The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

I left you all with the evident demonstration of how Adm Tovey dispatches were intentionally incorrectly written, especially on the points 17 and 19, ... enabling the Leach's and Wake-Walker explanations on points 22 and 23.

Lets recap a bit the situation about all this Court Martial attempt story by using Graham Rhys-Jones recent book page 227 :

Exchanges of the conduct of Leach and Wake-Walker were sharper still.

To Pound and Phillips the bare facts of the case meant automatic court-martial; this was the path of orthodoxy.

Outside Whitehall, their attitude smacked of mindless zealotry.

Tovey, sensing an injustice and, no doubt, smarting his own treatment, dug his toes in.
( There was substance in his reputation for bullish obstinacy )

When told that the Admiralty would start proceeding under is own authority, he threatened to haul down his flag and act as “ prisoner’s friend “.

Nothing more was heard of the matter

In its formal comment on Tovey’s dispatches, the Board ( of the Admiralty ) accepted that Leach’s decision to break off the action ( and Wake-Walker decision not to renew it ) had been “ entirely correct having regard to the circumstances of the case …. “.

Please notice the clear understanding of Graham Rhys-Jones that the Board commented and approved only the Adm Tovey dispatches, and nothing else, just as I have demonstrated Adm Pound was going to do showing you the Adm 205/10 the page 331.

Graham_Rhys_Jones_page_227.jpeg (101.19 KiB) Viewed 630 times

With more details of it on page 28 on the " Cover Up Synopsis " thread :

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6799&start=405

Notice the footnote 37 on page 227 of Graham Rhys-Jones book that perfectly connects with Stephen Roskill page 125 of the Churchill and the Admirals book ( 1977 ) and finally to that Roskill book footnote 38 on page 313 :

Roskill_page_313_note_38_01.jpeg (39.05 KiB) Viewed 630 times

We have seen this comment Graham Rhys_Jones reported on his book :

In its formal comment on Tovey’s dispatches, the Board ( of the Admiralty ) accepted that Leach’s decision to break off the action ( and Wake-Walker decision not to renew it ) had been “ entirely correct having regard to the circumstances of the case …. “.

... already last year on the " Cover Up Synopsis " thread on page 23 :

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6799&start=330

with more details of it on page 29 on the " Cover Up Synopsis " thread :

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6799&start=420

What now we need to do is to link all the above to the other Adm 205/10 documents just like Stephen Roskill directed us to do ( ref. note 38 above ) in order to find out all the additional correlations among Adm Pound ( page 331 ) with Sir Alexander and after with Sir Winston Churchill on pages 332; 333 and 334.

Bye. Antonio

[dunmunro]

Rhys-Jones makes assumptions while using secondary sources. No Admiralty source seems to exist that confirms "...automatic court martial...".

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

here following the Adm 205/10 page 332.

Page 332

First Lord,

The report on certain aspects of the BISMARCK operation referred to in W.M. ( 41 ) 56th Conclusions, Item 1, is still outstanding.

I suggest that the report to the War Cabinet should be on the following lines :

“ With reference to W.M. (41) 56th, Conclusions, Item 1, a full report has now been received by the Commander in Chief , Home Fleet, on the Bismarck operation and a thorough investigation has been made regarding the action of the commanding Officer of the PRINCE OF WALES in breaking off action with the BISMARCK after the loss of the HOOD.

The following is an extract from a letter from the Board of Admiralty to the Commander in Chief Home Fleet, in connection with his full report of the operation : “

“ Their Lordships desire to express their view that the action of H.M.S. PRINCE OF WALES in breaking off action with BISMARCK after being damaged in the engagement was entirely correct having to the circumstances of the case which are fully set out in the Commander in Chief Home Fleet’s Despatch. It is their opinion that the extremely difficult decision called for accurate judgement and very high courage on the part of the Commanding Officer. Similarly the decision of the Rear Admiral Commanding 1st Cruiser Squadron not to re-engage the enemy with PRINCE OF WALES at that time is considered by Their Lordships to have been entirely correct and to have shown good judgement and correct appreciation of the situation. “

19th September 1941

332_03.jpg

(92.17 KiB) Not downloaded yet

NOTES :

1) The letter is from the First Sea Lord Adm Pound to Sir Alexander the First Lord of the Admiralty ( Ref. Stephen Roskill footnote 38 above )

2) It clearly state the everything is based on the Commander in Chief Home Fleet ( Adm Tovey ) Dispatches and we now know that they have been written intentionally incorrect and misleading just on purpose to provide acceptable explanations for both Leach and Wake-Walker actions. That is evidently the necessary result of the very thorough investigation been made by Adm Tovey and it has been blessed with this letter by Adm Pound.

