The Plot

[dunmunro]

Hi Duncan,

Dunmunro wrote: "So you state now that Suffolk saw 4 hits... There's no mention of 3 hits anywhere."

I posted the exact wording of Capt. Ellis. If you are annoyed by his book and desperately try to contradict it, please be precise. The words of Ellis are:

"He (the enemy) had 2 holes below water, and we had seen , we thought, two other 14 inch or 15 inch hits in the battleship action"

you wrote: "No mention of seeing any hits on Bismarck"

Your statement above is simply incorrect.
They saw hits on BS. I think (my interpretation) that he meant they saw the hit in the bow (2 holes UW) and they saw 2 other hits. In any case, seeing hits on BS means they were at 9 sm , for sure not 21 sm as per the "official documents" like "The Plot".

you wrote: "There's no indication of when Hood came into view and the the exact wording was "funnel tops and gun flashes""

Exactly a perfect match with Antonio's reconstructed distances. Another element contradicting "The Plot", according to which Hood should not be visible at all at 5:52.

"So now you accept that Norfolk was not visible from Suffolk "

I can accept it, possibly visibility in the direction of Norfolk did not allow to see her. Why ? Who knows. If you have ever been at sea, you know that visibility is not the same in all directions..... Light, mist, a fog bank or any other possible reason.

you wrote: " and was many thousands of yards outside of gun range from Bismarck?"

Not at all. If Norfolk was not visible, there was no way for Ellis to determine whether Norfolk was out of range, so his sentence means just that he thought that Norfolk was out of range.

We have already discussed Norfolk position, unfortunately for Wake-Walker. Here we are considering Suffolk position and Ellis account is quite clear:; 18000 yards at open fire (5:53, according to Suffolk).

Bye, Alberto

There was no mention on pages 11-12 of any hits being observed or any mention of PoW's salvos. Ellis does state that they were prepared to flank mark but then provides no indication that he actually remembered doing so. Ellis quotes extensively from his on report later on, probably because he just didn't remember events accurately enough, and it's obvious that he doesn't remember the Hood action in any detail.

On page 19 Ellis states that they thought they saw 2 hits on Bismarck in addition to two others.


Mirage effects are common in the Arctic:
http://www.islandnet.com/~see/weather/e ... upmrge.htm

and they can easily confuse the viewer as to the actual range. Ellis's account is just not consistent with what actually happened.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you are not going away with this .

Capt Ellis account is COMPLETELY different compared to his Official version.

It is different the action described, ... are you able to realize that instead of a turn back on retreat ... he stated that he was at FIRING RANGE closing in the enemy ready to flank mark while trying to contact Hood by radio to do it.

Can you realize the difference ?

Bye Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Duncan,

you wrote: "There was no mention on pages 11-12 of any hits"

I agree, the hits are mentioned at page 19 (irrelevant), but this is NOT what you wrote before :

you wrote before: "No mention of seeing any hits on Bismarck"

you wrote: "Ellis's account is just not consistent with what actually happened."

Ellis account is perfectly consistent with all the other evidences that point to the fact that "official documents" have been altered for the cover-up:
1) the PG radar measurement for Suffolk being at 9 sm from enemy at 5:30 against the official report (15 sm);
2) the perfect bearing match (from PoW, Norfolk and Germans) nailing Suffolk still very close to BS at 5:41;
3) the fact that from Suffolk they were able to see hits on BS (possible from 9 sm, not from 21 sm);
4) the suspicious "mirage" effect that affected only the British cruisers, the turn to north before even checking distance,after an "enemy in sight" signal;
5) the evidences of all the other "official" reports used to embellish the whole DS battle story (see PoW and Norfolk);

Ellis account is just completely inconsistent with an "official version" that has already proven incorrect. The most astonishing difference being the emphasis on the reasons why Suffolk did not open fire being in effective range.


Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga & Dunmunro,

your turn now to demonstrate the events on a map, ... and the " validity " of Pinchin 17 sea miles distance on " The Plot ".

Plot_evaluation_versus_reality.jpg (60.7 KiB) Viewed 904 times

No more words, ... references ... data ... and related explanations.


Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you are not going away with this .

Capt Ellis account is COMPLETELY different compared to his Official version.

