The Plot

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Bill Jurens,

There has been a lot of discussion here on whether or not "The Plot" is incorrect. Of course it's incorrect. The technology of the time simply did not permit more precision than shown, and -- perhaps more importantly -- it is clear from the full transcript of the Board hearings that it was considered only of general interest to begin with. The purpose of the Board(s) was not to reconstruct the tactical development of the Bismarck Chase, it was to determine the cause of the loss of HMS Hood. In that regard, nobody really cared about the exact positions of ships much prior to the action -- it was not of real concern because clearly the British tactical maneuvers were able to keep track of Bismarck's position during the time leading up to the engagement, and that was really the important thing. Contact was obtained and maintained so that Hood and POW could arrange an interception. The details of previous activity, though of auxiliary interest, were not of primary concern.

In that regard, my guess was that Pinchin, and perhaps a few others were given the task of quickly putting together some sort of rough plot which would give the members of the Board some sort of perspective on how the tactical situation developed, in fairly broad terms, before the engagement began, and to present some idea of where, approximately, various observers of the explosion, etc. were likely to have been. In that regard, it's not surprising that The Plot did not match actual testimony exactly -- it just wasn't seen to be more than a rough general guideline in the first place. There was no need to produce a complete and accurate plot because there were, apparently, no significant problems taking place during the hours leading up to the final action, i.e. the British forces engaged, by whatever means, clearly had been doing their job of shadowing properly. The precise details of exactly HOW they were shadowing were simply not of interest.

Bill Jurens.

Bill, even if we assume for a moment that the Hood First board of inquiry statement of Norfolk evidence was not clear enough to define the HMS Norfolk distance from the HMS Hood at 06.00, ... don't you think that by the simple use of the 2 tactical plots of the HMS Suffolk and HMS Norfolk were going to be more than enough to satisfy any new need of the Hood Second board of Inquiry ?

Surely they were going to provide the absolute real situation evaluated by the 2 heavy cruisers on that precise moment, ... like the one's of PoW I have copied in Kew-PRO do show ... with no doubts.

Not having the need to evaluate the whole action, ... but just a snapshot of the real distance at 06.00, ... I was going to ask for the tactical plot of that moment or the gunnery reports if available ( like Schmundt asked to Brinkmann when he judged badly the PG battle map ), ... not for a redone battle map showing all the approach to the battle.

We all agree now that " The Plot " is incorrect, ... and who received/accepted it did incorrect evaluations too.

What about this bearing re-construction between 05.35-05.43 ?
NOTE : It is done utilizing the available information on that timeframe from several sources.

I like to have your evaluation of it, ... since I know you are good about battle maps, ...

Reference_01.jpg (50.27 KiB) Viewed 1115 times

... and thanks in advance.

Bye Antonio

[Bill Jurens]

@Antonio

Hello Antonio.

Thanks for the map. It's difficult (at least for me) to evaluate, as although it contains directions, i.e. azimuths, there is no scale. Also, as the time "window" you associate with it is about eight minutes long, and ships moving at 30 knots or so can move 4000 yards or so during that sort of interval, positions really cannot be specified by dots. One might attempt to approximate positions with lines or with ellipses with a major axis of about 4000 yards, assuming that courses were held steady during that eight minute period.

As I've said before, it's my general impression reading the inquiry transcripts, etc., that the general position of ships fifteen minutes or so prior to the commencement of the main action was not really considered very important, so not a lot of effort was put into trying to iron out every little discrepancy in the various reports available. My suspicion is that Pinchin was given the job of putting something reasonably plausible together quite quickly, and did so. If errors or discrepancies showed up, and they were important enough to mention, it appears that some witnesses, after seeing the Pinchin Plot re-evaluated their distances etc. somewhat; the tone (or at least the phrasing) of the various answers does not suggest that anyone was taking the discrepancies very seriously at all. The important thing, at least to the Boards, was not exactly where one was fifteen minutes prior to open fire, but approximately -- and the emphasis here is on approximately -- where observers were during the engagement itself, this primarily to determine what was likely visible and what was not, i.e. to attempt to weed out observations that -- although sincerely perceived -- were not actually plausible. It seems clear to me that mirage effects did cause some rather odd results, with some people seeing things that should have been, technically at least, invisible, and others not seeing things that should have been fairly clear.