3) It is involving on the answer to the W.M. 56 Item 1 requiring a PRIMA FACIE explanation also the Rear Admiral Commanding 1st Cruiser Squadron ( Rear Adm Wake-Walker ).

4) It is dated 19 September 1941. The Hood Second board changing the Norfolk distance from the enemy using " The Plot " had already took place in August and consequently there was no more into the Hood Official Inquiry results a statement clearly against Adm Tovey Dispatches point 17 declared distance of around 15 sea miles for the Norfolk ( it was 11 sea miles on Hood First board minute - Ref. Diagram B ).

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

So a thorough investigation is just a careful reading of Tovey's despatch?

Did Norfolk's action report which was written independently of the triangle of doom, support the ranges produced by the triangle? Did Norfolk's plot support it? Why would an erroneous set of ranges based upon an inquiry into the Hood's loss prevail over the ranges from reports prepared by Norfolk's officers?

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

referencing my notes above, those ones :

NOTES :

1) The letter is from the First Sea Lord Adm Pound to Sir Alexander the First Lord of the Admiralty ( Ref. Stephen Roskill footnote 38 above )

2) It clearly state the everything is based on the Commander in Chief Home Fleet ( Adm Tovey ) Dispatches and we now know that they have been written intentionally incorrect and misleading just on purpose to provide acceptable explanations for both Leach and Wake-Walker actions. That is evidently the necessary result of the very thorough investigation been made by Adm Tovey and it has been blessed with this letter by Adm Pound.

3) It is involving on the answer to the W.M. 56 Item 1 requiring a PRIMA FACIE explanation also the Rear Admiral Commanding 1st Cruiser Squadron ( Rear Adm Wake-Walker ).

4) It is dated 19 September 1941. The Hood Second board changing the Norfolk distance from the enemy using " The Plot " had already took place in August and consequently there was no more into the Hood Official Inquiry results a statement clearly against Adm Tovey Dispatches point 17 declared distance of around 15 sea miles for the Norfolk ( it was 11 sea miles on Hood First board minute - Ref. Diagram B ).

We now should all have realized that both Leach and Wake-Walker were under the Admiralty scrutiny, while Capt Ellis was not yet mentioned anywhere.

This is the reason why in order to save them all ( including Capt Ellis ) Adm Tovey dispatches have been intentionally incorrectly written and the real events have been altered and modified according to the justifications needed.

In summary :

A) - For Leach with the Y turret jamming event smart move before the disengagement order was released and the whole engagement duration being enlarged with additional 10 minutes ( from 06:03 to 06:13 ) remaining under enemy fire before the order to disengage was issued. This was of course more honorable and better acceptable.

B) - For Wake-Walker by avoiding to add to the missing re-engagement also the evident missing enemy engagement at first. This was done by enlarging the Norfolk distance ( from 11 to around 15 sea miles ) and cancelling the very superficial declaration he made and signed too at the Hood First board of being at only 11 sea miles from the enemy at 06:00 without having opened fire.

C) - Same was done for Ellis of Suffolk, that was at enemy engagement distance too at the enemy in sight signal, being at around 9 sea miles from the Bismarck at 05:42, but turned away north enlarging his distance from the starting battle.

Here the evidence for the Norfolk and Suffolk distances :

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=8231&p=76746#p76746

Bye Antonio

[Cag]

Hi All

Hi Antonio thanks for the printing of the letter, it was hard to make out on screen as are they all.

May I ask a few questions?
Notes
1) Is there a signature on the 19th September document?
2) If this is referencing the outstanding issue of a previous letter dated June, is it not this issue that is being answered here? (It is also post Riviera)
3) See above.
4) Does this not reference the break off decision of Leach and not Wake Walker and where he was at 06.00?

