The Plot

[dunmunro]

Dunmunro wrote: "......regardless both Bismarck and PE's secondary armament appeared to have been fully functional during the action,......."

The effect of the secondary armament from both sides was absolutely negligible anyway and in the dedicated thread you know that the PoW secondary armament exact number of shells fired is another "mistery" of this battle.......

The important fact is that the output of PoW main guns was less good but absolutely comparable with German's one. (75,5% vs 85% and 83% (or 89%)).

What level of gunnery output would justify PoW in opening the range?

[Antonio Bonomi]

Helo everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

Duncan, probably you have not yet understood that what they did to make " The Plot " does NOT correspond to what they had on the original documents in their hands, were all timing and tolerance errors could have been taken honestly. In fact they are in there and are insignificant.

They altered intentionally the reality for their purpose, ... on " The Plot " as well as with the 06.13 for PoW.

Clear enough now ?

Bye Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote:"What level of gunnery output would justify PoW in opening the range?"

Hi Duncan, as I said already, no problem if Leach decided to open the range. However, considering the importance of his mission and the fact that his ship was NOT damaged yet in any serious way, I would say that the engagement should have been continued until Leach had the certainty to have damaged BS as well.
It's not just a matter of output, that as you see was anyway good enough to continue the engagement at 6:00.

However I agree that after the whole Y turret jammed (DUE TO the disengagement decision) and the combined output with the A gun + the normal loss of output was decreasing below 50%), he could have been a bit more justified to decide a withdrawal, even if we have examples in the naval history of ships fighting until they had a single gun working...... and still 4 or 5 14" guns can still damage the enemy and deliver him to Tovey.....

So, the answer to your question depends whether Leach decision was the one of an outstanding Capt. or of an average one, from a pure military tactical viewpoint. His decision on May 24 at 6:01:30, IMHO is a "poor" one. That's why an inquiry was due after the battle, had the war time allowed for it.
From another viewpoint, with the hindsight of May 27, and with the "lucky" torpedo hit to the BS stern on May 26, I agree his decision was the right one....

Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

I dug up my analysis of PoW's output by salvo:




I'm sure it was obvious to Leach that the 14in gun output was reduced, and the reduction in 5.25in output was much worse.

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Dunmunro:
Hi Duncan, thanks for posting this analysis.

So, in conclusion, PoW had a 75% output, against 85% of PG and 83% (or 89%) of BS.

Still I see NO compelling reason to break off the engagement due to gun status (as per McMullen statement in his interview: "everything is fine"), before being sure BS had been damaged.

Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Still I see NO compelling reason to break off the engagement due to gun status

How surprising...

Note that from salvo 11 PoW's output averaged only 67.5% and her 5.25in guns only about 10%. (probably closer to O% from Salvo 11).

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Dunmunro: from salvo 11 still 3 to 4 shells per salvo (and one hit at salvo 13 !), not a bad shooting at all.
Sorry, Duncan, but the actual output of the ship was NOT mentioned by Leach in his final narrative as a cause for the withdrawal, just his FEAR about a possible decrease in the output.....

Bye, Alberto

[Byron Angel]

@Dunmunro: from salvo 11 still 3 to 4 shells per salvo (and one hit at salvo 13 !), not a bad shooting at all.
Sorry, Duncan, but the actual output of the ship was NOT mentioned by Leach in his final narrative as a cause for the withdrawal, just his FEAR about a possible decrease in the output.....

..... presumably and quite arguably based upon Leach's very recent experience of gunnery practice @ Scapa in the immediately preceding weeks. I'm not trying to be indelicate here, but it strikes me that the failure of Y turret is being completely ignored. Your argument for discounting the failure of Y turret appears to be that it was directly caused by PoW's radical turn away (which may be true), but it also implies in an unspoken manner that everything would have remained fine and dandy in Y turret if only Leach had remained stuck in and fought on. Such an assumption is IMO unfounded. It has by now become a mundane and ignored footnote to the affair, but there was a reason why PoW still had 100+ workmen aboard trying to sort out her turret problems. No fair evaluation of Leach's decision process can be reached without some grasp of the actual state of delicacy of PoW's turret machinery as understood by Leach from his ship's performance @ Scapa.

A large part of the job of any commander is to weight all the risks.

B

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Byron Angel,

I think I am in agreement on the majority of the arguments you mentioned above.

Initially Capt Leach tried to associate to his retreat decision the real state/number of working main and secondary guns and the damages received on board.
The May 24th, 1941 8.00 am radio message and the May 27th one are a clear evidence of this.

Than he changed completely his own justifications on June 4th, 1941 narrative when he realized that many of the written reports were NOT going to support his previous declarations.

He went to the gunners training status, his own crew/ship state of overall readiness ( point b below ) ... but most important he mentioned the main guns reliability issue ( point a below )

3. Some explanation remains to be made as to my decision to break off the engagement after the sinking of H.M.S. "Hood" - a decision which clearly invites most critical examination. Prior to the disaster to the "Hood" I felt confident that together we could deal adequately with "Bismarck" and her consort. The sinking of "Hood" obviously changed the immediate situation, and there were three further considerations requiring to be weighed up, of which the first two had been in my mind before action was joined. Namely:

(a). The practical certainty that owing to mechanical "teething troubles" a full output from the main armament was not to be expected.

(b). The working up of the Ship after commissioning had only just reached a stage where I felt able to report to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, that I considered her reasonably fit to take part in service operations. This was the first occasion on which she had done so. From the gunnery point of view the personnel was (sic) immensely keen and well drilled, but inexperienced.

