The Plot

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

YES, it is the GREEN box and it is correct at 270° from Norfolk.

@ Wadinga,

it is the reference Pinchin used for Suffolk originated bearing, so where is the problem ?

@ all,

the question stand: According to you who between Pinchin and Wake-Walker was incorrect at 06.00 ?

Obviously in my personal opinion Pinchin was correct with his bearings ( not distances ) and Wake-Walker was clearly incorrect at the second board ( 30.00 yards so 15 sea miles from Hood ), while he was correct on his own first board declarations ( around 20.00 yards, so 10 sea miles ) .

Do you need another evidence ?

Here it is, just evaluate where Norfolk was according to her own war diary at 05.50, so at 14 sea miles from Hood on bearing 220°.
Now try to see if from that position Norfolk can be 10 minute later where Wake-Walker declared her to be ( at 15 sea miles with Hood on bearing 230° ) at 06.00.
It is simply impossible as you can see given the 10 minutes track run by Norfolk.

Now do the same exercise with Pinchin plotted position, and you will have a perfect match, both for distance run on 10 minutes, so 5 sea miles while at 30 knots as well as for the track Norfolk run ( see the small example on the box I have attached above ).

0550_versus_0600_02.jpg (66.71 KiB) Viewed 945 times

It is so evident that does not need to be commented any further.
Pinchin was correct with his bearings ... and Wake-Walker was incorrect with his declared distance at the second board.

Now, why the Hood second board of inquiry did not get those very evident mismatches between the 2 maps they received ?
I mean both Hood overall track and the Norfolk position and distance from both Hood and the enemy at 06.00.

Bye Antonio

[Herr Nilsson]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

YES, it is the GREEN box and it is correct at 270° from Norfolk.

@ Wadinga,

it is the reference Pinchin used for Suffolk originated bearing, so where is the problem ?

The problem is that the green position of Bismarck is just one point on the line of Suffolks bearing.

Just for fun I shifted some tracks:

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

Marc, I think you will agree that the black bearing line starting from Norfolk track at " Hood opened fire " point (05.53), connecting the Norfolk own track to the BLUE box and called " BB " is the line that at the moment of Hood opening fire determine the bearing between Norfolk and Bismarck.

It is obvious because the line down below is called " Cruiser " and it was the bearing connection to the Prinz Eugen on same moment.

If we evaluate the 2 bearings, those are around 275° for Bismarck (BB) and around 272° for Prinz Eugen (Cruiser) at 05.53 from Norfolk.

Bismarck on 7 minutes, from 05.53 until 06.00 cannot loose 13° of bearing from Norfolk, moving around 5/6 sea miles ( around 12.000 yards ) as you showed with your example.

Bismarck from 05.53 until 06.00 can only cover 7.000 yards or 3,5 sea miles sailing at 30 knots as we all know.

Than we must keep in account that until 05.55 the bearing between Norfolk and Bismarck was not changing much and was still 275°, ... for confirmation just look at the very minimum change between 05.41 bearing of 276° and 05.53 bearing of 275° mainly due to the " Arc " that Norfolk did.

That is why on your showed example there is too much room sailed by Bismarck moving down on course 220°, ... reaching 263° bearing at 06.00 from Norfolk starting from a 275° at 05.53/05.55 ... that is just too much for her to cover.

Similarly it result on an incorrect distance the position of Norfolk from Hood at 05.50, which you correctly placed on bearing 220°, ... but now on your showed example it goes to around 18 sea miles instead of the reported 14 sea miles (this distance is already incorrect into the original Pinchin plot, since it is 16 sea miles and it should be 14 sea miles ).

Bye Antonio

[Herr Nilsson]

Marc, I think you will agree that the black bearing line starting from Norfolk track at " Hood opened fire " point (05.53), connecting the Norfolk own track to the BLUE box and called " BB " is the line that at the moment of Hood opening fire determine the bearing between Norfolk and Bismarck.

It is obvious because the line down below is called " Cruiser " and it was the bearing connection to the Prinz Eugen on same moment.

If we evaluate the 2 bearings, those are around 275° for Bismarck (BB) and around 272° for Prinz Eugen (Cruiser) at 05.53 from Norfolk.