It is different the action described, ... are you able to realize that instead of a turn back on retreat ... he stated that he was at FIRING RANGE closing in the enemy ready to flank mark while trying to contact Hood by radio to do it.

Can you realize the difference ?

Bye Antonio

Ellis's account is typical of an old man whose memory is failing, and it's not surprising that his memories were hazy because he got very little sleep over a ~10 day period.

Ellis seems to have tried to understand why he didn't open fire when he had a memory of Bismarck being close to Suffolk, but that memory was false. He simply didn't remember the turn away at 0542, which put him much further from Bismarck than he remembered.

But think about it for a minute. Ellis states that he was prepared to flank mark and tried to raise Hood on the radio, but since he didn't receive any radio reply why didn't he open fire? Why not open fire when Hood blew up? On pages 14-15 Ellis implies that Suffolk scored a 3rd salvo hit on Bismarck (with a 3rd salvo straddle) at 1842-1855 at a gun range of 21125 yds. Ellis's earlier remarks about 4 guns being ineffective at 18k yds makes no sense at all. If Suffolk was at 18k yards, she would have represented a deadly threat to PE and could have easily hit Bismarck with accurate radar ranging. However Ellis account of the battle does make sense if she was much further away as she could have indicated when the battleship's fire was accurate for range, even if she couldn't spot for line.

There's no way that W-W could have ordered Suffolk not to open fire and Suffolk's failure to do so makes no sense, especially when she did open fire at ~0620 when she believed she was in effective run range.

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,
.

Capt Ellis account is COMPLETELY different compared to his Official version.

I take it that someone showed you Ellis's account?

In any event it is not completely different, but his memoirs do show that his memory was failing.

[A Raven]

As someone who corresponded with him in the nineteen sixties, he stated that his memory of many of the details of the affair ...... AS THEY HAPPENED ..... WERE HAZY. This was due to the stress of the events AS THEY WERE HAPPENING, coupled with lack of sleep. Apparently this also applied to a number of the officers and crew. Something to note; he wrote that, when one is ACTUALLY being fired at, especially by a battleship, one tends to NOT to be aware of other things. This leads to differences between accounts, something that is NORMAL.

This message is submitted at 1.47 EST on the 25th.

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you are not going away with this :negative: .

Capt Ellis account is COMPLETELY different compared to his Official version.

It is different the action described, ... are you able to realize that instead of a turn back on retreat ... he stated that he was at FIRING RANGE closing in the enemy ready to flank mark while trying to contact Hood by radio to do it.

Can you realize the difference ?

Bye Antonio :D

Ellis's account is typical of an old man whose memory is failing, and it's not surprising that his memories were hazy because he got very little sleep over a ~10 day period.

Ellis seems to have tried to understand why he didn't open fire when he had a memory of Bismarck being close to Suffolk, but that memory was false. He simply didn't remember the turn away at 0542, which put him much further from Bismarck than he remembered.

But think about it for a minute. Ellis states that he was prepared to flank mark and tried to raise Hood on the radio, but since he didn't receive any radio reply why didn't he open fire? Why not open fire when Hood blew up? On pages 14-15 Ellis implies that Suffolk scored a 3rd salvo hit on Bismarck (with a 3rd salvo straddle) at 1842-1855 at a gun range of 21125 yds. Ellis's earlier remarks about 4 guns being ineffective at 18k yds makes no sense at all. If Suffolk was at 18k yards, she would have represented a deadly threat to PE and could have easily hit Bismarck with accurate radar ranging. However Ellis account of the battle does make sense if she was much further away as she could have indicated when the battleship's fire was accurate for range, even if she couldn't spot for line.

There's no way that W-W could have ordered Suffolk not to open fire and Suffolk's failure to do so makes no sense, especially when she did open fire at ~0620 when she believed she was in effective run range.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

when I state something about a document, ... be sure that I know what I am talking about, ... otherwise I will wait to have it before use it as reference.

The question on the table here is very simple.

Capt Ellis declared years after the event a complete different situation compared to what he declared and signed to the second board of inquiry.
He was in full control of himself, ... it is enough to read is account.
So please do not even try to talk about memory or dementia now, so clear and sharp it is.

