The Plot

[dunmunro]

Capt Ellis account of the battle is quite short (pages 11 and 12 of chapter 9) but very clear; in synthesis:

I think you meant Chapter 19: HMS Suffolk, 1941-1942 ("Bismarck Episode").

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote: "I think you meant Chapter 19: HMS Suffolk, 1941-1942 ("Bismarck Episode"). "

Hi Duncan,
thanks for pointing this out. Sure, you are right, I missed the 1. (as Ellis book is contained in 2 files, I was erroneously associating the 1 to file n.1).

In file number 1, the chapter is 19 HMS Suffolk, 1941-1942 ("Bismarck Episode"). 31 pages in total. Sorry for my mistake !

Bye, Alberto

[paulcadogan]

Question:

If, as Capt. Ellis recalls in his autobiography, Suffolk was at 18,000 yards from Bismarck at 0553, and pretty much maintained her course and speed, remaining an observer, how come, in the aftermath of the battle at 0619 when she fired at what she thought was Prinz Eugen because of the Sunderland error - gun range 19,400 yards - her shells fell 4,000-5,000 m short (Jasper)?

That is, the Germans were actually 24,000 to 25,000 yards away - despite their torpedo avoidance maneuvers which would have caused Suffolk to close in even more? How come she lost 6000 to 7,000 yards instead, between 0553 and 0620?

Or was that part of her log a forgery too???

Then by 0629, Suffolk records the range at 18 miles....

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Paul Cadogan:
Hi Paul,
I have asked the same question to Antonio, as we need now to understand what Suffolk did AFTER 5:52, according with available evidences and he replied he is working on this.

IMHO, the turn to north to open range did not happen at 5:41 but for sure it did happen at a certain point in time, during the battle, perhaps when Hood exploded, PoW started retreating making smoke and Ellis realized that Suffolk would have been left alone at 9 sm from an enemy that was free, at that time, to devote some attention at her.... Please don't forget Suffolk circled to open range several times in the night and also after the battle, the point is when this specific turn happened.....

In any case, unfortunately, also the short engagement with PG at 06:19 is not mentioned in Ellis book, while the evening engagement with the Germans is described with more lines than the DS battle......

Bye, Alberto

[paulcadogan]

Folks,

I think I've said this before a long time ago and I'll say it again.

You tread on very shaky ground when you put complete confidence in eyewitness testimony - especially that given long after an event.

Reconstructive Memory
Bartlett ’s theory of reconstructive memory is crucial to an understanding of the reliability of eyewitness testimony as he suggested that recall is subject to personal interpretation dependent on our learnt or cultural norms and values, and the way we make sense of our world.

Many people believe that memory works something like a videotape. Storing information is like recording and remembering is like playing back what was recorded. With information being retrieved in much the same form as it was encoded. However, memory does not work in this way. It is a feature of human memory that we do not store information exactly as it is presented to us. Rather, people extract from information the gist, or underlying meaning.

In other words, people store information in the way that makes the most sense to them. We make sense of information by trying to fit it into schemas, which are a way of organizing information.

Schemas are mental 'units' of knowledge that correspond to frequently encountered people, objects or situations. They allow us to make sense of what we encounter in order that we can predict what is going to happen and what we should do in any given situation. These schemas may, in part, be determined by social values and therefore prejudice.

Schemas are therefore capable of distorting unfamiliar or unconsciously ‘unacceptable’ information in order to ‘fit in’ with our existing knowledge or schemas. This can, therefore, result in unreliable eyewitness testimony.

Bartlett tested this theory using a variety of stories to illustrate that memory is an active process and subject to individual interpretation or construction.

In his famous study 'War of the Ghosts', Bartlett (1932) showed that memory is not just a factual recording of what has occurred, but that we make “effort after meaning”. By this, Bartlett meant that we try to fit what we remember with what we really know and understand about the world. As a result, we quite often change our memories so they become more sensible to us.