Bismarck on 7 minutes, from 05.53 until 06.00 cannot loose 13° of bearing from Norfolk, moving around 5/6 sea miles ( around 12.000 yards ) as you showed with your example.

Bismarck from 05.53 until 06.00 can only cover 7.000 yards or 3,5 sea miles sailing at 30 knots as we all know.

Than we must keep in account that until 05.55 the bearing between Norfolk and Bismarck was not changing much and was still 275°, ... for confirmation just look at the very minimum change between 05.41 bearing of 276° and 05.53 bearing of 275° mainly due to the " Arc " that Norfolk did.

That is why on your showed example there is too much room sailed by Bismarck moving down on course 220°, ... reaching 263° bearing at 06.00 from Norfolk starting from a 275° at 05.53/05.55 ... that is just too much for her to cover.

I didn't modify Rowell's plot. (Is it Rowell's plot anyway? The signature looks like Terry.) Anyway, if you're right, than this plot (and also plan 4 which is virtually the same) seems to be "not so precise". So what track sailed Bismarck? I'm open to suggestions.

Similarly it result on an incorrect distance the position of Norfolk from Hood at 05.50, which you correctly placed on bearing 220°, ... but now on your showed example it goes to around 18 sea miles instead of the reported 14 sea miles (this distance is already incorrect into the original Pinchin plot, since it is 16 sea miles and it should be 14 sea miles ).

In my example it's 16 miles not 18, but I'll check it again.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

OK Marc, now we are in synch, ... here it is the way Rowell map should be used with the correction of PoW bearing while firing her first salvo ( taken from the Gunnery plot, first salvo on Rowell should be moved from 337° to 335° bearing ).

I have added and corrected also for your convenience the Bismarck track that should show a course 220° for 7 minutes from 05.53 until 06.00 following the Prinz Eugen.

Here it is :

PoW_open_fire_correction_234509encIVb.jpg (38.07 KiB) Viewed 903 times

You can of course control the PoW gunnery plot here in where both maps are loaded on bigger scale :

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 09guns.htm


Pinchin was " forced " to draw Hood track incorrectly all the way thru in order to achieve the more then 15 sea miles distance between Norfolk and Hood at 06.00.

This is the reason why also at 05.50 between Norfolk plotted position on " The Plot " and Hood position at 05.50 there are 16 sea miles while they should be only 14 sea miles, like reported on Norfolk war diary.

On your example it is even more of course and reaches 18 sea miles, ... please verify it.

Based on the above the whole Norfolk track is " adjusted/altered " in order to fit the various bearings and crossing points needed to provide an acceptable overall scenario, that caused the speed you can measure on the track itself to be not so constant as it should have been.

Now, by knowing some " key " verified points all the way thru her track, we can reproduce it in a more reliable way with Bismarck and Hood correct tracks too.

After the Norfolk, ... we can do the Suffolk as well ... and everything will look much more precise.

Bye Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

Marc, here for you the complete signature on the document :

ADM 234-509 Exhibit B of August 20th, 1941

by Lieutenant Commander George William Rowell of HMS Prince of Wales - Royal Navy.

Rowell_signature_ADM234_509_ Exhibit_B_on_20_August_1941.jpg (122.52 KiB) Viewed 900 times

So we have no doubts about who drew that document for the Hood Second board of Inquiry on August 1941.

Bye Antonio

[Herr Nilsson]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

OK Marc, now we are in synch, ... here it is the way Rowell map should be used with the correction of PoW bearing while firing her first salvo ( taken from the Gunnery plot, first salvo on Rowell should be moved from 337° to 335° bearing ).

I have added and corrected also for your convenience the Bismarck track that should show a course 220° for 7 minutes from 05.53 until 06.00 following the Prinz Eugen.

Here it is :

PoW_open_fire_correction_234509encIVb.jpg

You can of course control the PoW gunnery plot here in where both maps are loaded on bigger scale :

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 09guns.htm

Antonio, thank you. I think your correction is wrong. Your mixing up visual bearing with gunnery bearing. You have to keep in mind that PoW's shell have to flight for more than 40 seconds.

