The Court Martial for the Denmark Strait

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

Duncan, during a demonstration the presenter can utilize part of documents or maps highlighting them in order to have the readers attention on particular aspects of the discussion going on.
Just be patient, ... you will have the whole document and the time to comment on it, ... do not worry.

Now, talking about unfairness ( and I am kind now ) lets see what somebody was trying to reduce this argument to having had the chance before anybody here in to read the Adm 205/10 documents and correlate them to the War Cabunet minutes 56 ( and obviously the 53 ) that the 56th is clearly referring to.

Here what Wadinga wrote ( by wadinga » Fri Nov 24, 2017 3:33 pm ) :

However you say

From the War Cabinet minute 53 of May 26th, requiring an INQUIRY, everything " changed " by the time the War Cabinet minute 56 Item 1 that was written on June 2nd, 1941, and the INQUIRY of May 26th, became an EXPLANATION request on June 2nd, 1941.

Nothing required an INQUIRY (whatever you choose to capitalise) Pound merely said someone would find out why the radar had malfunctioned and other matters. He volunteered "Whether she had been right in doing so". By my reading of WM 41 53 there was no discussion of the Bismarck action, no questioning of why Pound might have thought Leach's action was unwarranted, in fact no reaction at all and therefore no requirement for any response from the Admiralty. If WSC was still supposed be seething why not? There was a discussion about losses on a 20th May convoy. There was more discussion about Crete.

So, I read it :

1) NO discussion according to him about the Bismarck action on W.R. 53 -> " By my reading of WM 41 53 there was no discussion of the Bismarck action,... " ...

2) Nothing requiring an INQUIRY according to him -> " Nothing required an INQUIRY (whatever you choose to capitalise) " ...

3) NO reaction and NO response from the Admiralty according to Wadinga about Capt Leach being unwarranted for the PoW disengagement -> " ... in fact no reaction at all and therefore no requirement for any response from the Admiralty. " ...

Now in light of that Adm 331 first part request from the W.R. secretary referring the 56 open explanations needed on " certain aspects referring to PoW disengagement while in action " ( and back to the 53 when the explanation were INQUIRY matters ) lets see and compare the content of Adm Pound presentation with Wadinga above statements :

Here you go, we just compare now with the above statements by Wadinga :

Page_150_65_22_annexes_narrative_statement.jpg (110.77 KiB) Viewed 1394 times

It should be clear to everybody ( either English native speackers or not ) by the way the Adm Pound presentation is written, that it was a narrative about the action involving the Bismarck ( 1st Wadinga point being clearly incorrect ), ... with a clear reference to an INQUIRY to be done on several MATTERS, ... ( 2nd point by Wadinga clearly incorrect too ) ... and a CLEAR STATEMENT interrupting the narrative, ... consequently HIGHLIGHTED, ... where Adm Pound is clearly stating ( STATEMENT ) that the PoW disengagement is going to be evaluated for being right or not due to the previosus narrative period events listed before, ... consequently it is one of the MATTERS in discussion for the INQUIRY previously declared, ... and in my opinion the MOST IMPORTANT ONE, ... given the fact he interrupted the narrative in order to make that clear STATEMENT ( 3rd point by Wadinga being incorrect too and misleading ), ... while he did not do that for the RD/F jamming less important matter.

Are you able to follow me now ?

Lets see what the Adm 331 first part is highlighting now :

Page_331_01.jpg (29.26 KiB) Viewed 1394 times

It is clear like the sun that it refers to this statement on W.M. 56 Item 01 ( Note : W.M. = War Cabinet Minute ) :

Ref. WAR CABINET minute 56 (1941) Item 1 of June 2nd, 1941; point regarding the Bismarck.

A full report would also be made regarding certain aspects of the action which, PRIMA FACIE, seemed to require explanation.

