Ah yes, you haven't been to Kew, so you don't know there are, just like Tovey's reports, one preliminary sent from sea and one fair copy sent later. Didn't Antonio mention that? There is a blue mimeographed version, as I said of the preliminary Ellis report:
Ellis' report as originally sent in by signal 2221B 29/5/41 is the same as that formally submitted later. There has been a fatuous suggestion he was coerced at the time into writing things that never happened and that his ramblings in his memoir, written tens of years later, where they differ, are some hidden truth emerging, rather than simple mistakes about the dimly remembered past.
Remember you co-author has declared Ellis was lying in support of a Conspiracy which could not have yet developed at this point.
Now you are prepared to guess that Ellis was 25,000 yds behind Bismarck at 05:20 and in 20 minutes during which she did not turn to follow the Germans she closed 7,000 yds to make your magical 9 miles that Busch saw "a mast" at?
The only pathetic diversion round here is Antonio's refusal to show or even mention the Silver Bullet which you both claim is irrefutable evidence of CMDS. Until the "time is right" that is, presumably when you can make money out of defamation (liars and cowards) instead of doing it for free, as here.
All the best
wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
thanks to Mr.Wadinga for this info: I missed the fact that Ellis copy/pasted a message sent on 29/5 into his official report dated June 11 as any single word here is the same than his narrative in the despatches (very differently from Tovey who was careful to heavily change it.... ).... but that (unfortunately for Mr.Wadinga) changes nothing to what I said:
I wrote: "Anyway, such "statements" are just giving an estimate distance of 15 sm at 4:47 (more or less correct) and 5:20 (incorrect, it was already down to 12,5), due to course and speed of SF vs.Germans + available bearings..... Distances are unreliable, while bearings are more reliable (as a certain Mr.Wadinga explained to us long time ago, before being nailed by the same bearings)..... "
Of course, being at 15 sm from BS at 4:47, it is simply impossible for SF to be at 15 sm at 5:20. Geometry, course and speed would not allow that: SF was making 29 knots and BS 27, while the courses were slightly convergent..... These distances are just (wrong) estimates.
I also wrote: "please to discuss NF and SF position go to the appropriate thread (I'm sure that Antonio is waiting for you ). Your intentional attempt to divert discussion here from the threat to two timid officers is simply pathetic."
Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)
"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
Ah yes, you haven't been to Kew, so you don't know there are, just like Tovey's reports, one preliminary sent from sea and one fair copy sent later. Didn't Antonio mention that? There is a blue mimeographed version, as I said of the preliminary Ellis report:
Ellis' report as originally sent in by signal 2221B 29/5/41 is the same as that formally submitted later. There has been a fatuous suggestion he was coerced at the time into writing things that never happened and that his ramblings in his memoir, written tens of years later, where they differ, are some hidden truth emerging, rather than simple mistakes about the dimly remembered past.
Remember you co-author has declared Ellis was lying in support of a Conspiracy which could not have yet developed at this point.
Now you are prepared to guess that Ellis was 25,000 yds behind Bismarck at 05:20 and in 20 minutes during which she did not turn to follow the Germans she closed 7,000 yds to make your magical 9 miles that Busch saw "a mast" at?
The only pathetic diversion round here is Antonio's refusal to show or even mention the Silver Bullet which you both claim is irrefutable evidence of CMDS. Until the "time is right" that is, presumably when you can make money out of defamation (liars and cowards) instead of doing it for free, as here.
apart from the fact that I don't see the SF report text in Mr.Dunmunro above post.... , I have no intention to accuse anybody of having invented the existence (or the content) of this message as someone else is doing all the times (just I find VERY strange that the same identical words were used both in a radio message (May 29) and in his final narrative (June 11) by Ellis... ; he was probably extremely tired after the Bismarck hunt....).
I have already admitted I missed this preliminary report.
