The Plot

Discussions about the history of the ship, technical details, etc.

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Antonio Bonomi
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Re: The Plot

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

and in fact Schmalenbach is confirming it as we can read : " After transmitting my previous observations to the First Artillery Officer, I went to my battle station, ... "

So now we know who informed Jasper and how Busch was in condition to realize it and than write what he wrote on the 1943 book. It is correct.
Bericht des 2. Artillerieoffiziers:
Report of the Second Artillery Officer:
Ich war am 24. Mai 1941 ab 0400 Uhr Kriegswachleiter. Die Bb. Kriegswache war aufgezogen auf Nachtstationen. Das Schiff steuerte 180° und lief 27 sm. Im Kielwasser folgte mit durchschnitt lich 16 hm Abstand das Schlachtschiff Bismarck, mit dem vereinbart worden war, wie die EMII Geräte den Horizont absuchen sollten. (Prinz Eugen 270-90, Bismarck 90-270 Grad).
On 24, May 1941, I was in command of the battle alert watch since 0400. The portside battle watch had arrived at the night stations. The ship steered (a course of) 180° and traveled at 27 knots. The battleship Bismarck followed in our wake at an average interval of 16 hectometers, with whom it was agreed how the EM II instruments should search the horizon. {Prinz Eugen (was to take the sector) 270 to 90 (degrees), Bismarck 90 to 270°}.

Seit dem Abend vorher hatte ein engl. schwerer Kreuzer Fühlung mit den beiden deutschen Schiffen. Einzelheiten über dessen Meldungen, seine Schnelligkeit in der Erfassung unserer Kursund Fahrtänderungen waren mir bekannt. Der Fühlunshalter wurde verschiedentlich gemeldet.
An English heavy cruiser had been shadowing both German ships since the previous evening. Specific information regarding his reports, [such as] his swift detection of our course and speed changes, were known to me. The surveillance vessel was repeatedly reported.

Ich weiß aber nicht mehr, ob er von 0400 Uhr ab mit EMI oder EMII erfaßt worden und mir gemeldet worden war (die Vormarsdrehhaube suchte etwa alle 1/4 stunde auch den achteren Sektor ab, um da wir uns nach dem Flaggschiff richten mußten. Die erste Meldung über das Erscheinen weiterer feindlicher Streitkräfte gab der Horchraum, Uhrzeit geschätzt 0425 Uhr. Der Horchraum meldete Schraubengeräusche in 242 (oder 252) Grad. sie kommen schnell näher. Es sind zwei Ziele. Einige Minuten darauf - der Kommandant hatte inzwischen Meldung erhalten, desgleichen der N.O. - wurden von der Vormarsdrehhaube zwei Rauchwolken gemeldet in der vom Horchraum angebenen Richtung. Die Rauchwolken standen dicht beieinander und stiegen fast senkrecht in die Höhe, leicht nach rechts geneigt.
I do not recall if he (the surveillance vessel) was detected as of 0400 hours by EM I or EM II [radar] and reported to me (the foretop rotary cowl or dome also searched the aft sector about every ¼ hour), since we had to orient [our scan sectors] with [respect to those being used by] the flagship [The reader will recall that one of Bismarck's radars suffered shock damage, and thus PE was covering a sector for the flagship - Editor]. The first report of the appearance of [other] hostile forces was provided by the listening room, estimated time 0425 hours. The listening room reported rapidly approaching propeller noises [bearing] at 242 (or 252) degrees from two contacts. After a few minutes - during which time the commander and Navigation officer had also received the message - two clouds of smoke were reported from the foretop rotary cowl in the direction given by the listening room. The smoke clouds stood close together and rose almost perpendicular into the sky, leaning slightly to the right.