His participants heard a story and had to tell the story to another person and so on, like a game of “Chinese Whispers”.

The story was a North American folk tale called “The War of the Ghosts”. When asked to recount the detail of the story, each person seemed to recall it in their own individual way.

With repeating telling, the passages became shorter, puzzling ideas were rationalized or omitted altogether and details changed to become more familiar or conventional.

For example, the information about the ghosts was omitted as it was difficult to explain, whilst participants frequently recalled the idea of “not going because he hadn’t told his parents where he was going” because that situation was more familiar to them. For this research Bartlett concluded that memory is not exact and is distorted by existing schema, or what we already know about the world.

It seems, therefore, that each of us ‘ reconstructs ’ our memories to conform to our personal beliefs about the world.

This clearly indicates that our memories are anything but reliable, ‘photographic’ records of events. They are individual recollections which have been shaped & constructed according to our stereotypes, beliefs, expectations etc.

http://www.simplypsychology.org/eyewitn ... imony.html

Here is another interesting reference: http://www.human-memory.net/processes_recall.html

You CANNOT put greater trust in what Capt. Ellis wrote 30 years after the event just because it suits you - an event that involved a series of situations with high stress and lack of sleep over several days which can further complicate recall. Such "episodic" memories merge over time and as people age it is natural for recall to be altered - even for the best of us.

Hey...and by the way.....Capt. Ellis was removed from command of Suffolk and given a shore position in the Admiralty in March 1942, a mere 2 months longer in command of his ship compared to Capt. Phillips of Norfolk. Coincidence? Reward? Punishment? Or was this part of the great conspiracy to "cover up" the "victimization" of Phillips??

[Alberto Virtuani]

Paul Cadogan wrote: "You CANNOT put greater trust in what Capt. Ellis wrote 30 years after the event just because it suits you "

Hi Paul,
thanks for the interesting explanations. You are surely right, if this was the only evidence. However we have:

• 1) the PG radar measurement for Suffolk being at 9 sm from enemy at 5:30 against the official report (15 sm);
  2) the perfect bearing match (from PoW, Norfolk and Germans) nailing Suffolk still very close to BS at 5:41;
  3) the fact that from Suffolk they were able to see 3 hits (perfect count !) on BS (possible from 9 sm, not from 21 sm);
  4) the suspicious "mirage" effect, the turn to north without even checking distance,after an "enemy in sight" signal;
  5) the evidences of all the other "official" reports used to embellish the whole DS battle story (see PoW and Norfolk);

All the above, together with Ellis book, allow to reconstruct a much more credible (and worthy of respect for Capt.Ellis) version of facts than the "official" one.


In addition, I really do suggest you to read "The Bismack Episode" chapter on Capt.Ellis book. He accounts the DS battle (pages 11-12, chapter 19) with his words, ignoring his official report, "forgetting" the "mirage effect", giving quite a precise distance measurement and clearly explaining his decision not to open fire, but in the very following page (page 13, chapter 19) he describes the evening engagement (after 18:41), using the precisely identical wording and format (just a "copy / paste") of.............

HIS OFFICIAL REPORT (the same telling, just few lines before, the "funny" story of 15 miles, of the "mirage" effect and of the turn to north)...........


No memory failure, I'm afraid, just a clear sign (as I had already said.....) that, while writing this chapter, he had in front of him the official report, but he did want to tell a different story, even without explicitly accusing/involving anybody else (at least for this battle). This is the demonstration that he just wanted to tell the true story of that day, to vindicate his (still anyway wrong, IMHO) decisions and actions that day.

Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Some notes from my reading of The Wind before the Rain, Chapter 19.

pages 11-12:
Ellis states quite definitely that Norfolk was out of sight when the action began and out of main armament range from Bismarck and that no sighting of her was made prior to the action.

Only the extreme upper parts of Holland's ships were barely visible along with bursts of light when they fired.