However:
I wrote: "Anyway, such "statements" are just giving an estimate distance of 15 sm at 4:47 (more or less correct) and 5:20 (incorrect, it was already down to 12,5), due to course and speed of SF vs.Germans + available bearings..... Distances are unreliable, while bearings are more reliable (as a certain Mr.Wadinga explained to us long time ago, before being nailed by the same bearings)..... "
Of course, being at 15 sm from BS at 4:47, it is simply impossible for SF to be at 15 sm at 5:20. Geometry, course and speed would not allow that: SF was making 29 knots and BS 27, while the courses were slightly convergent..... These distances are just (wrong) estimates from Ellis. The fact is that, when he realized he was at only ... 9 sm instead... he immediately turned away.
I also wrote: "please to discuss NF and SF position go to the appropriate thread (I'm sure that Antonio is waiting for you ). Your intentional attempt to divert discussion here from the threat to two timid officers is simply pathetic."
Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)
"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
The only pathetic diversion round here is Antonio's refusal to show or even mention the Silver Bullet which you both claim is irrefutable evidence of CMDS. Until the "time is right" that is, presumably when you can make money out of defamation (liars and cowards) instead of doing it for free, as here.
All the best
wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
The unsubstantiated accusation "liar" against Captain Ellis was made in this thread. Since Leach and Wake-Walker were also accused of lying, defending Ellis against such defamation belongs here.
You have already accepted in another thread
and this is an and this is an error/approximation (due to the fact he spent few lines to descibe the whole morning events
Since the only evidence for Ellis being a "liar" is that there are differences between his sketchily described, dimly remembered memoir which has "error/approximation" and his detailed contemporary report we can discard the accusation as intemperate and unproven and judge other profligate opinions in the same light.
Despite Pound's cavalier hindsight attitude to expending a County in the vague hope that its destruction would somehow keep Bismarck in sight, there has never been a suggestion Ellis faced any disciplinary measures at all.
All the best
wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
Wadinga wrote: "there has never been a suggestion Ellis faced any disciplinary measures at all"
Correct, but no serious Inquiry / Court Martial was actually done, preferring to cover-up the poor facts with false statements (e.g. point 17 of despatches for Ellis).
Had Bismarck not been sunk, not only the two officers who were "accused" by Churchill/Pound/Phillips would have been Court_Martialled, but also Elllis, Dalrymple-Hamilton, Tovey and possibly Somerville would have logically faced an Inquiry for their "failures".
Bye, Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)
"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
Wadinga wrote: "there has never been a suggestion Ellis faced any disciplinary measures at all"
Correct, but no serious Inquiry / Court Martial was actually done, preferring to cover-up the poor facts with false statements (e.g. point 17 of despatches for Ellis).
Had Bismarck not been sunk, not only the two officers who were "accused" by Churchill/Pound/Phillips would have been Court_Martialled, but also Elllis, Dalrymple-Hamilton, Tovey and possibly Somerville would have logically faced an Inquiry for their "failures".
surely no " hooligan/ deniers " would have spent time here in with their useless trial to " mud the water " about what really happened in relation to those liars and cowards dressing an uniform.
The bearings on the other thread is demonstrating to everybody interested on realizing who you really are, ... and why you are doing this, ... you are just some intentional deniers no matter what, ... that having realized that the truth is now in our hands finally, ... are just trying to confuse the forum readers here in, ... using any possible way, ... mostly unfairly.
What a shame, ... what a useless waste of time, ... what a poor type of persons you are, ...
Bye Antonio
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
Insofar as my name has been mentioned a few times recently in this thread, I thought it appropriate to clarify and perhaps somewhat elaborate upon my opinions on these discussions.
First, regarding mapping. (I taught cartography, by the way, and was for years a member of the Canadian Cartographic Association, so do know how to read a map.)
