You are quoting me above, not Steve.Alberto Virtuani wrote:Hi Steve,Steve Crandell wrote: "1) Leach was aware of PoW's 14in gunnery problems and the lack of any output from the 5.25in guns. He could see that both Bismarck and PE had good output from all weapons systems, 2) and he knew that W-W's two cruisers were not in a position to effectively engage either KM ship. 3) He knew that he was outside his immune zone and vulnerable to crippling hits and that PE was also armed with torpedoes. RN tactical considerations dictated that he should open the range ASAP."
1) Leach couldn't know better than McMullen what was the status of his main battery and McMullen stated that "everything was fine with guns". The 5,25" battery "was now in action" as per Leach own statement in his account. If the 5,25" battery was then put out of action, for sure Leach ignored the fact, as he couldn't be aware (after the hit in CP) of the real damage caused by the subsequent hits n.2 and n.3....... Again Leach himself at the end of his different, conflicting messages admitted very clearly in his narrative that the reason for disengaging was just his lack of confidence in the guns, in the gunnery dept and in the overall readiness of the ship......
2) You are right: he was completely alone thanks to the "timid" (I'm trying to be very diplomatic here) manoeuvres of the 2 heavy cruisers after 5:41 . At that time (with the "Enemy in sight" already issued), both were in position to effectively engage (10 miles from enemy for Suffolk and 12 for Norfolk) and both did the opposite (Suffolk with the turn to north, Norfolk with the "outrageous arc").
3) He was out of his immune zone as Holland was with the Hood since the beginning of the battle.... sometimes in war you need to risk your life to accomplish your duty, you cannot always be 100% sure that you will win.
However, even putting this concept of "immunity zone" consideration before the RN traditions, once the Hood gone, he could just open range while fighting, not decide to disengage (as per his own admission, he never spoke of opening range, in no message/narrative).
I have said several times on other threads that, if really he couldn't fight out of his immunity zone, he could order a 200° course to open range while continuing the engagement and getting back into his immunity zone, not order a 160° turn UNDER SMOKE, as this is not a manoeuvre to "open range", it's just an escape from battle !
Bye, Alberto
1) Leach merely had to count the 14in shell splashes to know that PoW was not getting full output from her guns, and he could see for himself that the 5.25in guns ceased fire after 3 salvos. When did McMullen state that everything was fine with the guns...oh, many decades after the action! The GAR states otherwise.
2) Antonio just stated that his most recent calculations show Norfolk to be ~23500 yds from Bismarck at 0600 and this is not effective gun range for the RN 8in, especially without radar ranging. Suffolk's type 284 could obtain radar ranges at ~20,000 yds yet there is nothing from Suffolk to indicate that she believed herself to be that close. W-W-W needed to be able to effectively engage PE to have much chance of effecting the outcome of the battle. I have gamed this scenario many times, and placing PE in the Van effectively nullifies the RN CAs unless Bismarck is heavily engaged and damaged as she and PE can always double back and cripple one cruiser as Holland doesn't have enough speed to prevent this:
3) Hood had no 38cm immune zone and Holland hoped to overwhelm Bismarck before Hood was fatally damaged and if Hood had engaged Bismarck instead of PE, the plan might have worked. OTOH, Lutjens could quite fairly be presumed to try to evade the trap by turning north and shooting his way past W-W's cruisers who therefore had to keep their distance - but we have gone over this repeatedly and you want to ignore naval tactics and the limitations of naval gunnery in 1941 in favour of accusations of cowardice. A course of 200d would not have opened the range fast enough, especially if Lutjens had turned onto a similar course. PoW did turn onto a course of ~0220 at ~0604 but then turned away after Y turret jammed...17. 0542 (B). Received Norfolk's 0541 reporting sighting enemy, followed by Prince of Wales' 0537 and Hood's 0543. The mean of these placed the enemy some 280°, 14 miles from Suffolk's plot position, and sights obtained shortly afterwards confirmed this. As, however, the Battle Cruiser Squadron was now in touch with the enemy, no amending position report was made at this point.
Enemy appeared to be approaching, and in case he had reversed course at 0538 (being "turned" by the Battle Cruiser Squadron), Suffolk circled to keep northward of enemy. It was soon realised, however, that the enemy was not approaching, the appearance being due to mirage, which also explains the similar (false) appearances at 0325.