No mention of seeing any hits on Bismarck or even seeing straddles, and, in fact, no mention of Suffolk's own gunfire at ~0620.

On page 19 he states that Bismarck had two UW hits and possibly two others. He could not have known that Bismarck had UW hits so this indicated that he was influenced in his memoirs by post action accounts. So no indication of close range spotting during the action.

He mentions the effects of extreme sleep deprivation.


Radio transcription errors.
On page 21 Ellis recounts how a single digit error in decoding a signal changed the meaning from Scharnhorst & Gneisenau in port to S&G at sea.


There's really no basis whatsoever to consider Ellis's memoir as preferable to his Official Narrative, written from notes made at the time. I really hate to say it but Ellis's memoirs are typical old sailor stuff and it seems obvious that he was simply mistaken about the ranges to Bismarck when the action began, since at that range Norfolk would have been visible.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you wrote :

There's really no basis whatsoever to consider Ellis's memoir as preferable to his Official Narrative, written from notes made at the time.

I disagree.

The base, as Alberto stated above, is the irrefutable fact that he changed his official version of the morning battle, substituting it with a new version you can read and evaluate now, ... while in the afternoon action he used the official version taken directly from the document he signed during war time.

This means something ... this means a lot, ... at least to me, ... given the very sharp writing style of Capt Ellis that everyone can realize.

But, still we can verify which one of the 2 versions does correspond to the reality, ... by plotting the Suffolk as I did above, ... and the result is a confirmation of Capt Ellis autobiography version, ... unless you or anybody else are able to show me how the Suffolk ends up being at 17 sea miles from the Bismarck at 05.41 like " The Plot " shows.

So if you or anybody else still wants to support the original version, ... and try to disregard Capt Ellis autobiography, ... please go ahead and show to us the Suffolk course from 04.47 until 05.41 that ends up with Suffolk at 17 sea miles from the Bismarck at 05.41.

It is very simple ... please try to do it ...

@ Wadinga,

at 04.47 ( or 04.45 referencing her own war diary ) Suffolk having the enemy at 184° or 186° will not change much.

Here the Suffolk war diary input :

Suffolk__0445_184_degrees_war_diary.jpg (20.67 KiB) Viewed 717 times

Here the Suffolk radio message as decoded by B-Dienst :

0447_B_Dienst.jpg (24.17 KiB) Viewed 713 times

Same thing for the speed reduction during the turns Suffolk made between 04.47 and 05.41.

Remember that I never reduced the German speed kept at 27 knots during the turns too, from 220 to 170 and from 170 to 220.

Even the change of speed Herr Nilsson was suggesting from 27 to almost 28 knots for the German warships will not change much too, ... and I am very reluctant to do that because after few minutes the Bismarck will be never able to catch up on Prinz Eugen like she did if the Prinz Eugen was really at 28 knots, ... and Bismarck was at 30 knots.

In any case all this is within the tolerances ... since we do not know if the starting distance 15 sea miles declared from Suffolk at 04.47 were 15 sea miles, ...14, 7 sea miles ... or 15, 3 sea miles ... since it was a visual evaluated distance, ... surely not a radar taken one.

Compared to the current 9,5 sea miles distance at 05.41 between Suffolk and Bismarck ... even if you modify all the above parameter at once ... you will gain 1 or 2 sea miles distance, ... moving back the Suffolk from 9,5 sea miles to 11 or 12 sea miles at 05.41 from the Bismarck at the most.

So, please tell me now what are you going to do to move Suffolk at 17 sea miles from Bismarck at 05.41 like " The Plot " shows ?

Please show it to us ... thanks ...

NOTE : Of course I authorize you to take my above maps and modify them according to your evaluations, ... no problems.

Bye Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Duncan,

Dunmunro wrote: "Only the extreme upper parts of Holland's ships were barely visible along with bursts of light when they fired."