Pinchin was " forced " to draw Hood track incorrectly all the way thru in order to achieve the more then 15 sea miles distance between Norfolk and Hood at 06.00.

This is the reason why also at 05.50 between Norfolk plotted position on " The Plot " and Hood position at 05.50 there are 16 sea miles while they should be only 14 sea miles, like reported on Norfolk war diary.

On your example it is even more of course and reaches 18 sea miles, ... please verify it.

Based on the above the whole Norfolk track is " adjusted/altered " in order to fit the various bearings and crossing points needed to provide an acceptable overall scenario, that caused the speed you can measure on the track itself to be not so constant as it should have been.

Now, by knowing some " key " verified points all the way thru her track, we can reproduce it in a more reliable way with Bismarck and Hood correct tracks too.

After the Norfolk, ... we can do the Suffolk as well ... and everything will look much more precise.

Bye Antonio

Can me make an agreement that we dicuss this topic without permanent repetition of prejudices.

Marc, here for you the complete signature on the document :

ADM 234-509 Exhibit B of August 20th, 1941

by Lieutenant Commander George Wiliam Rowell of HMS Prince of Wales - Royal Navy.

Thank you very much, I always wondered how to read the signature.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

I see your point about the bearing at open fire and I fuly agree with you.
By evaluating the bearings on the gunnery plot thru the engagement you can realize which bearing is to be used at open fire for reference.
In my personal opinion 337° is overestimated by at least 1° degree, ... probably the whole 2°degrees, ... from 337° to 335° ... but I am open to any evaluation.
The Rowell map can give us some suggestions on how to read it at 06.00, ... by comparison ... of firing versus landing time/angle.

No prejudices from my side, ... just an help to try to explain and share with you the logic of it and the weak/incorrect data versus the correct ones ... but I got your point.

I know you are a very precise guy, ... and you like the double check and personal verification of everything.
I am more than ok with it and I personally like it very much, that is value add for everybody here in ... that is why I gave you promptly the Rowell signature confirmation.

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hello Antonio,

Once again. as several contributors have pointed out to you, you are attributing levels of navigational precision unavailable in 1941, to an "overview" plan prepared at short notice, that is created overnight, for an enquiry not really interested at all in the exact relative locations, but merely concerned with clarifying what various witnesses might be able to see of Hood's destruction. Furthermore, when the precision falls short of the 21st century parameters you are applying to it, you immediately assume skullduggery rather than simple innocent imprecision.

Yes, Norfolk's log says 14 miles at 220 degrees, but as we have established, McMullen was unable to measure a similar range in PoW, when he desperately needed to, 14 miles is an estimate. What is important about this report is that it the first time at which Norfolk definitely identified Holland's force. I have specifically asked for any information included in either Norfolk's log or on her original plot which predates this timing, but it would appear the first mention of visual sighting of the battlecruiser force is at 05:50 and only retrospectively, on the Pinchin Plot is Holland's force identified, prior to 05:50. Therefore expecting W-W to initiate action earlier is unreasonable. Additionally, apart from the enigmatic d/6 and d/7 lines there is apparently no suggestion either in Norfolk's log, or W-W's account or on the Norfolk plot that Suffolk was located at all, relative to CS 1 between 05:00 and 06:20. So when Pinchin took Suffolk's track and moved it around relative to Norfolk's with only one bearing and no range at 06:20 to tie them, it is not surprising that there might be misclosure of the traverse, and the green position of Bismarck from Suffolk might not tie with any blue position (ie from Norfolk) if one had existed for 06:00.

You suggest

You listed some Norfolk vs Hood/PoW bearings, but you forgot the PLAN 13 and 14 bearings recorded by PoW on her maps, 18° or less than that.

I do not forget them, I discount them as worthless guesstimates produced in PoW when they had no idea where the cruisers actually were and had use to use extrapolations, based on their radioed positions. 220 and reciprocal 040 are a logged sighting, 018 is a figment of imagination unfortunately perpetuated in post war publication.

