The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

well, ... time is arrived to close this long re-construction that started from the battle data and document mismatches and arrived till the Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill documents connection.

For everybody convenience I put here again the flow charts of the main involved persons starting from the Military reporting chain of Home Fleet until the Admiralty First Sea Lord Sir D. Pound :

Report_flow_chart.jpg (103.28 KiB) Viewed 929 times

thru the Admiralty board where the Military ( First Sea Lord Adm Pound ) connect with the Politicians ( First Lord of the Admiralty ) :

Admiralty_board.jpg (117.26 KiB) Viewed 929 times

for example you can see it on 1939 when Sir Winston Churchill was the First Lord of the Admiralty ( Politician ) :

Admiralt_Board_6_December_1939_Barnes_Churchill_02.jpg (78.72 KiB) Viewed 929 times

continue -->

[Cag]

Hi All

Alberto I'm afraid I'm not the one playing word games here. I think you need to read my posts again.

You state that conduct implies behaviour, can an inanimate object behave in any way? You have to look at the use of the words "of" and "in".

Conduct of the action, the action is the inanimate subject which Is being enquired about. Therefore the conduct of the action is how the action was conducted, ie what occurred and when, how it happened.

I might ask a surgeon how an operation (inanimate subject) was conducted, he will not tell me anything as regards his behaviour he will only tell me how he did it, what occurred and when.

Conduct in the action, the inanimate object 'the action' is no longer the subject of the enquiry but it is the the behaviour of those involved that is being enquired about, how they conducted themselves, how they acted.

If I ask of the conduct of a surgeon in the operation I'm asking about his behaviour, was he professional, negligible or even drunk as he has lost his watch and my heart valve is ticking.

If you do not wish to know the difference or are happy to carry on believing that the conduct of the action means how Captain Leach behaved feel free.

Best wishes
Cag.

[Antonio Bonomi]

continued --->

here you can see the same Admiralty board on 1943 when, ... like in 1941, ... Sir Alexander was the First Lord of the Admiralty ( Politicians ) and you can stil see Sir J. Barnes ( Deputy Secretary ) and the First Sea Lord Sir Adm D. Pound in there just as before on 1939 :

Admiralty_Board_July_16_1943.jpg (79.18 KiB) Viewed 929 times

obviously Sir Winston Churchill had become Prime Minister so here we have the Political flow chart we are referring to about this story :

Board_Politicians_Chart.jpg (48.47 KiB) Viewed 929 times

and last but not least we have the final statement by Winston Churchill of all this story that speaks for itself, after his own early statements at Chequers, ... the scrutiny on early August, ... and his final evaluations : Leave it !

Adm_205_10_page_334_WSC.jpg (41.63 KiB) Viewed 929 times

Closing this thread I have opened, where nothing is left to be demonstrated, I like to thank everybody that helped on making all those steps and documents clear to be read and understood.

Enjoy the reading ...

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

We have a whole plethora of people who would or should have been "in the know" about a threatened CMDS yet the only source cited by every book that mentions this is ultimately Tovey...

Strange don't you think?

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi all, @Mr.Cag,
thanks, I see now the difference between "conduct of the action" and "conduct in the action" in your previous sentences, that I had previously missed in your post.

Cag wrote: "the conduct of the action is how the action was conducted, ie what occurred and when, how it happened."

I have waited some time to see whether any "native speaking" wanted to show a bit of fairness, but it was a waste of time (as this whole discussion....)
According to all the dictionaries I have seen, your definition above is wrong (even when referred to an "inanimate object"), because it does not imply the way something is managed, driven or led, just how it generically happened. Your one is the definition of "development" of the action (sequence of events).

The word "conduct of an inanimate object" is clearly defined in English Dictionaries: (see second example here:
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/conduct
"The manner in which an organization or activity is managed or directed."
or here (point 2):
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conduct
"the act, manner, or process of carrying on : MANAGEMENT . E.g. "praised for his conduct of the campaign" "
or here (point 5):
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/di ... sh/conduct
"The conduct of a task or activity is the way in which it is organized and carried out. "
or here:
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictio ... sh/conduct
"the way in which an activity is organized and performed"

Would you mind to post an example (from a dictionary) that can overwhelm what I have shown above and where "conduct of something" (inanimate object) is used as a mere "development of something" as per your "interpretation" (again a nice word) ?