(c). The likelihood of a decisive concentration being effected at a later stage.

In all circumstances I did not consider it sound tactics to continue single handed the engagement with the two German ships, both of whom might be expected to be at the peak of their efficiency.

Accordingly I turned away and broke off the action pending a more favorable opportunity.

At first those can appear superficial changes, ... but it is just as said a superficial way to read it, ... they are very important especially if read on the light you explained above.

Due to his own previous responsibilities we can read on his biography book, Capt Leach knew better than anyone else the KGV class 14 inch quadruple turret loading mechanism problems and overall design un-reliability.

This was the reason why he forced his battleship to 7 weeks full gunnery training, night and day and why he pretended the Vickers technicians still on board.

But nobody on the Admiralty on May/June 1941 wanted this problem to surface and being declared and discussed.

That is why Capt Leach wrote on his narrative :

... of which the first two had been in my mind before action was joined.

So, I agree with you :

No fair evaluation of Leach's decision process can be reached without some grasp of the actual state of delicacy of PoW's turret machinery as understood by Leach from his ship's performance @ Scapa.

That is another good reason why nobody wanted an inquiry that would have had the need to dig into that as you correctly wrote, for PoW as well as for KG V, with awful results.

They decided to " cover up " everything, ... they invented the " teething problems " ... and they even highlighted KG V performances on the final battle against the Bismarck ( forgetting to mention that A quadruple turret had exactly the same PoW Y turret problem ).

But I think that those post's would have been better into the PoW guns thread and not here on " The Plot " were Norfolk and Suffolk are on the spot, ... not PoW.

Bye Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

@Antonio: I agree and I will answer to Byron serious considerations in the dedicated thread "poW 14" guns out of action").

Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

But nobody on the Admiralty on May/June 1941 wanted this problem to surface and being declared and discussed.

That is why Capt Leach wrote on his narrative :

... of which the first two had been in my mind before action was joined.

So, I agree with you :

No fair evaluation of Leach's decision process can be reached without some grasp of the actual state of delicacy of PoW's turret machinery as understood by Leach from his ship's performance @ Scapa.

That is another good reason why nobody wanted an inquiry that would have had the need to dig into that as you correctly wrote, for PoW as well as for KG V, with awful results.

They decided to " cover up " everything, ... they invented the " teething problems " ... and they even highlighted KG V performances on the final battle against the Bismarck ( forgetting to mention that A quadruple turret had exactly the same PoW Y turret problem ).

But I think that those post's would have been better into the PoW guns thread and not here on " The Plot " were Norfolk and Suffolk are on the spot, ... not PoW.

Bye Antonio

Again, an inquiry is classified and no one outside the Admiralty would be privy to it's proceedings. The KGV class turret and interlock loading problems were no secret within the RN and literally thousands of officers and men knew about them by mid 1941 and tens of thousands by mid 1942 as all 5 ships were commissioned. KGV and PoW had their turrets thoroughly overhauled in the summer of 1941 which mostly corrected the problems so it was not a case of the admiralty preferring to believe that there was no problem. Again, your rationale here just doesn't stand up to logical scrutiny.

[pgollin]

.

Antonio,

IF you have seen the files, then you will know that there is a FULL shorthand transcript of what was said.

Now I don't read shorthand, but presumably IF you are claiming some sort of cover up you have checked ?

.

[dunmunro]

This was the reason why he forced his battleship to 7 weeks full gunnery training, night and day and why he pretended the Vickers technicians still on board.

Are you stating that Vickers technicians were not on board?

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Phil Gollin,

I have seen the files, I know the overall FULL documents sequence and logic, I have taken them ALL.

If somebody thinks that are documents demonstrating the " cover up ", ... some sort of orders " top down " to do it, ... sorry ... that is obviously NOT the case.

Like in the case I have deeply studied about HMS Glorious, ... those things have been managed " outside " the official documentation, ... obviously.

The Official documents were needed ONLY to produce the submission of the rewarding, ... for Their Lordship needs and use, ... until the King request.

@ Dunmunro,

Duncan, you should realize that they were at a point that either they put them under an inquiry, … and declared why … or include them into the rewarded ones with all the others. They choose the second option, … there was no other possibility.

Maybe the problem was known into RN as you stated, surely not by the majority of the British population and putting an Officer under a court martial because he retreated NOT trusting his battleship guns was going to be a serious problem that Churchill did not want to manage on June 1941, … very wisely.

The fact that the problem was known and that Capt Leach was seriously worried about them is clearly explained into Colin McMullen IWM interview.

No, I never stated that the Vicker quadruple turrets technicians were not on board PoW, just the opposite.
Capt Leach pretended them on board as soon as he could and as many as he could have them. This is just confirming what I have stated.

I kindly ask you to move those arguments into the PoW main guns thread.

This thread is about “ The Plot “.

You wrote on another thread :

Trying to reconcile the plot of widely separated ships is not the same as altering an original plot.

If they wanted to reconcile 2 tracks in one map as you are saying ...

Why the connection of the bearings between Norfolk and Suffolk do not match ?
Why there are no bearings from PoW to Norfolk and Suffolk as we know they exist on Plan 4 of PoW and many available tracks ?
Why the Hood track is separated by the PoW one ?
Why Bismarck position from PoW at 05.37 do not match with the Bismarck position traced on the map ?

Bye Antonio

[Steve Crandell]

It is pretty common for commands to produce track plots after an engagement which provide the best summary of what happened, and they don't agree completely with the track charts produced at the time because the ones from different ships almost inevitably differ from each other. That is what happens during a battle.