The best possible approach at this point might be to take the observations to a professional surveyor who can enter all of the various and sundry observations of distances and bearings into a 'least squares' computer program. This technique, which is now fairly routine in figuring out discrepant observations and measurements in cadastral work, is usually pretty good in sorting out errors vs blunders, and should be able to create a best fit solution to the remaining observations based on objective statistical techniques.

I'm afraid I must consider Ellis' comments, written long after the fact, with considerable skepticism. Old sailors (and soldiers for that matter) especially if they feel their chances of being 'caught-out' are minimal, quite often elaborate a bit -- sometimes quite a lot -- in order to exaggerate their participation in any given engagement, etc. A good sea story is better than mundane history. The classic example of that, of course, lies in Ludovic Kennedy's descriptions of the sinking of Bismarck, where he waxes poetic about observing survivors jumping off Bismarck as she began to sink, when it seems fairly clear that his ship was, at the time this would have actually been taking place, much too far away to have rendered this possible. Along similar lines, I think there's a good chance that a good part of Ellis' account is somewhat imaginary.

I'd concur with others that the cruisers, etc. didn't engage because they were under orders, explicit or otherwise, basically not to engage and in a sense 'get in the way' of the bigger ships. I'd also suggest that had there been some sort of actual fiasco during the Hood/Bismarck engagement, there would have been -- regardless of awards given afterwards -- a fairly detailed, though probably secret or confidential 'wash up' afterwards to determine exactly what had gone wrong and why. Smart guys -- and the Royal Navy had a lot of smart guys around at the time -- may lie to the public, but they don't lie to themselves. It's unlikely a court martial would have taken place in any case, even if one or more RN officers had performed badly; court martials are usually intended to punish crimes, not to punish stupidity or poor judgement. That's done by simply slowing or halting the promotion process, or transferring the person of interest to another area where different skills are required. In any case, awarding medals and decorations is not usually of much practical importance; often (though not always) it's just something that military organizations do, as a sort of self-congratulatory process.

I honestly don't think there's much chance that there was any substantive conspiracy or cover up in the Denmark Strait action, on either side. Had cowardice been exhibited by any senior British officers, that would have been noticed by others, and spread like wildfire below decks. Cowardice is, in effect, an expression of poor leadership, and leadership is very important -- the crew(s) must have total confidence in the fellows in charge if morale is to be high and they are to perform well (if at all) in action. The fact that nobody on the 'lower decks' in P.O.W. (or, for that matter, in any of the other accompanying ships) seems to have suggested that anyone in command was exhibiting cowardly behaviour is -- at least in my opinion -- a fairly strong, though admittedly indirect, bit of evidence that none of significance took place.

My suspicion is that Churchill, and perhaps some others, may have gone through ill-advised and fairly private 'rants' after learning that Hood had been sunk and Prince of Wales had had her nose badly bloodied with little apparent damage delivered in return at Denmark Strait. After a bit more information came in, it quickly became clear that first impressions might have been misleading, and that snap judgements were probably inappropriate, and the whole problem went away. That being said, some information probably did leak downward. One might make a case, in fact, that the awards issued to British commanders after Denmark Strait represented not so much as a cover up, as an indirect apology from those 'higher up'.

Bill Jurens

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Bill Jurens,

Thanks for your prompt and usual wise answer.

I agree with you that the real position of the 2 heavy cruisers before and even during the engagement was not so important for the Hood Second Board of Inquiry, otherwise a direct question was going to be asked to every crew witness and especially to the warship Captain’s and this was not done.

Capt Phillips confirmation of what he saw and showed to Wake-Walker was eliminated by the mirage effect applied to Norfolk as well as to Suffolk. They just wanted to take that map and do what they did for everybody satisfaction, especially Wake-Walker that at the end, was the only one who took an evident benefit from it, otherwise any average Royal Navy Officer was going to catch immediately the many errors Pinchin plot clearly shows.

I like very much your evaluation that : “ Court martials are usually intended to punish crimes, not to punish stupidity or poor judgement “. I think this apply in particular to this case.

Churchill fired up during the chase and wanted to pursue after the responsible of DS disaster, but after Bismarck was sunk things changed completely, evaluating the advantages and disadvantages it was obvious that a court martial was a negative occurrence for England on autumn 1941, so they forgot about it and went for the decorations, for the self-congratulatory process as you properly stated.

Regarding Ellis my opinion is that he wanted to declare and explain what he really lived before he died.
He was evidently not feeling good not telling the truth while he surely was not feeling responsible for anything he did not do it, especially the missed open fire while at effective range. So that is the reason why he wanted to explain it to all in details with his own words and supporting reasons for it.

No one on Norfolk and Suffolk intended to engage at first at DS, and like Ellis wrote the battle was too short to enable anything after Hood explosion. This is the reason why everybody was not feeling any direct responsibility for what happened, they were there ready to shadow and do flank marking, and it was not their fault the fact that Hood exploded. After what they could do about it? Nothing really, PoW was damaged and retiring and the heavy cruiser duty was to shadow the enemy, not to engage a battleship.
This is basically what Wake-Walker explained to the Admiralty in the afternoon, when they asked him to re-engage the enemy.
For PoW it was different, in fact in Scapa Flow she was renamed the coward ship, and this just follows the logic you explained above and I agree with.

I fully agree with you when you state that Royal Navy was full of smart guys, and they realized what happened in every small detail, learning the lesson, I have never had any doubt about it.

As I said already, no conspiracy, but a cover up, to embellish the story, avoid any possible inquiry, and this is the reason why they had to change the Hood First board Norfolk evidence of 20.000 yards, otherwise it was due, and sell a good story to the King for the overall planned rewarding otherwise not possible for them like for everybody else on the other warships involved on the Bismarck action.

Regarding my above map, here the one I made on September 2014, a year ago, with the distances and a reference time at 05.35.

0535_ref_PoW_plan4_07.jpg (62.27 KiB) Viewed 1073 times

Why I removed the distances and the 05.35 time?

Only because both the distances as well as the timing now can have a minor revision after having read more carefully F.O. Busch ( 1943 and 1958 version ) , Schmalenbach, Jasper and the PG KTB.

Anyhow it is good enough to have a clear idea of where the Norfolk and Suffolk really where before the DS battle started.

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hello All,

Well I don't think any reasonable person would disagree with anything Bill Jurens has said in two comprehensive posts, realistically assessing the purpose of the Plot, its limitations given the information and time available to its draftsman, and his probable motives in creating it.

However reasonable people don't take few minor inconsistencies and confabulate a gigantic Conspiracy instigated by the mendacious British Establishment and maintained unbreached to this day, and ignore or contradict all the plentiful evidence denying such a thing ever existed.

Once again we are presented with The Polygon of Perfidy, created using various bearings some real reported visual values and some of extrememly doubtful provenance including

Despite that, he was unable to connect the bearings D/x and D/y to Suffolk track and used inconsistent speeds....

Not only do we not know what they are, we don't even know what they are called. There is obviously no reference to them in either cruiser's Log or presumably on the Strategical maps since such evidence would have been presented if it had existed, and the relevant sections of these documents have been witheld from the doubters to maintain the diminishing pretence that they refer to M/F D/F bearings which would anyway be of very limited resolution.