The positions of participants reflect an admixture of observations, some absolute, e.g. via regular (for the time) astronomical observations, most relative to other objects. If absolute position is uncertain by referenced to some stationary prominent object then it is often possible to reconstruct “after the fact”, the actual position of the observer, e.g. the location of an explorer making reference to local mountains and the confluences of rivers, etc. In that regard, it’s like an astronomical observation one step removed. But if the reference objects themselves are moving irregularly and are themselves uncertain of their positions, or those reference are measuring their positions relative to other objects that are also moving, then the ability to reconstruct a reliable detailed overall time-dependent plan – especially if times are only approximate – becomes very difficult indeed – one might even say ‘practically impossible’. The problems are exacerbated when one superimposes clerical errors regarding timing or position, etc., which are bound to occur in hand-written records. An error in any of these can throw the entire reconstruction off entirely, especially when it is difficult or impossible to tell which observation, or collection of observations is correct.
The bottom line is that most of the ships at Denmark Strait, less those engaged in actual combat, often did not know precisely where they were, either absolutely or relatively, at any given time. Although the information available does permit an approximate reconstruction, creating an accurate track chart after the battle is, in reality, a bit like trying to reconstruct the the precise position, second-by-second, of players on a soccer pitch, using only a ‘play by play’ radio broadcast and the recollections of three or four players after the game.
This – amongst other reasons – is why I chose not to reply directly to previous questions, as they appeared – at least in general – to revolve around levels of detail which in many cases were, at least in my opinion, impossible to resolve in any case. A bit like arguing over which 19th Century depiction of the canals on Mars was the most accurate one. Because there were no canals at all, arguing about their details is pointless.
There is, often, a good deal of confusion regarding the reliability of detail and the use of information regarding the historical reconstruction of combat operations. This sort of issue often revolves into a number of phases.
The first occurs during actual combat itself, where various observers ‘see’ things which reveal, at best, only a small part of the picture. In real time, they must try to fit these observations into some sort of coherent picture which may – or may not – accurately reflect what is going on elsewhere. In many cases, people’s observations are colored by their overall picture as well, so that one might see a tank, and assume it is an enemy tank because that’s where one assumes – for whatever reasons that that’s where the enemy is located. Therefore, many ‘real time’ observations, though historically the most primary of primary sources, later turn out to be invalid.
This does not involve – or at least does not necessarily involve – conspiracy or cover-up.
After combat is complete, the survivors usually conduct some sort of ‘wash-up’ where most or many of these real-time discrepancies can be resolved. This involves a lot of “Oh, I thought you guys were behind me – not on my left flank” sort of discussion. During this period a good deal is often clarified, and accounts are changed. Again, the revision of accounts during this phase does not usually involve conspiracy or cover up. Stories are changed, but that’s because everyone is, often for the first time, able to access and integrate a much larger number of observations.
The third phase usually involves some sort of official report or summary. As this is often done well after the fact, and intended to pass on useful if somewhat generalized lessons, it’s necessarily somewhat simplified, and often requires an additional collection of corrections to resolve, in the most reasonable way possible, discrepancies that remain from accounts presented in phase 2. Comparing the observations and descriptions in phases 1, 2, and 3 will almost always reveal differences in detail.
One can read these accounts after the fact, and conclude that the discrepancies and the successive accounts which tend to converge upon a ‘final’ story are due to a reasonable collection of attempts to arrive at the truth (or something close to that) or represent efforts to in effect obscure the truth. These latter interpretations are what typically result in so-called ‘Conspiracy Theories’.
Few of these can survive critical examination, as they in effect require the reader to argue from an established synthesis ‘backwards’ towards a more chaotic pre-synthetic condition.
