The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

[dunmunro]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

OK, so basically you agree with what I assumed being the time Johnston wanted in reality to declare : 05.53 and 06.09 ( Start at 0552:30 and end at 0608.)

So this situation and distances :

Norfolk_gunnery_data_20.jpg

But when I add on top of it the correct Rowell map, from my re-visited plot, than we can see the difference using the GO data as reference :

Norfolk_gunnery_data_30.jpg

Basically we will move from 11 sea miles between Norfolk and Hood at 06.00 to 12 sea miles if we use the GO data as reference base.

Do you agree ?

Bye Antonio

I agree that this is probably closer to the actual ranges and is a good starting point for a reconstruction of the battle with all ships plotted.

[wadinga]

Hello All,

Can I request you to move this map based argument to the Plot thread where it belongs. This thread is meant to concentrate on the diminishingly small evidence that there was ever a proposal for a Court Martial.

Hello Alberto,

Have you now accepted that the captions under the two photographs of Captain Leach in KG V battleships were written by the author V Tarrant and and therefore not quotes from Sir Henry Leach who merely provided the images? Sir Henry writes the foreword and he is credited for reading selected chapters of the manuscript and making constructive criticism, along with many others. I would contend that like many others he accepted Kennedy's story of the CM, without acknowledging the caveats Pursuit's author included.

Interestingly Tarrant's account of the Phone Call is that it was initiated by Tovey, specifically to complain about the "towing" signal, for which Pound blamed Churchill and apologised (p 81). There is no mention at this part of the narrative of a CM threat at all. BTW Kennedy's epilogue is different again, saying Pound deliberately hid Churchill's involvment in the towing signal.


The CM allegation is back on p 60 where it states "Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, after studying all the reports.....and with Churchill's prodding.....informed Tovey etc So now after W-W doing an "admirable job" on the 24th, and not receiving censure immediately Tovey docked, it is sometime later (when exactly) after reading the reports, but presumably before the Blake enquiry, that Pound turns on Leach and W-W. Kennedy says "a few weeks later".

It has been alleged that W-W changed facts in the reports to absolve himself from blame, as did Tovey hide facts to protect his underlings and yet Pound still finds enough for a CM? Unbelievable!

The "Phone call on arrival" version of the story at least has some possibility of reality, given Churchill's mercurial character, but this "reasoned response after reading the reports" is frankly ludicrous. Kennedy hid the CM allegation away in the Epilogue because as a journalist and former naval officer he was conflicted. He could not ignore premiering the juicy scandal, but equally he knew it stank to high heaven, and was based solely on Tovey's late life memory. So he detailed the faults in the latter in his footnotes to absolve himself. Unfortunately all anybody reads, including Sir Henry Leach, is the headlines, and away the legend goes.

All the best

wadinga

All the best
Wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

no problem to move the above maps on " The Plot " thread, it is already there but one more confirmation about it is not going to be of any problem.

Basically it is out of discussion that no matter how you take references, correcting " The Plot " with his original declared ( with due tolerances ) bearings or using the Norfolk gunnery Officer data, ... in no way Hood will be at 15 sea miles from Norfolk at 06.00.

We knew it since we know in which way it was obtained that distance on that original map, just drawing an incorrect BC1 track and enlarging the overall battlefield. But now the truth about " The Plot " is clearly out there.

So the 15 sea miles was in " invention " by Wake-Walker on the first days of June 1941, just like the 06.13 for PoW retreat.

Back we are on the matter of the potential court martial charges, where those 2 " inventions " directly apply.

You keep on focusing on Tarrant photo caption, but never forget that Mills book is more precise and fully supported by Sir Henry Leach.

Than, before Sir L. Kennedy and Pursuit, we have Colin McMullen interview with Adm Tovey and ViceAdm Blake.

Just as suggested by RF, if you do not believe that the " inventions " by WW and Tovev were related to the potential court martial charges they were discussing about during those days, ... with open mind, ... what do you think could have been a reason for those erroneous declarations released and accepted just after few days from completely different Official declarations ?