All the best

wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

why, when and by whom the document ADM 234 509 Exhibit A called by us “ The Plot “ has been done at all is well known by the available data and references available on the Hood Second board of inquiry.
What has been the purpose of it and the final result of it is written on the Hood Second board of Inquiry summary result as well.
In summary, the document has been used by RearAdm W.F. Wake-Walker to change his previous declaration of being at 20.000 yards from the Hood at 06.00 ( Hood First Board declaration ) to the 30.000 yards that the document made by Ltnt Pinchin shows mainly thanking an Hood incorrect traced track.

Facts are that due to the submission of that document and the new RearAdm W.F. Wake-Walker declarations the Hood Second Board of Inquiry moved the Norfolk position from 10 sea miles (20.000 yards) from Hood at 06.00 to 15 sea miles ( 30.000 yards ) from Hood when the British battlecruisers exploded.

Nobody cross checked Pinchin document ( Exhibit A ) with Rowell submitted document ( Exhibit B ) to the same board and consequently the evident mismatch passed un-noticed on August 1941.
The main mismatches on “ The Plot “ are 2 : first the Hood track as plotted going south-west, second an overall enlargement of the battlefield obtained by using only some selected bearings of Norfolk and Suffolk to plot their tracks and enlarging some distances.

Due to the above evident mismatches I realized, and adding to those evaluations both the Baron von Mullenheim-Rechberg ( between 12 to 15 sea miles ) and F.O. Busch evaluated distances from the German side, I started some researches to better position the 2 British County class heavy cruiser tracks on my battle map looking for more data into the archives.
I have shared with you all what I have found and my new approach on determining a more correct and precise positioning of those tracks.

Thanking your suggestion I moved from the analysis of the various incorrect distances available on many sources to a more precise approach using the bearings at various times at first, than merging the real warship speed and only at the end adding the comparison to the available distances.
Referring to distances, I invite you to evaluate on your overall reasoning at what distance from Norfolk they could have realized that the warships in front of them where positioned this way : ahead there was a cruiser ( Prinz Eugen ) and the warship following was a battleship ( Bismarck ).

You cannot choose as you wrote above what you like to assume being correct or not.
If the 06.20 bearing is correct as you stated above, than I do not see the reason why the many other bearings available on “ The Plot “ as well as on many other documents both sides from 05.35 until 07.08 should not been taken in account.

I will avoid to evaluate again what Pinchin did by realizing “ The Plot “ respecting my promise to Marc ( Herr Nilsson ) I wrote above, just to avoid the risk of pre-conceived views with prejudice, which is not my intention and never will.

The available data once properly evaluated demonstrate that both Suffolk and Norfolk at certain times has been closer to the enemy than the declared 15 sea miles showed on “ The Plot “ and declared by Adm Tovey.

Consequently what has been written on Adm Tovey report, on articles and books for more than 70 years, so that after the Holland squadron enemy in sight radio messages at 05.37/43 the 2 British heavy cruisers where too far ( around 15 sea miles ) to participate on the engagement, is incorrect.

It should have been stated differently, describing why they maneuvered and acted the way they did just like they explained on 1941 on their own reports : Suffolk was having “ mirages “ and turned back to avoid facing the enemy turning toward them ( Ref. Suffolk report ), while Norfolk did not open fire because they were not sure to be in condition to see their own fall of shells ( Ref. Norfolk Gunnery report ).

I think that in fairness, given what we have as evidence at hand now, we should be all in agreement about it.

Bye Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

I have to correct myself, ... the correct " The Plot " document number is : ADM 116/4352 Exhibit A

Just for the record ... in fact that is the Hood Second Board of Inquiry document number, .... Rowell map/document is the Exhibit B on the same document.

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hi Antonio,

Once again, a masterful “Summing-Up” Signor avvocato perseguire but just a little premature don’t you think?

We have not heard all the evidence yet. Not by a long way.

Most notably you have shown us only a postage stamped size excerpt from Norfolk’s real-time plot in your January 10th post, showing a single position for Suffolk, without derivation or supporting track, and also a dotted track, presumably for Bismarck, just the same format as the annotated “Estimated track for Bismarck”, on the Pinchin Plot. This latter is clearly only represented on the Pinchin Plot to indicate just how fundamentally wrong Bismarck’s position was for Norfolk when all they had to go on was Suffolk’s mis-positioned transmissions.