Further
A) We know two points in the despatch are incorrect, we must remember Leachs personal reasons are also included. Is the despatch not the final report?
B) Did Wake-Walker not give his reasons for not re engaging Bismarck post Hood in his report and in the despatch which were backed up by Tovey. Would his ships position at 06.00 have any bearing on this decision? He could not order PoW to re engage Bismarck immediately due to Y turret etc. His function was to keep contact with Bismarck post Hood not order PoW back into battle or worsen the tactical situation.
C) Had we not discussed that the cruisers function was to follow and flank mark? I think that was another unresolved issue based on individual belief.The RN tactical dept and the TSD looked into the feasibility of the cruisers participation, what do you think of that study in the Roskill papers? I think the conclusion was
a) A signal would have had to have been made to order the concentration quite early on giving away Holland's position.
b) The cruisers did not have the requisite speed over the German squadron to gain the required positional ground.
c) If they would have had the speed required Suffolk may have been able to gradually move to concentrate on Norfolk but leaving one area of sea open and tactically erroneous.
d) It would have meant a night or low visibility concentration and recognition of ships and the problems that raises, something that Tovey worried about on the evening of the 26th delaying until daylight on the 27th.

There are other reasons too but these are the main ones. It would seem from documents in the file that Wake-Walkers tactical function was to allow heavy units to find and engage Bismarck, and those in the War room, besides Phillips, were very happy with his actions.

I do understand your points, but we must be very careful when we try to link certain aspects. Was not Dahlrymple Hamilton, Vian and the Captain of the Piorun under criticism by Pound and or Phillips, or have I got that wrong?

Best wishes
Cag.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Mr.Cag,
IMHO, your points above are all valid and sensible and they might have been used during a trial, however we are not discussing here the possible line of defense of these officers at a Court Martial/Inquiry.

What is the key point is that, in order to provide the correct "explanations" and to avoid any further investigation, Tovey's final despatches were used, to address all the possible threats that a potential inquiry/CM (IMO correctly defined by Graham Rhys-Jones as "automatic", according to the RN "orthodoxy") would certainly have asked to all these officers.

We are now seeing, thanks to Antonio, how this clear (since years) "embellishment" (or "cover-up") has been requested (by the War Cabinet), done (by Tovey with his officers), accepted by the Admiralty (Barnes letter) and finally brought to the highest political levels.


Bye, Alberto

[wadinga]

Hello Alberto,

Of course I realise that Tovey's letters went to Roskill not Kennedy.

Kennedy had this info from Roskill, not the other way round, but you seem to refuse this evidence.

The significant point is that in Churchill and the Admirals he cites Kennedy as the source, even though he has had Tovey's letters in his possession for many years and supplied this very material to Kennedy. Citation of source is very important. Roskill cites Kennedy. Why? Either in an exaggerated courtesy that Kennedy had published the CMDS story first, or more likely to distance himself from this unsubstantiated anecdotal slur on Pound and Churchill which cannot be corroborated.

You will recall that I quoted the Roskill source several years ago from Corelli Barnett's Engage the Enemy More Closely and thanks Alberto because when I rechecked I find I can circumvent the anxieties some have over reproducing Tovey's accusations verbatim. The words of the 14th December 1961 letter to Roskill from Tovey are in Barnett.

".....he wished Wake-Walker and Jack Leach brought to trial by Court Martial for not re-engaging the Bismarck. I explained that the action taken by these officers was exactly what I wished, the last thing I wanted was for the Bismarck to be pushed further to the west and away from my own force. He stated he still wished them to be brought to trial. I replied nothing would persuade me to do so. He informed me the Admiralty would order a trial. I replied that if they did I would act as Prisoner's Friend, if necessary resigning my command to do so. I heard no more about it."

So, at last we have it, the actual words of a 1961 version of the CMDS story. The quote starts halfway through a sentence and Barnett says this happened "immediately" on arrival at Scapa. Like Antonio's estimate ie before Pound can have read even Tovey's preliminary report, which the covering letter points out will be modified once he has a chance to get additional info from detached units.