Eine dritte Wolke wurde fast zur gleichen Zeit weiter voraus (ich entsinne mich dunkel etwa 310° ) gemeldet und auch von der Brücke erkannt. Die Peilung der beiden dicken und sehr dunklen Rauchwolken stand nahezu, wärend die einzelne vordere langsam achteraus wanderte und später von mir nicht mehr beobachtet wurde, (es handelt sich wahrscheinlich um einender später an Bb. stehenden Kreuzer.) Die Aufmerksamkeit der Schiffsführung richtete sich in erster Linie den schnell näher kommenden zwei Schiffen Bb. achteraus. Das rechte Schiff, das allem Anschein nach das größere und vornstehende war, kam mir wegen der sehr hoch und breit aufgeworfenen Bugsee verdächtig vor. Ich hielt es aus diesem Grunde für ein Schlachtschiff und äußerte diese Meinung auch dem IAO gegenüber, (inzwischen war Alarm gewesen), der aber dieses wegen der großen Annäherungsgeschwindigkeit für völlig ausgeschlossen hielt. Einzelheiten der Schiffe waren wegen der spitzen Lage und wegen des scharzen, an den Schiffen klebenden Rauches nicht zu erkennen. Jedoch war auf dem Spitzenschiff ein Dreibeinmast mit Gefechtsmars zu erkennen. So konnte es sich um ein Schiff der "Emerald" -Klasse oder um einen Flakkreuzer handeln. Die Zahl der Schornsteine war auf dem Spitzenschiff lange Zeit nicht zu erkennen wegen des sich allmählich auch seitlich nach rechts ausdehnenden Rauches des Hintermanns. Nach Übergabe aller bicherigen Beobachtungen and den IAO begab ich mich auf meine Gefechtsstation, den Hauptflakeinsatzstand, der wegen der großen Helligkeit bereits ab 0400 besetzt war.
A third cloud (of smoke) was reported almost instantaneously farther ahead {I faintly recall (unreliably) at about 310°} and it was also recognized by the bridge. The direction finders [indicated] both dense and dark smoke clouds were close by, while the single forward one slowly drifted astern and later was not observable by me (it was probably related to one of the cruisers which stood at portside later on). The ship's command attention was primarily focused on the ships rapidly approaching form abaft the portside. The ship on the right, which according to all appearances was the larger and closer one, made me suspicious because it was throwing up a high and broad bow wave. Based on these observations, I considered it to be a battleship and made my opinion known to the First Artillery Officer (in the meantime there was an alarm) who thought this was completely impossible because of the [rapid] approach speed. Specific identification of the ships was not possible because of their point blank (straight on) approach [angle] and the black smoke enveloping the ships. However, a tripod mast with a fighting top was recognizable on the leading ship. Thus, it could only belong to a ship of the "Emerald" class or an antiaircraft cruiser. The number of stacks on the ship was not discernable at this point, [and this remained the case] for a long time because of smoke extending slowly and laterally from the aft ship. After transmitting my previous observations to the First Artillery Officer, I went to my battle station, the main antiaircraft battle station, which had been manned since 0400 because of the excessive amount of daylight.
So now it should be all clear.

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The Plot

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Wadinga wrote:"Why is Busch's report of an object so far away he can only identify it as a mast, but says is only 9 miles away, more trustworthy than Suffolk's report? :?

0520 (B). Enemy bore 203°, 15 miles, possibly increasing speed; and shortly afterwards altered course 30° to port and then back to starboard.

Suffolk had been maintaining this distance since the early hours in excellent visibility, shadowing as required. "
Well Sean, I would like to know how you explain that Suffolk, being at 15 miles at 5:20, could be still at 15 miles at 6:00, after having circled to North loosing 14 minutes from 5:41 to 5:55 (according to her own plot).......
I didn't know Germans had stopped engines or that Suffolk was capable of 45 knots...... :wink:

Bye, Alberto
Last edited by Alberto Virtuani on Wed Oct 22, 2014 2:08 pm, edited 1 time in total.
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

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Antonio Bonomi
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Re: The Plot

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

in order NOT to get confused with the bearings at the timings contained into the various documents, I provide here a LEGENDA.

1) German were using their time reference that was one hour before the timing used by the British.
So 04.30 for the Germans was 05.30 for the British and so on.

2) Into the German and British documents sometimes there are the absolute ( TRUE ) bearings and sometimes the relative bearings.
For the Germans the relative bearings were associated to the warship course on that moment and here following an example for Prinz Eugen on that moment sailing a 220° course.

Schmalenbach on his report used the RELATIVE bearings, ... while F.O. Busch on his books used the ABSOLUTE-TRUE bearings.

Consequently Schmalenbach 242° relative becomes 98° True and it is very close to the 96° True for Norfolk provided by Busch, ... in line with 276° from Norfolk to Prinz Eugen in opposition.

Same things for the 310° Relative becoming 170° True ... close to the 157° True by Busch ... which becomes 337° in the opposite from the British to the Germans.