Although I greatly respect the efforts of Mr. Bonomi and his cohorts to reconstruct various aspects of the “Bismarck Chase”, and am glad to acknowledge, with gratitude, the positive contributions he has made to resolving some hitherto unappreciated details of the various actions, etc., I’m afraid that I cannot see, in any of this work, any credible evidence of a ‘cover-up’ or some sort of conspiracy to reward, post facto, officers which were otherwise seen to be incompetent or in some other way inadequate. To elucidate my case in detail would take pages and pages, but in very brief summary:
1) I do not believe that the discrepancies in various and sundry track charts, including the “Pinchin Chart” represent any attempt at cover up at all. They merely represent the presentation of facts as then-known, and incorporate, of necessity, some inconsistencies which were, at the time, impossible to resolve completely. One did the best one could with the information then at hand. In the case of the Hood inquiries, the map was intended only to give the Board some rough idea as to the relative position of observers who witnessed the explosion. It was not intended to represent a complete and accurate track chart of the action. Such a track chart would have been basically impossible to construct before German and British records of the action could be brought together and forced into congruence. As it transpired, most of the track chart information was either lost with the ships that were sunk in May, 1941, or had, by 1945, been otherwise disposed of. This makes large components of the ships’ tracks impossible to reconstruct with any accuracy seventy-plus years after the fact.
2) Without going into detail, I think Prince of Wales turn away during action was completely justified, and suspect that after all the details of the Denmark Strait action were known, that the British felt this way as well. Leach had just seen Hood disappear suddenly (Had he considered the possibility – disproven afterwards – that the Germans had a ‘silver bullet...?) His ship was taking an unexpected number of severe heavy projectile hits, and he himself was undoubtedly somewhat shaken up by the passage of a heavy projectile through the bridge, with many of his immediate associates on the bridge either dead or incapacitated. Pulling back to regroup and rethink the situation a bit – especially insofar as his accompanying cruisers etc. would be sure to keep Bismarck in sight etc. afterwards, did not represented not cowardice, it represented good judgement. Discretion is, often, the better part of valor. In any case, the actions of the Admiralty, after some initial concerns and confusion, certainly seem to have reflected no animosity towards, or lack of confidence in, the major players involved.
3) The lack of communication, coordination and cooperation between the Admiralty ashore and the Admiralty at sea was, during and after the fact, seen to be somewhat unfortunate and embarrassing. Probably those at sea were somewhat miffed at the attempts made by those ashore to control and advise how a rapidly-developing and often unpredictable collection of actions at sea were to be conducted. Those at sea needed information, not advice from the ‘back seat’. So, a fair number of things were said (and written) ashore which proved to be somewhat embarrassing afterwards, especially after the operation turned out successfully, which it did (at least from the British side). This required, morally if not otherwise, the retraction or de-emphasis of some commentaries and comments from those ashore, which was, I would guess, somewhat awkward at times. It was, for those ‘higher up’ easier to say that those at sea had done a magnificent job (which they did, overall) than to admit that they were probably wrong in some attempts at micro-management. So the ‘cover-up’ if any occurred at all, probably took place more in the offices of the politicians than in the offices (and officers) of the Navy.
4) There probably was some consideration of a Board of Inquiry, not to assess blame but to find out in more detail exactly what happened. There were two into the loss of Hood, neither of which dealt deeply into tactical issues. There was little to inquire about regarding the action itself, as a tactical entity insofar as the maneuvering on both sides seemed (and seems) rather straightforward.
5) A Court Martial would have been pointless. Had any actions along these lines been considered necessary, it would have been easier – particularly considering the workload at the time – to simply reassign those involved to more mundane, or non-existent – duties.
6) It is worthwhile, I think, to consider that although many years have passed, to my knowledge nobody actually in the service on any of the British ships involved, or for that matter anywhere else in the R.N., took the opportunity to reveal that some sort of ‘cover-up’ had taken place, or even suggest that the medals, etc. awarded to the British officers involved were in any way inappropriate. Usually, if any realistic ‘cover up’ takes place (in any situation) somebody, somewhere, knows enough and is brave enough to ‘squawk’, especially ten-years after the fact.
Rumors circulate that the ‘real story’ has not been told. But in this case – although attacks have been made from outside the system – other actual participants have not chosen to let the cat out of the bag. Which suggests, at least to me, that there was no cat, and probably no bag, at all.