The "scoop" presented by Captain Ellis' unpublished, and therefore non-independently verified autobiography provokes observations thus

(of course Ellis autobiography categorically denies this turn

except it doesn't. The claim has recently been voluntarily downgraded to to implicitly denies.

It would appear that this autobiography does not actually deny or even refer to any part of Ellis' submitted official Report. It has been mispresented as a guilty man unburdening himself, but does Ellis actually say this? We would surely have the words by now if he did. Bill Jurens' explanation is far more reasonable and believable.

Antonio, please abandon this attempt to promote this imaginary construct and assist us to get closer to reality by reproducing the Strategical Maps in your possession.

All the best

wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

Sean, you come in from time to time, ... but with only one clear intent apparently ...

Bill is skeptical about Capt Ellis autobiography, ... and I respect a wise and very competent person opinion.

I am not so skeptical about Capt Ellis autobiography simply because it matches with the reality one can realize from several maps and inputs, ... mostly with the reality.

It is a fact that once you have the Suffolk sailing at around 30 knots following the enemy at around 27 knots, ... like should be obvious even to you at this point, ... than the Suffolk ends up at 05.41 more or less where I have positioned her on my maps.

You can discuss one sea mile back and forth, ... but surely Suffolk will NOT be where Pinchin placed her backing her up from the D/F ( direction finding ) position available on the plot itself at 05.41, .. which has been left on the water by Pinchin.
The same bearing ( 318°-320°) is available on the Norfolk strategical map, ... as well as on PoW maps.

So, please do not try to easily disregard " The Plot " D/F ( thanking Marc for having decoded that letter ), ... and the confirmation of that bearing on other maps, ... as well as you should not disregard Capt Ellis autobiography, ... because those are real facts, ... not my personal invention.

Lets make a summary now on where do we stand.

Plot_evaluation_versus_reality_703.jpg (70.49 KiB) Viewed 1031 times

We have the 04.47 position reproduced with 184° and 15 sea miles distance.
We have the tracks run by the German squadron as well as by Suffolk.
We have the 05.41 triangle of bearings defined.

Keeping the usual tolerances and minor modifications we can always make, the scenario is this one, surely NOT the one depicted by Pinchin with " The Plot" placing the Suffolk at 17 sea miles from the enemy having sailed at 24 knots only.

Everyone can easily realize by comparison on the above map what Pinchin did, moving back the Suffolk track and the Norfolk one, enlarging the battlefield NOT respecting available cross detected bearings, ... and keeping only some direct bearings to the enemy.

Suffolk will end up at 05.41 between 9 to 11 sea miles from the enemy, ... no doubts, ... and those are measurable facts Sean.

Pinchin made an incorrect plot and we have all agreed about it, ... the Hood Second Board of Inquiry changed Norfolk evidence and defined the Suffolk ones based on a wrong plot inputs, ... and this is another proved fact now.

We just need to realize better if Pinchin did it for incompetency or intentionally as it seems to me.

I invite you or anybody else that wants to sustain a different scenario at 05.41, ... to show it to us all now.

It is after 05.41 that Capt Ellis autobiography comes in with all is importance, ... not before.

From 04.47 until 05.41 it is enough to reproduce the reality with good tolerances as I did to realize where do we stand and where the Suffolk and Norfolk where that morning compared to the enemy.

Bye Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

Wadinga wrote: "It would appear that this autobiography does not actually deny or even refer to any part of Ellis' submitted official Report. "

Hi Sean,
I really admire your vain attempt to discredit all the evidences that things did NOT go as the official version still tells us since 70+ years......
Had the 3 involved RN officers been so determined to stop the BS at any cost, we would have assisted to a very different battle.

However, have you actually read Ellis DS chapter, BEFORE speaking about it and speculating about the "poor old sailor" funny story ?
I already said that for DS he provides a quite precise distance measurement (18000 yards) and explain why, being in effective gun range, he decided not to open fire. This is the exact OPPOSITE of his "official report"
However, in the very following page, describing the evening engagement, he copied/pasted his "action report" (the "official report" he submitted).
Therefore, he had his "official report" in front of him and intentionally decided to (implicitly, but very clealry) )DENY it for the main battle at DS.