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hello Antonio,

Once again you have returned to where you were before. Mill's description is from Kennedy's Pursuit

So my answer of 29/03 still applies

Thank you for confirming that Mills so uncritically uses Kennedy as his primary source for the Court Martial story. As I observed previously, he, like so many other authors, does not even include the massive caveat on the veracity of the story, and thus its sole source, Tovey, which Sir Ludovic Kennedy did when he first revealed it. Since Mills' book is not a general naval history, nor yet another inexpert retelling (B&H) of the Bismarck action, but specifically a John Leach biography, one might think the author would have put a little more effort into confirming a significant occurrence in his subject's career. Does he reveal any stunning new evidence from Sir Henry after their communications? No. Is there a shocking confirmation of such action from John Leach's confidential file? No. Why would Sir Henry have anything new to contribute? Well because in his role as First Sea Lord, if anyone on Earth were in a position to dig up actual evidence that a Court Martial of his father for cowardice in the face of the enemy was ever even contemplated, he would be the man to find it. Was anything found? Apparently not.

I notice you have barely commented at all on Sir Henry's own autobiography In it is just another tired restating of Kennedy's account, together with clear evidence from the minutae of discussion between father and son in December 1941 that they had not the slightest suspicion of disciplinary action attached to Leach senior. Even having spent a significant amount of time in PoW in the company of Churchill and Pound who are supposed to have schemed to destroy his career, John Leach suspected nothing! Because they had actually decorated him for his exemplary conduct instead!

Mc Mullen's story is of a phone call on arrival, does that mean both Tarrant and Kennedy are incorrect? Tovey's letter with his mistaken memories went to Roskill in 1961, McMullen was probably told the telephone version some time after that date. That is 20 plus years after it was alleged to have happened. Somebody else got told the analysis of reports version. Obviously poor Tovey in his befuddled state told different versions to diffferent people. Only the CM revelation was common, but different to ever other time he had told the story in the previous twenty years before the misremembering and exagerration Kennedy details took hold.

All the best

wadinga

[paulcadogan]

Interestingly Tarrant's account of the Phone Call is that it was initiated by Tovey, specifically to complain about the "towing" signal, for which Pound blamed Churchill and apologised (p 81). There is no mention at this part of the narrative of a CM threat at all. BTW Kennedy's epilogue is different again, saying Pound deliberately hid Churchill's involvment in the towing signal.

This is a very interesting and significant account conflict and underlines the possible confusion on the timing of the CM conversation on the part of Tovey after so many years - reflecting on his memory issues as described in Kennedy's footnotes.

what do you think could have been a reason for those erroneous declarations released and accepted just after few days from completely different Official declarations ?

My observations, having given more thought, are that:

1) The 15 mile range - If Norfolk's estimated distance to Hood was 14 miles at 0550 with Hood & PoW essentially crossing Norfolk's "T" angled somewhat away, then the distance MUST have fallen by the time Hood exploded - BUT...by that same token, at any time BEFORE 0550, Norfolk should have been at an even greater "estimated" distance from Hood - 15 miles? 16? 17? The point I'm making is that Tovey's statement of a round figure of "about 15 miles" is not necessarily inaccurate, as he does not state any precise time. Using the word "about" seems to make it just a generality - it could have been 14 or 16, could have been different for each cruiser.

Suffolk's 0542 circle seems to be what put her at that range, and we know - with hindsight - that was just a very unfortunate error on her part.

Also, Tovey's statement refers specifically to engaging Prinz Eugen - not Bismarck. Hood was destroyed and PoW turned away before either cruiser could get within effective range, based on their perception (Norfolk's GO, and Suffolk's astern location).

So based on the generalities of the positions of both cruisers in the run up to the battle, the statement is NOT that inaccurate at all!

2) 0613 - Norfolk's ship's log records 0614. Now, was this ordered specifically by WW at that very time in anticipation of what was to come? I would doubt that! It is the time that the log-keeper recorded that PoW had broken off the action. 0614 is also the time, according to "the Plot" that Norfolk turned to open the range from the Germans. So, subtract a minute for the presumed "actual" time of PoW's turn and you get.....

I would think a parallel might be the case of a doctor performing CPR on a patient in cardiac arrest - the procedure continues for some time until it is realized the patient is not coming back. The procedure is stopped. "Time of death - 0613". But the patient was already dead for some time prior to that.

So was 0613 a conscious fabrication on the part of WW? Maybe...but maybe not. The above provides " a reasonable doubt".

3) 20,000 vs. 30,000 yards: There can be no dispute that WW changed his testimony. And he WAS asked about it by the second Board - though not very directly:

18. These are the sketches you made for the previous committee. Is there anything that you would like to add to or remark on that?

I think I have shown too much of the hull as being visible above the horizon, and I cannot say that the picture in fig 4 had quite such a wide base.