The word conduct always implies the way something is driven or managed, therefore an analysis not only of the facts, but also of the decisions, of the management and of the leadership shown in an action (as obvious from its latin origin....).
"Conduct of the action" is "how the action was conducted, ie what occurred and when, the way it was carried on, how it was managed and directed/commanded", thus the "behavior" of Leach was well within the scope of the "very full discussions" with Churchill.


Bye, Alberto

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote: "We have a whole plethora of people who would or should have been "in the know" about a threatened CMDS yet the only source cited by every book that mentions this is ultimately Tovey... Strange don't you think?"

Hi Duncan,
not at all. Who else in the "plethora" (I guess only Churchill and Pound, possibly Alexander and T.Phillips too) would have had an interest in speaking or (worse) writing about the fact that a well deserved Court Martial was not done due to convenience and propaganda reasons during wartime ?

Only Tovey, who (erroneously) felt that he himself alone defeated the threat, would have been proud of this and accounted for it. I say erroneously because, obviously, what defeated the threat was not Tovey's menace but the final outcome of the operation, with Bismarck sunk.



Thanks to Antonio, we have now ALL the needed evidences not only of the CMDS (confirmed even by the official historian of the Royal Navy), but also of its "evolution" into a request for "explanations" (June 2nd War Cabinet), with the involvement of the whole military (up to Pound) and political chain (up to Churchill) in the "embellishment" of the facts (duly accomplished by Tovey with the "despatches"), and in the final "closure....." of the matter (with ADM 205/10 papers).


Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

Alberto Viruani wrote :

Thanks to Antonio, we have now ALL the needed evidences not only of the CMDS (confirmed even by the official historian of the Royal Navy), but also of its "evolution" into a request for "explanations" (June 2nd War Cabinet), with the involvement of the whole military (up to Pound) and political chain (up to Churchill) in the "embellishment" of the facts (duly accomplished by Tovey with the "despatches"), and in the final "closure....." of the matter (with ADM 205/10 papers).

Thanks for the compliments ... ... that surely I have to share with you that at first started my curiosity about all this with your immense love and knowledge of the Royal Navy best traditions and military conduct rules, ... up to the Capt Horatio Hornblower book that Churchill took on board PoW on his voyage to Placentia bay, ... and surely used to explain to Capt Leach too some of his personal thougths about it, ... and we have to share it also with many other persons here in cooperating with their knowledge too on helping finding the truth about all this court martial aborted attempt story.

Knowing who Stephen Roskill was,... the Official Royal Navy Historian for WW2, ... his letters exchange with Adm Tovey and the Adm 205/10 document content early on 2013, ... the research about the truth was going to be much faster and would have occurred much easier going very fast from the top down until the final evidences, ... thru the War Cabinet minutes, the Admiralty Official position about Adm Tovey dispatches ( Sir Barnes letter ) and finally to Adm Tovey dispatches point 17 and 19 ( plus 22 and 23 ) and the single Officers account mismatches until the Hood First board signed declaration, ... and the Pound/ Tovey phone call being the reason for all this " regrettable aftermath " of the DS battle story.

We have done it bottom up, ... starting from the very evident mismatches and up until finally finding all the needed confirmation of the complete knowledge and continuous participation on the decision making process of the politicians ( Churchill ) on top of the military command chain ( Pound ) since the very beginning of it, ... until Churchill final solution of the case, ... tersely writing : Leave it !.

It has been much more difficult and complicated, ... more elaborated and complex and full of difficulties and correlations to be done in order to keep on following the right path upwards, ... but I have to admit at the end it provide us a greater research competence value overall, ... since we made very minor mistakes while doing it, ... and I am personally very proud and satisfyed about it now.

Last but not less important, I have to thank the diligent and pragmatic historian capabilities of Stephen Roskill, saving all documents on his Cambridge Churchill archive, ... and leaving on his books clear footnote's indications about this historical facts, ... and in this way allowing every really interested person looking for the historical truth, ... to find it on the proper place.

That is what an historian should do and what we did here in and will do with this story on future publications.