Here in graphics how to read them correctly :
PG_Schmalenbach_01 (2).jpg
PG_Schmalenbach_01 (2).jpg (71.24 KiB) Viewed 686 times
Be Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Herr Nilsson
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Re: The Plot

Post by Herr Nilsson »

242° (or 252°) are becoming 102° (or 112°) true. 6° (or 16°) difference to 96°
13° difference between 170° and 157°.
Pinchin's plot was better.

Anyway, so when was the signal to Lütjens transmitted?
Regards

Marc

"Thank God we blow up and sink more easily." (unknown officer from HMS Norfolk)
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Antonio Bonomi
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Re: The Plot

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

I agree with you !

Brinkmann battle map and Schmalenbach bearings were not so precise.

Not to focus on the fact that they thought Hood was coming from far south and from different direction from KGV ( PoW in reality ) and that explains the 157° ( KGV - PoW ) versus the 170° ( Hood ) degrees evaluation. They were a lot confused and worried about the 2 smoke/warships coming fast from south on their bow.

In fact : " ...The ship's command attention was primarily focused on the ships rapidly approaching form abaft the portside. The ship on the right, which according to all appearances was the larger and closer one, made me suspicious because it was throwing up a high and broad bow wave. Based on these observations, I considered it to be a battleship and made my opinion known to the First Artillery Officer (in the meantime there was an alarm) who thought this was completely impossible because of the [rapid] approach speed ... "

They totally forget about the 242 ( 252 ) ... to east, ... so Norfolk ... totally ignored apparently.

Not to talk about the Suffolk that for Schmalenbach : " ... while the single forward one slowly drifted astern and later was not observable by me ( it was probably related to one of the cruisers which stood at portside later on). "

To answer your last question after having read Schmalenbach my opinion is that the SEMAPHORE ( Flag signals ) communication from Prinz Eugen to Bismarck using TRUE bearings of course occurred after 05.30 and before the ALARM - ACTION STATION ( at 05.47 ) ring was sounded on Prinz Eugen.

Jasper woke up at around 05.45 and was aside Schmalenbach at 05.47 when the ALARM sounded ( ref. Schmalenbach report ) and was updated about the SEMAPHORE flag signals made to Adm Lutjens by Schmalenbach before he left Jasper, just as confirmed on Schmalenbach own report and by F.O. Busch.

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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paulcadogan
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Re: The Plot

Post by paulcadogan »

Hi all,

I really have to comment here because if you carefully read what Schmalenbach is saying you will see it doesn't make sense!

He reports noises bearing 242 (252 as the case may be) from port side abaft, then TWO columns of smoke close together i.e. TWO ships coming from that direction at high speed. At the 310 bearing (port BOW) he reports one column of smoke that eventually drifted aft and either disappeared or became the cruiser shadowing port aft (Norfolk).

The 242 contact is what they were concerned about because that was supposed to be Hood & PoW - two smoke columns became two ships, the larger one on the right (i.e. the leading ship) kicking up a high bow wave so probably a battleship - he was talking about Hood therefore. So it is NOT Hood he is referring to at 310.

Now -Hood and PoW were in actuality significantly FORWARD of PG's beam (or there would not have been an interception) so the 242 relative bearing is incorrect. It is apparent that the two bearings 242 and 310 have either been confused or are simply wrong. He didn't "forget" about Norfolk at 242 because in his description he is referring to her being at 310 then drifting backwards to take up her shadowing position. No such occurrence in reality....

In other words, the scene Schmalenbach has described is: a ship (supposedly Norfolk) below the horizon off the port bow (so only showing smoke), Hood and PoW approaching from the port quarter and passing Norfolk which drops astern, which means Hood & PoW would have to step on the gas at 45 knots ( yes Alberto :D ) or more to surge ahead to the port bow to cut them off and engage at 0553!

So here we have error and discrepancy on the German side too, by someone who is supposed to be a competent, well-trusted officer. Hey....they were all human on BOTH sides....
Qui invidet minor est - He who envies is the lesser man
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Herr Nilsson
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Re: The Plot

Post by Herr Nilsson »

Antonio Bonomi wrote:Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

I agree with you !

Brinkmann battle map and Schmalenbach bearings were not so precise.

Not to focus on the fact that they thought Hood was coming from far south and from different direction from KGV ( PoW in reality ) and that explains the 157° ( KGV - PoW ) versus the 170° ( Hood ) degrees evaluation. They were a lot confused and worried about the 2 smoke/warships coming fast from south on their bow.