And that was the end of it. No further queries. It wasn't important to what they were discussing.

I still ask though - we have Norfolk's GO's measurement of 30,400 yards from Bismarck when Hood & PoW opened fire - specifically where does the measurement of 20,000 yards to Hood at 0600 come from???

So, were the statements/alterations a response to a C/M threat? The "prosecution" may allege that they were and build a strong circumstantial case, the "defense" will say they definitely weren't, but IMHO, the "jury" will say there is reasonable doubt, and be forced to acquit on that charge.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

Sean, I returned simply on the fact that the court martial discussion is not a legend like you would like it to be, but a real occurrence since we have several versions of it from different sources.

Do I have the precise details about it with all the involved persons : NO.

Do I believe it happened on late may/early June 1941 : YES, just like Sir Henry Leach did.

Was it the cause of the "sudden modifications" of the reports by Tovey and Wake-Walker occurred meanwhile ? Most likely YES.

So, do you have other reasons for those "sudden modifications" to explain why they happened or are we only left with the court martial possibility being the reason for it ?

In this case how would you define/describe what happened ?

Bye Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Paul Cadogan,

you need to reset your thinking at the Hood First board inquiry summary by ViceAdm Blake, with the signed declarations and the Diagram B showing the warship positions at 06.00 when Hood exploded.

Only this pages going around at certain level :

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 1_to59.htm

Plus the 2 radio messages by Capt Leach, on the 24th and 27th.

Like it or not those were the elements to be summed up to the court martial potential request on going in parallel.

Now put yourself in that moment and think : was there a reason to modify what has been declared in writing ?

I definitively think so.

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hello Antonio,

You say

since we have several versions of it

Yes we do have at least two incompatible versions "Phone" and "Reports" You have spent two years building a case on W-W changing his guess from 10 miles to 15 and this is indicative of a giant conspiracy, Yet this enormous inconstency in the CM legend is not worthy of comment.

No- one source only: Tovey's letter of 1961. Not a single reference prior to this date, and all others lead back to late life Tovey. Pre 1961 includes Grenfell who references McMullen, Capt R A B Edwards (the real person Kenneth More depicts in Sink the Bismarck) and a host of others. Of Tovey and Somerville he says "of the considerable trouble they have both taken to put me right on many points of fact, and to explain how the situation appeared to them at different periods of the operation". However because this was long before 1961, Tovey had not imagined his story of the CM and would not for many years when his memory faded and things became muddled.

All the best

wadinga

[A Raven]

Mr Wadinga,
When I write my peer review of Mr Bonomi's article, I would like to quote extracts from your comments placed on this board. Would you allow this. I realize that I do not need your permission, but wish to have it for the sake of correctness and completeness. Please let me know.
I also ask that your real name go with any of your quotes.
Thank you.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

I have spent 2 years demonstrating several incorrect things about this battle, reference some threads on this forum you know quit well.

Among those the WW surely incorrect declaration of 15 sea miles instead of his own signed first hand declaration of 10 sea miles from Hood at 06.00.

This made clear, I am looking for the reason of this change of opinion that was made simultaneously with the other incorrect declaration of 06.13 for the PoW retreat, on the same document dated June 5th, 1941, from CS1 to Home Fleet.

I do not even focus too much on the fact that WW himself does an auto-goal on the same document declaring both 06.13 as well as 06.03, ... on another statement, .. what is important is his " invention " of the 06.13.

Both those WW incorrect declarations have been picked up by Adm Tovey on his dispatches of July 5th, 1941,at points 17 and 19, and this is another sure fact.

Now you and everybody else can call it the way you like it better, I simply call it an intentional "cover up" done by them due to their own previous different declarations of May 30 and 31st.

The Court Martial proposal is a demonstrated evidence, like it or not it is there properly documented.

If you have other reasons for those declaration changes, ... please share them with us, ... we are all here with open mind, ... otherwise I think we can assume we only have this reason for them to be occurred like that.

Bye Antonio

[paulcadogan]

you need to reset your thinking at the Hood First board inquiry summary by ViceAdm Blake, with the signed declarations and the Diagram B showing the warship positions at 06.00 when Hood exploded.

Antonio, I am well aware of those, and I STILL ask..what was the SOURCE of that 20,000 "declaration" at the first Board? Was it measured by Norfolk's DCT? By a turret RF? Or was it a simply guess based on someone's visual perception? There is no record of that and the document states:

Diagram B shows the relative positions of Hood, Prince of Wales, Norfolk and Bismarck when Hood blew up.

