.

Sorry Duncan, ... you are NOT going to take Capt Leach out of his clear responsibilities once again with the excuse of errors done by somebody else writing a radio message.

They " saved " him on 1941, ... enough is enough, ... no more " cover up " is going to be accepted.

Remember that the British Admiralty/Churchill wanted to court martial Capt. J.C. Leach for what he did during that battle, ... and that request/decision in my opinion was mainly based on the radio messages they received being issued from PoW.

In fact, if you only put yourself into the Admiralty operation room receiving those radio messages, ... there is only one decision you can take, ... and you know it like I do that they were right about it, ... than the war propaganda needs have been considered a TOP priority and it was decided differently.

Bye Antonio

Antonio, I have tried to present to you the limitations of RN morse radio signalling. Instead you "... provide a unique interpretation..." of the signals to support a fantastical theory concerning Leach's criminal behaviour and his attempt at a cover up...rather than accept the much more mundane explanation, that there were transcription errors, errors in message sequencing (later corrected), and errors on board PoW in trying to piece together what actually happened and when.

Do you have any Admiralty documents detailing the list of charges prepared against Captain Leach? Do you have any evidence for possible charges against Leach other than Tovey's faded memories?