Bye, Alberto

[Cag]

Hi All,
I think after reading Mr Jurens post, someone that major TV companies etc have asked for help with regards to research as well as a renowned author in his own right, and I do apologise to Antonio and Alberto, but I am still finding it hard to see any willfull intent for a cover up theory at the moment. It does seem that it was not in the remit of Pinchin et al to produce an exact battle map and the inherant errors in the 'Plot' are there to see, and which are not unexpected and I'm affraid this applies to witness testimony also. Obviously we are not party to any discussions that took place between the 1st and 2nd boards or what deliberations were made as regards the plot itself especially when the positional error of HMS Suffolk was inevitably discovered. I would suggest that any bearings or distances used to create a new map should be regarded with a +/- measurement incorporated, I would love to see Antonio create a map that would win him the plaudits he would deserve, despite the differing opinions as regards a cover up. If I can be of help in any way it would be a pleasure to contribute in any small way. I think the 'D' lines on the plot are D/F bearings (Old style 'F') but whether they are Suffolk to Norfolk or vice versa I'm not sure (I don't think Suffolk signalled at 0536 or 0541) as Suffolk signals went out at 0522 0533 0538 and then at 0629 according to her narrative, but again this all depends on time of signal/receipt and all those problems. Norfolk's log does state that at 0550 BCS 1 was sighted approx bearing 220 degrees approx distance of 14 nm, might it be an idea to try work back from the track of Hood and PoW?
I realise that my opinion is small when weighed against other more noteworthy contributors but would like to take the opportunity to add my thanks to Mr Jurens for his sound and wise judgement.
Cag.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Cag,

first of all welcome on this board as a member, and I hope that you will have some fun like we do.

This said, before talking about " The Plot ", ... let me make it simple about the " Cover Up " done for good propaganda reasons during war time that enabled the needed positive propaganda with the King recognitions.

I maybe be too obvious about my conclusions, but since the 06.13 for PoW retreat has been declared wrong by the Admiralty on 1948 and everybody here has agreed that " The Plot " by Pinchin is an incorrect map and shows incorrect distances, ... so that the 15 sea miles between Norfolk and Hood are incorrect as well as the 17 sea miles between Suffolk and Bismarck ... like everybody should have realized by now, ... well guys the only possible conclusion here is that the " Cover Up " done by Adm Tovey with his points 17 and 19 on his dispatches is already well demonstrated.

I really do not see how you guys can try to refute what has been done now : both 06.13 for PoW as well as the famous 15 sea miles distance for Norfolk and Suffolk are wrong.

Now you can only refute this being done intentionally, ... and still tell me it happened because of incompetence, ... but you cannot state anymore that it never happened.

It happened and Adm Tovey wrote incorrect statements.

I have my personal opinion about it, ... and you can keep your one, ... and I am ok with it, ... for me the case is closed.

Moving on " The Plot " ... here you are making a very interesting point, I mean :

I think the 'D' lines on the plot are D/F bearings (Old style 'F') but whether they are Suffolk to Norfolk or vice versa I'm not sure (I don't think Suffolk signaled at 0536 or 0541) as Suffolk signals went out at 0522 0533 0538 and then at 0629 according to her narrative, but again this all depends on time of signal/receipt and all those problems.

The 05.33 Suffolk radio emission signal enabled the 05.36 D/F bearing from Norfolk ... and after the 05.38 enabled the 05.40-41 one, ... where it is obvious that Norfolk was getting the bearing of the Suffolk radio on transmission, ... first the bearing ( D/F ) and after probably the calibration ( D/c).