So a perfect match with distances from Hood that decreased during the battle from 24 sm up to 15 sm in Antonio's reconstruction. In "The Plot" the distance from Hood is much more.

Dunmunro wrote:"No mention of seeing any hits on Bismarck or even seeing straddles, and, in fact, no mention of Suffolk's own gunfire at ~0620.
On page 19 he states that Bismarck had two UW hits and possibly two others. He could not have known that Bismarck had UW hits so this indicated that he was influenced in his memoirs by post action accounts. So no indication of close range spotting during the action."

Not at all, Duncan. The EXACT words of Ellis at page 19 are: "He (the enemy) had 2 holes below water, and we had seen , we thought, two other 14 inch or 15 inch hits in the battleship action"
They saw from Suffolk the hits and the only point where you may be right is that Ellis could have used (not sure about that) his post-battle knowledge to assess that BS had 2 holes (not hits....) under water (from a single bow hit they probably saw as well).

Dunmunro wrote "There's really no basis whatsoever to consider Ellis's memoir as preferable to his Official Narrative........ I really hate to say it but Ellis's memoirs are typical old sailor stuff "

If you really prefer to believe to the official documents after all the evidences against (the ones I have listed in my previous post), I will not accept the excuse of the "old sailor" as I don't accept the dementia of Adm Tovey recalling the Court Martial request.
The account is perfectly fresh, very interesting for the usage of the 284 and absolutely reliable. Ellis wrote it with the so called "official reports" in front of him as I demonstrated in my previous post......

Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you wrote :

There's really no basis whatsoever to consider Ellis's memoir as preferable to his Official Narrative, written from notes made at the time.

I disagree.

The base, as Alberto stated above, is the irrefutable fact that he changed his official version of the morning battle, substituting it with a new version you can read and evaluate now, ... while in the afternoon action he used the official version taken directly from the document he signed during war time.

This means something ... this means a lot, ... at least to me, ... given the very sharp writing style of Capt Ellis that everyone can realize.

But, still we can verify which one of the 2 versions does correspond to the reality, ... by plotting the Suffolk as I did above, ... and the result is a confirmation of Capt Ellis autobiography version, ... unless you or anybody else are able to show me how the Suffolk ends up being at 17 sea miles from the Bismarck at 05.41 like " The Plot " shows.

So if you or anybody else still wants to support the original version, ... and try to disregard Capt Ellis autobiography, ... please go ahead and show to us the Suffolk course from 04.47 until 05.41 that ends up with Suffolk at 17 sea miles from the Bismarck at 05.41.

It is very simple ... please try to do it ...

Antonio, no reputable historian would use the brief and incoherent sentences from Ellis in preference to his official report written at the time.

Why was Norfolk not visible? How does that fit your "irrefutable facts"?

[dunmunro]

Hi Duncan,

Dunmunro wrote: "Only the extreme upper parts of Holland's ships were barely visible along with bursts of light when they fired."

So a perfect match with distances from Hood that decreased during the battle from 24 sm up to 15 sm. In "The Plot" the distance from Hood is much more.

Dunmunro wrote:"No mention of seeing any hits on Bismarck or even seeing straddles, and, in fact, no mention of Suffolk's own gunfire at ~0620.
On page 19 he states that Bismarck had two UW hits and possibly two others. He could not have known that Bismarck had UW hits so this indicated that he was influenced in his memoirs by post action accounts. So no indication of close range spotting during the action."

Not at all, Duncan. The EXACT words of Ellis at page 19 are: "He (the enemy) had 2 holes below water, and we had seen , we thought, two other 14 inch or 15 inch hits in the battleship action"
They saw from Suffolk the hits and the only point where you may be right is that Ellis could have used (not sure about that) his post-battle knowledge to assess that BS had 2 holes (not hits....) under water (from a single bow hit they probably saw as well).