In fact : " ...The ship's command attention was primarily focused on the ships rapidly approaching form abaft the portside. The ship on the right, which according to all appearances was the larger and closer one, made me suspicious because it was throwing up a high and broad bow wave. Based on these observations, I considered it to be a battleship and made my opinion known to the First Artillery Officer (in the meantime there was an alarm) who thought this was completely impossible because of the [rapid] approach speed ... "

They totally forget about the 242 ( 252 ) ... to east, ... so Norfolk ... totally ignored apparently.

Not to talk about the Suffolk that for Schmalenbach : " ... while the single forward one slowly drifted astern and later was not observable by me ( it was probably related to one of the cruisers which stood at portside later on). "

To answer your last question after having read Schmalenbach my opinion is that the SEMAPHORE ( Flag signals ) communication from Prinz Eugen to Bismarck using TRUE bearings of course occurred after 05.30 and before the ALARM - ACTION STATION ( at 05.47 ) ring was sounded on Prinz Eugen.

Jasper woke up at around 05.45 and was aside Schmalenbach at 05.47 when the ALARM sounded ( ref. Schmalenbach report ) and was updated about the SEMAPHORE flag signals made to Adm Lutjens by Schmalenbach before he left Jasper, just as confirmed on Schmalenbach own report and by F.O. Busch.

Bye Antonio :D
No, according Busch Brinkmann ordered the semaphore signal. Isn't it interesting: Brinkmann and Schmalenbach who were on the bridge are unprecise in your opinion, while Busch - who writes three different versions of the signal in three different books, with different timings, different distances and one version with no bearings at all - is incontestable.

They didn't ignore the 242 (252) bearing. They were focused on it. Remember Schmalenbach:
A third cloud (of smoke) was reported almost instantaneously farther ahead {I faintly recall (unreliably) at about 310°} and it was also recognized by the bridge. The direction finders [indicated] both dense and dark smoke clouds were close by, while the single forward one slowly drifted astern and later was not observable by me (it was probably related to one of the cruisers which stood at portside later on). The ship's command attention was primarily focused on the ships rapidly approaching form abaft the portside.
Jasper wasn't aside Schmalenbach when the alarm sounded, but he was awakened by the alarm at around 0545. According the war diary the alarm sounded at 0547. According Busch the orders for the signal and the alarm were given simultaneously.
Regards

Marc

"Thank God we blow up and sink more easily." (unknown officer from HMS Norfolk)
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The Plot

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hello All,
what is the difference between EM I and EM II (see previous posts ?) :oops:

Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Herr Nilsson
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Re: The Plot

Post by Herr Nilsson »

EM I = optical range finder
EM II = radar
Regards

Marc

"Thank God we blow up and sink more easily." (unknown officer from HMS Norfolk)
Byron Angel
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Re: The Plot

Post by Byron Angel »

Herr Nilsson wrote:EM I = optical range finder
EM II = radar

... EM = "Entfernungsmesser", most likely.

B
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: The Plot

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Thanks Marc and Dave !

A completely different question: is there in the PG KTB (war diary) the log of the signals made to (and from) the flagship (including F.O.Busch semaphore signal) ? I have not the PG KTB but I guess these official messages to Lutjens should have been logged somewhere aboard the ship (at least this would have been the practice in the Italian RM) and I'm sure in such circumstances PG should have exchanged quite a number of messages with BS to cross check the shadowers position and to inform about the approach of Holland's squadron .....

Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

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Herr Nilsson
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Re: The Plot

Post by Herr Nilsson »

http://www.kbismarck.com/archives/pg-ktb.zip

Sometimes. The content of a German war diary is generally a diary of the commanding officer and not a ship's log. It has to contain a describtion of the intentions of the commanding officer and not necessarily all events.
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Marc

"Thank God we blow up and sink more easily." (unknown officer from HMS Norfolk)
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Herr Nilsson
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Re: The Plot

Post by Herr Nilsson »

I think I found the origin of the Plan 4 bearings. :think:

Image
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Marc

"Thank God we blow up and sink more easily." (unknown officer from HMS Norfolk)
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Antonio Bonomi
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Re: The Plot

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

@ Paul Cadogan,

I agree with you, just like the British, also on the German side we have contradictory information and poorly precise data inputs.

