Hello everybody,
@ Steve Crandell,
what you wrote makes a lot of common sense and I can only agree about it.
I think personally that most likely this has been the thought processes on both RearAdm Wake-Walker on Norfolk, which altered course keeping distance with an " ARC " at 05.41 and not closing in at full speed opening fire, as well as Capt Ellis on Suffolk turning away north and making a circle for precaution at 05.42.
This is exactly what happened on that moment and as said not knowing what was going to happen and having 2 battleships from your side soon engaging the enemy with only 1 battleship and 1 heavy cruiser they probably thought as you correctly wrote :
My job is to attack him when he is otherwise engaged, not take him on by myself in a cruiser.
Unfortunately that gave as I wrote above an immediate help on Adm Lutjens thought process and decisions to be taken, as I wrote.
Going by the books and if things were going to happen the way everybody was thinking on that moment due to the Royal Navy force superiority, most likely nothing negative was going to happen on the Royal Navy side.
Unfortunately things went on a different way, Adm Lutjens was fast on deciding and took needed and desperate risks with Prinz Eugen using her in line of battle, ... despite the existing KM procedures ... the Hood exploded, ... and PoW retreated, ... the 2 Royal Navy heavy cruisers were left only as spectators of that battle.
All happened so fast and so dramatically that probably like Alecsandros wrote even if in condition to open fire at extreme range like Norfolk was, ... since Suffolk with his manoeuvre took himself too far away on the short terms ... they were too shocked to do anything on that moment.
But you will agree with me now that this is NOT what for 74 years reports and books have been telling us ...
A correct description of the above event would have been : " They where there at the " Enemy in Sight ! " signal by PoW at 05.37 ... but delayed their initial involvement in battle waiting for the 2 RN battleships to engage the enemy and create damages and superiority, ... than taking advantage of that and running less risks, ... they were planning to join in probably for the kill with torpedoes (Norfolk), ... but things did not go as planned and the occasion was lost.
But on reports and books we are reading that they were too far away following the enemy at around 15 sea miles to do anything, ... and this does not correspond to the truth reference the above analysis, ... as simple as that.
With this aspect now clear in mind I invite you to make those simple evaluations, just as an exercise.
What were going to be the consequences if Suffolk and Norfolk were going to engage the enemy at the early stage of the battle soon after Holland battleships opened fire for example ? Just like probably ViceAdm Holland was expecting of course ...
Was than Adm Lutjens in condition to take the decision he took ?
I do not think so.
Was Prinz Eugen going to be used against the Suffolk and Norfolk and not against the Hood ?
Probably yes.
Were the 16 heavy cruiser guns going to damage in some way both Prinz Eugen as well as Bismarck ?
Probably yes.
Was Hood going to receive less damages at early stage that he received ?
Probably yes.
Was Bismarck going to be forced to try to engage both the opponents with her guns and not only 1 like she did ?
Probably yes.
Was the outcome of that battle going to develop a bit differently than happened ?
Probably yes.
Just some thoughts, ... since we now know that Suffolk took himself out of that possibility due to her circle northward, ... and Norfolk was keeping herself at extreme range ... but did nothing and turned away after Hood exploded.
Bye Antonio
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )