Gentlemen,
Interesting as these strategical extrapolations may be: eg how much more guilty people would be if something different happened after their actions, as opposed to what actually happened, can we revert to the thread subject? Is there any evidence to back up Tovey's assertion in 1961 that there was a move by Pound to court martial Leach and/or Wake-Walker?
According to Robin Brodhill's book "Churchill's Anchor" WSC was at the PM's country home, Chequers, from Saturday 24th May through to 12:30 Monday the 26th, leaving for London at 12:30. Considering he was at the Cabinet meeting referenced above at 17:00 there was not much time for him to be directly interfering at the Admiralty about the Bismarck. At the meeting Pound delivered the interim report mentioned above, with its ambivalent observation about Leach's action. The main naval event was Crete. In the previous week Carlisle, Ajax, Naiad, Warspite and Valiant have all been damaged and Juno, Gloucester, Fiji, Kashmir and Kelly have been sunk.
But Churchill could interfere by phone, and obviously did so on the 24th. Hence the "Re-engagement signal." However, later the same day Pound sends
19:16 24th May Admiralty to Norfolk, Suffolk "Shadowing by Norfolk has been admirable. Keep it up and good luck"
This signal alone would be sufficient to scupper any moves for Court Martial. Defending counsel would have a field day.
Brodhill quotes Colville, WSC's secretary "The PM cannot understand why the PoW did not press home her attack yesterday and keeps saying it is the worst thing since Troubridge turned away from the Goeben in 1914. He rates the First Lord and the First Sea lord continuously." Yesterday means this was happening on Sunday 25th.
Despite the battering his fleet was taking Cunningham was told at 21:32 25th that "greater efforts were needed and greater risks must be accepted". The Chiefs of Staff also went over his head and ordered the transport Glenroy to turn north again after he had ordered her south.
On the 26th May Formidable and Nubian are badly damaged.
On the 27th to spoil somewhat the elation over the Bismarck's demise, Barham is damaged. Tovey receives the signal telling him he must remain to destroy Bismarck even if he runs out of fuel and has to be towed. Similar stupid WSC-inspired messages have been sent previously to W-W and Edinburgh. Evacuation of Crete commences.
On the 28th Ajax is further damaged and Imperial sunk.
On the 29th Hereward is sunk and Decoy, Dido and Orion damaged.
On the 30th May Perth and Kelvin are damaged.
On the 31st May Napier is damaged.
On the 1st of June Calcutta is sunk . Crete is evacuated and subsequently Cunningham offers to give up his command. Roskill "Churchill and the Admirals" says "an offer which was not accepted, despite the strained relations which had developed at the height of the battle."
Does the First Sea Lord really have nothing better to do
at this time than pursue a witch hunt against two officers? Or was it a vague idea matching previous behaviour:
Secondly, because there had been a number of incidents recently and this would set an example for others. Thirdly, because someone in the Admiralty would always hold it against Norris if he were not thoroughly cleared. “
never shared with anyone except in an unrecorded conversation with Tovey, remembered and exaggerated in importance only in later life? A vague idea, abandoned in an instant over Tovey's reaction?
All the best
wadinga