His memory was more than OK, he simply wanted to state a different story for obvious reasons.

This is confirmed by the fact that for the afternoon action he still used the official report on his autobiography book.

This said, it should be not so difficult to realize that it means that the morning war time second board declaration was incorrect.

This fact adds up a very solid additional confirmation to the many " Cover Up " evidence I already have discovered and Alberto listed in summary lately.

The reason why he did not open fire is explained by Capt Ellis himself on his account.
It was not his intention to confuse the Hood and PoW spotting with his 4 forward guns.

Those are the statements he used :

... would have been relatively ineffective, .... would certainly have confused the battleship's spotting.

He is underlining several times that the Suffolk " tactical function " was to follow and do the flank mark, ... pending the outcome of the " main action ".

And on he goes with the explanation of the training importance of the flank marking ... and why it was not done in war time until that moment ... until his last statement of the importance of that training between squadrons ( cruisers ) and fleet ( battleships ).

So, as you can see, a very sharp analysis of the situation he found himself into that morning ... with vivid and clear memory, ... and a sharp and logic reasoning capability.

Now the J'ACCUSE is out and available ... and the " Cover Up " clearly demonstrated.

Once this is translated into a map considering the new parameters, it results on a perfect match of distances and bearings as I showed you.


Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

As someone who corresponded with him in the nineteen sixties, he stated that his memory of many of the details of the affair ...... AS THEY HAPPENED ..... WERE HAZY. This was due to the stress of the events AS THEY WERE HAPPENING, coupled with lack of sleep. Apparently this also applied to a number of the officers and crew. Something to note; he wrote that, when one is ACTUALLY being fired at, especially by a battleship, one tends to NOT to be aware of other things. This leads to differences between accounts, something that is NORMAL.

This message is submitted at 1.47 EST on the 25th.



[

Mr Raven, thanks.

It is rather distressing to me to have to be critical of someone like Captain Ellis, who had great integrity and was picked out for important tasks not long after the Bismarck operation.

I'm certain that if Ellis or anyone else involved in the Bismarck operation had been ordered to falsify reports that they would have refused to do so, and in that they would have been supported by the laws governing the conduct of the RN. However, as we all know, the Admiralty was always free to concoct a cover story, if they wished to, without altering any the action ship's reports. In any event if Ellis really was ordered to falsify a report, then by the mid 1970s, while retired in the USA, he was certainly free to have stated it directly. It is just a fact that memoirs often differ from reports written at the time. I am not getting any younger either, and when I compare my memories of the same event, 30 or 40 years ago, with my siblings or friends we all end up telling a different version of the same event.


It also unfortunate that Antonio has chosen to claim that the RN falsified reports when trying to resolve differences between accounts. The bearings and range reported by PE at 0541 is interesting and worth exploring in conjunction with Ellis's Official Narrative, along with the ranges reported by Norfolk. Even if Antonio doesn't believe these are correct, it is worth fitting them together to see what it looks like.

I wish that Antonio would write his history taking the RN reports to be truthful, and then if he wishes, add in a final chapter outlining his conspiracy theory and his rational for it.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hello everybody,
I do agree that memory is not getting better with age.... This is out of question.

However, here we are not speaking of some minor details not matching.
Here we have someone writing his autobiography (and still we have to understand when exactly this chapter was written......), who has his "official report" in front of him, using its same wording to describe the evening engagement (page 13) but ignoring it for the battle (pages 11-12). This is clearly intentional, as well as the clear explanation of the reason why he did not open fire being in effective gun range during the battleships engagement.

This is not a matter of memory, it's a completely different story told against the official one.

Therefore, I'm afraid, the "innocent" explanation of the "poor old man" can't be accepted.
IMHO there are only 2 options:
1) Ellis official report is wrong (as demonstrated already by all the other evidences listed in my above posts, like radar measurements and relative bearing....) and therefore he was asked to submit an "adjusted" report (in line with all the other "incorrect" official ones produced after the end of May 41).
2) Ellis was intentionally lying when writing his autobiography as he was lately trying to sell a different, better story for himself (I personally don't think so).

Your choice........