Bye Antonio

[Cag]

Hi All

Dear me Alberto you really exasperate me! Ok here goes last time of trying, thank you for your examples which I will use to explain simply.

1st example. The manner in which an organisation is managed or directed. To manage or direct- to run, direct, control, oversee, lead, head, co ordinate. How the Bismarck operation was managed or directed, what steps were taken and carried out in sequence or who did what and when.

e.g. given in your example link "The war encompassed all spheres of state activity while it's conduct required tremendous outlays.

2nd example. Act manner or process of carrying on : management, see above who did what and when.

e.g. given in your example link praised for HIS conduct of the campaign ie this is describing a person's conduct, where as saying "The conduct of the campaign was long and hard" means the actual business of the campaign the process of carrying it out was long and hard.

3rd example. The conduct of a task or activity is the way in which it is organized and carried out. Process of organisation and the process in which the activity was carried out

e.g. given in your example link " Also up for discussion will be the conduct of free and fair elections" ie discussing doing free and fair elections or that free and fair elections will be done.

4th example. To organize and perform a particular activity ie. how it will be done or the process

e.g. given in your example link we are conducting a survey or experiments were conducted in a laboratory, or police officers will conduct a new inquiry.

Therefore again conduct of the action- management direction and process, conduct in the action- individuals performance or behaviour. If you do not agree I'm happy to accept that, but I will not continue to discuss this any further thank you.

Best wishes
Cag.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi all, @ Mr.Cag,
exactly, I agree ! You should carefully avoid to discuss again this point , I do hope you are able to keep your word!

You have initially tried to say that "conduct of the action" was meaning "how the action went" (please read your first post) !

Now, after having realized your error, you are posting again the difference between "in the action" and "of the action" (that I have already acknowledged).
However you are NOT PROVIDING a single evidence (from a dictionary, not from your "interpretation") supporting your initial statement above, while I have given you 4 dictionaries examples (with inanimate objects) in which it's clear that the "conduct of the action" is how the action was conducted, ie not only what occurred and when, but also the way it was carried on, how it was managed and directed/commanded". This "management of the action" was well within the scope of the "very full discussions" of Leach with Churchill.

Apparently you are unable to see the difference between the 2 above "interpretations"



Coming to some more serious matters:

Antonio Bonomi wrote: "Knowing who Stephen Roskill was,... the Official Royal Navy Historian for WW2, ... his letters exchange with Adm Tovey and the Adm 205/10 document content early on 2013, ... the research about the truth was going to be much faster and would have occurred much easier going very fast from the top down until the final evidences, ... thru the War Cabinet minutes, the Admiralty Official position about Adm Tovey dispatches ( Sir Barnes letter ) and finally to Adm Tovey dispatches point 17 and 19 ( plus 22 and 23 ) and the single Officers account mismatches until the Hood First board signed declaration, ... and the Pound/ Tovey phone call being the reason for all this " regrettable aftermath " of the DS battle story.

We have done it bottom up, ... starting from the very evident mismatches and up until finally finding all the needed confirmation of the complete knowledge and continuous participation on the decision making process of the politicians ( Churchill ) on top of the military command chain ( Pound ) since the very beginning of it, ... until Churchill final solution of the case, ... tersely writing : Leave it !.

It has been much more difficult and complicated, ... more elaborated and complex and full of difficulties and correlations to be done in order to keep on following the right path upwards, ... but I have to admit at the end it provide us a greater research competence value overall, ... since we made very minor mistakes while doing it, ... and I am personally very proud and satisfyed about it now.

Last but not less important, I have to thank the diligent and pragmatic historian capabilities of Stephen Roskill, saving all documents on his Cambridge Churchill archive, ... and leaving on his books clear footnote's indications about this historical facts, ... and in this way allowing every really interested person looking for the historical truth, ... to find it on the proper place.

That is what an historian should do and what we did here in and will do with this story on future publications."

Bye, Alberto

[Herr Nilsson]

Hello everybody,

thanks Marc.

In reality, the single document of Adm Tovey, his report called dispatches is this one : Home Fleet, 5th July, 1941 No. 896/H.F. 1325.

