Lutjens' target directive to Prinz Eugen

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Steve Crandell,

now that it is clear that Norfolk and Suffolk where at that distance because of their own manoeuvres, it would have been very interesting to know at what distance they both could have been at 05.53, when Holland opened fire, if they had NOT executed their " enlarging " manoeuvres.

@ Wadinga,

you may would like to realize the orders Adm Lutjens gave to Prinz Eugen by reading her own battle map.

Here it is for you :

Lutjens_orders_to_PG.jpg (27.56 KiB) Viewed 5318 times

1) Engaged by battleships

2) From Flottenchef (Flotte), so Adm Lutjens : to the enemy farthest to the left ( PoW )

3) to the right enemy ( Hood )

4) Change to left enemy ( PoW )

Weitesten_Links.jpg (59.27 KiB) Viewed 5314 times

Obviously we have here Marc ( Herr Nilsson ) that in case can better translate them for you.

You know like I do that Norfolk was more or less at that distance because of her own " ARC " started at 05.41.
If only she had kept speed ( 30 knots ) and course ( 240°) she was going to be in a perfect position to open fire at 05.53 that morning, jointly with PoW and 30 seconds after Hood, 2 minutes before Adm Lutjens decision to assign a target to Prinz Eugen.
RearAdm Wake-Walker decided differently and run a 215° course starting an " ARC ".
Those are the facts.

Bye Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

hello everybody,

@ Herr Nilsson,

Marc, when they wrote : From semaphore signal ....

What they really mean : the flags or the small light projector from the signal deck ?

Semaphore_signals.jpg (87.21 KiB) Viewed 5316 times

Or maybe one of the 2 no matter what ?

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

A quote from PE's war diary:

I did not recognize the opponents as battleships. and until the conclusion [of the battle] I considered them as being cruisers (under consideration, according to my memory or experience "Exeter", "Birmingham", or "Fiji" Class). ) Accordingly, I decided to use high explosive base fuzed shells. I persisted in using this type of projectile during the [entire] course of the battle, since their impacts differentiated them very well from other hits. The impacts stood out clearly as high white water columns amid innumerable clouds of explosive smoke that obviously came from the intermediate artillery of the Bismarck. (page 38)

It seems very likely that Lujtens charged into battle because he and the rest of his command team thought they were engaging RN cruisers and they persisted in this belief until it was too late to consider a withdrawal to the north. However, had they recognized that the RN ships were battleships, Lutjens might have turned and ran. In which case one of W-W cruisers could have been overwhelmed had they closed the range too much. Closing to effective gun range for Norfolk/Suffolk before Bismarck was fully engaged means closing to within the range where Bismarck could expected to fire with great accuracy at a time when Bismarck could be expect to turn north at full speed to avoid Holland.

Expecting W-W's cruiser to close to within their effective range before Bismarck was engaged with effective fire from Holland's force is complete and utter nonsense, and would have been tantamount to committing suicide.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

Duncan the fact that Kpt Ltnt P. Jasper ( author of the report you attached above ) did not recognize them being battleships does not mean that Adm Lutjens did not as well.

In fact it was just the opposite, since Adm Lutjens radio transmitted to SKL Berlin : " I am engaged by 2 battleship " before opening fire, and it was recorded by Kpt Brinkmann into the Prinz Eugen battle map too as you can see and read here above.

Your analysis as well as everybody else about the fact that it made sense or not for the Norfolk and Suffolk to close in and engage before, immediately after, or some time after Holland opened fire and engaged the enemy makes a lot of sense to me and I am ok with it.

All I am saying is that this is what should have been written on the reports and the books for 74 years, and NOT that they where out of range catching up at about 15 sea miles and never in condition to do anything about a potential engagement decision by themselves, ... due to unawareness of BC1 presence ... and Holland not giving them orders to do so.

Once they received the enemy in sight signal by PoW at 05.37 they were aware of BC1 presence, and they decided to enlarge their distance from the enemy for different reasons remaining intentionally out of the incoming battle at the beginning of it.

Right or wrong, this is what they did.

Bye Antonio

[paulcadogan]

It seems very likely that Lujtens charged into battle because he and the rest of his command team thought they were engaging RN cruisers and they persisted in this belief until it was too late to consider a withdrawal to the north. However, had they recognized that the RN ships were battleships, Lutjens might have turned and ran.

There could be some validity here since, according to the Baron, Schneider on Bismarck also thought the approaching ships were heavy cruisers. It was not until they opened fire that it became clear and Lutjens sent the signal "Am engaging two battleships."

There were flashes like lightning out there. ......Donnerwetter! (Gosh!) Those flashes couldn't be coming from a cruiser's medium guns.....

.....On the telephone I heard Albrecht shout "The Hood - it's the Hood!"

It was after this that permission to fire was given.