This bearing available on at least 3 maps ... is the crucial factor to determine as best as possible both Suffolk and Norfolk relative to each other positions ... as well as versus the enemy ... since on the same time we have Norfolk enemy report at 05.41 with the relative bearing of 276°.

I have already analyzed the 05.50 Norfolk war diary entry of 220° and 14 sea miles from Hood, ... and it does once again demonstrate " The Plot " being incorrect and the Norfolk being closer than 15 sea miles from Hood at 06.00.

So, bottom line, ... slowly the pieces are going all on the proper places ... and YES, you will see my map but not so soon as you probably would like it to be ... since I have decided to publish it at first on my future Bismarck book's series, ... after the Tirpitz one's that are now on release, with the second book out of 5 planned for Tirpitz.

So plenty of time to keep on having fun and make it better ... with everybody help and positive contribution ... and at the end we can leave for the posterity a good enough history research and battle map ... hopefully.

Thanks for your usual nice words, ...

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hello All,

Cag (welcome aboard) makes a good point that the spurious D lines do not actually coincide with Suffolk transmissions. We have already observed that M/F D/F will be much more inaccurate for bearing than H/F D/F which Norfolk did not have.

In another thread Alberto has again said

the PG radar measurement (17600 meters),

Once again there is no evidence whatsoever of a PG radar measurement. You must stop saying things you know are incorrect, unless you have real evidence and not just your opinion. In fact the English language version of the book The Story of the Prince Eugen omits the value altogether. Maybe Busch reviewed his action notes and realised he was talking twaddle, how could a ship only 9 miles away be referred to as "a mast"?

I have not had the opportunity to read Ellis' unpublished, uncorroberated, unreviewed,autobiography, but the evidence you who have read it, are unable to supply speaks volumes. His 18,000 yd story is a parallel universe of what Ellis theoretically should have done if he had been close enough to do so. But he clearly wasn't.

We can pull the witness acounts from those in his fire-control team idly watching at far beyond gunnery range. If Suffolk had been at 18,000 yds they would have been locked on target.

All the best

wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

I know you do not like the 05.41 bearing of 319° between Norfolk and Suffolk.

Unfortunately for you it is correct, ... it is showed on 3 maps, ... and closes the matter once for good about the distances.

There is simply nothing you can do about it, ... because it does correspond to the point where Suffolk should be at 05.41.

You cannot invent any " mirage " now, any " memory stuff ", any " old sailor " with dementia, any " typo " error ... nothing.

Bye Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

Wadinga wrote: "Once again there is no evidence whatsoever of a PG radar measurement."

Hi Sean,
F. O. Busch do say 176 hectometers, bearing 15 in his 1943 book. and if you think that 17600 meters is a guess-estimate.....
But you are right, in his post-war account, he omitted the third ship, possibly influenced by...... Adm. Tovey incorrect statement of 15sm already published.....

you wrote: "Ellis' unpublished, uncorroberated, unreviewed,autobiography"

I see that you are terribly annoyed by Capt.Ellis account, and you have to be.

The story told by the Captain of one of the involved ships is clear, totally contradicting his official report while having it in front of him, explaining the resons why he decided not to open fire, AND perfectly in line with the fact that it was possible to see hits on board of BS from Suffolk.
Or perhaps, do you really think that from 21 sm , as per Pinchin incorrect Plot, it was possible ?

Do you think 21 sm was the right distance for Suffolk in order to flank-mark the heavy ships ?

Of course, you are right, I'm underestimating the 'mirage' effect......

Bye, Alberto

[wadinga]

Hello Antonio,

As we both well know, maps merely record things. Some things based on real measurements, some things on pure guesswork by someone trying out scenarios afterwards, some outlandish and sometimes forgetting to rub them out afterwards.

I know you do not like the 05.41 bearing of 319° between Norfolk and Suffolk.