Once again, I beseech you, to continue your generosity in sharing information you have gathered using your own time and expense, to indicate unequivocally whether there is any indication at all, either on this real time plot, or in Norfolk’s written log, of any sighting of either Bismarck, from which to derive the dotted track on the real time plot, or of the battle cruiser force prior to 05:41 and 05:50 respectively?

Since your argument depends entirely on the premise that distances and bearings on the real-time are real in some way, whereas Pinchin’s Plot is a grotesque and malicious distortion designed to hide several senior officers’ dereliction of duty, I believe you really have to answer these questions.

Further, in the log of PoW, which you also have access to, and have only exposed the tiniest of excerpts so far, is there any actual report to support your misplaced (IMHO) belief in the accuracy of plans 13 & 14? Particularly a source for the bearings on Norfolk and Suffolk to support your Diamond of Death? Also, as we all can see, the cruiser’s tracks are represented only by dotted lines, one again, in my opinion, purely speculative tracks, based on guesses about position and with a simplified drawn course based on reports.

Incredibly, you have gone so far as to suggest that these simplified straight dotted lines drawn on PoW’s charts are more Real than Suffolk’s and Norfolk’s own plots of their own courses,

well Marc, ... on all those maps defining the precision is always very hard, ... especially with current standards we can reach much more easily.
In any case no, as far as tracks those maps ( Plan 13 and 14 ) we not so precise on the short period of time, ... only about the general main courses.
What they have that is very good are the bearings at given time, ... and that is what I am interested the most, ...

One thing I have noticed that is very intriguing to me was the track they plotted of Norfolk from 05.41 until 06.30, ... straight thru and very different from Pinchin tracks

David Mearns on his researches for the Hood wreck traced Norfolk on the same way on his personal map.

In fact I see nothing to suggest David Mearns did any such thing as disregard Pinchin’s Plot when considering Norfolk’s position. In his book he goes out of his way to say, “However, I was greatly relieved to see that my partial plot agreed in every aspect with the actual dead-reckonng plot.” He is speaking of comparing his plot with Pinchin’s Plot. He is confirming Pinchin's veracity.

Once again Antonio please give us the information Norfolk and PoW recorded at the time……..

All the best

wadinga

[Bill Jurens]

All of this lengthy discussion has been interesting, but I fear that we may overall be missing the point, that being that the various plots etc. under discussion were intended to support a TECHNICAL rather than a TACTICAL analysis of the action, i.e. they were intended to support an inquiry into the causes of the LOSS of H.M.S. Hood, not necessarily the detailed tactical maneuvers that led up to the immediate final gunfire phase. The various charts and plots, etc. were not really intended to describe the precise positions of various British and German ships for long intervals prior to the action, if indeed such positions could be reconstructed at all, they were put together in some haste in order to provide a bit of background to the final action and establish the relative positions of various observers so that the precision and accuracy of their observations of the fire and explosion on Hood could be better evaluated in overall context.

In that sort of situation, with the approach charts intended to serve primarily as adjuncts to the main thrust of the inquiry as a whole, it's is, at least to me, neither surprising nor disturbing that the charts provided were in some cases ambiguous and even contradictory in nature. As their main intention was to provide overall perspective rather than detail, it's unlikely that a tremendous amount of effort was put into reconciling small detail differences, especially as these were, again as seen in the context of the main thrust of the inquiry as a whole, not seen as being of critical value.

My feeling is that in this sort of situation it is very easy to in effect over-analyze these sorts of documents in order to extract information which they were never really intended to provide. Further, even if the intention of the British was to reconstruct the approach phases of the action in great detail, as might be appropriate in a tactical analysis, it is unlikely that much better results could have been obtained. A close analysis of the carefully prepared track charts of almost any action during the World War II period will quickly uncover a variety of inconsistencies and contradictions when they are compared with alternative sources. Prior to the advent of GPS, etc. plotting and coordinating the precise tracks of ships involved in a naval action was, at best, a fairly unreliable process.

There is certainly nothing that I can see in the record that would strongly support any allegations of some sort of 'cover up' on the British side. Instead, what we are seeing, appears -- at least to me -- to reveal the normal discrepancies that can be found in almost any multi-source reconstruction of a particular event, as might be observed via the discrepant testimony of witnesses in a court of law, especially in those areas where the detailed reconstruction of the events in question is only of peripheral interest to the main thrust of the investigation.