But we are lucky, because it connects the WR. 56 Item 1 with the previous W.R. 53 Adm Pound presentation very evidently ( ref. is PRIMA FACIE = Adm Pound presentation on May 26th on W.M. 53 ), ... and it does provide us the way to read it correctly, ... and what in PRIMA FACIE remained to be now EXPLAINED is very clearly the STATEMENT that Adm Pound put in between the 2 narrative periods on May 26th, 1941, ... when he was talking about an INQUIRY need into several MATTERS, ... and NOT ONLY about " certains aspects " explanation they had become only by June 2nd, 1941 on W.M. 56.

Of course the Adm 331 part 1 above also demonstrate Wadinga point 3 being absolutely incorrect since the Admiralty had probaly still a report ( ref. further report ) to be provided about the PoW disengagement MATTER on July 31st, 1941, ... as it is clearly written in there.

Hope that you are still with me now, ... because this is NOT only the way I read this, ... but more important it is the way Stephen Roskill read it, ... and the way Wadinga has been unable to read and realize according to yesterday totally incorrect post he wrote.

Unable or he did not want it to and tried to minimize it intentionally with a subterfuge ?

Will you be able to read it correctly now that I took you by hand thru the logic of it STEP by STEP ?

It is ALL here above for you and everybody else to read it now.

Bye Antonio

[Herr Nilsson]

To be honest, I can't follow you.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nillson,

thanks for your sincere comment.

That is exactly the reason why I decided to make it the way I did above, since it is NOT an easy story to be understood, among dates and minutes, different documents written for different reasons, ... on a changing situation.

I suggest you and everybody else to reference on some KEY dates at first, .. and lets start from the beginning of it.

Saturday, May 24th, 1941 was the battle on the Denmark Strait.

Monday, May 26th, 1941 was Adm Pound War Cabinet report 53 declaring an INQUIRY on the PoW disengagement ( STATEMENT )

Tuesday, May 27th, 1941 was the day Bismarck was sunk in the morning. THIS CHANGED EVERYTHING.

Friday May 30th, 1941 Adm Tovey writes his first report to Adm Pound where PoW disengagement is declared after 2 minutes.

Either on the same day Friday May 30th ( most probable ), Saturday May 31st or Sunday June 1st, 1941, the PHONE CALL between Adm Pound and Adm Tovey took place, and we know how it went.
Adm Pound surely checked with WSC and they basicallly realized that being Bismarck sunk it was not worthwhile to have to manage Adm Tovey refusal and force the action TOP down, with ALL the possible negative consequences.
The possible INQUIRY driving the trial for Court Martial Adm Pound discussed and proposed to Adm Tovey was definitively abandoned and changed into request for explanation

Monday June 2nd, 1941, into the War cabinet minute we can realize the change occurred during the week end and now the request that in PRIMA FACIE on the W.R. 53 was for an INQUIRY became just for EXPLANATION as we can read into the War Cabinet minute 56.
This is what the document Adm 205/10 on page 331 clearly demonstate correlating the 2 minutes.

From this moment onward, so from June 2nd, it started the so called COVER UP driven by Adm Tovey in response to the treath he realized from Adm Pound and in order to propose also those Officers (WW+Leach) for the recognition, just like for ALL the other officers involed into the Bismarck chase.

It is NOT so difficult to realize it having all the KEY dates and the documents available and taking it STEP by STEP.

Bye Antonio :-)

[Herr Nilsson]

Hello Antonio,

I myself can't follow your steps after May 24th, but don't cause yourself any trouble or inconvenience because of me.

[Cag]

Hi All

Hi Antonio, in the Roskill papers there is a copy of the 30th May letter from Tovey to Pound.

It mentions that the Hood loss considerably altered the battle situation and why it would have been unwise for PoW to continue the action against Bismarck alone. It does not however mention any battle time period?

I wonder are there 2 May 30th letters? I wonder also if as well as the rdf matter the loss of Hood was a pressing matter? (Also mentioned in the cabinet meeting paper)

I think we have to be very careful as we do seem to be laying down markers and guessing what may have happened in between.

One thing to mention PoW was visited by the First Lord Alexander on May 31st as it's in her log. The inquiry members into the Hood loss came aboard on the 1st June.

Best wishes
Cag.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Herr Nillson,

you wrote :

I myself can't follow your steps after May 24th, but don't cause yourself any trouble or inconvenience because of me.

No problems Marc, I know you are also very busy, so take it easy.
When you would like to spend time and efforts realizing this part of the story, you know where to look.

@ CAG,

you asked :

I wonder are there 2 May 30th letters ?

YES, ... I have noticed that too, ... and the answer is YES !
I have uploaded the other document of May 30th, the first one I knew about from Adm Tovey written on May 30th, 1941 on Friday Apr 03, 2015 8:37 pm on this thread at page 8 on top :

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6728&start=105

The King Georeg V arrived in :

May 29th - At 04:00 hours KING GEORGE V with destroyers arrived at Loch Ewe.

May 30th - At 03:00 hours KING GEORGE V with destroyers departed Loch Ewe for Scapa Flow.

At 11:00 hours KING GEORGE V with destroyers arrived at Scapa Flow.

http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono ... orge_V.htm

Adm Tovey told Colin McMullen that he was called on the phone by Adm Pound as soon as he arrived to Scapa Flow, so on May 30th in the afternoon seems very likely.
The 2 initial reports Adm Tovey made, both dated May 30th, 1941, could have been written before the afternoon call and very likely already on the way to Adm Pound/Admiralty when the call from Adm Pound reached Adm Tovey in Scapa Flow.

I am very careful since years about this story, ... since I started writing about it, ... do not worry.

I know what I am talking about, ... and others like Stephen Roskill knew about it long before I did, ...

Thanks for the information on PoW being visited on June 1st, 1941.

Bye Antonio

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi all,
for everybody convenience, this is the relevant part of May 30 Tovey's preliminary report to Admiralty:

Tovey_May30.jpg (39.01 KiB) Viewed 1370 times

Bye, Alberto

[Cag]

Hi All

Thanks Antonio and Alberto, this is then very odd. We have two 30th May documents both from Tovey to Pound personally.

One giving details of the battle telling Pound that within two minutes PoW had been hit on the compass platform and aft, then both 5.25 directors were ooa and water was coming in aft, Leach then decided to temporarily break off action. The other giving further information on Toveys opinion on the idea of PoW fighting on alone. These may, I assume, have resolved any uncertainty regarding the clarity of that decision that existed at 17.00hrs on May 26th.

But we then have evidence of a phone call of unknown duration and for us importantly of unknown date, in which we have evidence that a threat was made to CM both Wake-Walker and Leach for not re engaging Bismarck after Hood was sunk, a very specific charge.

Why was this such a spacidic charge? Why is there no mention of any other charge or discussion?

If we follow the 'connecting the occurrences' method above, then is it not also possible that the explanations of a temporary break off resolved any May 26th inquiries, but the signal requiring Wake-Walkers future intentions still wrangled which was still unexplained for those that had criticised it, hence the very specific charge?

Again it's open to speculation as we have no real evidence either way, but we do have a very specific order of phone call subjects and of any threatened charge.

Best wishes
Cag.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Cag wrote: "We have two 30th May documents both from Tovey to Pound personally"

Hi Mr.Cag,
the one I have posted above (and to which Antonio was referring to) is not a personal private letter to Pound, but the CinC HF preliminary official report to the Admiralty.

Tovey_30_May_1941.jpg (51.17 KiB) Viewed 1358 times

The above report gives a PoW retreat time at around 6:02 (Hood explosion is mentioned before at 6:00) and no mention of "Y" turret, while the final despatches (see point.19 below) give a radically different picture, with a 06:13 "turn away" time and "Y" turret that "had jammed" already before the decision to disengage.

Point19.jpg (83.03 KiB) Viewed 1358 times

Apparently the first official report, issued on May 30th, was not giving enough "explanations" re. this "aspect" in order to satisfy the June 2nd War Cabinet request.


Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ CAG,

as you may have read on several post's I wrote recently I ( we ) arrived to this point " bottom up " and not " top down ".

This means that I have started on May 2013 with the " Articles of War "thread and the evident mismatches contained in there on point 17 and 19 on Adm Tovey dispatches which are totally different if compared to that May 30th, 1941 initial report you have read now, ... and the 2 minutes you know about now, ... have become 13 minutes on the point 19 of Adm Tovey dispatches.

Plus other evident incorrect statements, ... on PoW as well as on the 2 heavy cruisers, ... by Ellis, Leach, Wake-Walker and Tovey, ... I have realized being done intentionally, ... on purpose, ... to remove those INQUIRY threats, ... eliminate other potential threats due to the REAL facts, ... and provide a better story enabling the final recognition from the King on October 1941.

Now we are at the end of it, all the details happend after this CM attempt are already well known and you can read about them on several thread's here in.

Now we are analizing the final connections UP thru the Admiralty ( Pound ), the War Cabinet ( Alexander ) and UP until the Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill.

All of them knew what was going on from May 24th, 1941 until October 1941, ... just as Stephen Roskill clearly wrote on 1976 ( Naval Policy book 2 ) as well as on 1977 on " Churchill and the Admirals.

Now the case is DEMONSTRATED and CLOSED as far as I am concerned, ... and we are only looking at the details of it and putting togheter the scenario details of all this regrettable aftermath, as Stephen Roskill called it, by just following his detailed indications and his documents re-construction.

Not and easy job, ... I agree, ... but so interesting for any person that likes historical truth re-construction, ...

@ Alberto Virtuani,


thanks for posting those documenst again.

They are precious here too, ... and soon to be compared to the final pages of the Adm 205/10, ...

Bye Antonio

[Cag]

Hi All

Thank you for that, I do have that info but just wanted it to be confirmed. So we have a letter to Pound from Tovey giving details, and we have a full report to the admiralty of which Pound was the head.

Therefore any unclear matter as regards the temporary break off was made clear, so thank you.

The problem is the Tovey despatch is dated later than these two documents and is later than the wealth of documentation from other sources. If the admiralty had the Tovey and Leach documents (or even only the Tovey report) as early as the very first days of June was the temporary break off not then fully explained by Tovey (and or Leach) at this time? From the documentation shared here it would seem so.

This returns us to the telephone conversation of which we have no details and the very specific charge made. For Wake-Walker we have his explanation together with Toveys (unwise tactical policy to engage with PoW alone and risk of pushing Bismarck away) to explain that charge, and we have the report by Leach himself backed up by Toveys 30th May points (unwise to expect PoW to continue battle alone etc etc) that clears up any unclear matters. Added to this we have the discussed points, loss of Y turret etc etc.

The Tovey despatch has been discussed probably on every thread in existence here, with various opinions regarding it and the intentional/unintentional parts which I guess is dependant on your view. But if the subject of the re-engagement/withdrawal decisions (or whatever you believe was the threatened charge) was known by those at the Admiralty by early June, as is apparently evidenced here, then surely the reports would have given the details required?

Best wishes
Cag.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Cag wrote: "If the admiralty had the Tovey and Leach documents (or even only the Tovey report) as early as the very first days of June was the temporary break off not then fully explained by Tovey (and or Leach) at this time?"

Hi Mr.Cag,
I don't follow your reasoning here. Which Tovey report do you refer to ?

Tovey final report (despatches) is an incorrect one (let's forget for the time being whether it was intentionally written this way or not.....). Based on it, the engagement break off of the PoW might have been accepted and "approved" already on June 2nd (as it was by Barnes when he finally answered Tovey).....

Tovey May 30 report is substantially correct re. damages and retreat time. Apparently, it was considered (and actually it is....) absolutely insufficient to provide a justification for the disengagement of a British battleship when in action, and further "explanations" were needed.....