Unfortunately for you it is correct, ... it is showed on 3 maps,

Once again you present an unexplained line on some sketch map, assign an unrecorded low accuracy M/F D/F measurement to it, fail to explain, as with the D lines, how it can have a range when it is claimed to be a bearing only measurement, and yet this is the cross brace without which your Polygon of Perfidy falls to pieces. If there were the slightest suggestion in the Norfolk Log or her strategical map that this miraculous measurement had taken place, you would have quoted it by now. It has no provenance.

There is only one recorded, validated bearing between Norfolk and Suffolk, and the distant hazy flashes of Ellis firing at his radar ghost is it. BTW does Ellis describe shooting at the radar mirage in his autobiography?

I do not need to invent "mirages". You, who put such great store in signed documents need only refer to the signed narratives and witness statements of those who were there. Cold water mirages are a well understood feature of Arctic waters and Duncan has given you the references to fully understand a common meteorological phenomenon.

As for being annoyed by what appears in Ellis' autobiographical account, hardly Nonplussed would be nearer the mark. Writing a description of events at odds with his report without explaining why.

Various Suffolk officers are apparently wandering around the ship, according to their witness accounts, obviously not at immediate Action Stations where they would be if the most powerful enemy ship in the world was only 9 miles away. Any tactical decision not to engage by the Captain, so as not to confuse shell splashes, would not mean the Control Teams would be permitted to wander off, so as to observe the action as spectators, as they did. Their disposition fits with the account Ellis wrote at the time, not that written many years later. Of corse Antonio has Suffolk's log and could tell us what was written at the time..................

We know Geoffrey Brookes saw individual components of Bismarck's superstructure at phenomenal ranges coming up over the horizon and there is no reason why Suffolk crewmembers should not see hits on the German ship, even outside range of their own weaponry.

Alberto, Busch actually keeps the bearing and the description of "a mast" of the third target, just what he might notice of a distant Suffolk.

All the best

wadinga

[Alberto Virtuani]

Wadinga wrote:"Alberto, Busch actually keeps the bearing and the description of "a mast" of the third target, just what he might notice of a distant Suffolk."

Hi Sean,
no, just as expected referring to a ship following in the wake of the Germans (no profile visible) in a sector where PG was not meant to put much attention as the Bismarck was watching the aft sector.

you wrote: "Various Suffolk officers are apparently wandering around the ship, according to their witness accounts, obviously not at immediate Action Stations where they would be if the most powerful enemy ship in the world was only 9 miles away"

If you read PoW witnesses accounts, you will see that there are men apparently wandering on the shelter deck or on the catapult deck (not the ones in charge of the aircraft....). I assume PoW crew was at action stations, don't you ?

The reason is that the commission not always asked what was the duty of the person questioned, just where he was at the time, so it's impossible to say whether someone was "wandering" or doing their job at action station.

Bye, Alberto

[Herr Nilsson]

Wadinga wrote: "Once again there is no evidence whatsoever of a PG radar measurement."

F. O. Busch do say 176 hectometers, bearing 15 in his 1943 book. and if you think that 17600 meters is a guess-estimate.....
But you are right, in his post-war account, he omitted the third ship, possibly influenced by...... Adm. Tovey incorrect statement of 15sm already published.....

So Ellis is possibly influenced by Busch's already published book?

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

Sean, if only we had available all the Suffolk and Norfolk ( CS 1 ) ... Tactical plots, the Gunnery reports, the D/F bearings log, .... etc etc ... that unfortunately are not available to us on this moment ... and you should spend a minute to guess why we do not have them available ... ... we were not going to be here reconstructing a credible scenario with the few information we have available.

So, please stop writing that since we do not have this and that ... we cannot try to realize what the reality was ... because it is not my fault the fact that somebody took the time to " hide " all those data, ... while producing incorrect documents and reports.

I/We have to work with what I/we have available.

What I have available at 05.41 are those bearings between Norfolk and Suffolk and those 2 bearings have been very likely taken during the 05.33 and 05.38 Suffolk radio transmission, ... that in fact are separated by 5 minutes one from the other 05.33+5 = 05.38, ... exactly like the bearings taken from Norfolk at 05.36+5 = 05.41.

