I had mentioned this at some point in another thread, but now, having given it much more thought, I feel I need to elaborate on it and hopefully generate more food for thought for all of you.
The Fleet Commander, Adm. Lütjens was known for his adherence to his operational orders. Yet in the DS battle he was thought to have slipped up with regards to Prinz Eugen and her role as a heavy cruiser facing attack by capital ships.
Vice-Admiral Schmundt in his comments on the conduct of Prinz Eugen said the following:
However, the preliminary report on the debriefing of Bismarck survivors indicates that three targets – Hood, PoW and a heavy cruiser (Norfolk) were in sight to port at the start of the battle.4. Conduct of Prinz Eugen during the battle.
a. Although the conduct of "Prinz Eugen" during the battle against 2 heavy enemy ships is indeed very courageous, it does not meet the common [tactical] views presently in force, according to which, already during the assembly for battle, the cruisers and torpedo boats are to post themselves in the fire-lee of the main body – here undoubtedly "Bismarck".
Although the cruiser had an armament of 20cm guns, with which the artillery officer fired remarkably well and also achieved damaging the opponent, this ship is so poorly armored that it belongs to the light units despite its designation as "heavy cruiser". Every 35 cm or 38 cm hit would have made this ship probably a prize of the pursuing English units or would have forced "Bismarck" to assume extremely unwanted responsibilities for protecting the heavily damaged ship.
In fact, the ship fired a closed salvo, which according to the commander would have hit without fail, but the ship had to maneuver coincidentally to avoid a torpedo from "Hood". Although the ship did not receive an order from the chief of fleet to position itself into the lee side of fire [of "Bismarck"], he should have and must have done this on his own, according to the valid tactical procedures in force, by reporting his intention to the chief of fleet, since at this stage there was no battle and the cruiser had not been fully engaged.
I do not know the thought processes of the chief of fleet here either for holding the cruiser in the line of battle, not only to engage "Hood" but also against the "Prince of Wales".
b. The cruiser did not receive a signal for fire division – indeed no battle signals were given at all – although this is unusual, it can be explained that the Chief of Fleet either considered the placing of the cruiser into the fire lee as self-evident and did not feel a fire division signal was not required or that the situation was so clear that a fire division signal was superfluous.
But I do agree also with the commander that a directive could be expected by him, particularly, since this is customarily always done when sailing in the line of battle.
No targeting orders were issued by the Fleet Commander prior to the permission to fire order at 0555 and, as a result, both Bismarck and Prinz Eugen engaged Hood. For two minutes prior to that, Prinz Eugen had been under fire from Hood with 15-inch shells falling close enough to flood her decks with water from collapsing splashes.
Based on “The Plot” and other official documents, we know as well that at 0555 Norfolk made a turn towards the German squadron and started to close rapidly. Although the Baron gave no indication of reporting this move in his book, it doesn’t mean that it was unnoticed on Bismarck.
We also know that shortly after hitting Hood with her second salvo, Prinz Eugen received a semaphore signal from the Fleet Commander to fire “auf den Gegner am weitesten links” which Google translates as “on the opponent leftmost” which Ulrich has translated as “engage opponent farthest to the left”.
“Leftmost” means “furthest to the left” according to the Oxford dictionary.
“Furthest” indicates more than one object or location is being considered with the one most distant being the choice.
From previous discussions, it was determined that Bismarck increased speed and closed with the Prinz during the battle. We know also that Bismarck engaged Hood with her full main armament, while her secondary armament, once in range, fired at PoW (so PoW was not left completely un-engaged).
Now…COULD IT BE…that Lütjen’s INTENTION, in keeping with battle policy and expecting an on-going engagement, was that Prinz Eugen fall back and take on her opposite number Norfolk, which had at the time altered towards the German squadron, which could be interpreted as a prelude to attacking?? That would have taken her out of the enemy capital ships’ line of fire, and allowed her to face an enemy of her ship class. Even if Suffolk was able to catch up and join in, it was still 1 vs. 2 of the same classification for both German ships.
Could it be, therefore, that Captain Brinkmann misinterpreted Lütjens order in simply ordering Jasper to switch to the immediate left opponent (PoW) rather than the furthest left opponent (Norfolk).
The destruction of Hood and the rapid withdrawal of PoW, together the Norfolk’s altering away then made Brinkmann’s misinterpretation a moot point and there was no further exchange on the matter.
PLUS…in the aftermath, when the criticism was leveled by Schmundt, it was NOT in Brinkmann’s (or anyone on PG’s) interest to point out the interpretive error (if they in fact realized it), leaving the blame squarely on Lütjens who was dead and could not explain himself. Schmundt's statement that "no battle signals were given at all" suggests he may have overlooked the semaphore signal and even the permission to fire signal.
If this is all valid, then once again (like in the already countered “failure to give permission to fire” argument) it shows that Lütjens was in control and knew exactly what he was doing!
As usual, I’m just sharing my thoughts…. Looking forward to yours - especially those who speak German, since the interpretation of “auf den Gegner am weitesten links” is key...
, I have been always convinced that Lutjens (as well as Holland) was expecting a long enough engagement to have the British heavy cruisers fully engaged, and his decision to order PG to keep her speed (27 knots) and to ask BS to accelerate to 30 knots is exactly in line with this expectation, as you correctly say.
PG had 15-inch shells screaming down on her- and coming close! I'd say the risk from even one hit was much bigger than her facing 8-inchers which she was designed for. If she had to fight at all, better she face her opposite number as in the situation they were in, there was no 
Herr Nillson?
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