I hope that this rather lengthy diatribe will adequately summarize my position. Regarding the thesis of Mssrs Bonomi and Virtuani etc., I can only say that although I do appreciate that a good deal of their analysis of the actions themselves is valuable in detail, and their efforts in that regard commendable, I cannot agree – at least in broad principles – with their conclusions that some sort of grand ‘cover-up’ was undertaken to somehow obliterate and/or obscure the cowardice, etc. of any members of the Royal Navy.
thanks for having provided your point of view above, but unfortunately is very generic about many concepts and did not respond to my 7 detailed questions addressed to you time ago on another thread.
Those ones :
I am very curious to have your opinion about just few points we can read on the documents that I am sure you know very well :
1) If I follow your above logic, why according to you Wake-Walker needed to go on the Hood second board with " The Plot " made by Pinchin and change his distance from Hood from 20.000 to 30.000 yards ?
Obviously this had nothing to do with the analysis of the reasons why the Hood exploded ... so, why he did it if his distance from Hood was not so important ?
2) Why Adm Tovey underlined on his dispatches point 17 that Suffolk and Norfolk before the engagement were at around 15 sea miles, ... without providing their real distance at open fire 05:52 and 30 seconds or during the overall engagement.
Point 17 on Adm Tovey dispatches is very misleading the way it has been written, .... why ?
3) Why Adm Tovey on his dispatches point 19 provided a version of the facts that had nothing to do with his first ( correct ) report and Capt Leach official report and told that the PoW Y turret jammed before the turn away of PoW ( false ) and that PoW turned away at 06:13 ( false too ).
Why Adm Tovey needed to write an incorrect story ( corrected Officially by the RN Admiralty by Pitcairn-Jones on 1948 back to 06:03 ) for the PoW disengagement ?
4) Why the Admiralty on September 1941 accepted only ( underlining it in writing signed by Sir J. Barnes ) the Adm Tovey dispatches version ( intentionally incorrect ) of the facts, especially regarding the PoW disengagement. Why ?
5) What is your opinion about the Court Martial trial story for Wake-Walker and Leach written by Adm Tovey to Stephen Roskill, the Official WW2 Royal Navy historian ?
Do you think that Stephen Roskill is wrong, that Sir Henry Leach ( son ) has been wrong about his father and that all the British historians on the last 75 years have been wrong of writing about it ? Do you think Adm Tovey was unreliable ? If so, why ?
6) What about the recent May 31st, 1941 letter between Tovey and Pound responding Pound May 28th, 1941 letter that we do not have yet. Do you think Pound was asking for some scrutiny and consequent military discipline actions to Tovey or proposing a rewarding for Wake-Walker and Leach actions ? Tovey response should be clear enough about it, what is your opinion ?
7) July 19th, 1941 letter from Pound to Tovey should be clear enough too, explaining that if Bismarck was not sunk, some errors made during the shadowing were going to be coming " accutely to the fore ". Do you agree about it or do you think that also in this case Pound was describing an " Admirable " shadowing job done by Wake-Walker and recommanding Tovey to think about the proper rewarding for Wake-Walker ?
Since you have been very generic, I will try to realize myself how those correlate with what I have asked you above, and please correct any wrong interpretation I am writing in case.
1) On the question 1 above you seems to assume it was normal for a Flag Officer to sign to the Hood first board 20.000 yards and after changing it using a very poorly precise map ( I am good on defining an intentional false realized map in this way ) and declared suddenly 30.000 yards. You seems to ignore that in case of 20.000 yards he was in danger personally, while with 30.000 yards he became safe.
Did you realize this difference ?
2) On point 2 you again ignore that Adm Tovey, without having seen the above intentionally false made map ( it was made by Pinchin in August 41 and enlarged the battlefield by many sea miles ) already in July was declaring that Norfolk was at around 15 sea miles, ... while in theory he should have been using the signed Hood first board declared 20.000 yards.
Why he was changing it already ?
3) Point 3 is not about Capt Leach been wise or not with his retreat in front of the enemy. It is about having done it at 06:03 at the most ( as he himself declared on his own official report ) and so why Adm Tovey on his dispatches added at least 10 more minutes changing the time to 06:13 ?