Now hopefully we will find out if the 1954 letters even mention the CMDS affair and if they do if their description varies from this 1961 version. The classic killer phrase "I heard no more about it" dates other author's references to this version, written just ten years before Tovey's death. Since even Roskill acknowledges Tovey had become a hermit in his last years, did this letter come from the Hermitage?

All the best

wadinga

[Alberto Virtuani]

Wadinga wrote: "The significant point is that in Churchill and the Admirals he cites Kennedy as the source"

Hi Sean,
the reason for this is very clear and simple and you should read what both me and Mr.Cag have already posted about the letters in which Tovey expressed to Roskill the wish that he should not use the Court Martial story in his books.
Whether Roskill behavior was fair, in providing the info to Kennedy, to have the latter "making the scoop" I don't know......

The absolute clear point is that Roskill confirmed the story in all his books published after Kennedy "Pursuit" ("Naval Policy" and "Churchill and the Admirals") and in all his private letters to Kennedy, confirming Tovey reliability and even suggesting to Kennedy NOT to write about Paffard story re. Tovey memory.

Please, as alerady suggested you, have a look at the letters yourself before you insist on this point......


Bye, Alberto

[wadinga]

Hello Alberto,

Is there any reference to CMDS in Tovey letters to Roskill prior to 1961? Straight answer, please . Cag can answer too if he likes.

Cag said:

He replies to another letter from the author regarding his new book. It includes again the telephone conversation with the 1st Sea Lord and the apology for the tow signal. He also recounts the story of the 1st Sea Lord wanting VACS1and the captain of the PoW being brought to trial by the C in C for not re engaging Bismarck and the C in C explained the action taken was what he required and the threat of Bismarck being forced further West. The already known info that the C in C would not bring them to trial and if the Admiralty ordered him to he would resign etc is contained in the letter. There was no wish by him for this to become public now as he would not want either VACS1 or the 1st Sea Lord unfairly criticized.

is this the December 1961 letter?

Why bother to tell the story again if it was already in the 1954 letters?

Roskill did not confirm anything in Churchill and the Admirals by retelling Kennedy's version of the story. He neatly unloads his responsibility for veracity of the story. He cites Kennedy. If it was so important to honour a promise to Tovey not to publish, even after the Admiral's death, then he clearly betrayed that promise. His wording suggests the CMDS threat happened after a post mortem ie not on arrival at Scapa. Antonio is creating a timetable of suppositions based around the threat triggering changes to "facts", based on it being delivered at the end of May, not "weeks later".

All the best

wadinga

[Cag]

Hi All

Hi Alberto thanks for the answer. The relative facts of the case could I presume be raised and discussed at any board meeting conviened to discuss certain actions and reports. Im not sure we can assume that there was any order to stick to only certain information.

The Board had always consisted of their Lord Commissioners, titles set out below, these men between June and October 1941 consisted of

First Lord Alexander, 1st Sea Lord D Pound, 2nd Sea Lord W Whitworth, 3rd Sea Lord B Fraser, 4th Sea Lord J Cunningham, 5th Sea Lord A Lyster, DCNS Tom Phillips, ACNS (T) H Moore, ACNS (F) H Harwood, ACNS (H) A Power, Parliamentry Secretary Sir V Warrender, Civil Lord A Hudson, Controller (Merchant Shipping) Sir J Lithgow, and the Permanent Secretary to the Admiralty H Markham.

Pound and Alexander had at some point spoken to Leach, and one can assume Pound had seen the relevant reports. We can assume the most vocal critic Tom Phillips would have seen all the reports. If memory serves me well Markham was at Riviera but dont quote me (HV Morton book?) The Roskill papers include a letter from Dahlrymple Hamilton to Cunningham supporting Leach's actions in the break off.

Unfortunately we do not have the minutes of the board to know what was discussed. But we can say that information would have been available outside of the Tovey despatch, and we can say Leach's and Wake-Walkers explanations were included in the despatch.

Hi Wadinga, I think we have to be fair and say that Tovey had to deal with his wife's illness at some point which took up a lot of his time. I can say that in Toveys letters up to 1961 there is no mention of the CM threat, only the mention of the pre Ark Royal attack towing signal. In one later letter there is a note made by Roskill that he has the signal and it's exact wording (McMullens letter is 1962).