Bye, Alberto

[A Raven]

The point that I was trying to make with his letter, was ..... at the time that the events were taking place while he was on the bridge .... his attention was often elsewhere, due to stress, lack of sleep, actually being under fire etc. He stated that he could NOT remember many events AS THEY WERE HAPPENING!
One should also bear in mind, the fact that he wrote up the report, not at the time, but days later, and had to rely on other people for the necessary information. No wonder there were mistakes. This is something that 'others' cannot/will not understand.
There is NO evidence of a cover-up, except for those that wish to find it.
Do you know by using English and /or European law, if it is possible to bring an action for defamation, even though the person being defamed is deceased? In this instance, it would be for libel.

This message is submitted at 8,03am EST on the 26th.

As someone who corresponded with him in the nineteen sixties, he stated that his memory of many of the details of the affair ...... AS THEY HAPPENED ..... WERE HAZY. This was due to the stress of the events AS THEY WERE HAPPENING, coupled with lack of sleep. Apparently this also applied to a number of the officers and crew. Something to note; he wrote that, when one is ACTUALLY being fired at, especially by a battleship, one tends to NOT to be aware of other things. This leads to differences between accounts, something that is NORMAL.

This message is submitted at 1.47 EST on the 25th.



[

Mr Raven, thanks.

It is rather distressing to me to have to be critical of someone like Captain Ellis, who had great integrity and was picked out for important tasks not long after the Bismarck operation.

I'm certain that if Ellis or anyone else involved in the Bismarck operation had been ordered to falsify reports that they would have refused to do so, and in that they would have been supported by the laws governing the conduct of the RN. However, as we all know, the Admiralty was always free to concoct a cover story, if they wished to, without altering any the action ship's reports. In any event if Ellis really was ordered to falsify a report, then by the mid 1970s, while retired in the USA, he was certainly free to have stated it directly. It is just a fact that memoirs often differ from reports written at the time. I am not getting any younger either, and when I compare my memories of the same event, 30 or 40 years ago, with my siblings or friends we all end up telling a different version of the same event.


It also unfortunate that Antonio has chosen to claim that the RN falsified reports when trying to resolve differences between accounts. The bearings and range reported by PE at 0541 is interesting and worth exploring in conjunction with Ellis's Official Narrative, along with the ranges reported by Norfolk. Even if Antonio doesn't believe these are correct, it is worth fitting them together to see what it looks like.

I wish that Antonio would write his history taking the RN reports to be truthful, and then if he wishes, add in a final chapter outlining his conspiracy theory and his rational for it.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Mr. Raven,

you wrote: "There is NO evidence of a cover-up, except for those that wish to find it."

This is just your (respectable) opinion.
All the points I have listed in the previous posts are nailing Suffolk at 9 sm from enemy.
If you prefer to believe to the funny story of the "mirage" (that never affected Germans....), if you want to ignore the cross-bearings taken from the different ships, if you choose to discard the PG radar measurement of 176 hectometers, if you consider seriously that it was possible to see the hits on Bismarck from 21 sm, if you trust what was written after the end of May in the "official" reports, it's your choice.

We have here, with Ellis account, a too clear "j'accuse" that confirms what was already evident: the official version of facts on May 24, 1941 has been embellished for war time propaganda reasons .

Ellis was not loosing his memory as he had in front of him (and used in the account of the evening battle and then after too) his "official report". He did not use it however for the DS battle and, instead, he gave his own version of facts, clearly explaining the reason why he did not open fire from 18000 yards.



Last but not least,

you wrote: "Do you know by using English and /or European law, if it is possible to bring an action for defamation, even though the person being defamed is deceased? In this instance, it would be for libel."

I don't even take into consideration this miserable threat of yours: we are here trying (in a hot, sarcastic, passionate, but respectful way) to reconstruct and evaluate from a military viewpoint an historical fact, not to injury anybody nor to intimidate other people. You must be really without any argument, if you bring yourself down to this level..... and your attitude is the best demonstration that what Ellis wrote in his autobiography is simply true.


Bye, Alberto

[Bill Jurens]

Before concluding with any certainty that the discrepancies and irregularities in the action(s) of 24 May may be ascribed to a 'cover-up', it would, be necessary -- or at least highly desirable -- to show, by actual demonstration, that similar levels of discrepancy and disagreement are not present in other contemporary naval actions, e.g. the encounter between British cruisers and Graf Spee, or the sinking of H.M.S. Glorious, where, presumably, no 'cover-ups' -- at least cover ups of tactical issues -- took place.