Dunmunro wrote "There's really no basis whatsoever to consider Ellis's memoir as preferable to his Official Narrative........ I really hate to say it but Ellis's memoirs are typical old sailor stuff "

If you really prefer to believe to the official documents after all the evidences against (the ones I have listed in my previous post), I will not accept the excuse of the "old sailor" as I don't accept the dementia of Adm Tovey recalling the Court Martial request.
The account is perfectly fresh, very interesting for the usage of the 284 and absolutely reliable. Ellis wrote it with the so called "official reports" in front of him as I demonstrated in my previous post......

Bye, Alberto

There's no indication of when Hood came into view and the the exact wording was "funnel tops and gun flashes"

So you state now that Suffolk saw 4 hits... There's no mention of 3 hits anywhere.

The account is perfectly fresh, very interesting for the usage of the 284 and absolutely reliable.

So now you accept that Norfolk was not visible from Suffolk and was many thousands of yards outside of gun range from Bismarck?

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Duncan,

you wrote: "So you state now that Suffolk saw 4 hits... There's no mention of 3 hits anywhere."

I posted the exact wording of Capt. Ellis. If you are annoyed by his book and desperately try to contradict it, please be precise. The words of Ellis are:

"He (the enemy) had 2 holes below water, and we had seen , we thought, two other 14 inch or 15 inch hits in the battleship action"

you wrote: "No mention of seeing any hits on Bismarck"

Your statement above is simply incorrect.
They saw hits on BS. I think (my interpretation) that he meant they saw the hit in the bow (2 holes UW) and they saw 2 other hits. In any case, seeing hits on BS means they were at 9 sm , for sure not 21 sm as per the "official documents" like "The Plot".

you wrote: "There's no indication of when Hood came into view and the the exact wording was "funnel tops and gun flashes""

Exactly a perfect match with Antonio's reconstructed distances. Another element contradicting "The Plot", according to which Hood should not be visible at all at 5:52.

you wrote: "So now you accept that Norfolk was not visible from Suffolk "

I can accept it, possibly visibility in the direction of Norfolk did not allow to see her. Why ? Who knows. If you have ever been at sea, you know that visibility is not the same in all directions..... Light, mist, a fog bank or any other possible reason.

you wrote: " and was many thousands of yards outside of gun range from Bismarck?"

Not at all. If Norfolk was not visible, there was no way for Ellis to determine whether Norfolk was out of range, so his sentence means just that he thought that Norfolk was out of range.

We have already discussed Norfolk position, unfortunately for Wake-Walker. Here we are considering Suffolk position and Ellis account is quite clear:; 18000 yards at open fire (5:53, according to Suffolk).

Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ all,

The real Norfolk distance from Suffolk can be obtained from the many available bearing of 318°-320° we have at 05.41 on more than one map, ... the famous D/6 that LtntCdr Pinchin left on the sea on " The Plot " ...

In any case it is of secondary importance on this evaluation now.

The most important fact on Capt Ellis autobiography is the avoidance to refer to his own war time Official morning battle version.

In fact he did NOT described the turn back to enlarge the distance before the OPEN FIRE and the " mirage effect " that caused it, ... but he provided real distance of Suffolk from Bismarck, ... 18.000 yards ... and MOSTLY described why he did NOT OPEN FIRE !

With an accurate explanation of his reasons for NOT having done what he could have done : OPEN FIRE.

I think it is NOT necessary to underline the difference between the 2 versions and mostly the importance of a revelation by itself in light of the " Cover Up " that now is well demonstrated.

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hello Antonio,

Since as I understand it the current map shown above seeks only to position Suffolk relative to Bismarck, rather than attempt to derive their absolute positions using the nav corrections, the corrected value of 186 degrees (transmitted incorrectly ?) and 15 miles (I am glad you accept it is merely an estimate- just like Wake-Walker on Hood ) will put Suffolk further astern. Why bother to correct it in the narrative unless someone realised the wrong value had been tranmitted?