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 9tovey.htm

Here you have the Adm Tovey dispatches document for your convenience in their originally printed version on the London Gazette on October 14th, 1947 :

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/L ... /38098.pdf

The Adm 234-509 containing it and all the other documents is something different, lately called Battle Summary Number 5, and carefully analyzed by Ltnt Cdr Pitcairn-Jones which, ... as we all know well, ... corrected on it on 1948 the incorrect 06:13 statement of Adm Tovey and moved it back to the correct 06:03.

Bye Antonio

I wrote:

...Tovey's own and first despatch is dated 5th July. His second dispatch contains further appendices to his first dispatch and as enclosures Reports from CS1, CS2, CS18, PoW, Rodney, Victorious, Manchester, King George and Suffolk. This despatch is dated 15th July. One can find all about it in the preface of ADM 234-509.

I've never written that ADM 234-509 is the source of the despatches. It's the source of the sequence and its dates.

Edit:

@Alberto and Antonio

In regard of the A.V.A. letters: Thank you, you made me smile.

[wadinga]

Hello All,

Firstly I am cutting myself a huge portion of humble pie And attempting to swallow and digest it.

I accept that Pound and Alexander are the origin points of the docs 332 and 333. The sprawling and illegible signature is AVA. I apologise for this error. It seems senior officials were indeed still involved in the matter two and four whole months after the WM 56 on 5th June.

However,

One of the docs not reproduced on these pages is War Cabinet 56. We have had a carefully chosen excerpt, but here is a fuller extraction:

Attention was called to a BBC broadcast made by a military officer who had been on board one of his Majesty’s ships in the Bismarck action, which had given an unfavourable impression of our ships’ gunnery. Enquiry was being made by the Admiralty into this matter, and a copy of the broadcast should be circulated to the War Cabinet.
A full report would also be made regarding certain aspects of the action which, prima facie, seemed to require explanation.

As Antonio has succinctly put it "everything had changed". Firstly the main actual point of interest is the broadcast by a blabby (Army?) officer, presumably transitting in Rodney, who, based on his experience of shooting at non-moving objects from a non-moving object, thought there had been too many misses. This is one of the items requiring enquiry. Whether or not the War Cabinet ever got a transcript of the broadcast is not really of much interest except if it is the case, then many of the things they showed an interest in were never followed up.

The thing that is not clear is what the certain aspects are. There is no mention of Court Martial or any disciplinary action against anyone in these or the 331-334 series papers.

We know, and WSC and Alexander knew, that the most serious aspect of the operation, now it was completed, was not the ill-informed and over-hasty observation that someone had perpetrated "the worst thing since Troubridge", but that mishandled intelligence had sent Tovey in the wrong direction for hours and jeopardized the interception. Despite the attempt to misdirect us with the suggestion that the tiny encroachment of a CMDS threat into the Real World from a half remembered and barely recorded phone call, and never again referenced by those supposed to prosecute it, represents the tip of an enormous and all-encompassing Conspiracy.

Why my account of the casual and relaxed attitude of the Prime Minister used to getting his own way, and supposedly still livid over the "the worst thing since Troubridge", and determined to punish it, is aboard a ship still commanded by a man who had supposedly perpetrated it, should be characterized as "trolling" I fail to understand. Except when you run out of excuses and even imagination, insults are next to hand...........

The important point in docs 331-334 is not who signs what, but the four month delay since no one is interested any more.

All the best

wadinga

[Alberto Virtuani]

Wadinga wrote: "Firstly I am cutting myself a huge portion of humble pie And attempting to swallow and digest it.
I accept that Pound and Alexander are the origin points of the docs 332 and 333. The sprawling and illegible signature is AVA. I apologise for this error. It seems senior officials were indeed still involved in the matter two and four whole months after the WM 56 on 5th June."

Hi Sean,
I'm happy you decided to open your eyes and look at the reality, instead of just denying the evidences.
This is a very fair and dignified approach of yours, that I would like to see from all the ones that (since 2013....) were here, just trying to deviate the discussion, were insulting the ones reconstructing this regrettable aftermath, and even tried to menace legal actions.....