The basic principle is that proving a thesis really involves two steps, first proving that ones hypothesis is correct, and secondly proving that plausible alternative hypotheses must be wrong.

Bill Jurens

[wadinga]

All,

Alberto has stated:

if you choose to discard the PG radar measurement of 176 hectometers,

Eveybody should discard it because:

On port – almost abeam – are two, and then three smoke trails coming into view, and they appear to be coming rapidly closer.
As we are now informed, the Commander had requested, at 0430, that a semaphore signal be made to the chief of staff of the fleet:
“Commander to Chief: one each smoke trail, true bearings 96 and 157 degrees. True bearing 15 degrees an additional mast. Distance 17,600 meters.” [rechtweisend = true bearing]
This is indeed the enemy. These are unquestionably English warships which are approaching at flank speed!
The blue eyes of the 1st artillery officer flash:

This wording has no mention of radar usage. So:

1) the PG radar measurement for Suffolk being at 9 sm from enemy at 5:30 against the official report (15 sm);

is imaginary.

A vague, disorganised, imprecisely-timed account by Busch has been presented as being as reliable as the PG KTB.

The Baron, who is supposed to be monitoring Suffolk's movements and is in charge of Bismarck's after range measuring facilities somehow never notices she has astonishingly closed the range by nearly one half.

As for creating alternate maps to Antonio's hypothesis, this is impossible without access to those elements of information he continues to withold. Like Suffolk's speed. Time to go to the PRO.

All the best

wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

you wrote :

As for creating alternate maps to Antonio's hypothesis, this is impossible without access to those elements of information he continues to withold. Like Suffolk's speed. Time to go to the PRO.

Probably you do not like anymore now to rely on Capt Ellis Official report, because the Suffolk speed is clearly stated in there :

0550 (B). Suffolk's course 220°, 29 knots, following the enemy.

Please go to the PRO and start collecting the information I have used to create my analysis of those events, ... but meanwhile why you do not just take the time to realize and finally admit " The Plot " being an incorrect document ?

Unless you are dreaming to find out that Suffolk was sailing at around 22 knots ... you will be never in condition to respect the 04.47 radio declared position from the enemy and the 17 sea miles from the Bismarck at 05.41 that " The Plot " shows.

It is enough to take a ruler to realize it : are you able to do it ? ... and consequently satisfy Bill Jurens request as far as : " ... proving that plausible alternative hypotheses must be wrong. "

Or do I need to show it myself ... just tell me ...

@ Bill Jurens :

I agree with you and we have positive answers to both your statements :

1) We do have Churchill guidelines to the Admiralty about changing the events when needed for propaganda reasons.
Additionally you very properly are referring to the HMS Glorious case, were the " Cover Up " is well known about several arguments, like the real reason for the Glorious come back as well as the Devonshire distance.
I can anticipate you that I am going to work on Cape Matapan after DS, ... and it looks the same as far as " Cover up " of some events ...

2) I have widely proved my hypothesis being correct, both for the 15 sea miles distance, since " The Plot " is clearly an incorrect document made with incorrect tracks for Hood/PoW and enlarged relative distances not respecting several available bearings, ... as well as for the 06.13 of PoW retreat, ... confirmed being incorrect by the Royal Navy Admiralty itself on 1948.
Not to talk about many other evidence, ... among the ones Capt Ellis last found autobiography is a loud and clear evidence of the " Cover Up " occurred.

So, now it is the turn of the ones that like to prove " The Plot " being a correct document to show us how it is possible to accept it, ... and how it is possible to refute the 06.13 correction of Adm Tovey July 1941 declaration, done by the Royal Navy Admiralty on the Battle Summary number 5.
Then it will be the turn of Capt Ellis autobiography to be explained ... versus his own 1941 first declaration.

I am here waiting for their explanations now ... my hypothesis is out well supported ...even by a direct declaration by one of the 4 key Officer involved.

Somebody else turn now to try to explain me how it went ...

@ Alberto,

well done my friend

Bye Antonio