I was interested to see how you have managed to get the range down by 1.5 miles in only a few minutes, but then is because you are using 30 knots for Suffolk, only 27 knots for the Germans and you do not slow Suffolk at all, when she turns hard twice in ten minutes. What the Germans do later is of no consequence because when Suffolk reports again at 04:56 she says "No change", because the turn to the south has lost distance and it is still "about 15 miles" not the 13.5 you have engineered in an attempt to reach your goal of 9 miles by open fire. Even if it means alleging the circle was a deliberately made-up manouevre and the entire 700 man crew had to remember to not divulge this secret. As you have given us a glimpse of a war diary (surely a deck log) can you show us what speed it records for Suffolk at this time.

If the range after two Suffolk turns is still about the same, (it could be higher) then the German turns (BTW does anybody have faintest idea why Lutjens did this?) might allow Suffolk to catch up a bit. Of course if you were prepared to show us what the Suffolk Strategical map shows us for the 05:20 bearing and range we would all know what you know.

When does Bismarck "catch up" with Prinz Eugen? Since we are still only around 05:00 Bismarck has nearly an hour to get to the point where Brinkmann's turn across her bows endangers Bismarck and forces her to turn hard to starboard, thus prematurely "withdrawing" from the action- just like PoW. I thought you agreed with Marc's point that Lutjens was actually doing 28 knots as Suffolk reports. The only way Ellis guesses Bismarck is doing 28 knots is presumably that if he himself is doing 28 knots and range and bearing are not changing much, then that's what the enemy is doing too.

Somehow, Busch's vague description of a mast, not the 10,000 ton three funneled heavy cruiser which has been trailing them all night and reporting by radio, has miraculously transmogrified into a definite radar range and identification,

1) the PG radar measurement for Suffolk being at 9 sm from enemy at 5:30 against the official report (15 sm);

and this is preferred to the Baron's estimate of no closer than 12-15 miles. What would he know, he has only been instructed to keep an eye on this ship? And of course he is closer to Suffolk than Busch.

With regard to the circle, Ellis clearly states this happened because Bismarck appeared to be turning back on him. Looking through his binoculars he thought she had turned, and his ship and men's safety was threatened. Not because he picked up a scary "enemy in sight message, or because the estimated range was coming down. How long would it take to know this? With a potential combined closing rate of, say 56 knots, he had to react smartly.

4) the suspicious "mirage" effect, the turn to north without even checking distance,after an "enemy in sight" signal;

Once again what device is he going to "check the distance" with, he is 15 miles astern? There was no need to be at radar range since in the exceptional visibility he could easily keep sight of Bismarck.

Paul and Duncan have clearly and sensibly highlighted the shortcomings of an account written many years after the events. It is no surprise there is more description of later events, because Suffolk was not really involved in the morning action. When she was, it was only to embarrassingly to shoot at the radar range of a Sunderland, instead of the ship she thought she was shooting at after having disconcertingly discovered they were 20 miles away from where they thought they were.

All the best

wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga & Dunmunro,

STOP mixing up everything with the useless intent to try to dismiss Capt Ellis declaration that he was at FIRING RANGE and did NOT OPEN FIRE, ... and that his Official war time declaration was obviously incorrect due to the " Cover Up ".

This will never change from now on.

Forget my map, ... made with the available correct data, ... and just as requested several times to you, please SHOW ME how you obtain the 17 sea miles on " The Plot " starting from 15 sea miles at 04.47 on bearing 184°.

Here the shameful battlefield enlargement made by Pinchin to save Wake-Walker and change the reality.

Plot_evaluation_versus_reality.jpg

(134.74 KiB) Not downloaded yet

Please give me your logic of the events now ... in details on the map ... and NOT with a generic description.

Too easy try to dismantle somebody else correct work with some generic wordings ... and never provide your version of the events in details.

Now we are ALL waiting your detailed explanations and maps.

Bye Antonio