However:

you wrote: "Firstly the main actual point of interest is the broadcast...:"

This was the June 2nd War Cabinet minute.
2 to 4 months later (to use your words), at page 332, Pound is clearly mentioning that the main interest was on "the action of the commanding officer of the Prince of Wales in breaking off action with the Bismarck". Then he mention Barnes acceptance of Tovey despatches, where also the failure to re-engage by Wake-Walker is listed.

you wrote: "The important point in docs 331-334 is not who signs what, but the four month delay since no one is interested any more. "

The four months were duly used to collect the reports, to build up the intentionally incorrect (but "credible" at first glance) Tovey's despatches (July), to allow Churchill to have "very full discussions" with both Tovey and Leach, to run a second board to overwrite the less than cautionary declarations of a certain Rear-Admiral (August), and to finally have the board of Admiralty accepting "Tovey's" version of the story (September)...... I would not say that nobody was interested for 4 months......
However, until September, Pound had still nothing to present to the politicians. After Barnes released the board acceptance, few days passed before Pound wrote to Alexander, Alexander to to Churchill and back...... to have this regrettable aftermath silenced until NOW.....


Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

it is easy now knowing all the events and their correlations to find more confirmations on the available books.

On the book : Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War by Correlli-Barnett editor W. W. Norton & Co.; 1st edition ( May 1, 1991 ).

In that book we can find the story of this Court Martial attempt by Adm Pound mainly connected with RearAdm Wake-Walker failure to re-engage the Bismarck at pages 298-299. To be noticed that Correlli-Barnett does not reference to Kennedy book, but directly to Adm Tovey original letter to S. Roskill ( dated Dec. 14, 1961 ) preserved into the Churchill archives folder 4/17 with the footnote 43 on page 928.

https://www.amazon.com/Engage-Enemy-Mor ... 0393029182

Correlli-Barnett is a British historian still alive.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Correlli_Barnett


Going back to Stephen Roskill it is just enough to read into his book : Naval Policy Between the Wars: The Period of Reluctant Rearmament, 1930-1939 first published on 1976.

At pages 463 and 464 there is a clear description of Adm Sir Dudley Pound personality, directly from who, like Stephen Roskill, served under him for five consecutive years from the on the fleet up to the Admiralty.

The last statement of Roskill about Adm Pound is of particular interest for this story :

... and that he ( Adm Pound ) loved " schedules and Courts of Inquiry " (1) an opinion with which this historian, who served under him for five consecutive years on the Mediterranean fleet Flagship and the Admiralty 1937-41, fully agrees.

That statement correlate to the footnote 1 that I have first found about S. Roskill contradicting Sir L. Kennedy on 1976 and declaring Adm Pound " addiction to enquiries" with the above statement that is more than enough to declare his personal opinion on the Court Martial attempt for the Denmark Strait declared to him by Adm Tovey.

https://www.amazon.com/Policy-Between-R ... 8TFPX4NEGX


Everything is confirmed by Robin Brodhurst book : Churchill anchor - The biography of Adm Pound edited on February 2001.

On the pages from 178 until to 183 there the same story with the Court Martial attempt ( page 180 ) and of Churchill continuous presence on the phone from Chequers and directly in the Admiralty ( footnote 12 - page 298-9 Correlli-Barnett ) war room keep on referring to the Troubridge event ( footnote 13 - page 296 J. Colville, The fringes of Power, page 391 ).

I have never read about a description of the events and the presence into the Whitehall Admiralty war room during those days better described before on a book.

https://www.amazon.com/Churchills-Ancho ... 0850527651

Now everybody interested on knowing this Cout Martial attempt story and the available evidences from the British historians, do have a correct path to follow in order to know more about it.

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

Hello Alberto,

Thank you for your kind comments,

However

I'm happy you decided to open your eyes and look at the reality, instead of just denying the evidences.

I contend my eyes have been wide open since the beginning What I do see is a Herculean effort to manufacture a mountain not even out of a molehill, but a single grain of sand.

The only evidence is that Tovey wrote to Roskill in 1961, referring to what must have been solely a conversation item with him in the mid Fifties with the CMDS story. Tovey although critical of Pound and Churchill in many areas, unaccountably told an author information he, Tovey, didn't want published at all, supposedly because of some concern for their reputation. There is no supporting evidence at all for Tovey's assertion of what took place during a what must have been a highly charged phone conversation on arrival at Scapa Flow. In this conversation between the victor and his commander, in addition to praise on success, was the former's outraged response to the "stupidest signal ever sent" and perhaps arguments over whose fault the D/F plotting error was. In such a highly charged situation, it may well be a threat or even the threat of a threat was made, and its seriousness misconstrued many years later.