Comments welcome...

Bill Jurens

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Bill Jurens,

welcome back into the discussion Bill, of course I agree on all you wrote above, so about the intention of those maps, about the precision and so on, it is correct and one can tell that just by having a couple of those maps in his hands and being able to read them correctly.

But in this case we are in front to a map ( "The Plot" ) and a situation that in my opinion is unique and was very important.

You know like I do that during the Hood First Board on Inquiry Norfolk was placed at 20.000 yards so at 10 sea miles from Hood, and all witnesses has been considered being reliable, here the evidence.

Evidence from Norfolk

Norfolk was not in action. Although Hood was at a range of 20,000 yards, she was clearly visible. Being the leading ship, Hood was in no way obscured by smoke or firing from Prince of Wales. Hood, being the Senior Officer's ship, was closely watched; in fact, two signal ratings had their telescopes on her all the time. From a long distance point of view, the evidence is considered reliable and this is borne out by the reasonably consistent statements of the majority of the witnesses.

Why, according to you, during the Hood Second Board of Inquiry it was considered so important to re-evaluate Norfolk previously declared position in relation to Hood ?

More, why once realized that the provided map ( The Plot ) and the new distance was 30.000 yards equal to 15 sea miles, so 50% more than previously declared nobody verified a map that even at first look was going to result incorrect given what they had at hand as information with Rowell precise map.

The difference between the 2 declarations resulted on making not necessary anymore to proceed with a more than due inquiry versus a Rear Admiral for dereliction of duty for several reasons, as often happened before on Royal Navy also during WW2 even for less important actions and failures of duty by an Officer.

This is the point and this is the reason why " The Plot " was done at all, to move Norfolk away from Hood from 10 to 15 sea miles and consequently at around 15 sea miles from the enemy ( Bismarck ) and not in condition to be able to open fire because out of range, and it was not true, since also the Norfolk gunnery officer reported it differently.

But instead of making a long response like the one I have ready for Sean ( Wadinga ) questions, I like your wise and competent opinion about this particular argument.

I am sure you know about Churchill initial Court Martial request thru Pound/Tovey for both Leach and Wake-Walker before the Hood first board on June 1941 and that the Hood second board occurred in August 1941, when everything was settled down already by Adm Tovey dispatches that placed Norfolk and Suffolk at around 15 sea miles already, even before " The Plot " was even made.

What do you think happened and for which reason in your opinion ?

Bye Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

many thanks my friend for your nice compliment, … many persons tell me that I should have been a lawyer, … but I like better some history researches done for hobby … it is more fun and a sure pleasure only.

No, it is not premature, … that summary is basically what it is and I think you know it like I do now since a lot of time, … but I like to keep on covering the many questions that anyhow everybody will arise for sure in the future, ... as this will surely be a never ending story with a lot of personal opinions, … and I am ok with it.

Most notably you have shown us only a postage stamped size excerpt from Norfolk’s real-time plot in your January 10th post, showing a single position for Suffolk, without derivation or supporting track, and also a dotted track, presumably for Bismarck, just the same format as the annotated “Estimated track for Bismarck”, on the Pinchin Plot. This latter is clearly only represented on the Pinchin Plot to indicate just how fundamentally wrong Bismarck’s position was for Norfolk when all they had to go on was Suffolk’s mis-positioned transmissions.

I agree with you, that on Norfolk from the late evening of the 23 rd , until the 05.41 of the 24 they had no clue of where Bismarck was unless for the information provided by HMS Suffolk, and this was valid also for ViceAdm Holland squadron of course, causing lots of problems too, but this is another chapter of this story.

So also in this case many book authors should go back and rewrite a lot of statements on their books about the shadowing effort done by the 1st cruiser squadron, composed by Suffolk and Norfolk under the orders of RearAdm Wake-Walker, that night until 05.41. Only Suffolk did the job, Norfolk did nothing after the first encounter and was only referring on Suffolk information until 05.41 in the morning of the 24th.

