Hi Sean,Wadinga wrote: "Once again the same material "
the "same" material, coming from a reputed historian (viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6728&start=885#p76920), is better than just the "same" Kennedy / Paffard insinuation about Tovey reliability, that you still want to trust.
Roskill was well aware about the "signal" Tovey said he received on May 26, and he tried to find it. Despite this minor error in the ToR of a single signal (if it was an error and the message was never sent, which I still have some doubts about....), Roskill considered Tovey to be otherwise VERY reliable and confirmed all what he was saying re. the Court Martial story.
Your attempt to discredit his memory regarding such an event is just ridiculous, in front of the evidences:
1) letter from Tovey to Roskill (this is a written proof and can be countered ONLY by another evidence, or by a medical certificate stating Tovey was somehow insane in 1961), that you don't have),
2) McMullen testimony (same as above),
3) historians advise (Roskill, Correlli Barnett, Graham Rhys-Jones) that are possibly more able than you to judge what had happened between Downing Street and the Admiralty at that time....
4) Sir Henry Leach confirmation (if he had even a minimum doubt about the "saga", he would have said that in the Wills book),
5) War Cabinet Minutes and ADM 205/10 papers , clearly showing (if you finally try to open your eyes) that "certain aspects" were under investigation.
6) Even this modern DS battle author (before he decided to join the "RN hooligans" side, refusing "a priori" all evidences), was apparently convinced of the Pound threat to Tovey, despite he still apparently lacked, according to mentioned bibliography, Roskill late books, McMullen, Sir Henry, War Cabinet minutes and ADM 205/10...(http://www.hmshood.com/history/denmarks ... olland.htm, last paragraph of "Finding the Range" chapter).
You now have ONLY Kennedy (a poor historian....) account of Paffard recollections, denied by Roskill......
Re. papers on Crete, again, thanks for posting undoubtedly interesting pages, but please open a separate thread to discuss about Crete crisis, as you have NOT posted a single document showing that "This is what Pound and the Admiralty was doing as well as handling Bismarck" (as per your words) in the Admiralty War Room during the days of the Bismarck hunt.
I have no doubts that Crete could have been strategically even more important, but the War Room tactical attention was for the Bismarck only, at least if you are unable to find a document stating the contrary and listing WHO was handling Crete, WHERE and WHEN in the War Room.
I have already posted (here below again for everybody convenience) the extracts of the account of Adm.Davies regarding the War Room activity and the interest of Churchill for the Bismarck. Not a single word is dedicated to Crete.
According to Davies the Bismarck hunt was followed by "WSC, Eden, Alexander, Mr.Winant (Special US representative), Adm.Ghormley (US Naval representative), and apparently Lord Beaverbrook.
The following naval officers were working on the Bismarck chase: Pound (albeit he had to mainly manage.... WSC fury), Tom Phillips (who actually managed the operation according to Davies), Ralph Edwards (Director of Ops), Charles Daniel (Director of Plans) and the Director of Naval Intelligence, who were just the most active. In addition J.Terry and Bowhill (CinC Costal Command) and Davies himself (Director of Operations (Foreign)) were involved too.
You "forget" (I'm sure it's not a lapse of yours) the War Cabinet on June 2nd, that mentioned "certain aspects" that, "prima facie" needed explanations, NOT yet forgotten (after 6 full days from Bismarck sinking) apparently...... and the subsequent ADM 205/10 papers showing that the "displeasure" lasted at least until September 1941 (accompanied by full discussions of the PM with Tovey and Leach regarding these aspects, incorrectly "explained" by the Tovey's despatches), when Alexander wrote him:you wrote: "His ill informed observation about Leach's actions was merely a product of this grumpy mood ("bitter disappointment and grief to me") and was undoubtedly forgotten sometime after Colville noted it. It should also be noted in passing, that Troubridge was exonerated by his Court Martial, and promoted two years after to Vice Admiral and to full Admiral after that. "
and Churchill minuted his final :"Leave it" at pag.334.
Incidentally, Troubridge was inquired, the Inquiry sent in front of a CM, that exonerated him, but he and Milne NEVER saw a command at sea anymore.