There is no contemporaneous supporting evidence that the slightest effort was made to institute such proceedings or any subsequent recollection from anybody other than Tovey as Duncan has pointed out. Not a single confidant of Pound has ever come forward to confirm this thought was in his mind, and his resolution was so weak on it that Tovey supposedly "defeated" his superior by his counter threat to walk away from his C-in-C Home Fleet responsibilities to play at lawyers. Tovey's 1961 letter quoted in Barnett is a dramatic tour de force from a man who by his own admission kept no diary and had a poor memory. First Pound wants him to order a CM, he says no, because they acted as he wanted. Then Pound says never mind I still want you to do it and Tovey says no again. Then Pound says he will do it himself and Tovey produces his heroic flourish of relinquishment of command and his desire to enter the fray as the victims' champion. Not bad recollection for something that happened twenty years previously and kept a secret from almost everybody. And of those very few told one who worked with Tovey the longest alleges exaggeration.

Barnett quotes these words from the 1961 letter but prefaces this with "(according to Tovey's later account)" thus highlighting that this is a recollection shared by no-one else. Barnett has read Kennedy's caveat and Paffard's observations.

We know, having seen the complete Colville quote, that Churchill was raging at Cunningham's actions over Crete, not only Leach's. His anger over the perceived timidity of Cunningham in a much more important situation, involving greater loss of life, prestige and territory, about which he had complete information, contrasts with Denmark Straits where he had no knowledge of the actual circumstances.

The evidence Churchill had largely forgotten his rage at W-W and Leach is clear from the lack of discussion of Pound's report at the Cabinet meeting on the 27th or on any other subsequent occasion. There is discussion of Crete, but nothing about prosecuting any officers. It is Pound who promises a report and then doesn't deliver. It is Pound who says he will take Tovey's report (green ink) at the end of July and apparently doesn't. It is Pound at the end of September who says the Admiralty Board is happy enough and it is Alexander who suggests to Churchill that since in the 4 months previous, since he personally has spoken to Tovey and Leach that there is no point. The tactical details are of no interest to the War Cabinet since they are concerned with matters of State, not the incomprehensible minutae of naval engagements.

But WSC has spoken at length to both Tovey and Leach Yes he has. Since Winston likes painting and Tovey likes golf what are they going to talk about but the sinking of Bismarck? Since Winston has had a very comfortable and relaxing trip under Leach's captaincy aboard PoW, a vessel still bearing the scars of battle what are they going to talk about?

All the best

wadinga

[dunmunro]

Everything is confirmed by Robin Brodhurst book : Churchill anchor - The biography of Adm Pound edited on February 2001.

On the pages from 178 until to 183 there the same story with the Court Martial attempt ( page 180 ) and of Churchill continuous presence on the phone from Chequers and directly in the Admiralty ( footnote 12 - page 298-9 Correlli-Barnett ) war room keep on referring to the Troubridge event ( footnote 13 - page 296 J. Colville, The fringes of Power, page 391 ).

I have never read about a description of the events and the presence into the Whitehall Admiralty war room during those days better described before on a book.

https://www.amazon.com/Churchills-Ancho ... 0850527651

Now everybody interested on knowing this Cout Martial attempt story and the available evidences from the British historians, do have a correct path to follow in order to know more about it.

Bye Antonio

No, I don't think Broadhurst confirms anything and again his ultimate source is Tovey:

Certainly Pound needed little encouragement from Churchill to prod
Wake-Walker, demanding to know how he was going to employ Prince of
Wales. In fact, Wake-Walker's reply that he doubted if Prince of Wales
had the speed to force an action infuriated Pound, and after the action he
wrote to Tovey demanding that Wake-Walker and Leach (captain of
Prince of Wales) be court-martialled for not re-engaging Bismarck. Much
to Tovey's credit he refused to do so, and no more was heard of this. (Broadhurst)

This is all that Broadhurst has to say about a potential CMDS. It is certainly telling that Pound's biographer cannot source the CMDS threat to anyone in Pound's circle but has to use Tovey.