Nothing new, so we have to apply the same approach, just analyze them and select what is reasonable and matches with the overall scenario and the other data inputs available before and after and the data on the opposite side.

It is evident that the 3 warships ( Norfolk plus Hood+ KGV/PoW ) did create on the German side a lot of confusion once at 05.25 ( 04.25 German time ) they have been alerted by the GHG ( listening room ).

They saw smoke on the horizon pretty soon, but Schmalenbach apparently associated 2 warships to the smoke coming from 242 ( 252 ) from where Norfolk was coming, and only one smoke from 310 from where Hood + PoW where sailing toward the Germans.

Brinkmann on his battle map made a lot of confusion too, just look at it, there is a Kleine Kreuzer B-Dienst ( Light Cruiser ) associated to King George V ( PoW ) and Hood is approaching from further south. No mention of Norfolk at all and Suffolk is tracked only at 05.50.

Jasper on his quick horizon overview description report is by far more accurate than Schmalenbach and Brinkmann, in fact : “ A quick report and a panoramic view around the horizon revealed three ( 3 ) targets to port ( Norfolk plus Hood+PoW ), two ( 2 ) of which were approaching rapidly ( Hood and PoW ). Off the starboard stern stood a fourth target ( the Suffolk ), apparently, the surveillance cruiser from the previous night. “

Bottom line I agree with you : “So here we have error and discrepancy on the German side too, by someone who is supposed to be a competent, well-trusted officer. Hey....they were all human on BOTH sides.... “.


@ Herr Nilsson,

I think you got my point correctly, for one reason or another, Brinkmann and Schmalenbach were not so precise at first apparently, Jasper did much better at first look if we read his report inputs written just after the battle, … but on 1943 F.O. Busch really did merge all the infos into a precise summary, … because he wrote on his book what Jasper described, but in my opinion he could have taken the bearings only from the semaphore signal Brinkmann made to Adm Lutjens between 05.30 and 05.40.

I agree with you, F.O. Busch made his best version on the 1943 book. On later written books he scrambled the previous precise inputs in many ways, sometimes he forgot the Suffolk, and sometimes he forgot the Norfolk or the Hood and PoW bearings.

Anyhow, even if we will never know why Busch did it on that way on his later books, what count to me is that on 1943 he was just close to perfection and did provide us the complete and most accurate overview from German side with 3 precise bearings ( 15, 96 and 157 ) and a distance for Suffolk at around 05.30-05.35 ( 176 hundert = 176 Hectometers = 17.600 meters = 19.248 yards = 9,5 sea miles ).

The smoke description and related association to the warship by Schmalenbach is a lot confusing me, but I see that you only correlate this to Norfolk, Hood and PoW ( port side 3 smoke’s ) and not to Suffolk ( on starboard side aft ) like I was thinking.

I assumed that Jasper was already aside Schmalenbach when the alarm sounded because of this declaration on Schmalenbach report written after the battle : “ Based on these observations, I considered it to be a battleship and made my opinion known to the First Artillery Officer ( in the meantime there was an ALARM ) who thought this was completely impossible because of the [rapid] approach speed. “
Since the the First Artillery Officer was KptLtnt P. Jasper, than I assumed the ALARM sounded with Jasper aside Schmalenbach.

But than on Jasper report I can read : “ About 05.45 hours I was awakened by an " ALARM ". So if Jasper was awakened by an ALARM than Schmalenbach is incorrect, … unless on Prinz Eugen they sounded more than one ALARM.


Moving on the map I think you are correct, most likely that is what could have happened on the Admiralty by the “ mysterious Officer “.

He just used the PoW original track map of June 4th, 1941 and made a reasoning you are describing on the bearings he had available on that map, … and this means he trusted those bearings being correct.

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=5830&start=1350

One more input we need is the difference between the triangular ( Suffolk and Norfolk ) compared to the squared ( PoW and Bismarck ) plotted positions.
PoW_4June1941_0535_Noon.jpg
PoW_4June1941_0535_Noon.jpg (57.71 KiB) Viewed 395 times
Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Herr Nilsson
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Re: The Plot

Post by Herr Nilsson »

Schmalenbach's comment just explains why Jasper is on duty. Normally Jasper shouldn't be there.
Regards

Marc

"Thank God we blow up and sink more easily." (unknown officer from HMS Norfolk)
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