Norfolk was only able to check his position in relation to Suffolk, based on Suffolk radio reports and by the utilization of the RDF bearings to Suffolk, than based on that was evaluating the enemy relative position to her.

In fact, as a confirmation, both on the German official tracks as well as on all the British maps we can see the key bearing taken plot position perfectly corresponding to Suffolk radio emission. Everybody was referring to Suffolk radio, and the events all night long have been recorded on both sides maps based on Suffolk radio transmission event time.

The PoW map PLAN 13 is very clear about it and leave no doubts, the PoW was accurately plotting Suffolk at every radio transmission made by the British heavy cruiser shadowing the enemy, and the same PoW did versus the Norfolk when they had a chance at 02.22 that night. RearAdm Wake-Walker himself on his report confirmed he was referring mainly to the RDF equipment utilization to stay in touch with Suffolk and consequently with the enemy.

This is the reason why on “ The Plot “ we have the annotation “Estimated track for Bismarck”, and also the reason why RDF bearing D/7 and D/6, from Norfolk to Suffolk, are crucial to correctly establish how the convergence of all the tracks really occurred that morning.

Now moving on Pinchin and “ The Plot “ which was something he needed to put together on August 1941 obviously based on somebody request.

Please remember that when Pinchin made ” The Plot “ on August 1941 the Admiral Tovey dispatches had already been written on early July 1941, and in there it was written that Norfolk and Suffolk were at around 15 sea miles that morning.

Read again Admiral Tovey point 17 on his dispatch:

17. It was the intention of the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron, that the Hood and Prince of Wales should engage the Bismarck, leaving the Prinz Eugen to the cruisers, but the Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, was not aware that the battlecruiser force was so near; the Norfolk and Suffolk, therefore, shadowing from the eastward and northward respectively at a range of about 15 miles, were not in a position to engage the Prinz Eugen who was now stationed ahead of the Bismarck on a course of 240°.

Back on “ The Plot “ , those 3 details I mentioned above are crucial to understand and in fact you are correctly highlighting them. With the “Estimated track for Bismarck “ Pinchin was correlating “ The Plot ” with his original track map, … but when he needed to correlate RDF D/7 and D/6 with Suffolk track … that was a problem as was closing the battlefield too much and was not allowing him to keep Bismarck track far enough from the Norfolk.

Than we move on 05.37, 05.41 and 05.43, when we have the 3 Royal Navy enemy interception reports by PoW, Norfolk and Hood in sequence, and so we can start putting together very accurate “Diamond of Death” from the bearings stand point, merging on them also the Suffolk and the bearings from Prinz Eugen we have from maps and F.O. Busch books, and you know here we have a perfect set of matches.

I agree with you in any case that in some maps both sides there are evident errors on tracks and distances that is the reason why I used mainly the bearings when they are available.

Since your argument depends entirely on the premise that distances and bearings on the real-time are real in some way, whereas Pinchin’s Plot is a grotesque and malicious distortion designed to hide several senior officers’ dereliction of duty, I believe you really have to answer these questions.

Well my friend, in this case you make my answer very easy.

Unfortunately I had to realize why Pinchin did not use the Suffolk map just as it was but needed to enlarge her distance from the enemy plotted on it while keeping same the bearings at least. I had to realize why Pinchin did enlarge his own track map too and why he did not merge correctly the D/7 and D/6 bearings he had available to him as well as his own bearing to Suffolk at 05.41 ( it was 320° matching correctly the D/6 he traced but disregarded after ) from his own map. That D/6 bearing that should be 320° becomes 330° on “ The Plot “ confirming the overall enlargement executed.

I had to realize why on “ The Plot “ the bearing from PoW to Suffolk at 05.35 is not 350° as it should be but becomes 360°, while it was clear on available maps that PoW was correctly RDF plotting the Suffolk since at least 2.30 am that morning so since 3 hours.

But what is really incredible and unacceptable is what Pinchin did with Hood and PoW tracks, having Rowell map provided on same board on real time.

If Pinchin had problems on positioning his ship to the enemy track and Suffolk, despite the many bearings he had at hand out of which he should have explained why some were good and some were not good to a careful evaluation, I do not see why he had problems on positioning both Norfolk and Suffolk to a correct provided PoW ( and consequently Hood ) map like Rowell map is, and why he made Hood separated from PoW and sailing a south west course.