The diagrams are subject to correction when the analysis has been completed, but are sufficiently accurate for the purpose of the enquiry

This says that the analysis of the available data was incomplete - supposedly due to the hurried calling of the inquiry with WW and others being informed just the day before (30th- see signal sent informing participants). And, they were not overly concerned with the distance of Norfolk and whether or not she could have opened fire - they just wanted info on what was seen of Hood's sinking.

It is also very clear that the calling of the second Board was due to the deficiencies of the first - mainly non-existent record-keeping (hence no record of where the 20,000 yards came from!) and nothing whatever to do with covering WW's & Leach's behinds to prevent a court martial.

Now, in the aftermath of the first Board it turns out Norfolk's GO had measured 30,000 yards to Bismarck when Hood opened fire. What was WW to do? Tell his GO his measurement was wrong by up to 8,000 yards since 22,000 (at Hood's sinking) was declared and signed at the enquiry? Or accept what "Guns" found and modify his own assessment accordingly?

Reasonable doubt....

Paul

[Bill Jurens]

Although I have great respect for Mr. Bonomi's work, I'm afraid I must in this case express some skepticism regarding his fairly recent suggestions that there was some sort of 'cover-up' regarding British tactical activities at the Battle of Denmark Strait. My own observations and opinions are as follows:

a) Insofar as the inquiries into the loss of Hood were only peripherally concerned with the tactical situation prior to the actual main engagement itself, the precise position of ships prior to about 0550 or so were seen to be of little consequence, and primarily useful only to establish the rough location of eye-witnesses. Had their been major concerns regarding the overall tactics of the approach to and withdrawal after the main gunfire action, there would have probably been another inquiry into the Battle of the Denmark Strait, and of course there wasn't. The discrepancies regarding ranges and timings, etc, expressed by witnesses to the Inquiries are, at least in my view, both typical and innocuous in nature, primarily intended, and received, as fairly offhand commentary.

b) Although it's likely that the shock of the loss of Hood and the severe damage received by Prince of Wales with little apparent damage to Bismarck and Prinz Eugen in return may have immediately suggested to some who were not on the scene, including Churchill, etc., that this could only be indicative of some sort of mismanagement on the British side, these reactions were momentary in nature and after more information came in were quickly proven to be unjustified. Although there were undoubtedly 'second thoughts' on how exactly things were handled prior to and after the main gunfire action, and in retrospect some might have thought some things might better have been done differently, these are normal in any post-action 'wash up', and are not necessarily suggestive of incompetence. 'Second-guessing' is inevitable, and often instructive.

c) The discrepancies in the various track charts etc., which I alluded to briefly in my 1984 paper on the engagement and inquiry are far from abnormal and are in fact rather typical of track charts published in books and inquiries. To take one simple example, the track charts of Bismarck and the surrounding British vessels during the final action of 27 May -- which the British at least might have wished to reconstruct in great detail -- contain at least as many discrepancies regarding the courses and positions of engaged warships as do the track charts provided to the Boards of Inquiry, but there has been -- at least to date -- no accusations of a 'cover-up' there.

In any case, bringing the various track charts and observations into congruence, remains a critical and historically worthwhile step in understanding exactly what happened that day. Whether or not sufficient information remains to do this at this remove, if it ever existed at all, remains a highly debatable issue. But it remains primarily geometric in nature, and should be approached in an entirely objective manner.

Again, I would like to re-iterate my respect for the work Mr. Bonomi and others have done to throw light on this subject. I do, however, remain skeptical that his overall thesis is either plausible or provable.

Bill Jurens.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Paul Cadogan,

I am in agreement with your analysis.

But I think you will agree with me that being called some days after the event and declare 10 sea miles, after being called and cautioned to an Official RN board of inquiry by the 4 most important Officers on board the HMS Norfolk is not something that we can under estimate so easily.
We are talking RearAdm Wake-Waker, Viscount Kelburn ( Flag Officer ), Capt Philips and Commander Luce, all drawings and signing for 10 sea miles on May 31st, 1941.
Do you think that having any reasonable doubt of being much more distant ( 50 % more distant ) they would have declared so easily 10 sea miles ? I doubt.

We do not know on what they based this estimation, but they were 4 Royal Navy Officers and I think they would have known more or less the distance they were from the Hood.

That was the first hand account declaration we have.