On the Norfolk strategical map we have the Suffolk position recorded at 05.41 from Norfolk and it is a perfect match at 05.41, ... the famous 319°, ... confirming they were so sure about Suffolk being there at that time to record it also in that map, where the Suffolk position is recorded just few times ... like 03.21, 05.41 and 08.00 ... se when Suffolk was transmitting and Norfolk was checking with R D/F her position.

If you have something better or the evidence demonstrating this being not correct, ... show it to us.

Unfortunately for you I do have another additional confirmation that this is correct and it is what you are referring to here above, ... the cross bearing you like so much at 06.20 between Norfolk and Suffolk :

There is only one recorded, validated bearing between Norfolk and Suffolk, and the distant hazy flashes of Ellis firing at his radar ghost is it.

Obviously you are referring to the 335° bearing between Norfolk and Suffolk at 06.20, ... when Suffolk opened fire ( where is the Suffolk gunnery report of this day ??? ) ... traced by Pinchin on " The Plot " as well only partially and ending up on the water ( ??? ??? ) exactly like those 2, ... and reported by RearAdm Wake-Walker on his report to Adm Tovey on June 11th, 1941.

I love this Pinchin, ... that traced bearings, ... only half way on the map ... leaving them on the water ...

If you go above on the previous post on this thread I have demonstrated to you and Dunmunro that once you correct " The Plot " from the many errors Pinchin made ( intentionally or not ??? ) ... by changing the Hood+PoW invented track with the real one from Rowell and repositioning the Suffolk and Norfolk tracks respecting known bearings and also your " secure " bearing at 06.20 between Norfolk and Suffolk, ... so the only one you seem to trust, ... then the D/F bearing at 05.41 magically goes on the proper place, ... demonstrating my reasoning being absolutely correct ... and your one being simply wrong.

In fact it is enough to properly position 1 cross tracks bearing on Pinchin map, ... all the others go on the proper place, ... obviously, ... and we have one visual at 06.20 ... and the 2 D/F above.

I showed it to you and Duncan, ... go back and check, ... but you failed to realize it and respond ... mostly to accept it ...

Now please we like this effort from your side to be made, ... please give us your confirmation, ... so we can close this debate and " freeze " the track of Suffolk from 04.47 until 05.41, ... and the Norfolk relative positioning too at 05.41 in relation to Suffolk and the enemy at 276°, ... which is the only thing I care about.

I noticed that you do not like my polygon, of course not, be sure that if ever will happen that 1 bearing will be missed out of the 6 it will not be a problem. This because geometry is a law, ... not an opinion ... but in this case I am a lucky guy since I have all 6 of them recorded and 3 of them even both ways. At the beginning it was not so precise when I first made it, ... now it is accurate enough for this purpose, ... and you know that I took the idea from an Admiralty modified PoW battle map ( plan 4 ) having the lower part of it already made.

Do not worry that we will have plenty of time and post's in the close future to discuss about the British " mirages ", ... did you realize that the Germans were not affected that morning by this occurrence at all, ... ... as well as Capt Ellis autobiography and latest battle events fact version, ... occurred after 05.41-42.

Be happy, we will be talking also about the Germans now ... ... to try to realize a bit better what they saw on Prinz Eugen and in which timing sequence ... as best as we can ... since when you have something to refer to like we have built now, ... everything becomes a little more easy to be understood.

Waiting your acknowledgment about the 06.20 of 335° ... and then the 05.41 bearings of 319° being correct on my revisited version of " The Plot ", ... I attach here for your convenience the map so you can verify without going back and search for it, ... I traced 2 large BLUE lines aside the bearings, ... so you can check and verify very easily :

Plot_redone_adjusted_bearings_077.jpg (70.31 KiB) Viewed 935 times

Bye Antonio