Roskill did receive a letter with a copy of the signal sent by the Admiralty on the 27th after Bismarck had sunk. Tovey does suggest that Pound decided to destroy the towing signal (to expunge it from the records) which Roskill found no evidence for either way. He could only find the 27th May signal that mentioned towing, which was in essence irrelevant as Bismarck had already been dispatched but obviously angered Tovey.

Best wishes
Cag.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Sean,
I have seen only 1961 and 1962 letters mentioning it. Of course, as in the 50's Tovey was frequently coming to see Roskill (see my post above), I don't see why he should have written to him in the previous years to discuss about this specific episode.......

Do you have an evidence whatsoever that Roskill put in doubt the Court Martial story ? "Straight answer", please.
Also, please, no long post anymore with YOUR personal interpretations and speculations about Roskill thoughts, just post the text where Roskill doesn't trust Tovey CM story. I have posted the full texts where Roskill CONFIRMS Tovey recollections, while I see you insist to discuss a topic of which you don't have the evidences in your hands.....

you wrote: "His wording suggests the CMDS threat happened after a post mortem"

Not at all. The CM threat is clearly described by Tovey (1961 letter) as happening in the same "telephone conversation after I got back from the Bismarck outing." (Tovey's words to Roskill).


Bye, Alberto

[Alberto Virtuani]

Cag wrote: "The Roskill papers include a letter from Dahlrymple Hamilton to Cunningham supporting Leach's actions in the break off. "

Hi Mr.Cag,
the same letter (June 8th, 1941) in which he criticized quite heavily Tovey for waiting to engage Bismarck (until May 27 morning), instead of finishing her off immediately (on May 26) ?


I'm afraid, however, that we are diverging from the clear sequence of events and reactions, from May 25 and 26 tough Pound and Churchill comments on PoW retreat,...... to the CM threat (possibly 30 or 31 May),...... to the War Cabinet meeting held on June 2 officially asking for "explanations", ....... to the Tovey's July 5th despatches, written to give an embellished picture of the open "aspects",....... to their acceptance from the Admiralty Board (Barnes letter)....... and finally to the closure of the "matter" at the highest political level.


Bye, Alberto

[Cag]

Hi All,

Hi Alberto, to start with please do not take this as argumentative or denial. Im trying to get to the facts of the matter, and I would suggest that the statement to Cunningham is directly related to Leach breaking off the action. It was sent to one of the members of the board. It is relevant. His opinion on Toveys actions is not.

Despite your worry I am not diverging from anything, however nor should we I think be forced to be restricted in the discussion subject. The decision reached by the board is entirely dependant on the amount and content of the information it used to reach that decision from whatever source.

I realise we are suggesting, without knowledge of the discussions or common knowledge available in the Admiralty about one of the most important actions so far in the war, that the only evidence considered in the boards meeting was the despatch, nothing else was relevant and that what was likely known including accurate reports etc etc were ignored by various members of the board (Pound, Alexander, Phillips, Cunningham etc) to suit a need to

A) allow the 1st Sea Lord and Tom Phillips (possibly the 1st Lord?) to divert a CM threat to two officers, which was initially instigated by them, by use of a single report as we believe that the actual explanations given by the men involved and relevant reports received were not good enough.
B) allow the possible award of medals to those officers because we believe they did not deserve recognition otherwise and should have been tried
C) allow false evidence to be submitted to the 2nd Board of inquiry into the loss of HMS Hood because we believe that the first board estimates were correct and needed extending (despite the fact neither boards estimates were correct and all the documents giving distance I've seen include the word estimated or approximately) to justify the position of the cruisers, although in fact it has no bearing on the decision to break off the action by Leach or re engaging Bismarck with PoW alone after Hood had sunk.

Best wishes
Cag.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Cag wrote: " the only evidence considered in the boards meeting was the despatch"

Hi Mr.Cag,
of course there were other evidences, but the final official operation report was the Tovey's despatches.

All the other considerations are valid and sensible but they have no interest in this discussion. The evidences are clear enough.


Bye, Alberto