Bye, Alberto

[dunmunro]

Cag wrote: "If the admiralty had the Tovey and Leach documents (or even only the Tovey report) as early as the very first days of June was the temporary break off not then fully explained by Tovey (and or Leach) at this time?"

Hi Mr.Cag,
I don't follow your reasoning here. Which Tovey report do you refer to ?

Tovey final report (despatches) is an incorrect one (let's forget for the time being whether it was intentionally written this way or not.....). Based on it, the engagement break off of the PoW might have been accepted and "approved" already on June 2nd (as it was by Barnes when he finally answered Tovey).....

Tovey May 30 report is substantially correct re. damages and retreat time. Apparently, it was considered (and actually it is....) absolutely insufficient to provide a justification for the disengagement of the PoW and further "explanations" were needed.....


Bye, Alberto

There's two issues here.

First, there's the 26 May report, about an active military operation, to the War Cabinet by Pound and then the later request from the W. Cabinet secretary for follow up information, arising from that report. The 2nd is Tovey and Pound and their discussion and exchange of information regarding the Bismarck actions beginning on 30 May.


There's not necessarily any connection between the first and 2nd issue. The first issue is just the workings of an efficient bureaucracy, to ensure that issues arising from the W.Cabinet minutes are dealt with.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ CAG,

if you want to understand this whole story, you better read :

Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=5830

Cover up synopsis

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6799

The Plot

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6495

There are many other threads related to this one ... but those 3 and especially the first 2 are mandatory to know.

Bye Antonio

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro,

you wrote :

There's two issues here.

First, there's the 26 May report, about an active military operation, to the War Cabinet by Pound and then the later the request from the W. Cabinet secretary for follow up information, arising from that report.
The 2nd is Tovey and Pound and their discussion and exchange of information regarding the Bismarck actions beginning on 30 May.
There's not necessarily any connection between the first and 2nd issue.
The first issue is just the workings of an efficient bureaucracy, to ensure that issues arising from the W.Cabinet minutes are dealt with.

You seem to start understanding the problem they had at the time, the " hot potato " Adm Pound and Adm Tovey had in their hands.

As I wrote the May 26th, 1941 Adm Pound action description was very favourable and optimistic for the PoW disengagement, and despite that the " judgement " about the PoW retreat while in action was still pending.
You can imagine when, after the Trias for Court Martial attempt was defeated by Tovey, ... and Adm Pound received is first battle report with the correct timing and reasons description, ... much, much worst than thougth at first.

That report of May 30th, 1941 very close to the reality by Adm Tovey was ABSOLUTELY UNACCEPTABLE for Adm Pound.

It was NOT receivable and NOT to be presented anywhere, ... with that report Capt Leach was not even going thru an inquiry, ... but was going to face a much worst destiny .
The same for Wake-Walker that meanwhile ( May 30th, 1941 ) had gone to the Hood First board on Inquiry and declared he was at 11 sm from Hood and consequently at 12 sm from the Bismarck and did not open fire.

All of the above cannot be received by the Admiralty with no reaction. That reality needed to be changed.

From that point it started the need for Adm Tovey to ... intentionally modify timing and data, reasons, distances and so on, ... for both Capt Leach and RearAdm Wake-Walker actions, ... that is when the " Cover Up " started, ... while in parallel the War Cabinet secretary was asking for the report, ... and Adm Tovey started working with WW+Leach in order to use their reports to write his new " dispatches " with the new and INTENTIONALLY MODIFIED/ALTERED DATA, ... and we will see how the 2 " issues " you are referring above, ... converged at a certain point.

The final result of Adm Tovey work with Leach and Wake-Walker saw the light on a " new report ", completely different than the one he himslef first submitted on May 30th, 1941 and it was dated July 5th, 1941, ... the Adm Tovey dispatches - Home Fleet,
5th July, 1941 - No. 896/H.F. 1325 .

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 9tovey.htm

Bye Antonio