So on Bismarck, they did not continue with the misidentification as Jasper inexplicably did on Prinz Eugen (Schmalenbach however did realize the leading ship was a capital ship, but Jasper thought this impossible due to the speed of approach. Jasper seems to have forgotten that the British had 3 BC's and knew nothing of the KGV class!)

[RF]

It looks like to me that PE switching fire to PoW was the right move even if orders were not interpreted correctly nor SOP was not followed taking position on BS lee. If Lutjen's did or didn't order it maybe it just made sense the way it played out given the positions as the battle opened as strange as it may sound. Just my 2 pfennig.

I'm not sure that PE switching fire from Hood to POW was a good idea - for a heavy cruiser engaging capital ships I would have thought that the target for those 8 inch guns should be the least heavily armoured of the opposing capital ships, on the grounds that they could inflict greater damage than on a more heavily armoured ship.

Now with PE firing on Hood that would leave POW under no fire, but the quick destruction of Hood relieved that situation.

[RF]

I suspect that had Hood not sunk and the battle continued well past 0600, Norfolk would have eventually opened fire

My view is that was probably Wake-Walkers intention.

......and Prinz Eugen would have fallen behind Bismarck to engage her.

I'm not too sure on the value of this - PE has torpedoes and in Lutjens shoes I would have considered that a torpedo attack on POW might have been a better option. One reason for this thought is that in engaging Norfolk then Suffolk is likely to move in and support the Norfolk.

[RF]

[
... I have been always convinced that Lutjens (as well as Holland) was expecting a long enough engagement to have the British heavy cruisers fully engaged, and his decision to order PG to keep her speed (27 knots) and to ask BS to accelerate to 30 knots is exactly in line with this expectation, as you correctly say.

IMHO he was outstanding on May 24, (even more if the switch target is to be intended against PoW and not against Norfolk), employing all means to achieve his objective, starting from a losing position and disregarding "fighting instructions" that only apply in an ideal situation.

I'm not so sure, I tend towards the view expressed by Karl Heidenreich in his threads some years ago.

To my mind Lutjens thinking is unclear, particulary as he was reacting to a situation that was forced on him. He delayed the order to open fire as long as possible, possibly a big mistake, indicating he was minded to avoid a battle altogether (which was what German operational instructions required). This is particulary so as the approaching capital ships were reported as cruisers prior to their opening fire.

[paulcadogan]

I'm not sure that PE switching fire from Hood to POW was a good idea - for a heavy cruiser engaging capital ships I would have thought that the target for those 8 inch guns should be the least heavily armoured of the opposing capital ships, on the grounds that they could inflict greater damage than on a more heavily armoured ship.

Now with PE firing on Hood that would leave POW under no fire, but the quick destruction of Hood relieved that situation.

Not necessarily RF. Remember Bismarck's secondaries were also firing at PoW when PG switched. The medium and small calibre shells could certainly knock out PoW's fire control positions (one disabled her forward HACS directors) which would interfere with the accuracy of her gunfire which was hitting Bismarck. That and more had already been apparently accomplished with Hood by the combined fire of the two German ships when PG was ordered to switch.

I'm not too sure on the value of this - PE has torpedoes and in Lutjens shoes I would have considered that a torpedo attack on POW might have been a better option. One reason for this thought is that in engaging Norfolk then Suffolk is likely to move in and support the Norfolk.

I think PG was in far greater danger of crippling or fatal damage the longer she stayed under large calibre shell fire. Something could be said for keeping her there if Hood had successfully shifted fire and left her unmolested. Even if she did launch her torpedoes, what next? With Norfolk firing and also a torpedo danger it would still be the Prinz's job - under German rules of engagement - to take on her opposite number. Even if Suffolk had caught up, she would have been in the same situation as Bismarck (this is presuming Hood had not blown up as I originally postulated) - each being engaged by two opponents.

[RF]

Not necessarily RF. Remember Bismarck's secondaries were also firing at PoW when PG switched. The medium and small calibre shells could certainly knock out PoW's fire control positions (one disabled her forward HACS directors) which would interfere with the accuracy of her gunfire which was hitting Bismarck.

I wouldn't dispute that at all.

My point is that the PE fire would be more effective against Hood as the lesser armoured ship, not that POW was impervious to smaller calibre shellfire. One previous thread on this forum did raise the possibility of PE being the actual slayer of Hood rather than Bismarck, which of course cannot be the case as Hood at its demise was not under PE fire. The fact that such a thread could be raised is I think significant, as there is no possibility PE posing a terminal threat to a KGV with shellfire alone.

I think PG was in far greater danger of crippling or fatal damage the longer she stayed under large calibre shell fire.

In Lutjens position all the more reason for concentrating all German fire on Hood. Once Hood is disabled or sunk, all German fire can be concentrated on POW, with the added consideration that if POW's speed is reduced then PE is available for torpedo attack.
In this scenario the two British cruisers should be left in the Germans wake, there would be little to gain by detaching PE to engage Norfolk, especially if there is a realistic chance of sinking the POW.