Those are the reason why I rate “ The Plot “ being a document done on purpose with a clear intent to show the Norfolk and Suffolk being at around 15 sea miles distance from enemy and Hood, and in fact due to all the un-noticed errors contained into the map, the goal has been achieved and the document has been used in the way we all know by RearAdm W.F. Wake-Walker, accepted by the Hood Second board of Inquiry, which used it to change a previous Hood First board of Inquiry evaluation about it, and this is just incredible as it should have been at least more carefully evaluated.

Surely not less interesting and important is the evaluation and comparison with David Mearns map.

Davide Mearns did a wonderful job and by finding the Hood wreck exact position gave me the real and accurate geographical position to start all my work based on it.

I have studied for months David Mearns book and documentaries, findings and maps, and I am not going to show you in the internet too much about it because I want to prevent the disclosure of the Hood exact sinking position, which was probably Tedd Briggs desire and David Mearns is protecting it too. I will do the same from my side until possible.

To find Hood, which David did successfully, he went thru a very similar reasoning process I did and realized exactly all I am telling you, and it was when I realized all he did and merged with all I did than I understood I had the reality in front of me and I went to Kew to find more evidence about it.

David Mearns goal was to find the Hood, and that part was already done, I want to make a never made overall Op. Rheinubung map including a new and more precise version of my Denmark Strait battle map, and I am close to finish my job now.

If you do not see David Mearns disregarding “ The Plot “ by tracing Norfolk sailing a straight line on course 220° starting from her 05.41 position until 05.55 PoW/Hood crossing track, thru the 06.34 point crossing PoW track and over, … well my friend tell me what that mean to you ?

Personally that is what PLAN 14 shows but with a course 225° for Norfolk, not 220°, but I think it is not correct and I trust more Norfolk original traced map for Norfolk original course, which also Pinchin used to trace “ The Plot “ as main reference. PLAN 14 starts with 3 bearings, one is Suffolk on 350° and it is correct like on other maps, Bismarck on bearing 335° and it is correct as well. Norfolk is on bearing 360°/0° and in my opinion is incorrect in there just like the Norfolk track traced on it.

On her map Norfolk recorded Suffolk RDF plotted position at 03.20, at 05.41 and at 08.00 ( when Norfolk finally corrected Suffolk huge positioning error ).
On her map ( PLAN 13 ) PoW recorder Suffolk RDF plotted position since 02.30 several times until 05.37.

Finally I like to add another important reference we have, since nothing as to be intentionally disregarded on this analysis, as we are all looking for the truth and not to have our current personal opinion to succeed whatever that is on this moment.

I am referring to the Norfolk gunnery plot, which made me really thinking about it when I first received it with an help of an Iceland friend, because May 24 th battle data is very poorly mentioned, while on May 27 th we have all the details we can dream about.

Anyway, on that document there is written an important reference about the initial plotted distance at opening fire and the final plotted distance at cease fire by the gunnery officer, and it stated that the battle rested 16 minutes which is correct ( from 05.53 until 06.09 are exactly 16 minutes ).

So disregarding that the gunnery officer wrote that open fire was at 06.06 ( incorrect by any mean ) and assuming it was 05.53 as it was on reality, then we can assume we have 2 available distances between Norfolk and Bismarck, at 05.53 ( open fire ) and at 06.09 ( cease fire ) separated by 16 minutes as stated by the Norfolk gunnery officer.

The 2 distances are at 05.53 equal to 30.400 yards = 15,01 sea miles and at 06.09 equal to 27.200 yards = 13,43 sea miles.

Those 2 distances on “ The Plot “ are not respected and they are 15, 5 sea miles both at 05.53 as well as at 06.09.

If we use the Norfolk gunnery data Bismarck is at 13,2 sea miles at 06.00 on bearing 270° and Hood results being at 11 sea miles on bearing 230° from Norfolk when the British battlecruiser exploded.

Of course Pinchin on “ The Plot “ not respecting those bearings and/or distances had Bismarck and Hood at more than 15 sea miles at 06.00.

Bye Antonio