Was it because he wanted to bring in the Y turret jamming event as he did ( an intentional false statement ) and consequently increase the number of unusable guns by PoW plus all the received damages causing her retreat ?
It is the only possible reason why he did it, to increase the retreat justifications.
4) Point 4 can only be accepted as it is, since the Admiralty board accepted and signed the Adm Tovey intentional incorrect dispatches.
The Admiralty Board is part of the Royal Navy, they are not only politicians.
5) Point 5 is the same, Stephen Roskill and Sir Henry Leach position cannot be refuted, and here I am glad that you did not even mention the Adm Tovey potential unreliability invented by Paffard/Sir Kennedy and refuted by S. Roskill in writing at the time.
6) Point 6 is the same, no possibility to refute what the official documents show, the board of inquiry request by Adm Pound on the conduct of those 2 officers later rewarded by the King is a reality well demonstrated by Adm Tovey response on May 31st, 1941.
7) Last but not least the point 7 with Adm Pound clear written statement explaining that, in case Bismarck was not sunk, the story would have been a lot different for some RN Officers.
In summary you seem to try to put a lot of cold water on the fire, ... but very high flames are still alive, ... your explanation above in not sufficient to explain what happened satisfactorily.
This was surely not a generic revision of the reports as usually done by superiors as you try to define it above.
We can see some initial reports well done already ( almost perfectly ) and suddenly the start of the documents alteration done on purpose and focused on the intentional justification of those 2 Officers conduct/events in particular.
We see after this being the only version accepted by the Admiralty Board and the Politicians ( ref ADM 205/10 4 pages ), and it was an incorrect ( intentionally altered ) version of the facts.
Adm Tovey intentional incorrect statements are evident and unacceptable, in fact for example the 06:13 was corrected back in 1948 by the Admiralty itself to 06:03. The PoW Y turret jamming we all know happened because of the turn away and not before.
Norfolk and Suffolk have been at closer range than 15 sea miles during the battle, their relative cross bearings clearly demonstrate it.
Why they reconstructed and saved the PoW tactical plots, and the heavy cruiser ones disappeared from the records ?
Last question : why according to you Adm Pound May 28th, 1941 letter is not available in the archives as it should be ?
I am curious to read your opinion now and to see how you will manage those data, maps and facts on the close future.
Bye Antonio
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
Indeed, but conspiracy theorists just aren't interested in reasonable, thoughtful, responses. When confronted with reasonable discourse they just double down on their pet conspiracy theory; just see the post above for proof.
At some point A/A crossed a kind of psychic Rubicon on this and now it seems that no amount of reason or logic can ever dissuade him from it. It is truly tragic.
After reading Bill Jurens well balanced piece into which he has clearly put a great deal of thought and effort I think you are mistaken to expect him to perform as you request and answer your heavily-loaded questions.You want him to say Wake-Walker was wrong to make a second estimate of distance to Hood. Since you have already used your intuition to decide it was wrong, and done solely to hide his previous cowardice, and that he lied under oath and required him to coerce his juniors, and you have been saying it for five years or more, what could Mr Jurens possibly say to change your mind?
You want him to tell you
Last question : why according to you Adm Pound May 28th, 1941 letter is not available in the archives as it should be
You already have your own invented answer and nothing except the discovery of the letter will change your mind.
You are also wrong IMHO about this:
In summary you seem to try to put a lot of cold water on the fire,
To me it looks like a very well directed and copious stream of warm water to me...…………….
As you often see printed on urinals:
"We aim to please,
you aim too please!"
All the best
wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
).... but that (unfortunately for Mr.Wadinga) changes nothing to what I said: 
, I have no intention to accuse anybody of having invented the existence (or the content) of this message as someone else is doing all the times (just I find VERY strange that the same identical words were used both in a radio message (May 29) and in his final narrative (June 11) by Ellis... 
; he was probably 