What is important is what happened after, in fact only 5 days after Wake-Walker was already signing for 15 sea miles

And now is my turn to ask your opinion : based on what ?

Surely not the war diary, not " The Plot ", nor the GO measured distances from Bismarck, because he sailed for 5 minutes toward Bismarck on course 270° loosing bearing but closing distance.

Still he changed for a solid reason, ... and here we are trying to realize what was the reason for it ?

It is not to be under estimated that exactly on the same report, he started the error of 06.13 for the first time for the PoW retreat.

Bye Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Bill Jurens,

I see your opinion Bill, and of course I respect it.

But let me ask your opinion about some simple facts :

1) What do you think of the 06.13 versus 06.03 PoW retreat time declaration by WW and Tovey, later corrected by the RN Admiralty on 1948 back to 06.03 as obvious.

2) What do you think of the 10 later become 15 sea miles distance declaration to the Hood board of Inquiry by Wake-Walker.

3) What do you think about " The Plot " track traced for the BC1 warships, so Hood and PoW sailing a south west track while going toward the enemy. This map was submitted with Rowell map being Exhibit B showing the correct BC1 warship tracks.

4) Do you believe the Court Martial discussion/request between Pound and Tovey.

Thanks for you inputs and help ...

Bye Antonio

[Bill Jurens]

@ Antonio

I've added my comments in between yours, between asterisks, so please read on...

I see your opinion Bill, and of course I respect it.

*** These are areas where honest and intelligent men can disagree to be sure.***

But let me ask your opinion about some simple facts :

1) What do you think of the 06.13 versus 06.03 PoW retreat time declaration by WW and Tovey, later corrected by the RN Admiralty on 1948 back to 06.03 as obvious.

*** I think it's just a typographical error. Errors in spelling are usually relatively easy to proofread out, but numerical errors are not nearly as obvious. ***

2) What do you think of the 10 later become 15 sea miles distance declaration to the Hood board of Inquiry by Wake-Walker.

*** I think WW made an initial statement, talked to a few people, looked at some other data, and made a correction to his estimate. I don't think he (or anybody else) put a lot of weight on it, as it wasn't really germane to the Inquiry per se. ***

3) What do you think about " The Plot " track traced for the BC1 warships, so Hood and PoW sailing a south west track while going toward the enemy. This map was submitted with Rowell map being Exhibit B showing the correct BC1 warship tracks.

***My own feeling is that the track charts used in the Inquiry were presented as merely informational, not ever intended as formal bits of critical evidence regarding the loss of Hood, which was really what the Inquiries were about. They were just intended to serve as rough introductions to the much closer examination of the gunfire phase, with interest ending at 0600 or so when Hood exploded, and to give the board members a rough idea of 'who was where' at any particular time. As such, although they were 'official' in the sense that they became part of the inquiry records, they were not seen to be of particular importance to the issue at hand, which was why Hood exploded.***

4) Do you believe the Court Martial discussion/request between Pound and Tovey.

***At this stage it's impossible to say. People have a lot of conversations, at times quite heated, especially when they are trying to work through a confusing and potentially threatening situation. And, of course, there's often some embellishment afterwards, especially when a long conversation must be 'telescoped' into a brief summary. Who hasn't told a colleague that they told their boss to 'go to hell' when in fact what they really did was convince the boss that another choice was better? The plain fact of the matter is that the R.N. was handed a pretty severe bloody nose on 24 May, and that HURT, both physically and psychologically. Along similar lines, who hasn't suggested -- including some team owners -- that the coach be fired after a particularly severe and unexpected loss? There's a tendency to think -- at least in the heat of the moment -- that there must be a reason for the loss, other than just plain bad luck, and blame whomever happened to be in tactical command -- the poor coach or the unfortunate quarterback in football -- and demand they be sacked. It's part of the venting process. (Hitler undoubtedly felt this way quite often, but having a more direct approach to things, just had the defeated General -- or whomever -- shot...)

My suspicion is that Churchill, knowing the report of the action would not fly well in the British press, flew off the handle, and began looking for an easily identified scapegoat, who could be publicly 'punished' for the loss. He got Pound to phone Tovey, who told Pound to just keep his hat on and wait for things to calm down a bit.

Thanks for you inputs and help ...

***Glad to help. I'm sorry that my evaluation of your thesis -- at least so far -- is not more positive. Whether it turns out to be plausible or not, the mere investigation into the thesis has, and continues to be, worth the effort. ***